RASHMI CHOPRAversusTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.

1132                     [2019]REPORTS
               SUPREME COURT    6 S.C.R. 1132             [2019] 6 S.C.R.


 A                             RASHMI CHOPRA
                                        v.
                  THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.
                        (Criminal Appeal No.594 of 2019).
                                  April 30, 2019
 B
                [ASHOK BHUSHAN AND K.M. JOSEPH, JJ.]
             Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:
             s.482 – Application under – By six appellants-accused –
       Praying for quashing the complaint and criminal proceedings in a
       complaint case u/ss. 498A, 323, 504, 506 IPC and s.3/4 of Dowry
 C
       Prohibition Act – Application dismissed by High Court – Appeal to
       Supreme Court – Held: There were two sets of allegations in the
       complaint – One was with regard to offences u/ss. 323, 504 and
       506 IPC and another for offences u/s. 498A IPC and ss. 3/4 of
       Dowry Prohibition Act – Complaint u/ss. 323, 504 and 506 was
 D     made only against one appellant-accused and two unknown persons
       – Therefore, other appellants could not have been summoned for
       the offences u/ss. 323, 504 and 506 IPC – In the complaint u/s.
       498A IPC r/w ss. 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act there were common
       general allegations against every appellant and the complaint shows
       that the same was filed with a view to harass the appellants and
 E
       hence deserves to be quashed – Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 323, 504,
       506 and 498A – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1984 – ss.3/4.
             Penal Code, 1860:
             s.498A – Complaint alleging offence u/s. 498A – Locus standi
       of complainant – Held: There is nothing in s.498A to indicate that
 F     the complaint has to be necessarily filed by the woman who was
       subjected to cruelty by husband or his relatives.
             Disposing of the appeals, the Court
             HELD: 1.1 While taking cognizance of an offence, a
       Magistrate is not required to pass a detailed order. However, in
 G     a case when Magistrate issues process against a person, who is
       not even charged with the offence for which he is summoned, in
       such cases the summoning order can be assailed. [Para 12]
       [1143-A-B]

 H
                                     1132
 RASHMI CHOPRA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.                      1133


     Dy. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports v. Roshanlal          A
     Agarwal & Ors. (2003) 4 SCC 139 : [2003] 2 SCR
     621; Nupur Talwar v. Central Bureau of Investigation
     & Anr. (2012) 11 SCC 465 : [2012] 6 SCR 723 –
     referred to.
       1.2 In the present case, there are two sets of allegations.   B
One set of allegations of offence under Section 498A IPC and
Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and second set of allegations
are allegations made for offences under Sections 323, 504 and
506 of IPC. The allegations under Sections 323, 504 and 506
has been made citing the incident dated 08.11.2014.
[Paras 13 and 14][1143-C-D]                                          C

      1.3 The complaint with regard to offences under Sections
323, 504 and 506 IPC has been made only against the accused/
appellant in Crl. Appeal No. 595 of 2019 and two unknown
persons. Neither in the complaint nor statements made by
complainant or his witnesses, there is any allegation with regard    D
to above offences against any other appellants. There being no
allegations for offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506 IPC in
the complaint or statement before the Magistrate, there was no
question of summoning the other appellants for offences under
Sections 323, 504 and 506 of IPC. When the complaint does not        E
allege any offence against other appellants, the cognizance of the
complaint cannot be taken against other appellants with regard
to offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506 IPC.
[Para 15][1144-C-D]
      1.4 In so far as allegations against the appellant in Crl.     F
Appeal No. 595 of 2019, pertaining to Sections 323, 504 and 506
IPC is concerned, there were specific allegations, which were
also supported by the complainant and his two witnesses in the
evidence, at this stage, this Court cannot pronounce as to whether
any incident as alleged by the complainant happened on
08.11.2014 or alleged as offence by respondent No.2 or offence       G
as alleged was committed by the appellant or not. Therefore,
said complaint shall be proceeded with and the order dated
17.01.2017 is upheld to the limited extent i.e., summoning of the
appellant in Crl. Appeal No. 595 of 2019 under Sections 323, 504
and 506 IPC. [Para 31][1156--F-H; 1157-A]                            H
1134            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2019] 6 S.C.R.


 A           2.1 Criminal prosecution can be allowed to proceed only
       when a prima facie offence is disclosed. Judicial process is a
       solemn proceeding which cannot be allowed to be converted into
       an instrument of oppression or harassment. If High Court finds
       that proceedings deserve to be quashed in parameters as laid
       down by this Court in *Bhajan Lal case, High court shall not
 B
       hesitate in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to
       quash the proceedings. [Para 21][1149-H; 1150-A-B]
             Rakhi Mishra v. State of Bihar and Others (2017) 16
             SCC 772 ; Sonu Gupta v. Deepak Gupta (2015) 3 SCC
             424 : [2015] 1 SCR 1069 ; K. Subba Rao and Others v.
 C           State of Telangana (2018) 14 SCC 452 ; Vineet Kumar
             and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another (2017)
             13 SCC 369: [2017] 6 SCR 922; *State of Haryana v.
             Bhajan Lal (1992) 1 Suppl. SCC 335 : [1990] 3 Suppl.
             SCR 259 – relied on.
 D            2.2 So far as the allegations made in the complaint under
       Section 498A IPC and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act are
       concerned, the complaint was filed by respondent No.2 on
       10.05.2015, before which date, the petition for divorce had already
       been filed in the Court. It is on the record that at the time of
 E     filing of the complaint ‘V’ (wife) was living in Canada whereas
       appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 599 of 2019 (husband) was living
       in U.S.A. Both were separately living. It was pleaded in the
       application for divorce that husband and wife had separated on or
       around November, 2013. It is on the record that neither on the
       day criminal complaint was filed in the Court of C.J.M. ‘V’ (wife)
 F     was in India nor was she in India at the time when statements
       were recorded in complaint of complainant as well as his two
       witnesses. The complaint is not by ‘V’ (wife) but it was filed by
       her father. In the divorce application filed in the State of Michigan,
       ‘V’ (wife) was represented by her attorney. The divorce was
 G     granted with orders relating to alimony, pension benefits and
       retirement benefits, life insurance, property settlement and
       provision in lieu of dower, mutual release of claims and other
       aspects on 24.02.2016. [Para 22][1150-B-F]


