RATIAN KUMAR TANDON AND ORS.versusSTATE OF UTIAR PRADESH

                 RATIAN KUMAR TANDON AND ORS.
                                         v.
                       STATE OF UTIAR PRADESH

                                AUGUST 1, 1996

             [K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATIANAIK, JJ.]                                     B

       Land Acquisition Act, 1894:

          Ss.4(1), 18(3) and 23(1)-Acquisition ofurba11 land with building a11d
·trees therem~ompensation--22528 sq. yd. of land i11 city of Allahabad,                 C
 belonging to the claimant having lease-hold right in the land acquired in
  1986-Declaratio11 under s.6 of Urba11 Land (Ceili11g a11d Regulatio11) Act
  made i11 respect of the land in 1976-Held, burde11 is always on the claima11t
  to establish proper market value of trees, or la11d or building--Wlien forest
  officers estimated value of trees, unless there is contra evidence i11 that behalf,
  it cannot be said that the award of compensatio11 of Rs. 23,000 and odd given         D
  by Collector's award 1vas without any evidence-When land and building are
  acquired by a notification, clabnant is not entitled to separate valuation of
  the building and the la11d-Since the State did not question the compensation
  of Rs. 8,33,000 as awarded by reference cowt and High Cowt, the same is
  co11finned-Publication of prevailing p1ices in the local 11ews paper is not the       E
  evidence and the reference cou1t eJTed in relying upon the san1e-Jt also e1red
  in relying upon the sale deed of a free-hold small piece of land pmticularly
  when neither the vendor nor the vendee was exaniine~Since the State did
 not question the compmsation of the land at the rate of R. 423 per sq. yd.
  detenni11ed by the High Cowt, the same is confinned-For the excess vacant
 la11d compensatio11 would be paid u11der s.11 (6) of the Ceiling Act-Silice            F
 before renewing the lease the Govemme11t have acquired the la11d and the
 claimant has got 011ly 7 years lease-hold right in the land, High Court was
 1igl1t i11 directing that compensatio11 should be apportioned in the ratio of
 50:50 to the State a11d the claimant-The limited right given to the State u11der
 sub-sectio11 (3) of s.18 is only in respect of excess compe11sation awarded by         G
 the Collector-In respect of appmtiomnent of the compe11satio11 covered
 under the Ceiling Act. there is 110 need for referC11ce u/s 18(3).

       Urban La11d (Ceiling a11d Regulatio11) Act, 1976:

       Ss.6, l1(6)-l>eclaratio11 u/s 6(1) made i11 1976-Lease-hold land in              H
                                         259
    260                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A City of Allahabad acquired under la11d Acquisition Act in 1986-Compensa-
  tio11 in respect of excess vacant land-Land owner claiming that land having
  been acquired under Land acquisition Act and possessivn thereof having been
  taken by the State, the same cannot be declared as excess vacant land and
  he is entitled to compensation under land Acquisition Act--lt was also
  claimed that in certain matters the State Govemment had directed to drop
B the proceedings under the Ceiling Act and to proceed under land Acquisition
  Act-Held, excess urban land covered under Ceiling Act is not required to be
  de-notified as it statutorily stands vested i11 the Govemme11t-Govemme11t
  cannot be compelled to acquire such land and to pay compensation under
  the La11d Acquisition Act-Govemment instructions do not have oveniding
C effect on the operation of the Ceiling Act and the law declared by this Court
  under Article 141 of the Constitutio11-Such instn1ctions are 011ly administra-
  tive instrnctions.

             Constinitio11 of India, 1950 :

D         Article 141-Govemment instmctions do 11ot have oveniding effect on
    the law declared by the Supreme Court.

          17ie Govt. of Andhra Pradesh v. H.E.H. the Nizam, Hyderabad JT
    (1996) 3 SC 629 and State of Gujarat a11d Ors. v. Pershottamdas Ramdas
E   Patel and 01'. [1988] 1 SCR 997, relied on.

         lnder Pa,,·Jwd v. Union of India and 01~., [1994] 5 SCC 239 and Sri
    Piedade Femandes v. U11io11 of India (1994) 3· SCALE 860, helil inap-
     plicable.

             M/s. Majas Land Development Corporation and Ors. v. State of
F Maharashtra a11d Ors., AIR (1983) Bombay 188; State of M.P. v. Swinder
     Kumar and Anr., [1995] 2 SCC 627 and Purslwttam Dass Tandon and Ors.
     v. State of U.P. Luck11ow a11d o,,., AIR (1987) All. 56, cited.

             CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 10786 of
G    1996.                                                                         '
          From the Judgment and Order dated 22.10.92 of the Allahabad High
     Court in F.A. No. 147 of 1990.

           Satish Chandra, Rajesh Tandon and E.C. Vidya Sagar, for the Ap-
H    pellants.
                         R.K TANDONv.STATE                             261

      D.V. Sehgal, Ashok Kr. Srivastava for the Respondent.                  A

      The following Order of the Court was delivered :

      Leave granted.

      We have heard learned counsel for the parties in e.ltenso.              B

      Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1
of 1894) (for short, the 'Act') was published in the State Gazette on
February 14, 1986 acquiring an extent of 4 acres 2 rods 21 poles equivalent
to 22, 528 sq. yd. situated in Allahabad city for public purpose, namely,
planned development of the urban area. The Land Acquisition Officer
                                                                             c
determined by his award under Section 11 on October 28, 1987 a total
compensation of Rs. 4,57,750.88. Dissatisfied therewith, the appellants
sought reference. The Additional District Judge by his award and decree
dated July 20, 1989 determined compensation @ Rs. 500 per sq. yd. He
also awarded Rs. 50,000 towards the value of trees, Rs. 8,33, 700 towards D
the value of the building together with the statutory solatium and interest.
On appeal, the High Court reversed the valuation of the tress and con-
firmed the award of the land Acquisition Officer, namely, Rs. 23,219.97.
High Court also confirmed the value of the building as awarded by the
reference Court but as regards the value of the land the High Court
disagreed and determined market value @ Rs. 423 per sq. yd. by the
                                                                             E
impugned judgment dated October 22, 1992 in First Appeal No. 149 of
1990. Thus, this appeal by special leave.

      Shri Satish Chandra, learned senior counsel, contended that though
the value of the trees given by the appellants was Rs. 1,40,000, the reference F
court on appreciation of evidence determined compensation therefor @
Rs. 50,000. The Land Acquisition Officer relied upon the valuation report
given by the Forest Department, OPW-1 examined on behalf of the Land
Acquisition Officer admitted that the valuation report did not bear the seal
of the office of Forest Department nor it was signed in his presence. None G
of the officers who prepared the valuation report was examined for its
proof. Therefore, the valuation report is inadmissible. The High Coun,
therefore, was not right in reversing the decree of the reference Court in
that behalf. He next contended that when the building consists of more
than 17 rooms situated in a posh locality in the heart of Allahabad city,
determination of the compensation @ Rs. 500 per sq. yd. by the reference H
    262                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A Court is not arbitrary. The view of the High Court in determining compen-
    sation at Rs. 423 per sq. yd. is based on no evidence. Therefore, the High
    Court was not right in reversing the decree. As regards the value of the
    building, it is contended that the appellants had valued it at Rs. 25,00.000
    (Rupees twenty five lacs only). The Land Acquisition Officer awarded Rs.
    3,18,429. The District Judge and the High Court were not right in confining
B
    the valuation to Rs. 8 lacs and odd, as referred to earlier. The appellants,
    therefore, are entitled to higher compensation on proper consideration.

          He further contended that the direction to the appellants given by
    the learned Judges to file returns under Section 6(1) of the Urban Land
C   (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 (for short , the 'Ceiling Act') is illegal.
    Since the possession of the land was already taken from the appellants
    dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A, after their dispossession
    and vested in the Government free from all encumbrances, the·appellants
    did not have possession of excess vacant land. The entire land having been
D   acquired under the Act, the appellants are entitled to compensation@ Rs.
    500, as determined by the reference Court. Though the State pleaded in
    the written statement filed before the reference Court that the Ceiling Act
    would be applicable to the lands in question, neither an issue was raised
    nor a finding recorded by the reference Court nor there appears to be a
    ground taken in the grounds of appeal in the High Court nor the standing
E   counsel for the State argued in that behalf. The High Court, therefore, was
    not right to go into that question.

          He further contended that the Government having given the acquired
    land on kase on October 1, 1892 for 50 years and having renewed it in
F   September 30, 1942 for a further period of 50 years on the same covenants
    as originally envisaged, the appellants are entitled to further renewal from
    time to time. Thus the lease is a perpetual one. The High Court was in
    error in restricting the apportionment of the compensation between the
    Government and the appellant in the ratio of 75:25.

