RANVEER YADAVversusSTATE OF BIHAR

                    [2010] 6 S.C.R. 1073


                     RANVEER YADAV                               A
                               v.
                     STATE OF BIHAR
             (Criminal Appeal No. 188 of 2009)

                        MAY 12, 2010
                                                                 B
   . [G.S. SINGHVI AND ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, JJ.)

         Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 - ss. 12(1) explanation,
   2(c){ii), 19(1){b) - Contempt of court - Apology in contempt
   proceeding - Held: It must be bonafide and to the satisfaction C
   of the court - Apology must be offered at the earliest possible
   opportunity - Belated apology hardly shows contrition which
   is the essence of the purging of a contempt - Court may
   refuse to accept apology though not belated but is without real
   contrition and remorse and was merely tendered as a weapon D
   of defence - On facts, conviction and sentence of main
   contemnor by High Court for disrupting the court proceedings
.. which forced the judge to leave, justified - His act is a clear
   case of criminal contempt in the face of the court - In show
   cause notice main contemnor did not offer any apology rather E
   tried to justify his act - Apology was offered in a subsequent
   show cause reply which was a belated apology - Supreme
   Court Rules, 1966 - Or. XX/ r. 15 (1)(e).

     BH, BM, PN and MD are accused in a Sessions trial
 case and the appellant was the witness in the case and          F
 was to be cross-examined. On the fateful day, all of them
 disrupted the proceedings by aggressively exchanging
 heated words and creating unpleasant c:;cenes in court,
 forcing the judge to leave the room.· The Additional
 Sessions Judge made a reference to High Court. The              G
 High Court treated the same as reference made under
 section 15(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and
 issued show cause notice to the contemnors. It held that
 the appellant was the main person responsible for the
                          1073                                   H
    1074   SUPREME COURT REPORTS               (2010] 6 S q.R


A disruption, who acted in a motivated and high handed
  manner. The High Court convicted the appellant for the
  contempt of lower court. He was sentenced to a simple
  imprisonment for two months with fine of Rs. 2000/-. The
  High Court accepted the unqualified apology of the other
B contemnors and let them off. Hence the appeal.

        Dismissing the appeal, the Court

         HELD: 1.1. In the facts of the case aod on the
    materials on record, it is clear that the case of the
C   appellant that in the show-cause notice which was given
    to appellant, no different role has been attributed to him
    and he cannot be treated differently by the High Court in
    the matter of awarding punishment cannot be accepted
    as the appellant's case stands on a different footing. In
D   fact the appellant took the main role in causing disruption
    and there was no lack of opportunity on his part in
    answering the charges against him. The charges put
    against him must be read in a practical sense and cannot
    be read in a pedantic manner. All the constituents of the
E   charges were stated in the show-cause notice and the
    appellant understood the charges and gave the reply.
    Nowhere in the reply the appellant raised any difficulty
    in understanding the charges. It does not appear that any
    contention was raised by the appellant before the High
F   Court about any vagueness in the charges or about
    furnishing inadequate particulars in the charges. This
    argument of the counsel for the appellant only before this
    Court and that too without a proper factual basis cannot
    be entertained. [Para 19] [1081-F-H; 1082-A-B]

G       1.2. From the facts of the case it is clear that the
    offending acts of the appellant are specifically coming
    under section 2(c)(ii) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
    Due conduct of any judicial proceeding is a matter of high
    public importance as it is inextricably connected with rule
H
       RANVEER YADAV v. STATE OF BIHAR              1075


of law on which is based the constitutional mode of A
governance in this country. That is why the framers of the
Act preceded the expression interfere with the words
"tends to" and it has been further emphasized by
addition of word 'due' before "course of any judicial
proceedings". The legislature does not waste words. B
Therefore, every word used in section 2(c)(ii) must be
given its proper and natural meaning. Thus read, section
2(c)(ii) must be given a broad sweep so as to include
within it even any attempt to interfere with the due course
of a judicial proceeding. The word 'due' is very crucial in C
thfs context and. must mean a natural and proper course
of judicial proceeding. [Paras 21 and 22] (1082-F-H; 1083-
A]
     1.3. Section 2(c)(ii) has been enacted to protect apart ·
from sanctity, the regularity and purity of a judicial D
proceeding. It is based on principles. of high public
policy. That is why contempt power is said to be an
 inherent attribute of a Superior Court of Record. This
 power has not been given to the subordinate judiciary,
 but in an appropriate case, subordinate judiciary can E
make a reference to the High Court under section 15 (2)
of the Act. Thus, when High Court exercises its power on
a reference under section 15(2) of the Act, it is virtually
exercising the same as a guardian of the subordinate
judiciary to protect its proceedings against an outrage • F
and affront. In exercising such· power, the High Court
being a 'Court of Record' and the highest judicial
authority in the State is discharging its jurisdiction 'in
loco parentis' over subordinate judiciary in that State.
Therefore, there is something in the nature of High G
Court's power under section 15(2) of .the Act which
couples it with a duty. The duty is obviously to uphold
the rule of law. But there is a rider. Contempt power has
to be exercised with utmost caution and in an
 appropriate case and that is why High Court has been H
   1076    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010] 6 S.C.R