 H
 RASHMI CHOPRA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.                         1135


      2.3 There is nothing on the record to indicate that orders        A
of divorce between the parties was brought into the notice of the
Magistrate when he issued process against the appellants. Decree
of divorce shall not wipe out any criminal offence, which has been
committed within the meaning of I.P.C. or Dowry Prohibition Act
and the criminal offence committed in jurisdictional court has to
                                                                        B
be examined despite the divorce decree having been granted.
[Para 23][1150-F-G]
      2.4 A perusal of the complaint indicates that the allegations
against the appellants for offence under Section 498A IPC and
Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act are general and sweeping.
No specific incident dates or details of any incident has been          C
mentioned in the complaint. The complaint having been filed after
proceeding for divorce was initiated in the State of Michigan,
where ‘V’ (wife) participated and divorce was ultimately granted.
A few months after filing of the divorce petition, the complaint
has been filed in the Court of C.J.M. The sequence of the events        D
and facts and circumstances of the case leads the Court to
conclude that the complaint under Section 498A IPC and Section
3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act have been filed as counter blast to
divorce petition proceeding in the State of Michigan.
[Para 24][1150-H; 1151-AC]
                                                                        E
       2.5 There being no specific allegation regarding any one of
the applicants except common general allegation against everyone
i.e. “they started harassing the daughter of the applicant
demanding additional dowry of one crore” and the fact that all
relatives of the husband, namely, father, mother, brother, mother’s
sister and husband of mother’s sister have been roped in clearly        F
indicate that application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was filed
with a view to harass the applicants. Further, prior to filing of the
application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. there was no complaint
at any point of time by the girl or her father making allegation of
demand of any dowry by any one of the applicants. [Para 25]             G
[1151-C-E]
      2.6 The judgment in divorce proceedings indicates that the
parties to the divorce petition had settled all issues between them
including division of properties at the time when divorce
                                                                        H
1136           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2019] 6 S.C.R.


 A     proceedings were in progress at Michigan and both the parties
       were not in India, the complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
       had been filed making allegation under Section 498A of IPC and
       ss. 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act only to harass and put
       pressure on the applicants. [Para 26][1151-B-C]
 B           2.7 Therefore, insofar as the offence under Section 498A
       IPC and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act is concerned,
       present is a case, which is covered by Category 7 as enumerated
       by *Bhajan Lal case and the High Court erred in refusing to
       exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. [Para 31]
       [1156-E-F]
 C
              3. High Court in its impugned judgment has not referred
       to allegations made in the complaint except noticing that the
       summoning order has been passed and noticing the principles of
       law. The High Court ought to have first set out the brief facts of
       the case with a view to understand the factual matrix and then
 D     examined the challenge made to the proceedings in the light of
       the principles of law laid down by this Court with a view to record
       the findings on the grounds urged by the appellants as to whether
       any interference therein is called for or not. [Para 27][1154-D;
       1155-B]
 E           Jagdish Prasad and Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh
             and Another (2019) 2 SCC 184 – relied on.
             4. Section 498A IPC provides for an offence when husband
       or the relative of the husband, subject her to cruelty. There is
       nothing in Section 498A, which may indicate that when a woman
 F     is subjected to cruelty, a complaint has to be filed necessarily by
       the women so subjected. A perusal of Section 498A indicates
       that the provision does not contemplate that complaint for offence
       under Section 498A should be filed only by women, who is
       subjected to cruelty by husband or his relative. Complaint filed
 G     by respondent No.2, the father of the victim/girl cannot be said
       to be not maintainable on this ground. [Para 30][1156-C-E]
                              Case Law Reference
             [2003] 2 SCR 621        referred to             Para 11
             [2012] 6 SCR 723        referred to             Para 12
 H
 RASHMI CHOPRA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.                             1137


      (2017) 16 SCC 772          relied on                 Para 16          A
      [2015] 1 SCR 1069               relied on            Para 16
      (2018) 14 SCC 452               relied on            Para 18
      [2017] 6 SCR 922                relied on            Para 19
      [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR 259 relied on                   Para 21           B
      (2019) 2 SCC 184                relied on            Para 27


     CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No.594 of 2019                                                              C
       From the Judgment and Order dated 08.08.2018 of the High Court
of Judicature at Allahabad in case application under Section 482 No.30257
of 2017
                                 With
                                                                            D
      Criminal Appeal Nos.598, 599, 597, 596 and 595 of 2019.
       Shikhil Suri, Shiv Kumar Suri, Ms. Shilpa Saini, Ms. Vinishma
Kaul, Santosh Krishnan, Ms. Deepika Kalia, Sarvesh Singh Baghel, Advs.
for the appearing parties.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                            E
      ASHOK BHUSHAN, J. 1. These appeals have been filed
challenging the judgment of Allahabad High Court dated 08.08.2018 by
which the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. filed by the appellants
praying for quashing the complaint and proceedings in Complaint Case
No. 4967 of 2015 have been dismissed.                                       F
       2. All the appeals having been filed against the same judgment,
facts of the case are being taken from Criminal Appeal No. 594 of
2019 – Rashmi Chopra & Ors. Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh &
Anr., in which criminal appeal, reply affidavit and rejoinder affidavit
have been filed. The background facts of the case necessary to be           G
noted for deciding these appeals are:-
       2.1 Nayan Chopra, son of Rashmi Chopra and Rajesh Chopra
           got married with Vanshika Bobal, daughter of respondent
           No.2, Indrajeet Singh on 15.04.2012. All the appellants are
           family members of Nayan Chopra. Rashmi Chopra is                 H
1138    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 6 S.C.R.


