Supreme Court of India
RATAN LAL ADUKIA & ANR.versusUNION OF INDIA
- Citation
- 1989 INSC 206
- Decided
- 19 July 1989
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- RANGANATH MISRA
Holding
Section 80 of the Indian Railways Act, as amended, is a special, exhaustive provision that impliedly repeals the conflicting jurisdictional rules of Section 20 CPC and Section 18 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act for suits for compensation against the railways.
Summary
The appellants filed two suits in Alipore and Calcutta Small Causes Courts seeking compensation for short delivery of goods booked with the Indian Railways. The Union of India contended that, under Section 80 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 (as amended in 1961), the trial courts lacked jurisdiction, arguing that the provision itself prescribed the appropriate forum. The High Court Full Bench held that Section 80 is a self‑contained special law that overrides the general jurisdiction rules of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 18 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, thereby implying their repeal. The Supreme Court examined the doctrine of implied repeal and the legislative intent behind the amendment, concluding that the later special provision exhaustively governs the place of instituting compensation suits against the railways. Consequently, the Court affirmed the High Court's view that the trial courts were without jurisdiction and dismissed the appeals.
Issues considered
- Whether Section 80 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 (as amended) is a complete, self‑contained provision that overrides Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Section 18 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 with respect to the choice of forum for compensation suits against the railways.
- Whether the doctrine of implied repeal applies to render the earlier general provisions inoperative in favour of the later special provision.
Legislation cited
Subjects
Indian Railways ActSection 80implied repealjurisdictionchoice of forumcivil procedurespecial legislationstatutory interpretationcompensation suits
Judgment
RATAN LAL ADUKIA & ANR.
A
v.
UNION OF INDIA
JULY 19, 1989
B [RANGANATH MISRA AND M.N. VENKATACHALIAH, JJ.]
Indian Railways Act, 1890: Section 80-Suits for compensation
against Railways-Choice of forum for cognizance of suits-Whether
limited by the section itself or provisions of Section 20 Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 and~ Section 18 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts '
C Act, 1882 are also applicable.
Statutory Interpretation-Doctrine of implied repeal-Applicability
of.
Under Section 80 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890, prior to its
D substitution by the Amendment Act, 1961, the choice of forum for filing
suits for compensation for loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or
non-delivery of goods etc. carried hy the Railways was regulated hy
Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure or Section 18 of the Presi-
dency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, as the case may be. However, the
new section, besides making specific reference to a certain class of suits,
J
E to be dealt with under the section and identifying the Railways Ad-
ministrations which were liable to the claim, also specifically provided
the places where such suits may be instituted.
The appellants filed two separate suits in the courts at Alipore and
Calcutta for recovery of certain amounts from the Railways for short
F deliveries of consignments booked by them. The respondent contended
that in view of Section 80 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890, the trial
4
courts concerned had no jurisdiction. The trial courts rejected the
objection and decreed the suits.
In the revisions filed by the respondent, the Full Bench of the
0 High Court, by its common order, held that the tri?I courts had no
jurisdiction. It was of the view that tire new Section 86, was a complete
and self-contained special law, as to the place of suing, respecting suits
envisaged by the section derogating from the generally of the provisions
of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1890 and Section 18 of the
Presidency Town Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 and that it brought
H about an implied repeal of those provisions as to the jurisdiction of
440
R.L. ADUKIA v. U.0.1. 441
courts by itself providing a jurisdiction to those suits. A
In the appeals before this Court it was contended on behalf of the
appellants that the legislative intent was clear: that it did not render
Section 80 over-riding, by not expressly excluding Section 20 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1890, and that even if the provisions of Section
B
80 were held to be a later special law, the principle of implied repeal
-~ could not be invoked, as there was no inconsistency between the two
provisions and, on the contrary, both sets of provisions could exist and
prevail.
.~ Dismis~ing the appeals,
c
HELD: The doctrine of implied repeal is based on the postulate
v that the legislature which is presumed to know the existing state of the
law did not intend to create any confusion by retaining conflicting pro-
visions. Courts in applying this doctrine, are supposed merely to give
effect to the legislative intent by examining the object and scope of the
D '
two enactments. But in a conceivable case, the very existence of two
provisions may by itself, lead to an inference of mutual irreconcilability
if the later set of provisions is by itself a complete code with respect to
the same matter. In such a case, the actual detailed comparison of the
two sets of provisions may not be necessary. I452F -& J .
