Holding

A second complaint is maintainable where the first complaint was dismissed for the complainant's default and not on merits, and no conviction, acquittal or discharge has occurred.

Summary

Ranvir Singh challenged two criminal complaints filed by Smt. Ved Wati under the Prevention of Corruption Act, alleging that the first complaint (1999) and a later complaint (2002) were dismissed because the complainant failed to pay the process fee. He argued that a second complaint on the same facts could not be entertained after the first was dismissed. The Supreme Court examined whether the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) bars a fresh complaint when the earlier one was dismissed for default rather than on merits, and whether the special provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act override the CrPC. Relying on earlier decisions (Pramatha Nath Talukdar, Jatinder Singh v. Ranjit Kaur, etc.), the Court held that there is no statutory bar to filing a second complaint if the first was dismissed for the complainant’s default and no conviction, acquittal or discharge resulted. The special statute does not displace the general procedural rules. Consequently, both complaints were deemed maintainable and the Special Leave Petitions were dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether a second criminal complaint on the same facts and parties is maintainable when the first complaint was dismissed for the complainant's failure to pay process fees and not on merits.
Whether the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, as a special statute, override the procedural provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, in this context.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 80
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 202, s. 203, s. 362
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988s. 11, s. 13, s. 19, s. 7, s. 8, s. 9

Subjects

second complaintcomplaint dismissal for defaultCrPC s.203Prevention of Corruption Actmaintainabilityspecial leave petitionprocess feedouble jeopardy

Judgment

[2009) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 1063

4 .
RANVIR SINGH A
v.
STATE OF HARYANA & ANR.
(SLP (Criminal) Nos. 670-671 of 2008)
SEPTEMBER 1, 2009
B
[ALTAMAS KABIR AND CYRIAC JOSEPH, JJ.]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.203 - Complaint
under provisions of Prevention of Corruption Act - Dismissal
of, for failure on the part of the complainant to put in process C
for effecting service - Second complaint - Maintainability of
- Held: Cr.P.C. does not bar filing of second complaint, if the
first complaint did not result in conviction, acquittal or
discharge of the accused - Second complaint would be
·- maintainable if first one was dismissed on account of default D
on the part of complainant.

The question for consideration, in the present case
was whether second complaint on the same Issue
between same parties would be maintainable when the
earlier one had not been dismissed on merits, but for the E
failure of the complainant to put in process fees for
effecting service.

Dismissing the Special Leave Petitions, the Court
F
HELD: 1.1. Even if a complaint was dismissed u/s.
203 Cr.P.C., a second complaint would still lie under
exceptional. circumstances. The question of making a
prayer for recalling the order of dismissal would not be
maintainable before the Magistrate in view of s. 362 G
, Cr.P .C .. But in the instant case, neither have the
1 complaints being dismissed on merit nor have they been
dismissed at the stage of s. 203 Cr.P .C. On the other
hand, only on being satisfied of a prima facie case, the
1063 H
.
).

1064 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A Magistrate had issued process on the complaint. [Para - >-
14] [1070-H; 1071-A-B]

1.2. In the absence of any provision in Cr.P.C. barring
,,,.. a second complaint being filed on the same allegation,
there would be no bar to a second complaint being filed
B
on the same facts if the first complaint did not result in
the conviction or acquittal or even discharge of the
accused, and if the dismissal was not on merit but on
account of a default on the part of the complainant. [Para
14] [1071-C-E]
c
Pramatha Nath Talukdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar AIR
1962 SC 876; Jatinder Singh v. Ranjit Kaur 2001 (2) SCC
570, relied on.

D Poonam Chand Jain v. Fazru 2005 SCC (Cri) 190;
Di/awar Singh v. Parvinder Singh 2005 (12) SCC 709,
referred to.

Case Law Reference:

E 2005 sec (Cri) 190 Referred to. Para 6
2005 (12) sec 109 Referred to. Para 7
AIR 1962 SC 876 Relied on. Para 14
2001 (2) sec 570 Relied on. Para 14
F
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISD' '.:TION : Si..P (Criminal) 670-
671 of 2008.

From the Judgment & Order dated 31.5.2007. of the High
Court of Punjab and Haryana at rhandigarh in Criminal Misc.
G
6703-M of 2000 and 598-M of 2005.

· Ranvir Singh (Petitioner-in-person.)