 A          mother, Rajesh Chopra is father, Amit Chopra is Brother
            and Anita Gandhi is Mother’s Sister of Nayan Chopra,
            whereas Kuldeep Gandhi is husband of Anita Gandhi.
            Nayan Chopra with his mother, father and brother are
            resident of 203, Jainti Apartment, Police Station – Begumpet,
            Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh). Anita Gandhi and Kuldeep
 B
            Gandhi are resident of Greater Kailash – I, New Delhi.
       2.2 After the marriage of Nayan Chopra and Vanshika, which
           was performed at Noida, District Gautam Buddha Nagar
           on 15.04.2012, Vanshika went alongwith her husband at
           Hyderabad, the matrimonial home of Vanshika. On
 C         28.04.2012, Vanshika and Nayan Chopra left for the U.S.A.
           On or about November, 2013, Vanshika and Nayan Chopra
           separated. On 23.10.2014, an application was filed by
           Nayan Chopra in the Circuit Court for the County of
           Kalamazoo Family Division, Michigan,USA, seeking
 D         divorce.
       2.3 On 10.11.2014, a complaint was sent by respondent No.2
           through registered post to the Superintendent of Police,
           Gautam Buddha Nagar, Noida making allegations against
           Rajesh Chopra and two other unknown persons. An
 E         application under Section 156(3) was filed by respondent
           No.2. The application of the respondent No.2 was sent by
           the Magistrate to Mediation Centre running under the
           District Legal Services Authority for counselling. After
           failure of counselling and mediation, an application under
           Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was filed by respondent No.2 dated
 F         10.05.2015 making allegations against all the appellants
           under Section 498A and Sections 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition
           Act.
       2.4 In the complaint, allegations have been made on the basis
           of incident dated 08.11.2014 against Rajesh Chopra and his
 G         associates. It was alleged that Rajesh Chopra called the
           respondent No.2 near the Gurudwara at Sector 18, Noida
           to talk about the problem of Nayan Chopra and Vanshika
           and when respondent No.2 went for talks, he met Rajesh
           Chopra with two unknown persons. Respondent No.2
 H         further alleges that on his request to accept his daughter,
RASHMI CHOPRA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.                           1139
             [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

         Rajesh Chopra repeated his demand of one crore rupees           A
         and used filthy words against Vanshika, which was objected
         by respondent No.2, on which Rajesh Chopra and his
         associates became annoyed and they abused and beat the
         respondent No.2 and snatched his gold chain from his neck
         and Rs.60,000/- from his pocket. The allegations within
                                                                         B
         the meaning of Sections 323, 324, 504, 506, 392 of I.P.C.
         were made on the basis of the aforesaid incident. In the
         application, it was also stated that Nayan Chopra has filed
         a petition for dissolution of marriage in America.
    2.5 On the basis of the application of divorce by Nayan Chopra,
        the Circuit 9th Court for the County of Kalamazoo Family         C
        Division, Michigan gave a judgment of divorce on
        24.02.2016. The order of judgment of divorce was passed
        after hearing both Nayan Chopra and Vanshika Bobal, who
        were represented through attorneys. The judgment of
        divorce made provisions for alimony, pension benefits and        D
        retirement benefits, life insurance, property settlement and
        provision in lieu of dower, mutual release of claims and other
        provisions.
    2.6 The application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. filed by
        respondent No.2 was treated as a complaint and registered        E
        as Complaint No. 4967 of 2015, on which the learned Judicial
        Magistrate, Gautam Budh Nagar issued a summoning order
        on 17.01.2017 summoning the appellants under Sections
        498A, 323, 504, 506 of I.P.C. and Section 3/4 of Dowry
        Prohibition Act.
                                                                         F
    2.7 The appellants filed an application under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
         in the High Court praying for quashing the complaint and
         proceedings and order dated 17.01.2017 in Complaint Case
         No. 4967 of 2015. In the application under Section 482
         Cr.P.C., High Court passed an order referring the matter to
         mediation centre of Allahabad High Court. The mediation         G
         having failed between the parties, application under Section
         482 Cr.P.C. was heard. The prayer of the appellants to
         quash the complaint and proceedings have been refused.
         The application was disposed of after directing that the
         applicants may surrender in the court below and make an         H
1140             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 6 S.C.R.


 A                  application for bail within a period of two months. Aggrieved
                    against the judgment of the High Court, these appeals have
                    been filed.
             3. All appeals arise out of the same order passed in their application
       under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
 B           4. We have heard Shri Shikhil Suri, learned counsel for the
       appellants and Shri Santosh Krishnan, learned AOR appearing for the
       respondent No.2. We have also heard learned counsel for the State of
       Uttar Pradesh.
               5. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that High Court
 C     failed to exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in quashing the
       entire complaint proceedings, which proceedings are nothing but abuse
       of the process of the court. It is submitted that Nayan Chopra and
       Vanshika Bobal had already been granted divorce by Family Court of
       Michigan, which fact was not brought into notice of the Magistrate by
 D     respondent No.2 before summoning order was passed. It is submitted
       that a reading of the complaint does not prima facie discloses any offence
       under Section 498A and 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act against the
       appellants. The appellants, Anita Gandhi and Kuldeep Gandhi separately
       reside and they have never met Vanshika, the girl after marriage. The
       allegations in the complaint are vague, sweeping and general. The
 E     complaint is not even filed by Vanshika, the girl nor she got her statement
       recorded in support of the complaint.In so far as incident alleged on
       08.11.2014 at Sector 18, Noidano such incident took place and allegations
       are false and concocted to somehow rope in Rajesh Chopra, the father
       of the boy Nayan Chopra. The complaint has not been filed by competent
 F     person, hence ought not to have been entertained.
               6. Shri Santosh Krishnan, learned counsel appearing for respondent
       No.2 submits that there is no error in summoning of the appellants by the
       Magistrate by order dated 17.01.2017. It is well settled that Magistrate
       is not required to record elaborate reasons for summoning of an accused.
 G     The complaint discloses several allegations pertaining to offence under
       Section 498A and other offences mentioned therein. Two courts having
       taken one particular view of the matter, this Court may not exercise its
       jurisdiction in interfering with the orders. It is further submitted that
       Section 498A does not indicate that complaint on behalf of the women