A entrusted with it. [Paras 23 and 24] [1083-B-E; 1084-A]

        1.4. The offending acts of the appellant constitute
   contempt in the face of Court. When contempt takes place
   in the face of the Court, peoples' faith in the
   administration of justice receives a severe jolt and
B precious judicial time is wasted. Therefore, the offending
   acts of the appellant certainly come within the ambit of
   interference with the due course of judicial proceeding
   and are a clear case of criminal contempt in the face of
   the Court. The High Court, in the impugned judgment was
c- correct in holding the appellant guilty and also in
   punishing him with the sentence it has imposed. It
   appears in the show cause notice, which was given by
   the appellant, initially he did not offer any apology. Rather
   the appellant tried to justify. The apology was offered in
D a subsequent show cause reply. Therefore, it is a belated
   apology. [Paras 25 and 26] [1084-B-E]

      1.5. Under Explanation to section 12(1) of the Act, the.
                                                              .
  Court may reject an apology if the Court finds that it was
E not made bonafide. Under section 12, it has been made
  very clear that the apology must be to the satisfaction of
  the Court. Therefore, it is not incumbent upon the Court
  to accept the apology as soon as it is offered. Before an
  apology can be accepted, the Court must find that it is
  bonafide and is to the satisfaction of the Court. However,
F Court cannot reject an apology just because it is qualified
  and conditional provided the Court finds it is bonafide.
  [Para 27] [1084-E-G]

      1.6. An apology in a contempt proceeding must be
G offered at the earliest possible opportunity. A belated
  apology hardly shows the 'contrition which is the
  essence of the purging of a contempt'. Apart from belated
  apology in many cases such apology is not accepted
  unless it is bonafide. Even if it is not belated where
H apology is without real contrition and remorse and was
           RANVEER YADAV v. STATE OF BIHAR                 1077


 merely tendered as a weapon of defence, the Court may               A
 refuse to accept it. [Paras 28, 30 and 33) [1084-G; 1085-
 8-C, F]

     1.7. The judgment of the High Court is upheld. The
 appellant is to serye the sentence in terms of the High
                                                                     8
 Court order. Notices issued on other respondents are
 discharged. [Para 34) [1085-G]

      Debabrata Bandopadhyay and Ors. vs. The State of West
 Bengal and Anr. AIR 1969 SC 189; Principal, Rajni Parekh
 Arts, K.B. Commerce and B.C.J. Science College, Khambhat            C
 and Anr. vs. Mahendra Ambalal Shah 1986 (2) SCC 560;
 Secretary, Hailakandi Bar Association vs. State of Assam and
 Anr. (1996) 9 SCC 74; Chandra Shashi vs. Anil Kumar
 Verma (1995) 1 SCC 421, referred to.
                                                                     D
                        Case Law Reference:
   AIR 1969 SC 189           Referred to.    Para 29
   1986 (2) sec 560          Referred to. Para 31

... · (1996) 9 sec 74        Referred to . Para 32                   E

   (1995) 1 sec 421          Referred to. Para 33

     CRIMINAL APP ELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
 No. 188 of 2009.
                                                                     F
     From the Judgment & Order dated 03.09.2008 of the High
 Court of judicature at Patna in Contempt Jurisdiction in Original
 CR Misc. (DB) No. 8 of 2008.

     P.S. Mishra, Kumar Rajesh Singh, Sishir Pinaki,                 G
 Thathagat H.Vardhan, Upendra Mishra, Dhruv Kr. Jha and
 Niranjana Singh for the Appellant.

    Nagendra Rai, P.H. Parekh, Gopal Singh, Manish Kumar,
 Sameer Parekh, Ajay Kumar Jha, Somanadri Gour, Pallavi
                                                                     H
    1078   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010] 6 S.C.R.


A   Srivastava (for Parehk & Co.) Shangtanu Sagar, Smarhar and
    T. Mahipal for the Respondent.