E
It is a matter of legislative intent that the two sets of provisions
were not expected!<> be applied simultaneously. l452HI
Section 80 is a special provision dealing with certain class of suits
distinguishable on the basis of their particular subject-matter. It made
a conscious departure on the law as to the place of suing in respect of
-) suits envisaged by that Section, and is a self-contained provision in
F
regard to the choice of fora for such suits. There was no need for the
legislature to specify the places of suing which would otherwise be
covered by Section 20 C.P.C. unless the special prescription as to places
of suing was considered to be necessary in derogation to the general ldw .
as the matter contained _in Section 20 C.P.C. or the provisions in the
G
Small Cause Courts Act. [453B-C)
• Assam Cold Storage v. Union of India, AIR 1971 Assam 69;
Hindustan Machine Tools v. Union of India, AIR 1985 Madras 130;
Oghamal Cha11dhury v. Union of India, [1974] CLJ 420 and Union of
India v. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd., AIR 1981Bombay414, approved. H
442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989) 3 S.C.R.
A New India Assurance Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1981 Delhi 135 )
and Union of India v. C.R. Prabhanna, AIR 1977 132, over-ruled.
Shah Babula/ Khimji v. Jaya Ben D. Kania and another, [1982) 1
SCR 187; Municipal Council, Palai v. T.J. Joseph and others, [1964) 2
SCR 87; Zaver Bhai Amaidas v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 752;
B Union of India v. Ladu Lal Jain, [1964) 3 SCR 624 and Union of India
v. The Steel Stock Holders Syndicate, Poona, AIR 1976 SC 879, refer-
red to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 224
& 734 of 1988.
c From the Judgment and Order dated 17.6.87 of the Calcutta
High Court in Ref. No. 1/83 from C.R. Case No. 2938-40/81 & Civil
Order No. 2537/81, C.R. Case No. 75/81, Civil Order No. 362/82, &
C.R. No. 3803 of 1980.
D Dr. Shankar Ghosh, Sadar Durrez Ahmed, Parijat Sinha, A.K.
Sarkar, A.K. Sahay for the Appellants.
Kuldip Singh, Additional Solicitor General, A .K. Ganguli, C.V.
Subba Rao, A. Subba Rao and Heman! Sharma for the Respondent.
E The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
VENKATACHALIAH, J. These appeals, by certificate, prefer-
red against the common order dated 17.6.1987 of the High Court of
Calcutta in Full Bench Reference 1 of 1983 raise a short and interest-
ing question, of some general importance, whether the choice of the
F forum for the cognizance of suits envisaged in Section 80 of the Indian
Railways Act, 1890 (As substituted by Section 14 of the Indian
Railways (Amel\dment) Act, 1961 (Act 39 of 1961) is limited by Sec-
tion 80 itself or whether provisions of Section 20 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 and Section 19 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts
Act, 1882, as the cases may be, in regard to places of suing, are also
G applicable to the suits referred to in the said Section 80.
The question, in other words, is whether the said Section 80 is a
complete, self-contained, exhaustive Code in regard to the place of
suing respecting suits constituting a special law for such suits exclud-
ing, by necessary implication, the operation of provisions of Section 20
H of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Section 18 of the Presidency
R.L. ADUKIA v. U.O.l. [VENKATACHALIAH, J.l 443
Small Cause Courts Act, 1882. The Full Bench, resolving the earlier
A
conflicts .of Judicial opinion in the High Court on the points has held
Section 80 as containing within it a self-contained scheme for suits
envisaged by it and that Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure and
Section 18 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts, Act 1882 stand
excluded from operation. The Full Bench, however, has left open the
question whether Section 80 also over-rides clause 12 of the letters B
patent.