M.A. Chinnasamy, T.V. George, Gautam Awasthi,
H
RANVIR SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA & ANR. 1065

.( . Prashant Kr. Sharma and S.S. Sangwan for the Respondent. A
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

ALTAMAS KABIR, J. 1. These Special Leave Petitions
arise out of the judgment and order passed by the Punjab &
Haryana High Court on 31st May, 2007, dismissing two criminal B
revision cases, viz., Crl. Misc. No.6703-M of 2000 and Crl.
rt Misc. No.598-M of 2005 filed by the petitioner herein, who is
appearing in-person. Crl. Misc. No.6703-M of 2000 was filed
by the petitioner herein to quash a complaint filed by Smt. Ved
Wati, Respondent No.2 herein, on 1st July, 1999, under Section c
420/34 l.P.C. on allegations of payment having been received
by the petitioner to perform certain favours for the complainant's
son-in-law by making use of his official position. Process was
issued by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Rohtak, Haryana, on
l,
the said complaint on 19th August, 1999. The said matter is D
still pending before the learned Magistrate.
2. The Crl. Misc. No.598-M of 2005 was filed by the
petitioner for quashing another complaint filed by the said Smt.
Ved Wati on 29th September, 2003, under Sections 7, 8, 9,
E
11 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, wherein
the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak, issued process
on 8th January, 2004. Both the Criminal Revision Petitions were
taken up for hearing and disposal together by the High Court
on 31st May, 2007, and were dismissed by a common
judgment and order, which has been assailed in these Special
F
Leave Petitions.

3. The petitioner, who appeared in-person, submitted that
the High Court had erred in rejecting the revisional applications
filed by him since in the first complaint filed on 1st July, 1999, G
the complainant had stated that sanction was being sought for
prosecuting the petitioner, but such sanction had never been
obtained.
4. The petition~r also submitted that thereafter the
H
1066 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A
complainant applied for sanc:tion to prosecute the petitioner
under the provisions of the Pn.~vention of Corruption Act, 1988,
on four different occasions, buit such sanction was not granted
while the petitioner remain~d in service. The petitioner
ultimately retired from service on 31st January, 2002.
8
Immediately thereafter, on 8th l\pril, 2002, the complainant filed
the complaint mentioned hereinabove under the provisions of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988,·on 8th April, 2002, which
was entertained by the learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Rohtak, and process was issued on 16th April, 2003. The
C petitioner further submitted that the complaint filed on 8th April,
2002, on which process had been issued on 16th April, 2003,
came to be dismissed on 24th July, 2003, for non-filing of
process fee .. The petitioner submitted that an application filed
by the compli:1inant on 18th September, 2003, for recall of the
D order dated 24th July, 2003, was dismissed by the learned
Additional Sessions Judge, ·Rohtak. Thereafter, yet another
C()rnplaint was filed by Smt. Ved Wati on 29th September,
2003, on the same grounds under the yrovisions of the
Prevention of C'?rruption Act, 198~,.>_qn w~ich process was
E issued on 8th January, 2004,. The petitioner submitted that
having taken cognizance on the complaint filed by Smt. Ved
Wati and the same having been dismiss~d for non-filing of
process fee, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rohtak,
was no longer competent to take cognizance and issue process
F on a separate complaint on the same cause of action.
According to the petitioner, the complaint filed on 29th
September, 2003, was nothing but an abuse of the process of
the Court having regard to the fact that the earlier complaint on
which cognizance had been taken was dismissed on account
G of non-filing of process fee.

5. In support of his· aforesaid submission, the petitioner
firstly referred to the decision of this Court in Pramatha Nath
Talukdar v. Saroj Ranjan Sarkar [AIR 1962 ·SC 876), wherein
the majority view of the Three-Judge Bench Was that an order
.H
RANVIR SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA & ANR. 1067
[ALTAMAS KABIR, J.]
---4, - of dismissal on a· complaint under Section 203 Cr.P .C. does A
not constitute bar to the entertainment of a second complaint
on the same facts, but it would be entertained only in
exceptional circumstances such as (i) where the previous order
was passed on an incomplete record; or (ii) on a
misunderstanding of the nature of the complaint; or (iii) it was B
manifestly absurd, unjust or fallacious or false where new facts
y
which could not with a reason!3ble diligence have been brought
on record in a previous pro~ading, have been adduced. It was
.' observed further that it could not be said in the interest of justice
that after a decision had been given against the complainant c
upon a full consideration of his case, he or any other person
should be given another opportunity to have his complaint
inquired into.
'
i,.,