        The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

        GANGULY, J. 1. This is a statutory appeal under Section
B 19(1 )(b) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 read with Order
  XXI Rule 15(1 )(e) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 from the
  final judgment and sentence dated 3.9.2008 of the High Court
  of Patna in Original Cr. Misc.(DB) No. 8 of 2008.

c      2. The said Original Misc. (DB) No. 8 of 2008 was a
  reference through a communication dated 22.4.2008 by the 1st
  Additional Sessions Judge, Khagaria about an incident which
  happened in his Court on 13.2.2008. The High Court treated
  the same a reference made under Section 15(2) of the
0 Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter, "the Act") made by
  the 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Khagaria (hereinafter, "the
  Judge").

       3. The reference by the Judge was made for the reasor.
  that during the course of the Sessions Trial No.46/.93 on
E 13.02.2008, five of the alleged contemnors were on one side
  and the sixth contemnor, the appellant Ranveer Yadav, on the
  other side, and all of them disrupted the proceedings by
  aggressively exchanging heated words and creating unpleasant
  scenes in Court. The decorum and dignity of the Court was so
F much threatened that the Judge was forced to rise.

       4. Out of the six contemnors, Bharat Yadav, Bimal Yadav,
  Ajay Yadav, Pandav Yadav and Madan Yadav are accused in
  the Sessions Trial No. 46/93. The appellant Ranveer Yadav, an
G witness in the case and was due to be cross-examined on that
  day, i.e. 13.02.2008.

        5. The High Court on the basis of such reference issued
  notice on 11.07 .2008 to show cause why the alleged
  contemnors should not be held guilty of Criminal Contempt for
H their acts set out in the reference.
         RANVEER YADAV v. STATE OF BIHAR                      1079
            [ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, J.]

      6. In the joint affidavits filed by the first five contemnors,   A
 they tendered their apologies for creating the disturbance and
 stated that the main person responsible for the ruckus was the
 appellant, Ranveer Yadav. They stated the scene was created
 by him to delay his cross-examination.
                                                                       8
        7. The show cause submitted by Madan Yadav, who is 76
  years old and is one of the accused in the Sessions Trial No.
  46/93, is a crucial one. Madan Yadav stated that the appellant
  is the prime accused in a case of murder of Madan's son in
  1998. In that case the appellant could be produced before the
  Trial Court for the purpose of framing charges only on the orders    C
  of the High Court. Madan further stated that he had been falsely
  implicated in the criminal case which was pending before the
  Court on the basis of a police complaint containing false
. allegations made by the brother of the appellant. The main
  reason for Madan's implication is to pressurize him to withdraw      D
  the earlier case relating to the murder of his son and which is
  pending against the appellant.

      8. The High Court after noting these facts observed that
 the appellant, on many occasions came to the Trial Court with         E
 followers vtho helped him in creating a nuisance in Court. It also
 observed that several Additional Public Prosecutors had
 withdrawn themselves from criminal cases against the appellant
 in view of threats and intimidation they received from the
 appellant. On the date of incident, even the defence counsel          F
 was not spared as is apparent from the letter written by the
 defence counsel to the Presiding Officer.

       9. The High Court found that appellant had also managed
  to postpone and delay his cross-examination on various
  occasions on the pretext of illness and non-appearance on the        G
  fixed dates.

      10. It was also brought to the notice of the High Court that
  a case under Section 302 IPC in which the appellant was an
  accused had to be transferred to another district in view of         H
    1080    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2010] 6 S.C.R.


A threats and intimidation given out by the appellant.

       11. In the show cause submitted by the appellant Ranveer
  Yadav, he tried to justify his behaviour on 13 02.2008 by stating
  that on 12.12.2007, in the Court he had been informed that
  there would be a compromise. But he got miffed when the
8
  Additional Public Prosecutor made an appearance before the
  Court and he thought that the latter had appeared without the
  orders of the Public Prosecutor. On such justification of the
  appellant, High Court held that the appellant being a witness
  had nothing to do with the appearance of the public prosecutor
C and held that the appellant's misbehaviour was not justified.

         12. With regard to his failure to appear before the Court
    on 1.3.2008, the appellant stated that he was not provided the
    police protection which he had asked for.
0
        13. The High Court held that all the Contemnors were guilty
  of having committed criminal contempt and it relied on the
  letters of the two prosecution counsel as well as the defence
  counsel and came to the conclusion that the main person
E responsible for the disruption was the appellant who acted in
  a motivated and high handed manner to interfere in the due
  conduct of the proceeding.                              '

         14. High Court further held that the main culprit for the
    disruption in Court was the appellant. While accepting the
F   unqualified apology of the other five contemnors and letting
    them off with admonition and severe warning, the appellant was
    sentenced to a simple imprisonment for two months with a fine
    of Rs.2,000/- and in default the appellant was to undergo a
    further imprisonment of one month.
G
       15. This Court while issuing notice in this appeal passed
  an order dated 28.8.2009 asking the other five contemnors to
  show cause why the order of the High Court accepting their
  unconditional apology and directing them to be let off be not
H set aside. In the meantime, a further stay on the arrest of the
        RANVEER YADAV v. STATE OF BIHAR                      1081
           [ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, J.]

appellant was ordered extending the order whereby the                 A
appellant was given exemption from surrendering.