2. In the original proceedings from which C.A. 224 of 1988
arises, appellant instituted Money Suit No. 35 of 1978 against the
Respondent in the Court of the 6th Sub-Judge at Alipore, Distt.-24
Parganas, West Bengal, seeking recovery of Rs.13,200 respecting an
alleged short delivery of a consignment booked with the Respondent
c
on 24.4.1975 Ex-Ernakulam to Ranchi, a station under the South
Eastern Railway Administration. Respondent contested the suit on
grounds, inter-alia, that having regard to the said Section 80, the Court
at Alipore had no jurisdiction. The trial-Court by its order 22.5.1981
having rejected this objection as to jurisdiction, Respondent preferred D
C.R. 2938 of 1981 under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
before the High Court to have that order revised. The matter was
referred to a Full-Bench, culminating in the order now under appeal.
3. In C.A. 734 of 1988, appellant instituted a Suit No. 3831 uf
1985 in the Court of the Small Causes, Calcutta, for the recovery of a E
sum of Rs.6,573.50p. on account of snort deliveries of two consig-
ments booked with the Respondent on 27.4.1984 and 24.7.1984
respectively, Ex-Saugar in Central Railway to Ramkrishtopur in
Eastern Railway. Similar objection as to jurisdiction having been
urged, the trial Court rejected that objection and decreed the suit.
This was assailed before the High Court by the Res'pondent. The Full-
Bench, by its common-order, has held that the trial Court had no
jurisdiction and directed the return of the plaint for presentation to the
proper Court.
4. In order that the contentions of Dr. Shankar Ghosh urged in
support of these appeals are apprehended in their proper perspective, G
it becomes necessary to refer to and notice the legislative history of the
provision. Section 14 of the Indian Railways (Amendment) Act, 1961, ·
substituted the old Section 80 by a new provision. The old Section
reads:
"Section 80: suit for compensation for injury to through H
booked traffic:
444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 3 S.C.R.
Notwithstanding anything in any agreement purporting to
A
limit the liability of Railway Administration with respect to
traffic while on the Railway of the another Administration,
a suit for compensation for loss of the life of, or personal
injury to, a passenger, or for loss, destruction or deteriora-
tion of animals or goods where the passenger was or the
B animals or goods were booked through over the Railways
of two or more Railway Administrations, may be brought
either against the Railway Administration from which the
passengers obtained his pass or purchased his ticket, or to
which the animals or goods were delivered by the consignor
thereof, as the case may be, or against the Railway
Administration on whose Railway the loss, in jury, destruc-
c tion or deterioration occurred."
The new Section 80 substituted in 1961 by the amending Act provides:
"80. Suits for Compensation: A suit for compensation for
D loss of the life of, or personal injury to, a passenger or for
loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or non-delivery of
animals or goods may be instituted.
(a) if the passenger was, or the animals or goods
were, booked from one station to another on the
E railway of the same railway administration
against that railways administration;
(b) if the passenger was, or the animals or goods
were, booked through· over the railway of two or
more railway administration against the railway
F administration from which the passer.ger ob-
tained his pass or purchased his ticket or to which
the animals or goods were delivered for carriage,
as the case may be, or against the railway
administration on whose railway the destination
station lies, or the loss, injury, destruction,
G damage or deterioration occurred;
and, in either case the suit may be instituted
in a Court having jurisdiction over the place at
which the passenger obtained his pass or
purchased his ticket or the animals or goods were
H delivered for carriage, as the case may be, or
R.L. ADUKIA v. U.0.1. (VENKATACHALIAH, J.] 445
over the place in which the destination station
A
lies, or the loss injury, destruction, damage or
deterioration occurred."
The changes brought about in the sc.heme of the provisions ate quite
marked. The old Section did noCdeal with-liabiiity for Claims in
respect of goods carried by a single Railway. It concerned itself with B
goods etc., ·earned by mote than one Railways or what, in the con-
•cerned jargon, is called "through booked traffic" and provided that a
suit inter-alia for loss, destrudion, damage, deterioration or non-
delivery could be brought against the Railway Administration with
which the booking had taken place or against the Railway Administra-
tion of the delivery station. The old section Spoke nothing of the pla1.1es C
where such suits could be laid. The choice·of the forum was regulated
•b.y Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure or the relevant provisions
·of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, as the case -may be. This
Co'ffrt in Union·of India v. Ladu Lal Jain, [1964] 3 SCR 624 observed
·that the principal place of Railway Administration can be said to be
the place where the Railways can be said to carry on business for D
·purposes ofclause (a) of Sectioil 20 .of the Code of Civil Procedure. It
was'heid:
"The principle behind the provisions of Cls. (a) and (b) of
S. 20 is that the suit be instituted at a place where the
defendant be able to defend the suit without undue E
trouble."