)..
6. The petitioner alsd referred to the decision of this Court
in Poonam Chand Jain v. Fazru '[2005 SCC (Cri) 190), D
'. wherein a similar view was expressed relying on, among other
cases, the decision in Pramatha Nath Talukdar's case (supra).
· 7. The petitioner then contended that the complaint under
the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, is a E
special Statute and would have an overriding effect over the
general provisions contained in the Code of Criminal
r Procedure. According to the petitioner, the maxim generalia
>·
specialibus non derogent would have application and that
since a special provision had been made with regard to F
matters relatin~J to prevention of corruption and for other matters
connected therewith, the same would stand excluded from the
general provisions and accordingly the provisions of Section
19 of the Act would have an overriding effect over the general
provisions contained in Section 190 or 319 Cr.P.C. In support
G
of his said submission, the petitioner relied on the decision of
~ this Court in Dilawar Singh v. Parvinder Singh [2005 (12) SCC
709].

8. The petitioner lastly submitted that in any event, the
H
1068 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009] 13 (ADDL,.) S.C.R.

A. complainant after serving notice under Section 80 of the Civil - >--
Procedure Code had issued a notice on 12th June, 1999,
indicating that if sanction was not given, the complainant would
be compelled to file a suit for damages against the
Government. The petitioner submitted that it was obviously an
J3 attempt to pressurize the Government into ;granting sanction for
prosecution of the petitioner under the provisions of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The petitioner submitted
that both the complaints filed on 1st July, 1999 and 29th Y'
j ~
September, 2003, without the sanction under Section 19 of the
c Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, were not maintainable,
particularly when the earlier complaint on the same cause of
action had been dismissed.

9. The petitioner also urged that .sin~e under Section 362
of the Code of Criminal Procedure the learned Additional ....
D Sessions Judge was not competent to recall and/or review his
earlier order, he was not competent to entertain the second .""' .,,
complaint on the same set of facts and between the same
parties. In support of his submissions, the petitioner relied on
the decision of this Court in Sankatha Singh v. State of U.P.
E (1962 Supp. (2) SCR 817), which dealt with the provisions of
Sections 369 and 424 of the 1898 Code which is pari materia
with the provisions of Section 362 of the present Code. The
petitioner submitted that this Court had specifically observed .,,
that inherent powers of the Court could not. be exercised to do
. -l
F something which the Code specifically prohibited the Court from
doing.

10. Appearing for the complainant, Smt. Ved Wati, Mr. S.S.
Sangwan, learned Advocate, submitted that while a Magistrate
could not exercise any inherent jurisdiction to restore a case
G
after the discharge or acquittal of an accused, a second
complaint could be entertained if the same could be tried within
the limitations imposed by this Court in Pramatha Nath '~
Talukdar's case (supra). Relying on the decision of this Court
in Maj. Gen. A.S. Gauraya & Anr. v. S.N. Thakur & Anr. [AIR
H

'
' '
'
RANVIR SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA & ANR. 1069
[ALTAMAS KABIR, J.]
1986 SC 1440], Mr. Sangwan submitted that it had been held A
_..., · in the said decision that filing of a second complaint is nof the
same thing as reviving a dismissed complaint after recalling
/
the earlier order of dismissal. Mr. Sangwan, therefore, urged
that there was no legal bar to a second complaint being
entertained by the Magistrate if it could be brought within the 8
parameters of the exceptions culled out in Pramatha Nath
Talukdar's case (supra).

11. On behalf of the State, it was sobmitted by Mr. Gautam
Awasthi, learned Advocate, that apart from the various
decisions mentioned hereinabove regarding the competence C
of the learned Magistrate to entertain the second complaint,
right from the decision in Pramatha Nath Talukdar's case
(supra), any doubt as to whether a second complaint could be
__.,. entertained by the Magistrate if an earlier complaint was
.>-- dismissed not on merits but on account of default on the part D
~ . of the complainant, had been dispelled by the decision of this
Court in Jatinder Singh v. Ranjit Kaur [2001 (2) SCC 570],
wherein while considering the earlier decisions, including the
decision in Pramatha Nath Talukdar's case (supra), this Court
spelt out the distinction between Sections 202 and 203 Cr.P.C. E
in arriving at a finding that dismissal of a complaint on grounds
of default was no bar for a fresh complaint being filed on the
same set of facts. This Court held that under Section 202 of
't the Code a :Magistrate conducts an inquiry before issuing
.> process, for the purposes of determining whether there. was F
sufficient ground for proceeding, whereas Section 203 of the
Code empowered him to dismiss a complaint after holding
such inquiry, if he was of the view that there was no sufficient
ground of proceeding. In such an event, the Magistrate was
required to record reasons as to why there was no sufficient G
ground. for proceeding though an elaborate order was not
required to be given. But, there is mo provision in the Code
~1 which debars a complainant from preferring a second
complaint on the same allegations if the first complaint did not
H
1070 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2009) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A result in the conviction or acquittal or even discharge. This Court
~)...
observed further that if the dismissal of the complaint was not
on merit but on default of the complainant to be present, there
could be no bar in the complainant moving the Magistrate again
with the second complaint on the same facts. However, 1this
B Court made a distinction in respect of a dismissal under
Section 203 of the Code on merits on the basis ~\an inquiry
conducted under Section 202 thereof. Relying on the
observations made in Pramatha Nath Talukdar's case (supra), y
it was held that in such a case the second complaint on the t •