G           He also contended that the rompetent authority under the Ceiling
     Act had not determined the surplus land in accordance with the procedure
     prescribed under Sections 8, 9 and 10. It. was decided only after the
     direction of the High Court. On appeal under Section 33 of the Ceiling
     Act, the District Judge had further· calculated the land within the ceiiling
H    limit. According to the appellants, the entire land is not in excess of the
                          RK TANDONv.STATE                             263

ceiling limit under the Ceiling Act. The three writ petitions which came to A
be filed by the petitioners are pending. Therefore, as on date there is no
surplus land. The State, therefore, cannot determine compensation in
respect of the excess land under Section 11 (6) of the Ceiling Act. The
claimants, therefore, are entitled to the entire compensation for entire land
at Rs. 500 per sq. yd. Shri D.V. Sehgal, learned senior counsel appeating B
for the respondent, resisted the contentions.

         Having regard to the rival contentions, the first question that arises
  for consideration is : whether the decree of reversal pertaining to the value
. of the trees is sustainable in law? It is seen that when OPW-1 was examined
  on behalf of the Land Acquisition Officer, his statement that he was c
  present at the time of inspection by the Forest Officer and taking meas-
  urement of existing trees and their height etc. was not disputed. It is true,
  as admitted by him, that the report does not bear the seal of the Forest
  Officer nor does it bear the name of the officer who prepared the report.
  It is seen from the evidence of the claimant, Rajesh Kumar Tandon D
  examined on behalf of the claimants that he merely had given the estimate
  of Rs. 1,40,000 towards the value of the trees without any data. The Land
  Acquisition Officer relied upon the report given by the Forest Officer who
  admittedly inspected the trees etc. No dispute as regards the proof of the
  trees existing in the compound was raised. The report would indicate that
  the officer who estimated the value has given the details of the estimate of E
  the trees, heirs age and size, girth and the value of each tree. It would have
 been prudent on behalf of the Land Acquisition Officer, to have officer
  examined but the estimate and details as such were not questioned in the
  cross·examination. Under these circumstances, the only inference that
 could be drawn is that when the forest officers who are the experts in this F
 behalf, estimated the value of the trees, unless there is contra evidence in
 that behalf, it cannot be said that the award of compensation of Rs. 23,000
 and odd given by the Collector's award was without any evidence. On the
 other hand, the claimant did not place any evidence to the contra. The
 burden is always on the claimant to establish the proper market value of
 the trees or land or building. Since they have not discharged their burden, G
 the evidence is not sufficient to hold that the value of the trees would be
 Rs. 50,000. The Additional District Judge accepted the ipse di.xit of the
 claimant and gave arbitrary amount on mere asking. The High Court,
 therefore, was right, though for different reasons, in reversing the award
 of the reference Court in that behalf and confirming that of the Land H
    264                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A   Acquisition Officer.

          The next question is : as to what would be the value of the building
    to which the appellants are entitled to? It is well settled law that when land
    and building are acquired by a notification, the claimant is not entitled to
    separate valuation of the building and the land. They are entitled to the
B   compensation on either of the two methods but not both. If the building is
    assessed, it is settled law that the measure of assessment be based on either
    the rent received from the property with suitable multiplier or the value of
    the building is the proper method of valuation. In this case, since the land
    is separately valued, the building cannot again be separately assessed and
c   compensation awarded except the value of debris. However, since State has
    not come in appeal, we need not go into the legality of the award of the
    Additional District Judge and of the High Court in that behalf. It would,
    therefore, be unnecessary to go into that question and we confirm of the
    compensation in respect of building at Rs. 8,33,000 and odd.
D
           The next question is : what would be the value of the land? It is seen
    that the appellants have relied upon a solitary sale deed dated January 1,
    1985 wi:h reference to an extent of Rs. 434 per sq. yds. which worked out
    @ Rs. 423 per sq. yd. The appellants, on the basis of the report given by
    the valuation officer who was not examined, claimed @ Rs. 500 per sq. yd.
E   They have also relied upon the paper cutting in respect of the prevailing
    prices notified in the newspapers. It is sellled law that either the vendor
    or vendee of a sale deed should be examined in proof of the circumstances
    in which the sale deed came to be executed and the consideration passed
    thereunder and in respect of the value etc. The said sale deed is a free-hold
F   small piece of land as compared to encumbered lease-hold land of 4 acres
    and odd. The vendor of the sale deed by name Jai Prakash Singh was not
    examined. Therefore, the sale deed cannot be relied upon as proof of
    valuation prevailing in the area. The High Court has relied upon that
    document ~nd granted the compensation @ Rs. 423 per sq. yd. Since the
    State had not come up in appeal, nor filed cross-objections, we need not
G   go into the correctness of the award of compensation on that rate. The
     paper cutting as to the publication of the prices in the local newspapers is
    not evidence and the reference Court, therefore, committed clear error in
     relying upon those transactions and in proof of document of the sale deed
     executed by Jai Prakash Singh. If those documents are excluded, there is
H    no other evidence to further enhance the compensation. The High Court
                          R.K. TANDON v. STATE                            265

granted the rr;aximum compensation as reflected in unproved solitary sale        A
deed of small extent of land. Accordingly, we are constrained to uphold
the valuation of the land @ Rs. 423 per sq. yd.