" ..... Union of India carries on the business of running
railways and, can be sued in the Court of the subordinate
Judge of Gauhati within whcse territorial jurisdiction the
head-quarters of one of the railways run by the Union is F
situated."
This was said .in -a case governed by the old Section. Does the position
·Continue to hold good ~ven after the new Section 80 was substituted in
place'<>Hhe<ild?
G
The new Section 80 (substituted by Act 39 of 1961), however,
brought about far reaching changes -in its scheme, the notable amongst
them being three. The new Section made specific reference to a certain
·Class ·of suits having regard to their subject-matter, to be dealt with
under that Section. Secondly, the new Section also dealt with identity
of the !Railway Administrations which were made liable to the claim H
446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 3 S.C.R.
and, thirdly, the section specifically provided the places where such
A suits "may be instituted". Referring generally to the scope of th~
changes brought about by the 1961 amendment to Chapter VII of the
Railways Act, 1890, this Court, in Union of India v. The Steel Stock
Holders Syndicate, Poona, AIR 1976 SC 879 observed:
B "The history and the object with which the radical provi-
sions of the new Act were introduced bear testimony to
change of the nature of the liability of the railway •
administration."
"We, therefore, agree with the learned counsel for the
respondent that under the new Act the liability of the
c Railway has been increased so as to take upon itself the
responsibility of a common carrier."
The new comprehensiveness of the scheme of the amendments
was one of the circumstances that commended itself to the High Court
D to persuade it to hold that the new Section 80 in Chapter VII, con-
stituted a complete and self-contained special law as to the place of
suing respecting suits envisaged by that Section derogating from the
generality of the provisions of Section 2.0 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure or the provisions touching the jurisdiction of the Small Cause
Courts and that with the enactment of the new Section 80 there was an
implied repeal of those other provisions respecting such suits.
5. The High Court took due notice of the fact· that the new
Section did not expressly provide that in respect of suits envisaged by
it, the provisions of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure or
Section 18 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, as the case
may be, shall no longer be applicable. The High Court took due note
of the situation emerging from this omission. It noticed:
"the new Section 80, no doubt, did not expressly provide
that the said provision of Section 80 of the Act would over-
ride all other laws. But Section 80 of the Indian Railways
G Act is in the nature of the special provision applicable only
to suits for compensation against the Railways."
"The point is whether by enacting " .... the suit may be
instituted" in the Courts having jurisdiction over the places
mentioned in the last part of Section 80 of the Indian Rail-
H ways Act, 1890, the said Section of the Railways Act by
R.L. ADUKIA v. U.0.1. [VENKATACHALIAH, J.] 447
implication overrides section 20 of the Civil Procedure A
Code, 1908 and Section 18 of the Presidency Small Cause -......_
Courts Act, 1882."
The High Court took into consideration what, according to it,
was the real intention in enacting the new Section 80 and was
persuaded to the view that the Section brought about an implied repeal B
of the other provisions as to the jurisdiction of Courts by itself provid-
ing a jurisdiction to these suits. It was observed:
"By mentioning the Courts in which the suits for compen-
sation may be filed, Section 80 of the Railways Act
purports to deal with matters which have been dealt with in
Section 20 of the Code and Section 18 of the Presidency c
Small Causes Courts Act. These two sets of laws deal with
the same subject of territorial jurisdiction of Courts. We
are, therefore, required to ascertain whether in respect of
suits for compensation against the Railways, the intention
was to override the general law." O
"We have already indicated that Section 80 of the Railways
Act was a particular or special legislation. Section 80 of the
Railways Act purports to deal with the subject of places for
instituting particular class of suits which was previously
covered by Section 20 of the Code which was a general E
enactment. Two statutes cover the same field, i.e., territo-
rial jurisdiction. Mentioning for the first time in Section 80
of the Railways Act of the places where suits for compensa-
tion may be instituted was itself 'introductive of a new law
implying a negative'. When the same subject of territorial
jurisdiction has been dealt with in the subsequent legisla- F
tion (i.e., Section 80 of the Railways Act) the prior laws
(Section 20 of the Code and Section 13 of the Presidency
Small Cause Courts Act) on the same subject were not
intended to subsist."