c same facts cannot be made unless very exceptional
circumstances existed.

12. Mr. Awasthi submitted that since a prima facie case
had been made out for issuance of process in the first complaint
in which process was issued on 19th August, 1999, the High
D Court had rightly rejected the petitioner's prayer for quashing "'""'
~
the same. Even with regard to the subsequent complaint in
which process was issued by the learned Additional Sessions
. .
Judge, Rohtak, on 8th January, 2004, there was no bar to the
filing of a second complaint when the earlier complaint had not
E resulted in either conviction, acquittal or discharge.

13. The main quest!on which emerges for decision in
these special leave petitions is whether a second complaint on
the same cause of action and between the same parties would 1
F lie, when· an earlier application had been dismissed. In the .(

instant case, the question is narrowed down further as to
whether such a second complaint would be maintainable when
the earlier one had not been dismissed on merits, but for the
failure of the complainant to put iii process fees for effecting ·
service.
G
14. The answer has been provided firstly in Pramatha Nath
Talukdar's case (supra), wherein this Court had held that even .r:
if a complaint was dismissed under Section 203 Cr.P.C., a
second complaint would still lie under exceptional
H
RANVIR SINGH v. STATE OF HARYANA & ANR. 1071
[ALTAMAS KABIR, J.]

circumstances, indicated herein-before. The said view has been A
...4..
, consistently upheld in subsequent decisions of this Court. Of
\ course, the question of making a prayer for recalling the order
of dismissal would not be maintainable before the learned
Magistrate in view of Section 362 Cr.P.C., but such is not the
case in these special leave petitions. In these cases, neither B
have the complaints been dismissed on merit nor have they
been dismissed at the stage of Section 203 Cr.P.C. On the
l' other hand, only on being satisfied of a prima facie case, the
~ )
learned Magistrate had issued process on the complaint. The
said situation is mainly covered by the decision of this Court c
in Jatinder Singh's case (supra), wherein the decision in
Pramatha Nath Talukdar's case (supra) was also taken into
consideration and it was categorically observed that in the
absence of any provision in the Code barring a second
complaint being filed on the same allegation, there would be
D
't
* no bar to a second complaint being filed on the same facts if
the first complaint did not result in the conviction or acquittal or
even discharge of the accused, and if the dismissal was not
on merit but on account of a default on the part of the
complainant.
E
15. As far as the first complaint under Section 420/341.P.C.
is concerned, the petitioner has not seriously questioned the
t order of the High Court rejecting the petitioner's prayer for
quashing the same. The petitioner confined his case mainly to

..
-.
.> .
the complaint wherein the learned Sessions Judge took
cognizance and issued process under the provisions of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, despite an earlier complaint
F

on the same ground and on the same set of facts having been
... dismissed earlier for non-filing of process fees .
G
16. We are unable to appreciate the submissions made
on behalf of the petitioner, since the law with regard to the filing
of a second complaint is now crystalised. It is well-settled that
such a complaint is maintainable in different circumstances as
enumerated in Pramatha Nath Talukdar's case and Jatinder
H
1
1072 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2009) 13 (ADDL.) S.C.R.

A Singh's case (supra). We, therefore, have no hesitation in
dismissing both the Special Leave Petitions, since we are of
the view that both the complaints are maintainable and the
impugned judgment of the High Court does not warrant any
_interference.
B
17. The Special Leave Petitions are, accordingly,
dismissed.

K.K.T. Special Leave Petitions dismissed.