 H
 RASHMI CHOPRA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.                             1141
              [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

has to be filed by the women herself. The complaint was fully competent     A
and no error has been committed by Magistrate in taking cognizance of
the complaint.
       7. Learned counsel for the parties have placed reliance on various
judgments of this Court in support of their submissions, which shall be
referred to while considering the submissions in detail.                    B
      8. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for
the parties and have perused the records.
       9. The copy of the complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., which
has been treated asprivate complaint by Magistrate has been brought on
the record as Annexure P-2. The allegations in the complaint are that       C
marriage was solemnised on 15.04.2012 in which marriage, gifts of Rs.50
lakhs were given to Nayan Chopra and his family members. It is alleged
that after the marriage, all family members were not satisfied by the
gifts and they started harassing the daughter of respondent No.2 by
demanding further dowry of one crore rupees. They further pressurised       D
to solemnise the marriage of Vanshika as per Punjabi rites and
ceremonies, on which pressure, marriage was solemnised on 06.11.2012
in Gurudwara at Sector 37, Noida as per Punjabi rites and ceremonies.
Further allegations are that family members of Nayan Chopra kept on
threatening Vanshika to desert her and on 01.12.2013 Nayan Chopra
threw Vanshika out of house and since then Vanshika is residing with        E
respondent No.2. Another set of allegations are with regard to incident
dated 08.11.2014 alleged to have been taken place at 6.00 PM near the
Gurudwara, Sector-18, Noida. It is alleged that Rajesh Chopra, father
of Nayan Chopra called the respondent No.2 to talk about their problem
on which date Rajesh Chopra again repeated his demand of one crore          F
rupees and used filthy words against Vanshika to which respondent No.2
objected, on which Rajesh Chopra and his associates became annoyed
and they abused and beat the respondent No.2 and snatched his gold
chain from his neck and Rs.60,000/- from his pocket. The above two
sets of allegations have given rise to summoning order. The summoning
order passed by the Magistrate on 17.01.2017 is as follows:-                G
                                 “ORDER
      The accused persons Nayan Chopra, Rajesh Chopra, Rashi
      Chopra, Amit Chopra, Kuldeep Gandhi & Anita Gandhi are
                                                                            H
1142            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 6 S.C.R.


 A           summoned for the offence under Sections 498A, 323, 504, 506 of
             IPC and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act. The complainant is directed to
             take steps as per Rules within one week. Case is fixed for
             08.03.2017 for appearance.
                                                                Sd/- illegible
 B                                                               17.01.2017
                                                                      (Vikas)
                                                   Civil Judge (Jr. Division)
                                                J.M. Gautam Budh Nagar.”


 C            10. One of the submissions, which has been pressed by learned
       counsel for the respondent No.2 is that Magistrate has to be satisfied
       that there are grounds for proceeding and there is no requirement of
       giving any elaborate reasons for summoning the accused.
            11. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on
 D     Dy. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports Vs. Roshanlal Agarwal
       & Ors., (2003) 4 SCC 139, this Court in paragraph No. 9 of the
       judgment laid down following:-
             “9. In determining the question whether any process is to be issued
             or not, what the Magistrate has to be satisfied is whether there is
 E           sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether there is sufficient
             ground for conviction. Whether the evidence is adequate for
             supporting the conviction, can be determined only at the trial and
             not at the stage of inquiry. At the stage of issuing the process to
             the accused, the Magistrate is not required to record reasons.
             This question was considered recently in U.P. Pollution Control
 F           Board v. Mohan Meakins Ltd., (2000) 3 SCC 745 and after
             noticing the law laid down in Kanti Bhadra Shah v. State of
             W.B., (20000 1 SCC 722, it was held as follows: (SCC p. 749,
             para 6)
               The legislature has stressed the need to record reasons in certain
 G             situations such as dismissal of a complaint without issuing
               process. There is no such legal requirement imposed on a
               Magistrate for passing detailed order while issuing summons.
               The process issued to accused cannot be quashed merely on
               the ground that the Magistrate had not passed a
               speaking order.”
 H
 RASHMI CHOPRA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.                               1143
              [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

       12. Same proposition was reiterated by this Court inNupur Talwar       A
Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr., (2012) 11 SCC 465.
There can be no dispute to the above proposition as laid down by this
Court that while taking cognizance of an offence, a Magistrate is not
required to pass a detailed order, however, in a case when Magistrate
issues process against a person, who is not even charged with the offence
                                                                              B
for which he is summoned, whether in such cases also the summoning
order cannot be assailed?
      13. In the present case, there are two sets of allegations, which
are contained in the complaint, which has also been repeated in the
statements recorded by respondent No.2 and his two witnesses – PW1
– Raj Kumar, brother of respondent No.2 and PW2 – Deepa, wife of              C
respondent No.2. One set of allegations of offence under Section 498A
and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act and second set of allegations are allegations
made for offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506 of I.P.C.
       14. We may first take up the allegations for offences under Sections
323, 504 and 506 of I.P.C. The allegations under Sections 323, 504 and        D
506 has been made citing the incident dated 08.11.2014. It is useful to
extract the entire allegations pertaining to incident dated 08.11.2014 from
the complaint, which are to the following effect:-
      “…………………..On 08.11.2014 at about 6 p.m. Nayan
      Chopra’s father Rajesh Chopra called the Applicant near the             E
      Gurudwara at Sector 18, Noida to talk about their problem. When
      the Applicant reached there for talk then he met there Rajesh
      Chopra alongwith two unknown persons. When the Applicant
      requested Rajesh Chopra to accept his daughter the Rajesh Chopra
      again repeated his demand of one core Rupees and said that if he        F
      has arranged for one crore Rupees then he can send his daughter
      at their home, otherwise keep Vanshika at his house and Rajesh
      Chopra used filthy words against Vanshika, then the Applicant
      objected for the same, on which Rajesh Chopra and his associates
      became annoyed and they abused and beat the Applicant and
      snatched his gold chain from his neck and Rs.60,000/- from his          G
      pocket. The wife of the Applicant and a number of other people
      gathered at the spot and saved the Applicant from them. While
      leaving these persons threatened the Applicant that after arranging

                                                                              H
1144            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 6 S.C.R.