      16. The five contemnors who were let off by the High Court
filed their joint counter affidavit on 28.01.2010. While tendering
their unqualified apology, they have given the same explanation       8
as given before the High Court that the main person
responsible for the disruptions was the appellant. In Paras IV
as well as V of the counter affidavit, they have stated that the
appellant behaved in an audacious manner and abused the
counsel for the both sides and refused to be examined. They           C
have also made allegations that the appellant is a very well
connected person and has a political background with criminal
antecedents.

      17. In this case learned counsel for the appellant sought
to argue that in a contempt proceeding, the High Court cannot         D
take a different stand by punishing the appellant and letting the
other appellants go unpunished even after holding that they are
guilty of contempt.             ~


     18. Learned counsel also argued that in the show-cause           E
notice which was given to the appellant, no different role has
been attributed to him so he cannot be treated differently by
the High Court in the matter of awarding punishment.

     19. This Court is unable to appreciate the above contention
of the learned counsel for the appellant. In the facts of the case    F
and on the materials on record, it is clear that the case of the
appellant stands on a different footing. In fact the appellant took
the main role in causing disruption and there has no lack of
opportunity on his part in answering the charges against him.
The charges put against him must be read in a practical sense         G
and cannot be read in a pedantic manner. All the constituents
of the charges were stated in the show-cause notice and the
appellant has understood the charges and has given the reply.
Nowhere in the reply the appellant has raised any difficulty in
 understanding the charges. It does not appear that any               H
    1082          SUPREME OOURT REPORTS                  [2010] 6 S.C.R.


A contention was raised by the appellant before the High Court
  about any vagueness in the charges or about furnishing
  inadequate particulars in the charges. This argument of the
  learned counsel for the appellant only before this Court and that
  too without a proper factual basis cannot be entertained.
B
         20. Criminal contempt has been defined under Sedion
    2(c) of the Act. The said definition is very wide. For a proper
    appreciation of the questions involved in this case the said
    definition is set out below:-

c       "2(c). "criminal contempt" means the publication (whether
        by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible
        representation, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of
        any other act whatsoever which-

D          (i)      scandalizes or tends to scandalize, or lowers or
                    tends to lower the authority of, any court; or

           (ii)     prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with,
                    the due course of any judicial proceeding; or

E          (iii)    interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or
                    tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any
                    other manner;"

        21. From the facts of the case it is clear that in this case
F the offending acts of the appellant are specifically coming under
  Section 2(c)(ii). Due conduct of any judicial proceeding is a
  matter of high public importance as it is inextricably connected
  with rule of law on which is based the constitutional mode of
  governance in this country. That is why the framers of the Act
G preceded the expression interfere with the words "tends to" and
  it has been further emphasized by addition of word 'due' before
  "course of any judicial proceedings".

       22. We must remember that legislature does not waste
  words. Therefore, every word used in Section 2{c)(ii) must be_
H given its proper and natural meaning. Thus read, Section 2(c)(ii)
                              (

           RANVEER YADAV v. STATE OF BIHAR                    1083
              [ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, J.]

    must be given a broad sweep so as to include within it even       A
    any attempt to interfere with the due course of a judicial
    proceeding. The word 'due' is very crucial in this context and
    must mean a natural and proper course of judicial proceeding.