       The next question is : whether the appellants are entitled to the
compensation in respect of the entire extent of the land? It is not in dispute
that the lands are situated in the urban agglomaration and 1500 sq. meter
                                                                                 B
is the urban vacant land ceiling limit in Allahabad to which the holder is
entitled under the Ceiling Act. Admittedly, the declaration under Section
6 was made as early as on August 14, 1976. The procedure prescribed
under Section 8 the preparation of the draft statement, inviting objections,
consideration thereof and making the draft statement; under Section 9,           c
publication thereof, inviting objections and publication; and determination
of the surplus land. Procedure under Section 10(1) of the Ceiling Act
prescribed inviting objections, consideration thereof under sub- section (2)
and making the final publication under Section 10(3) fixing a date of vesting
are required to be followed and on and from that date the excess urban           D
land stands vested in the State. The appellants have placed before us the
order of the competent authority that determined the excess land and on
appeal, confirmation by the District Judge declaring that the appellants are
entitled to retain 9585.14 sq. meter of land as permissible limit and 9157
sq. meters of land as vacant land which stands vested in the State. The
details of the procedural steps taken are not on record. It appears that the     E
appellants have filed three writ petitions in the High Court which are
pending disposal on the question of surplus lands. It is, therefore, unneces-
sary for us to go into the question of the actual extent of the surplus land.

      The contention of Shri Satish Chandra is that once the notification
                                                                                 F
under Section 4(1) was published, the Land Acquisition Officer was en-
joined to pass an award for entire land under Section 11. Since possession
was already taken and it vested in the State free from all encumbrances,
the acquired land is situated within agglomeration and is found to be in
excess of the ceiling limit. The appellants are entitled to full compensation.
In support thereof, he placed reliance on M/s. Majas Land Development            G
C01poration and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., AIR (1983) Bombay
188; State of M.P. v. Swillder Kumar and Anr., (1995] 2 SCC 627 and 77ze
Govt. of Andhra Pradesh v. H.E.H., the Nizam, Hyderabad, JT (1996) 3 SC
629. The question, therefore, is: whether the Land Acquisition Officer is
enjoined to pass award in respect of the excess land? This controversy was       H
    266                  SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A   considered in H.E.H. Nizam 's case after surveying the relevant provisions
    of the Ceiling Act. It is not necessary to traverse the ground once over. It
    was held that it is not necessary for the Government to determine the
    compensation under Section 23(1) of the Act in respect of the excess land
    found under the Ceiling Act since Ceiling Act is a special Act, not-
B   withstanding any contrary law. In that case, it was noticed that the Govern-
    ment have exempted the acquired land from the purview of the Ceiling
    Act, the determination of the compensation in respect of that land by Civil
    Court was upheld with modification. Far from helping the appellants, the
    ratio therein is against the appellants. This question was also considered
    in another judgment of this Court in State of Gujarat & 01>. v. Pa1>hottam-
C   das Ramdas Patel and Ors., [1988] 1 SCR 997. It was held therein that the
    provisions of the Ceiling Act have over-riding effect on all other lands. In
    Surinder Kzunar's case, the purchase of vacant land within ceiling limit
    pending determination by competent authority came up for consideration.
    Therein this Court had pointed out the procedure to be adopted in dealing
D   with the situation. The Bombay case, with due respect, was not correctly
    decided. The principle of withdrawing notification under Section 48(1) of
    the Act need not be followed for the reason that compensation for the land
    within ceiling limit be determined under Section 23(1) and excess land is
    covered by Section 11(6) of the Ceiling Act. Until ceiling area and excess
E   land are determined, it would be difficult to postulate as to what extent of
    excess vacant land would be available to pay compensation either under
    Section 23(1) of the Act or Section 11(6) of the Ceiling Act. The excess
     urban land covered under the Ceiling Act is not required to be de-notified
     as it statutorily stands vested in the Government land and Government
     cannot be compelled to acquire the excess ·urban vacant land covered
F
     under the provisions of the Ceiling Act, and compensation paid under the
     provisions contained in the Land Acquisition Act. Shri Salish Chandra
     Also referred to us instructions issued by the Government of U.P. dated
    January 31, 1986. He placed reliance on paragraph 6 of the instructions. It
     is seen that the Government has given instructions to the respective
G    authorities under Section 35 of the Ceiling Act that where the authoritiies
     were not able to dispose of the matter under the Ceiling Act and land is
     required for public purpose, it would be necessary to drop the proceedings
     under the Ceiling Act and to proceed under the Land Acquisition Act.
     These are only administrative instructions. They do not have any statutory
H    effect on the operation of law. In case of yearning gaps, they may guide
                              R.K TANDONv.STATE                               267