"In other words, Section 80 of the Indian Railways Act by G
requiring something special to be done repealed by neces-
sary implication the former general statute relating to
territorial jurisdiction of Courts in so far as the suits for
compensation against the Railways were concerned."
Any other construction, according to the High Court, would lead H
448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989) 3 S.C.R.
A to anomalies and render Section 80 a surplusage. High Oourt said:
"If it was to be held that clause (c) of Section 20 of the
Code still applied to suits for rompensation against the
Railways, then the cause of action for the purpose of
B jurisdiction of Courts would arise not only at the three
places mentioned in Section 80 of the Act but at several
/ other places. In other words, the provisions of Section 80 of
the Act relating to places where the suits for compensation
may be instituted, would be, in that event, surplusage and
unnecessary."
C 6. In the view of the High Court, the distinction between provi-
sions in the New Section 80 on the one hand and Section 20 of the
Code of Civil Procedure or Section 18 of the Small Cause Courts Act
on the other, assumed particular significance as qualifying the Court's
jurisdiction in respect of a particular subject-matter as distinct from
D those that relate to a Court's territorial jurisdiction or pecuniary
jurisdiction. The High Court observed:
"Section 80 of the Railways Act, in effect, limits the appli-
cation of Section 20 of the Code by specifying the Courts
which shall have jurisdiction over the suits whose subject
matter is the claim for compensation against the Railways
E
for loss of life or personal injury to a passenger or loss,
destruction, damage, deterioration or non-delivery of
animals or goods. We have already held that Section 80 of
the Act, in other words is in the nature of a special provi-
sion in respect of classes of suits mentioned in Section 80 of
p \the Indian Railways Act."
7. Dr. Shankar Ghosh assailing the soundness of the High
Court's view, urged that the proposition on which its conclusions rest,
if accepted, would render what was intended as a mere an enabling
entitlement to lose its character as such and become, on the contrary, a
limiting factor and convert a right into a liability. Dr. Ghosh said that
0
the legislative intent was clear; it did not render Section 80 over-riding
by not expressly excluding Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
It expressly supplied, says Dr. Ghosh, an enabling provision when it
chose the expression " . . . . . may be instituted". It is further
contended that the doctrine of implied repeal was, clearly inapplicable
H to the situation.
R.L. ADUKIA v. U.0.1. [VENKATACHALIAH, J.] 449
Dr. Ghosh commended for acceptance the reasoning. of the A
Assam and Madras High Courts, in Assam Cold Storage v. Union of
India, AIR 1971 Assam 69 and Hindustan Machine Tools v. Union of
India, AIR 1985 Madras 130, respectively, in preference to the views
of the Calcutta, Bombay, Delhi and Karnataka High Courts in
Oghamal Chaudhury v. Union of India, [1974] CLJ 420; Union of
India v. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd., AIR 1981 Bombay 414; New B
India Assurance Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1981Delhi135 and Union
of India v. C.R. Prabhanna, AIR 1977 132 respectively.
8. The thrust of the arguments of Dr. Ghosh is that the construc-
tion placed by the High Court ignores the crucial aspect that while the
old Section 80 did not render the destination railway as such, liable to
be sued if loss was not proved to have occurred there, the new Section,
c
however, renders the destination Railway also liable even though no
loss occurred there. The provision in the new Section 80 enabling the
suit to be instituted at the place of the destination Railway, where no
part of the cause of action might otherwise be shown to have arisen,
was, it is urged, a mere consequential provision-to g{'1e effect to the D
substantive provision, that the destination Railway was also liable. Dr.