 A           for one crore Rupees he can send his daughter at their house,
             otherwise keep her at his house and if he dare to inform the police
             then they will kill the Applicant and his daughter Vanshika…….”
              15. In the statement made by the complainant in support of his
       submission, complainant repeated the same allegations regarding incident
 B     dated 08.11.2014 as made in the complaint, as noted above. PW-2,
       Deepa, wife of respondent No.2 has also about the incident dated
       08.11.2014 repeated the allegations as narrated in the complaint. A perusal
       of the allegations in the complaint makes it clear that the complaint with
       regard to offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506 has been made only
       against Rajesh Chopra and two unknown persons. Neither in the
 C     complaint nor statements made by complainant or his witnesses, there is
       any allegation with regard to above offences against any other appellants
       before us. There being no allegations for offences under Sections 323,
       504 and 506 in the complaint or statement before the Magistrate, there
       was no question of summoning the other appellants for offences under
 D     Sections 323, 504 and 506 of I.P.C. When the complaint does not allege
       any offence against other appellants, we fail to see that how the
       cognizance of the complaint can be taken against other appellants with
       regard to offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506. In above view of
       the matter, the complaint as well as summoning order are liable to be
       quashed against all the appellants except Rajesh Chopra due to the above
 E     reasons in above regard.
              16. Now, we come to the allegations in the complaint under Section
       498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act. Learned counsel for the respondent
       in support of his submission that power of the High Court under Section
       482 Cr.P.C. has to be exercised in exceptional circumstances, has relied
 F     on judgment of this Court in Rakhi Mishra Vs. State of Bihar and
       Others, (2017) 16 SCC 772. This Court in the above case has relied
       on an earlier judgment of this Court in Sonu Gupta Vs. Deepak Gupta,
       (2015) 3 SCC 424, in which judgment, in paragraph No.8 following
       proposition was laid down, which has been referred to and relied on:-
 G           “8. … At the stage of cognizance and summoning the Magistrate
             is required to apply his judicial mind only with a view to take
             cognizance of the offence … to find out whether a prima facie
             case has been made out for summoning the accused persons. At
             this stage, the learned Magistrate is not required to consider the
 H           defence version or materials or arguments nor is he required to
 RASHMI CHOPRA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.                              1145
              [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

      evaluate the merits of the materials or evidence of the complainant,   A
      because the Magistrate must not undertake the exercise to find
      out at this stage whether the materials would lead to conviction or
      not.”
      17. This Court in Rakhi Mishra’s case has also laid down that
High Court in exceptional circumstances can exercise power under             B
Section 482 Cr.P.C. when a prima facie case is not made out against the
accused. Paragraph No.5 of the judgment is as follows:-
      “5. The order passed by the trial court taking cognizance against
      R-2 and R-4 to R-9 is in conformity with the law laid down in the
      above judgment. It is settled law that the power under Section         C
      482 CrPC is exercised by the High Court only in exceptional
      circumstances only when a prima facie case is not made out against
      the accused. The test applied by this Court for interference at the
      initial stage of a prosecution is whether the uncontroverted
      allegations prima facie establish a case.”
                                                                             D
       18. Learned counsel for the appellant has also relied on various
judgments of this Court in support of his submissions. In K. Subba Rao
and Others Vs. State of Telangana, (2018) 14 SCC 452, this Court
laid down following in paragraph Nos. 5 and 6:-
      “5. A perusal of the charge-sheet and the supplementary charge-        E
      sheet discloses the fact that the appellants are not the immediate
      family members of the third respondent/husband. They are the
      maternal uncles of the third respondent. Except the bald statement
      that they supported the third respondent who was harassing the
      second respondent for dowry and that they conspired with the
      third respondent for taking away his child to the U.S.A., nothing      F
      else indicating their involvement in the crime was mentioned. The
      appellants approached the High Court when the investigation was
      pending. The charge-sheet and the supplementary charge-sheet
      were filed after disposal of the case by the High Court.
      6. Criminal proceedings are not normally interdicted by us at the      G
      interlocutory stage unless there is an abuse of the process of a
      court. This Court, at the same time, does not hesitate to interfere
      to secure the ends of justice. See State of Haryana v. Bhajan
      Lal, 1992 Suppl. (1) SCC 335. The courts should be careful in
      proceeding against the distant relatives in crimes pertaining to
                                                                             H
1146            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2019] 6 S.C.R.


 A           matrimonial disputes and dowry deaths. The relatives of the
             husband should not be roped in on the basis of omnibus allegations
             unless specific instances of their involvement in the crime are
             made out. See Kans Raj v. State of Punjab, (2000) 5 SCC 207
             and Kailash Chandra Agrawal v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC
             551"
 B
              19. This Court in Vineet Kumar and Others Vs. State of Uttar
       Pradesh and Another, (2017) 13 SCC 369 had occasion to examine
       the parameters of exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in respect
       of quashing of criminal proceeding. One of us (Justice Ashok Bhushan)
       speaking for the Bench after examining the scope and ambit of Section
 C     482 Cr.P.C. laid down following in Paragraph Nos. 22 to 25:-
             “22. Before we enter into the facts of the present case it is
             necessary to consider the ambit and scope of jurisdiction under
             Section 482 CrPC vested in the High Court. Section 482 CrPC
             saves the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders
 D           as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code,
             or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to
             secure the ends of justice.
             23. This Court time and again has examined the scope of
             jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC and laid
 E           down several principles which govern the exercise of jurisdiction
             of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC. A three-Judge Bench
             of this Court in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, (1977) 2
             SCC 699, held that the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding
             if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue
 F           would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of
             justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. In para 7
             of the judgment, the following has been stated: (SCC p. 703)
                “7. … In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court
                is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion
 G              that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of
                the process of the court or that the ends of justice require that
                the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High
                Court’s inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is
                designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a
                court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a
 H
RASHMI CHOPRA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.                             1147
             [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

     weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the          A
     veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the
     material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and
     the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding
     in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the
     ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered
                                                                           B
     according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling
     necessity for making these observations is that without a proper
     realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which
     seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do
     justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible
     to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction.”   C
   24. The judgment of this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan
   Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, has elaborately considered the
   scope and ambit of Section 482 CrPC. Although in the above
   case this Court was considering the power of the High Court to
   quash the entire criminal proceeding including the FIR, the case        D
   arose out of an FIR registered under Sections 161, 165 IPC and
   Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. This Court
   elaborately considered the scope of Section 482 CrPC/Article
   226 of the Constitution in the context of quashing the proceedings
   in criminal investigation. After noticing various earlier
   pronouncements of this Court, this Court enumerated certain             E
   categories of cases by way of illustration where power under
   Section 482 CrPC can be exercised to prevent abuse of the process
   of the Court or secure the ends of justice.
   25. Para 102 which enumerates 7 categories of cases where power
   can be exercised under Section 482 CrPC is extracted as follows:        F
   (Bhajan Lal case, SCC pp. 378-79)
     “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
     relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the
     principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions
     relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article     G
     226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which
     we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the
     following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein
     such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the
     process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice,      H
1148   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 6 S.C.R.


 A     though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly
       defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or
       rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of
       cases wherein such power should be exercised.
       (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report
 B     or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and
       accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any
       offence or make out a case against the accused.
       (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and
       other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose
 C     a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police
       officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an
       order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of
       the Code.
       (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or
 D     complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same
       do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a
       case against the accused.
       (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a
       cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence,
 E     no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order
       of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the
       Code.
       (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so
       absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no
 F     prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is
       sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
       (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the
       provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a
       criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
       continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific
 G
       provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious
       redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
       (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with
       mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted
 H
 RASHMI CHOPRA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.                              1149
              [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

         with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused       A
         and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
     20. After referring to several other cases, this Court concluded
and made following observations in Paragraph No. 41:-
      “41. Inherent power given to the High Court under Section 482
      CrPC is with the purpose and object of advancement of justice.         B
      In case solemn process of Court is sought to be abused by a
      person with some oblique motive, the Court has to thwart the
      attempt at the very threshold. The Court cannot permit a
      prosecution to go on if the case falls in one of the categories as
      illustratively enumerated by this Court in State of Haryana v.         C
      Bhajan Lal. Judicial process is a solemn proceeding which cannot
      be allowed to be converted into an instrument of operation or
      harassment. When there are materials to indicate that a criminal
      proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and proceeding
      is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive, the High Court
      will not hesitate in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482    D
      CrPC to quash the proceeding under Category 7 as enumerated
      in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, which is to the following
      effect: (SCC p. 379, para 102)
         “102. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
         with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously           E
         instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on
         the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and
         personal grudge.”
      Above Category 7 is clearly attracted in the facts of the present
      case. Although, the High Court has noted the judgment of State         F
      of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, but did not advert to the relevant
      facts of the present case, materials on which final report was
      submitted by the IO. We, thus, are fully satisfied that the present
      is a fit case where the High Court ought to have exercised its
      jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC and quashed the criminal           G
      proceedings.”
      21. The criminal prosecution can be allowed to proceed only when
a prima facie offence is disclosed. This Court has observed that judicial
process is a solemn proceeding which cannot be allowed to be converted
                                                                             H
1150             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 6 S.C.R.


 A     into an instrument of oppression or harassment. If High Court finds that
       proceedings deserve to be quashed in parameters as laid down by this
       Court in State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335,
       High court shall not hesitate in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482
       Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings.
 B            22. Now, we revert back to the allegations made in the complaint
       under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act. Few facts have to be
       noticed before we look into the allegations made in the complaint in the
       above regard. The complaint has been filed by the respondent No.2
       before the C.J.M., Gautam Budh Nagar on 10.05.2015, before which
       date, the petition for divorce has already been filed by Nayan Chopra on
 C     23.10.2014 before the Circuit Court for the County of Kalamazoo Family
       Division, Michigan. It is on the record that at the time of filing of the
       complaint Vanishka Bobal was living at Canada whereas Nayan Chopra
       was living at U.S.A. Both were separately living. It was pleaded in the
       application for divorce that husband and wife had separated on or around
 D     November, 2013. It is on the record that on the day criminal complaint
       was filed on 10.05.2015 in the Court of C.J.M. Gautam Budh Nagar by
       respondent No.2, neither Vanishka was in India nor she was in India at
       the time when statements were recorded in complaint of complainant as
       well as his two witnesses. The complaint is not by Vanishka but it has
       been filed by father of Vanishka, respondent No.2. In the divorce
 E     application filed in the State of Michigan, Vanishka Bobal was represented
       by her attorney. The divorce was granted with orders relating to alimony,
       pension benefits and retirement benefits, life insurance, property
       settlement and provision in lieu of dower, mutual release of claims and
       other aspects on 24.02.2016.
 F            23. There is nothing on the record to indicate that orders of divorce
       between the parties was brought into the notice of the Magistrate when
       he issued process against the appellants. We, however, are in agreement
       with the submission of Shri Santosh Krishan that decree of divorce
       between Nayan Chopra and Vanshika shall not wipe out any criminal
 G     offence, which has been committed within the meaning of I.P.C. or
       D.P.Act and the criminal offence committed in jurisdictional court has to
       be examined despite the divorce decree having been granted.
             24. Coming back to the allegations in the complaint pertaining to
       Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act. A perusal of the complaint
 H
 RASHMI CHOPRA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.                                1151
              [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