    the officers. In view of the law laid down by this Court, the instructions do    A
    not have any over-riding effect on the operation of the Ceiling Act and the
    law declared by this Court under Article 141. Therefore, it is not necessary
    for the State to proceed with the determination of the compensation under
    Section 23(1) of the Act to the extent of the excess land found under the
    Ceiling Act. Compensation shall be paid only as per Section 116 of the           B
    Ceiling Act.

           The question then is : what is the proportion in which the appellants
    and the State are entitled to the compensation for the land within ceiling
    limit. As stated earlier, the main contention of Shri Satish Chandra is
    reference under Section 18(3), as amended by the State Legislature of U.P.       C
    is available to the State claiming apportionment in a particular proportion
    but was not availed of. The reference Court has recorded finding only with
    regard to the apportionment not under the Ceiling Act but with regard to
    the determination of the value of the land. In the grounds of appeal filed
    in the High Court, no arguments were addressed by the counsel for the            D
    State. Therefore, the High Court was not right in going into that question.
    We find no force in the contention. It is seen that sub section (3) of Section
    18 of the Act as amended by the Land Acquisition (Uttar Pradesh Amend-
    ment) Act 22 of 1954 reads as under :

            "(3) Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-section (1) the          E
            Land Reforms Commissioner may, where he considers the amount
            of compensation allowed by the award under Section 11 to be
            excessive, require the Collector that the matter be referred to by
            him to the Court for determination of the amount of compensation.

            Explanation :- In any case of land under Chapter VII the requi-          F
            sitioil under this sub-section may be made by the Land Reforms
            Commissioner at the request of the Company on its undertaking
            to pay all the cost consequent upon such requisition.

            (4) The requisition shall state the grounds on which objection to        G
            the award is taken and shall be made within six months from the
            date of the award."

          A reading of sub-section would indicate that without prejudice to the
    provisions in sub-section (1), the Land Reforms Commissioner where he
    considers the amount of compensation allowed by the award under Section H

-
    268                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A 11 to be excessive, may require the Collector that the matter may be
    referred to the Court for determination of the amount of compensation. It
    is settled law that the award of the Collector is an offer and it binds the
    Government without objections thereto. The State Legislature felt that
    where the Collector under Section 11 made excess award of compensation
    for the land which was not capable of fetching that value, the Land
B
    Reforms Commissioner has been empowered to seek a reference to Ihe
    Court for determination of the compensation. The limited right given to
    the State is only in respect of excess compensation awarded by the Collec-
    tor. Therefore, in respect of the apportionment of the compensation
                                                                                    ...
    covered under the Ceiling Act, there is no need for reference under Section
c   18(3). Moreover, it could be seen that on a reference made under Section
    18(1) to the Court, as required under Section 20(c) of the Act, the Court
    is enjoined to give notice to the Collector when the objection relates to the
    area of the land or the anzount of conzpensation. Section 21 restricts the
    scope of the proceedings envisaging that "the Court shall restrict the scope"
D   of consideration of "interests of the persons affected by the objection".
    Thus, it could be seen that the Court is enjoined to go into the acquisition
    of the land of the persons entitled to the compensation. On a reference
    made, the compensation would be restricted to the interest in the land held
    by the claimant and the court should enquire as to the extent to which the
E   claimant will be entitled to get compensation under Section 23(1) of the
    Act towards his interest in the acquired land. The interest consists of right
     and title to the compensation. Admittedly, the appellants had lease of
     Government land for 50 years on October 1, 1892 obviously under Crown
     Grands Act with a right to a renewal for further period of 50 years.
     Admittedly, further renewal was granted on September 30, 1942 for a
F    further period of 50 years which stood expired on 30th September, 1992.
     It would, therefore, be clear that the term of the lease as granted by the
     Government was upto September 30, 1992. It is then contended by Shri
     Salish Chandra that it was a licence since the appellants were permitted to
     construct permanent building under the lease and, therefore, it is in
G    perpetuity by operation of Section 60 of the Easement Act. We find no
     force in the contention. The lease itself expressly mentions demising the
     vacant land lo the appellants with exclusive possession but subject to
     construction of the buildinr; within the specified period and be in peaceful
     exclusive possession and enjoyment thereof subject to paying the lease
     amount to the Government under the Act. Therefore, it cannot be treated
H
                                                                                    -
                          R.K. TANDONv.STATE                             269