Ghosh emp1tasised the expression "may be instituted" in Section 80 to
reinforce his contention that Section 80 did really expand the rights of
.; and not seek to restrict therein suitors. Learned counsel also
emphasised 'hat section 80 did not contain any words expressly exclud-
ing clauses (a) and (b) of Section 20, Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as E
suits contemplated by Section 80 were concerned. The new Section 80,
- it is contended, did not intend to impair the choice of the forum
afforded by Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that any
contrary view, offends settled principles of statutory construction
guiding the matter. Learned counsel invited attention to the following
observations in Ajay Kumar Banerjee & Others etc. v. Union of India F
& Others etc., [1984] 3 SCR 252 at page 282:
"The general rule to be followed in case of conflict between
two statutes is that the latef abrogates the earlier one. In
other words, a prior special law, would yield to a later
general law, if either of the two following conditions is G
satisfied:
(i) The two are inconsistent with each other;
(ii) There is some express reference in the later to the
earlier enactment. H
450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 3 S.C.R.
A If either of these two conditions is fulfilled, the later law,
even though general, would prevail."
and submitted that even if, conversely, the provisions of Section 80 are
held to be a later special law, the principle of implied repeal could not
be invoked as there was no inconsistency between the two provisions
B and that, on the contrary, both set of provisions could co-exist and
prevail. Learned counsel invited our attention to and relied upon the
following passage in Shah Babula/ Khimji v. Jaya Ben D. Kania and
Another, [1982] 1SCR187:
"We find ourselves in complete agreement with the argu-
ments of Mr. Sorabjee that in the instant case S. 104 read
c with Order 43, Rule 1 does not in any way abridge, interfere
with or curb the powers conferred on the Trial Judge by
Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. What Section 104.read with
Order 43, Rule 1 does is merely to give an additional
remedy by way of an appeal from the orders of the Trial
D Judge to a larger Bench."
The learned counsel also placed reliance on the following observations
of this Court in Municipal Council, Palai v. T.J. Joseph and Others,
[ 1964 l 2 SCR 87 at page 98:
E "In order to ascertain whether there is repugnancy or not
this Court has laid down the following principles in Deep
Ghand v. The State of Uttar Pradesh,:
1. Whether there is direct conflict between the two
provisions;
F
2. Whether the legislature intended to lay down an exhaus-
tive code in respect of the subject matter replacing the
earlier law;
3. Whether the two laws occupy the same field."
G
9. Reliance was also placed on Section 21-A inserted by Section
4 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts (West Bengal Amendment) )-
Act, 1980 which provides:
"2 lA. Act to override other laws including Letters Patent:
H The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding
R.L. ADUKIA v. U.0.1. [VENKATACHALIAH, J.) 451
anything to the contrary in any other law, including in
A
particular the Letters Patent of the High Court."
to contend that the construction opted for by the High Court would
rµn in the·teeth of this express provision.
10. Lastiy, learned counsel invited our attention to the following B
passage in Crawford on Statutory construction:
"All laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation, and
with full knowledge of all existing cases on the same
J\ subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that the Legisla-
ture, in passing a statute, did not intend to interfere with or
abrogate any former law relating to the same matter,unless
c
the repugnancy between the two is irreconcilable. Bowen
v. Lease, 5 Will 225. It is a rule, says Sedwick that a
general statute without negative words will not repeal the
particular provisions of a former one, unless the two acts
are irreconcilably inconsistent." D
(p. 633)
"And, as we have already suggested, it is essent.ial that the
new statute cover the entire subject matter of the old;
otherwise there is no indication of the intent of the Legisla-
ture to abrogate the old law. Consequently, the latter E
enactment will be constructed as continuation of the old
one." (624)
It was urged that repeal by implication is not to be presumed-and that,
on. the contrary, there is always presumption against a repeal by impli-
cation. In order that there be a repeal by implication, there should be a F
clear, irreconcilable conflict between the two sets of provisions and the
later enactment should be an exhaustive code in itself in respect of the
subject matter. On these submissions, Dr. Ghosh says that the view
taken by the High Court is clearly unsustainable in law.
11. The contention emphasised is that where a statute merely G
recognises a right pre-existing in common-law and provides a remedy,
such a remedy, unless the statute expressly bans or excludes other
remedies, could only be an additional or concurrent one open to an
election.
It is true that where a statute does not itself bring into being a H
452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1989] 3 S.C.R.
new right not a pre-existing right and also provides a remedy therefore \....
A
so however that the right and the remedy cannot be said to have been
...;
brought into existence for the first time uno-flatu, such a remedy
would not generally be held to be exclusive but only an additional and
concilrrent one, along with the pre-existing remedies, unless there are
express indications to the contrary in the statute itself.