indicates that the allegations against the appellants for offence under        A
Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act are general and sweeping.
No specific incident dates or details of any incident has been mentioned
in the complaint. The complaint having been filed after proceeding for
divorce was initiated by Nayan Chopra in State of Michigan, where
Vanshika participated and divorce was ultimately granted.A few months
                                                                               B
after filing of the divorce petition, the complaint has been filed in the
Court of C.J.M., Gautam Budh Nagar with the allegations as noticed
above. The sequence of the events and facts and circumstances of the
case leads us to conclude that the complaint under Section 498A and
Section 3/4 of D.P. Act have been filed as counter blast to divorce petition
proceeding in State of Michigan by Nayan Chopra.                               C
       25. There being no specific allegation regarding any one of the
applicants except common general allegation against everyone i.e. “they
started harassing the daughter of the applicant demanding additional
dowry of one crore” and the fact that all relatives of the husband, namely,
father, mother, brother, mother’s sister and husband of mother’s sister        D
have been roped in clearly indicate that application under Section 156(3)
Cr.P.C. was filed with a view to harass the applicants. Further, prior to
filing of the application under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. there was no
complaint at any point of time by the girl or her father making allegation
of demand of any dowry by any one of the applicants. When both Nayan
Chopra and Vanshika started living separately since November, 2013,            E
had there been any dowry demand or harassment the girl would have
given complaint to Police or any other authority. Further, in the divorce
proceedings at Michigan, U.S.A., parties have agreed for dividing their
properties including gifts given at marriage but no complaint was made
in those proceedings regarding harassment by her husband or his family         F
members. The judgment of the divorce contains following clauses
regarding “Property Settlement and Provision in Lieu of Dower”:
                 “PROPERTY SETTLEMENT AND
                 PROVISION IN LIEU OF DOWER
                                                                               G
           1. Each party affirms that he or she fully and accurately
      disclosed all the assets owned by him or her in which he or she
      has any interest. By affixing their signatures on this Judgment,
      Plaintiff and Defendant affirm that each has disclosed all assets

                                                                               H
1152      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2019] 6 S.C.R.


 A     each owns or has any interest in, whether held by him or her
       individually, by both of them jointly or with any other person or
       entity, or by another person or entity for the benefit of a party.
       The property division set forth in this Judgment of Divorce is
       intended to be a distribution and allocation of all the property of
       the parties and also is intended to declare the parties’ property
 B
       interests as of entry of this Judgment of Divorce. If either party
       has failed, either intentionally or unintentionally, to disclose any of
       his or her assets, the issue of property division may be reopened
       on the motion of either party to determine and resolve the
       distribution of any previously undisclosed assets.
 C     2. It appears to the court that the parties have divided between
       them to their mutual satisfaction all articles of personal property,
       household furniture and appliances, cash, savings and checking
       accounts and vehicles except as provided below. The personal
       property as so divided shall be the sole and absolute property of
 D     the party in whose possession or under whose control each of the
       articles of personal property are now found and each shall defend
       and hold the other harmless from liability thereon.
       a. The parties agree to return all jewelry to the other party that
           they currently have in their possession, which was acquired
 E         as a result of their marriage. Plaintiff testified that he only
           had one item of jewelry and provided the only jewelry he had
           in his possession to Defendant-a single gold ring. Plaintiff
           testified she does not have any jewelry in her possession.
       b. The parties agree that their respective parents will return to
 F         the other party’s parents, all jewelry given as gifts to their
           parents and are in their parent’s possession, which was
           acquired by them as a result of the parties’ marriage. The
           parents agree to exchange at a mutually agreed upon location
           and at a mutually agreed upon time.

 G     3. Except as otherwise provided herein, each party shall be liable
       for the debts incurred by him or her after separation (11/1/2013)
       and shall defend and hold the other harmless from all liability
       thereon.


 H
RASHMI CHOPRA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.                             1153
             [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

   4. Except as provide herein, each party shall be liable for the         A
   debts in his or her name and for the debts associated with property
   awarded to him/her pursuant to the Judgment of Divorce and
   shall defend and hold the other harmless from all liability therein.
   5. Except as otherwise provided herein, each party shall retain all
   monies in their respective names, including but not limited to          B
   checking accounts, savings accounts, certificates of deposit, stocks,
   bonds, IRAs or 401Ks.
   6. There are no joint debts of the parties except as provided herein.
   7. Plaintiff, NAYAN CHOPRA, shall receive the 2013 Honda
   CRV free and clear from any claim of the Defendant, VANSHIKA            C
   BOBAL, and the Plaintiff assumes and agrees to pay the liability
   thereon and to defend and hold the Defendant harmless thereon.
   Defendant shall transfer title of such vehicles to the Plaintiff if
   transferring is needed.
   8. Plaintiff, NAYAN CHOPRA, shall receive the 2005 Toyota               D
   Camry free and clear from any claim of the Defendant,
   VANSHIKA BOBAL, and the Plaintiff assumes and agrees to
   pay the liability thereon and to defend and hold the Defendant
   harmless thereon.
   9. The provisions for each party herein made for the parties shall      E
   be in lieu of the dower or spousal right in the lands of the other
   and each shall hereafter hold their remaining lands free, clear and
   discharged from any such dower, spousal right and claim and said
   provision shall be in full satisfaction of all claims either may have
   in any property which the other owns, or may hereafter own, in          F
   which either has or may hereafter have an interest.
   10. The parties warrant that neither has incurred any debt in the
   other party’s name, or on which the other party may be liable,
   which is not expressly disposed of in this Judgment.
   11. This Judgment of Divorce shall constitute a termination of all      G
   rights of a surviving spouse including, but not limited to, homestead
   allowance, election, exempt property, settlement and family
   allowance by each party in the property of the other, and a


                                                                           H
1154             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 6 S.C.R.