         23. This Court, therefore, holds that Section 2(c)(ii) has
                                                                       B
    been enacted to protect apart from sanctity, the regularity and
    purity of a judicial proceeding. This, we repeat, is based on
    principles of high public policy.· That is why contempt power is
    said to be an inherent attribute of a Superior Court of Record.
    This power has not been given to the subordinate judiciary, but C
    in an appropriate case, subordinate judiciary can make a
    reference to the High Court under Section 15 (2) of the Act, as
    has been done in this case. Thus when High Court exercises
.   its power on a reference under Section 15(2) of the Act, it is
    virtually exercising the same as a guardian of the subordinate
    judiciary to protect its proceedings against an outrage and D
    affront. In exercising such power, the High Court being a 'Court
    of Record' and the highest judicial authority in the State is
    discharging its jurisdiction 'in loco parentis' over subordinate
    judiciary in that State. Therefore, there is something in the
    nature of High Court's power under Section 15(2) of the Act E
    which couples it with a duty. The duty is obviously to uphol_d the
    rule of law. Here we may remember the views of Lord
    Chancellor Earl Cairns, who gave the concept of power coupled
    with duty, the most graceful articulation· and which I quote:
                                                                      F
        " ... But there may be something in the nature of the thing
        empowered to be done. something in the object for which
        it is to, be done, something in the conditions under which
        it is to be done, something in the title of the person or
        persons for whose benefit the power is to be exercised,       G
        which may couple the power with a duty, and make it the
        duty of the person in whom the power is reposed to
        exercise that power when called upon to do so ... "

          [Julius v. Lord Bishop of Oxford and another, 5 A.C. 214
       '. (t°i.L.) at 222-223]                                        H
    1084    SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   (201 O] 6 S.C.R.


A        24. These words resonate with a strange poignancy even
    today. But there is a rider. Contempt power has to be exercised
    with utmost caution and in an appropriate case and that is why
    High Court has been entrusted with it.

       25. The offending acts of the appellant constitute contempt
B in the face of Court. When contempt takes place in the face of
  the Court, peoples' faith in the administration of justice receives
  a severe jolt and precious judicial time is wasted. Therefore,
  the offending acts of the appellant certainly come within the
  ambit of interference with the due course of judicial proceeding
C and are a clear case of criminal contempt in the face of the
  Court.

         26. The High Court, in the impugned Judgment, therefore
    was correct in holding the appellant guilty and also in punishing
                                                                        ..
0   him with the sentence it has imposed. It appears in the show
    cause notice, which was given by the appellant, initially he did
    not offer any apology. Rather the appellant tried to justify. The
    apology was offered in a subsequent show cause reply.
    Therefore, it is a belated apology.

E        2·7_ It may be noted that under Explanation to Section 12(1)
    of the Act, the Court may reject an apology if the Court finds
    that it was not made bonafide. Under Section 12 it has been
    made very clear that the apology must be to the satisfaction of
    the Court. Therefore, it is not incumbent upon the Court to
F   accept the apology as soon as it is offered. Before an apology
    can be accepted, the Court must find that it is bonafide and is
    to the satisfaction of the Court. However, Court cannot reject
    an apology just because it is qualified and conditional provided
    the Court finds it is bonafide.
G        28. An apology in a contempt proceeding must be offered
    at the earliest possible opportunity. A belated apology hardly
    shows the 'contrition which is the essence of the purging of a
    contempt'.

H       29. This Court in the case of Oebabrata Bandopadhyay
        RANVEER YADAV v. STATE OF BIHAR                     1085
           [ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, J.]

and others vs. The State of West Bengal and another reported         A
in AIR 1969 SC 189, observed "an apology must be offered
and that too clearly and at the earliest opportunity. A person
who offers a belated apology runs the risk that it may not be
accepted for such an apology hardly shows the contrition which
is the essence of the purging of a contempt" (See para 7 page        B
193.of the report).

    30. Apart from belated apology in many cases such
apology is not accepted unless it is bonafide.

     31. Even in a case of civil contempt this Court held in the     C
case of Principal, Rajni Parekh Arts, K.B. Commerce and
B. C.J. Science College, Khambhat and another vs. Mahendra
Amba/al Shah reported in 1986 (2) SCC 560 that an apology
offered at a late stage would encourage the litigants to flout the
orders of Courts with impunity and accordingly the Court             D
refused to accept the apology (See para 7 page 566 of the
report).

     32. Equally in the case of Secretary, Hailakandi Bar
Association vs. State ,of Assam and another reported in (1996)
                                                                     E
9 sec 74, this Court in a case of criminal contempt refused
to accept an apology which was belated. The Court held that
such belated apology cannot be accepted because it has not
been given in good faith (See para 24 page 82).

     33. Even if it is not belated where apology is without real     F
contrition and remorse and was merely tendered as a weapon
of defence, the Court may refuse to accept it. (See
Chandra Shashi vs. Anil Kumar Verma, (1995) 1 SCC 421).

     34. For the reasons aforesaid, the appeal fails, the            G
judgment of the High Court is affirmed. The appellant is to serve
the sentence in terms of the High <;ourt order. Notices issued
on other respondents, namely, Bharat Yadav, Bimal Yadav, Ajay
Yadav, Pandav Yadav and Madan Yadav are discharged.

N.J.                                         Appeal dismissed.       H