B
In Municipal Council, Palai v. T.J. Joseph, [1964] 2 SCR 87, this
Court considered the tests of repugnancy applied under Article 254(2)
of the Constitution, relevant in the examination of circumstances
b~inging about an implied repeal. Strictly speaking the examination of ~
I
the question whether an act of Parliament prevails against the law
C enacted by a State under Article 254, does not really involve any
question of repeal. In Zaver Bhai Amaidas v. State of Bombay, AIR
1954 SC 752 this Court applied the test conversely, of the principle of
implied repeal to cases of repugnancy under Article 254(2). It was
observed:
D
"It is true, as already pointed out, that on a question under
Art. 25(1) whether an Act of Parliament prevails against a
law of the State, no question of repeal arises, but the
principle on which the rule of implied repeal rests, namely,
that if the subject-matter of the later legislation is identical
E with that of the earlier, so tl1at they cannot both stand
together, then the earlier is repealed by the later.enact-
ment, will be equally applicable to a question under Art.
254(2) where the further legislation by Parliament is in
respect of the same matter as that of the State law."
F The doctrine of implied repeal is based on the postulate that the legis-.
lature which is presumed to know the existing state of the law did not
intend to create any confusion by retaining conflicting provisions.
Courts, in applying this doctrine, are-supposed merely to give effect to
the legislative intent by examining the object and scope of the two
enactments. But in a conceivable case, the very existence of two provi-
G sions may by itself, and without more, lead to an inference of mutual
irreconcilability if the later set of provisions is by itself a complete code
with respect to the same matter. In such a case the actual detailed
comparison of the two sets of provisions may not be necessary. It is a
matter of legislative intent that the two sets of provisions were not
expected to be applied simultaneously. Section 80 is a special JJrovi-
H
R.L. ADUKIA v. U.0.1. [VENKATACHALIAH, J.] 453
-1' sion. It deals with certain class of suits distinguishable on the basis of A
thejr particular subject-matters.
The High Court has come to the conclusion that new Section 80
made a conscious departure on the law as to the place of suing in
respect of suits of a particular subject-matter envisaged by that Sec-
B
tion. The High Court has held that the new Section 80 is a self-
contained provision in regard to the choice of fora for such suits.
According to the High Court, there was no need for the legislature to
specify the places of suing which woud otherwise be covered by Sec-
tion 20 C.P .C. unless the special prescription as to places of suing was
considered to be necessary-in derogation to the general law as
contained in Sec. 20 CPC or the provisions in the Small cause Courts c
Act.
As to the words "may be instituted" occurring in that Section,
the High Court observed:
D
"The use of the expression 'may be instituted' in Section 80
of the Railways Act was .equivalent to 'shall be instituted'.
Section 80 conferred right to institute suits for compensa-
tion against the Railways fodireach of their obligations for
carrying passengers, animals or goods specified in Chapter-
VII of the Indian Railways Act. Both the obligation on the E
part of the Railways and the right of the consignor and the
consignee to institute suits are now statutory in their
nature. The clear intendment of the Legislature was that it
would be obligatory for the plaintiffs to institute suits only
in the Courts mentioned in Section 80 of the Railways Act
for enforcement of the claims for compensation against the F
Railways."
12. After a consideration of the matter, we are inclined to the
view that the reasoning of and the conclusion reached by the Full
Bench of the Calcutta High Court that the new Section 80 is a self-
contained provision are sound and require to be preferred to the view G·
expressed by the Assam and the Madras High Courts. The view of the
Full-Bench is to be preferred having regard to the weight and pre-
ponderance of the relevant interpretatory criteria. No appeal, in our
opinion, could be made to Section 2 lA of the State Amendment to the
Small Cause Courts Act either, in as much as, that provision cannot be
understood to have been intended to cover a situation of the present H
454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1989] 3 S.C.R.
A type. It does not exclude a special law applicable to and governing a
distinct class of subject matter intended to be covered by that special
law.
In the result, for the fore-going reasons, these appeals fail and
are dismissed; but in the circumstances, without any directions as to
B
costs.
/N.P.V. Appeals dismissed.
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