to be a licence but a lease.                                                   A

       Lease having been given for a specified period upto september 30,
1992, the question is : whether the appellants are entitled ro full compen-
sation? In this behalf, the contention of Shri Satish Chandra is that since
the first renewal contained the same covenant as contained in the first
                                                                                 B
lease, the appellants are entitled to further renewal of lease of in property.
In support thereof, he placed reliance on the judgment of the Division
Bench of the Allahabad High Court as confirmed by this Court in the
special leave petition, namely, Purshottam Dass Tandon and Ors. v. State
of U.P. Lucknow and Ors., AIR (1987) Allahabad 56. It seems that Tan dons
are ha,ing large extent of lease-hold lands from the Government and one        c
such lease-hold land is under acquisition. We are not concerned with
regard to the legality of the mandamus or directions issued in the above
case. Suffice it to state that since the State had acquired the property
before the expiry of the first renewal, we are constrained to go into the
language used in the first lease. It expressly mentions that lease initially was D
granted for a period of 50 years and a right of another renewal for another
50 years, i.e., upto September 30, 1992. Before its expiry, the Government
have already acquired the lands for public purpose and taken possession.
The question of further renewal would not arise in this case. Under these
circumstances, residuary period of lease is hardly 7 years.
                                                                               E
      The question, therefore, is : whether the appellants are entitled to
the entire compensation in respect of the land within the ceiling limit under
the Ceiling Act. In support thereof, Shri Salish Chandra Placed reliance
on two judgments of this Court in lnder Parshad v. Union of India & Ors.,
[1994] 5 SCC 239 and Sri Piedade Femandes v. Union of India, [1994] 3 F
SCALE 860. In lnder Parshad's case, land was sought to be acquired for
public purpose but the Land Acquisition Officer was unable to decide the
proportion in which the lease-holders and the Union of India are entitled
to the compensation. On reference under Section 30, the reference Court
had determined the compensation at a particular rate ultimately the High G
Court determined the proportion at 75% and 25%. Since the Union of
India had not filed appeal, this Court upheld the proportion to the lease-
holders and the Government of India. It was a perpetual lease. In that
back-drop, this Court had upheld the view of the High Court granting
apportionment in the ratio of 75: 25 to the lessee and the Government. In
Sri Piedade Fernandes case, ·the covenant expressly gave power to the H
    270                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A   Government to get the land for a public purpose without payment of the
    compensation. That was not covered under the Ceiling Acl. Instead of
    invoking the clause thereunder, proceedings under Land Acquisition Act
    were initiated. It was, therefore, held that the State is enjoined to pay full
    compensation for the land acquired. The ratio of either case does not help
    the appellants in this case. As seen, the appellants have got hardly 7 years
B
    lease-hold right in the land and thereafter the lands would stand revested
    to the State. Thereafter, the State would be entitled to resume the land
    after ejectment of the appellants. Under those circumstances, they are not
    entitled to the full compensation. The High Court directed that compen-
    sation should be apportioned for the extent of land within the limit in the
c   ratio of 50:50 to the State and the appellants. It is also to be seen that the
    Slate has not questioned at least the apportionment granted by the High
     Court. Considered from this perspective, we hold that it is not a fit case to
     reserve the judgment.

           The appeal is dismissed but in the circumstances without costs. The
D State is directed to pay the compensation in respect of the extent of excess
    vacant land as now found by the District Judge under Section 11(6) of the
    Ceiling Act and the Land within ceiling limit in the proportion now upheld
    within a period of 3 months from today. Since we have stated that we are
    not concerned with regard to the extent of the excess vac~nt land under
E   the Ceiling Act, our finding may not be construed to have been given as
    conclusive finding on the excess land under the Ceiling Act.

    R.P.                                                       Appeal dismissed.