 A           termination of all benefits which would otherwise pass to one
             party from the other by testate and intestate, succession or by
             virtue of any provision of any will executed prior to the entry of
             this Judgment of Divorce.”
             26. The above judgment in divorce proceedings indicates that
 B     Nayan Chopra and Vanshika have settled all issues between them
       including division of properties at the time when divorce proceedings
       were in progress at Michigan and both the parties were not in India, the
       complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. had been filed making allegation
       under Section 498A of IPC and the Dowry Prohibition Act only to harass
       and put pressure on the applicants.
 C
              27. One observation also needs to be made with regard to order
       passed by the High Court. High Court in its impugned judgment has not
       referred to allegations made in the complaint except noticing the
       summoning order has been passed and noticing the principles of law.
       This Court had occasion to consider a similar order passed by the High
 D     Court rejecting the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in Jagdish
       Prasad and Others Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another, (2019)
       2 SCC 184. In the said case also under Section 482 Cr.P.C. proceedings,
       the challenge was made to summoning order as well as entire proceedings
       of complaint case where allegations under Sections 498A and 323 IPC
 E     as well as Section 3/4 of D.P. Act were made. In paragraph No.3, the
       facts giving rise to filing the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. before
       the High Court has been noted. This Court made following observations
       in paragraph Nos.6 to 9:-
             “6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and on perusal
 F           of the record of the case we are inclined to set aside the impugned
             order and remand the case to the High Court for deciding the
             appellants’ application, out of which this appeal arises, afresh on
             merits in accordance with law.
             7. On perusal of the impugned order, we find that the Single Judge
 G           has quoted the principles of law laid down by this Court in several
             decisions relating to powers of the High Court on the issue of
             interference in cases filed under Section 482 of the Code from
             para 2 to the concluding para but has not referred to the facts of
             the case to appreciate the controversy of the case. We are,
             therefore, unable to know the factual matrix of the case after
 H
 RASHMI CHOPRA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.                                1155
              [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

      reading the impugned judgment except the legal principles laid           A
      down by this Court in several decisions.
      8. In our view, the Single Judge ought to have first set out the
      brief facts of the case with a view to understand the factual matrix
      and then examined the challenge made to the proceedings in the
      light of the principles of law laid down by this Court with a view to    B
      record the findings on the grounds urged by the appellants as to
      whether any interference therein is called for or not. We find that
      the aforementioned exercise was not done by the High Court
      while passing the impugned order.
      9. We, therefore, find ourselves unable to concur with such              C
      disposal of the application by the High Court and feel inclined to
      set aside the impugned order and remand the case to the High
      Court (Single Judge) with a request to decide the application afresh
      on merits in accordance with law keeping in view the
      aforementioned observations. Having formed an opinion to remand
      the case in the light of our reasoning mentioned above, we do not        D
      consider it proper to go into the merits of the case.”
       28. What was said by this Court in paragraph No. 7 and 8 of the
above judgment is squarely applicable in the facts of the present case
and the order of the High Court deserves to be set aside on this ground
alone.                                                                         E

       29. One of the submissions, which has been made by the learned
counsel for the appellant also needs to be considered. Learned counsel
for the appellant had submitted that complaint has not been filed by a
competent person. It is submitted that complaint is not made by Vanshika,
but has been filed only by father of Vanshika, hence it is not maintainable.   F
The above submission has been refuted by Shri Santosh Krishnan. He
submits that it is not necessary that a complaint under Section 498A
should be filed only by the victim of offence. He submits that complaint
filed by father of the victim, respondent No.2 was also fully maintainable.
Section 498A provides as follows:-                                             G
      “498A.Husband or relative of husband of a woman
      subjecting her to cruelty.—Whoever, being the husband or the
      relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty
      shall be pun-ished with imprisonment for a term which may extend
      to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
                                                                               H
1156             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2019] 6 S.C.R.


 A           Explanation.—For the purpose of this section, “cruelty” means—
            (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive
                the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger
                to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman;
                or
 B          (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a
                view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any
                unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on
                account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet
                such demand.”
 C             30. Section 498A provides for an offence when husband or the
       relative of the husband, subject her to cruelty. There is nothing in Section
       498A, which may indicate that when a woman is subjected to cruelty, a
       complaint has to be filed necessarily by the women so subjected. A
       perusal of Section 498A, as extracted above, indicates that the provision
 D     does not contemplate that complaint for offence under Section 498A
       should be filed only by women, who is subjected to cruelty by husband
       or his relative. We, thus, are of the view that complaint filed by respondent
       No.2, the father of Vanshika cannot be said to be not maintainable on
       this ground. We, thus, reject the submission of the counsel for the appellant
       that complaint filed by respondent No.2 was not maintainable.
 E
              31. In view of the foregoing discussions, insofar as the offence
       under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act is concerned, we are of
       the view that present is a case, which is covered by Category 7 as
       enumerated by State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal (supra) and the
       High Court erred in refusing to exercise its Jurisdiction under Section
 F     482 Cr.P.C. We, however, observe that in so far as allegations against
       Rajesh Chopra pertaining to Sections 323, 504 and 506 of IPC is
       concerned, there were specific allegations, which were also supported
       by the complainant and his two witnesses in the evidence,at this stage,
       this Court cannot pronounce as to whether any incident as alleged by
 G     the complainant happened on 08.11.2014 or alleged as offence by
       respondent No.2 or offence as alleged was committed by Rajesh Chopra
       or not. We, thus, are of the view that insofar as complaint pertaining to
       offence under Sections 323, 504 and 506 I.P.C. against Rajesh Chopra
       is concerned, said complaint shall be proceeded with and the order dated

 H
  RASHMI CHOPRA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ANR.                              1157
               [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

17.01.2017 is upheld to the above extent only, i.e., summoning of Rajesh      A
Chopra under Sections 323, 504 and 506.
       32. In result,
       (i) Criminal Appeal Nos.594, 598, 599, 597 and 596 of 2019 (arising
out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 8103, 8050, 8052, 8042 and 8041 of 2018) are
allowed. The complaint as well as summoning order dated 17.01.2017            B
is set aside insofar as the appellants in the above-mentioned criminal
appeals are concerned.
        (ii) Criminal Appeal No.595 of 2019 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.
8039 of 2018 – Rajesh Chopra Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr.)
is partly allowed. The complaint as well as summoning order is set aside      C
insofar as offence under Section 498A and Section 3/4 of D.P. Act is
concerned, however, complaint shall proceed insofar as offence under
Sections 323, 504 and 506 of I.P.C. and summoning order to that extent
only is upheld.
                                                                              D
Kalpana K. Tripathy                                    Appeals disposed of.




                                                                              E




                                                                              F




                                                                              G




                                                                              H