Holding

Non‑compliance with Section 130(1) and the participation of the commanding officer who had a personal interest vitiated the Summary Court‑Martial, and the disproportionate sentence constituted bias and irrationality, warranting quashing of the conviction.

Summary

The appellant, a signalman in the Indian Army, was serving a 28‑day rigorous imprisonment when he was charged under Section 41(2) of the Army Act for refusing to eat food on a superior's order. A Summary Court‑Martial, presided over by the commanding officer who had previously punished him, sentenced him to one year of rigorous imprisonment and dismissal from service. The appellant challenged the trial on grounds of procedural irregularity under Section 130, bias due to the commanding officer’s participation, lack of jurisdiction because he was not in active service, and the disproportionality of the punishment. The Supreme Court held that non‑compliance with Section 130 vitiates the trial, that the commanding officer’s involvement created a real likelihood of bias rendering the proceedings coram non‑judice, and that the sentence was so disproportionate as to constitute bias and irrationality. Consequently, the Court set aside the Court‑Martial’s order, quashed the sentence, and ordered the appellant’s reinstatement with full benefits. The appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

The Court‑Martial complied with the procedural safeguard of Section 130(1) of the Army Act requiring the accused to be asked about objections to any member of the court.
Whether the participation of the commanding officer who had previously punished the appellant created a real likelihood of bias rendering the trial invalid.
Whether an accused serving a sentence and therefore not in "active service" could be tried under Section 41(2) for disobeying a lawful command.
Whether the one‑year rigorous imprisonment and dismissal were disproportionate to the alleged offence and amounted to bias or irrationality.

Legislation cited

Army Act, 1950s. 130, s. 164, s. 41
Army Rules, 1954s. 106-133
Constitution of Indias. 136, s. 226, s. 32

Subjects

Army ActCourt Martialbiasprocedural fairnessnatural justiceproportionalityjudicial reviewdisobedience of lawful commandactive servicesentencingSection 130Section 41

Judgment

RANJIT THAKUR
A
v.
UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.

OCTOBER 15, 1987

B [A.P. SEN AND M.N. VENKATACHALIAH, JJ.]

Anny Act, 1950/Army Rules, 1954: Sections 41 and 130/Ru/es
106-133-Court Martial-When proceedings vitiated-Participation of
Officer who has punished accused-Whether amounts to bias--
Soldier-Refusing to eat food-Whether amounts to disobedience of
C lawful command.

Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 32, 136 and 226-Judicial
Review-Irrationality and perversity-Extent of.

Administrative Law: Natural Justice-Fair Trial-Judgment only
D after due observance of Judicial Process-Quantum of punishment dis-
proportionate to offence-Whether conclusive evidence of bias.

Interpretation of Statutes: Procedural safeguards-Statutory
Provisions-How to be construed.
E
The appellant, a Signal Man in a Signal Regiment of the Armed
Services, while serving out a sentence of 28 days' rigorous imprison-
ment imposed on him by the Commanding Officer of the Regiment-
respondent No. 4, for violating norms for presenting representations to
higher officers, was alleged to have committed another offence by refus-
F ing to eat his food on March 29, 1985 when ordered to o;lo so. He was '
charged under section 41(2) of the Army Act, 1950 for disobeying a }-
lawful command given by his superior officer. A sentence of rigorous
imprisonment for one year was imposed by a Summary Court Martial
consisting of respondent No. 4 and others. He was removed to the civil
prison 'aud he served out the sentence.
G
The appellant's representation to the confirming authority under
section 164 of the Act was rejected by the General Officer Commanding A
on May 24, 1985.

The appellant's writ petition challenging proceedings of the Sum-
H mary Court· Martial was dismissed in limine by the High Court.
512
RANJIT v. U.0.1. 513

,;._ In the appeal by special leave, it was contended on behalf of the A
appellant that the proceedings of the Court-Martial were vitiated (i) by
a non-affording of an opportunity to challenge the constitution of the
Summary Court-Martial under section 130(1); (ii) by bias on the part of
the respondent No. 4 who participated in and dominated the proceed·
ings; (iii) by awarding a punishment so disproportionate to the offence B
as to amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias and vindictiveness;
Y and (iv) by ignoring that as the appellant was then serving-out an
earlier sentence he could not be need to be in active-service so as to be
amenable to disciplinary jurisdiction and that the appellant's refusal,
while already serving a sentence, to accept food did not amount to
disobedience under section 41, of any lawful command of a Superior C
...·
/
Officer .

Allowing the appeal,

HELD: I.I The Indian Army Act, 1950 constitutes a special law
in force conferring a special jurisdiction on· the Court· Martial prescrib· D
Ing a special procedure for the trial of the offences under the Act. The
Act and Rules constitute a self-contained Code specifying offences and
the procedure for detention, custody and trial of the offenders by the
Court· Martial. [518G·H; 519A)
E
1.2 The procedural safeguards contemplated in the Act must be
considered in the context of and corresponding to the plenitude of the
Summary jurisdiction of the Court-Martial and the severity of the con·
sequences that visit the person subject to that jurisdiction. The pro·
cedural safeguards should be commensurate with the sweep of the pow·
ers. The wider the power, the greater the need for the restraint in its
exercise ad correspondingly, more liberal the construction of the pro·
cedural safeguards envisaged by the Statute. [519B·CI

1.3 Non-compliance with the mandate of section 130 is an infir· G
mity which goes to the root of jurisdiction and without more, vitiates
the proceedings. [519F]
.A
Prithvi Pal Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 1413 relied on.

Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 referred to. H
514 SUPREME COURT REPORTS !1988] I S.C.R.

2 .1 It is the essence of a judgment that it is made after due obser-
A
vance of the judicial process; that the Court or Tribunal passing it
observes, at least the minimal requirements of natural justice, is com-
posed of impartial persons acting fairly and without bias and in good
faith. A judgment which is the result of bias or want of impartiality is a
nullity and the trial 'coram non-judice'. [520D-E]
B
Vassiliades v. Vassiliades, AIR 1945 PC 38 referred to.

2.2 As to the tests of the likelihood of bias what is relevant is the
reasonableness of the apprehension in that regard in th~ mind of the
party. The proper approach for the judge is not to look at his own mind
c and ask himself, however, honestly, "Am I biased"? but to look at the
mind of the party before him. [S20F] --+
Allinson v. General Council of Medical Education and Registra-
tion, (1894] I Q.B. 750 at 758; Metropolitan Properties Co. (F. G. C.)
D Ltd. v. Lannon, (1969] I. Q.B. 577 at 599; Public Utilities Commission of
the District of Colwnbia v. Pollack, 343 US 451 at 466 and Regina v. Liver-
pool City Justices, Ex-parte Topping, (1983] 1WLR119 referred to.

Having regard to the antecedent events, the participation of

E
respondent No. 4 in the Courts-Martial rendered the proceedings ;.c
Coram non-judice. [522Bl

3. The mere circumstance'that the appellant was at the relevant
point of time, serving a sentence of imprisonment and could not, there-
for,e, be said to be in 'active service' does not detract from the fact that
F he was still a person subject to the Act, as is clear from the second
clause of section 41(2) which refers to offences committed when not in
'active servic~', the difference being in the lesser punishment contem-
plated. [S22C-D]

4. Every aspect of life of a soldier is regulated by discipline.
G Rejection of food might, under circumstances, amount to an indirect
expression of remonstrance and resentment against the higher autho- ).
rity. To say that a mere refusal to eat food is an innocent, neutral act
might be an over simplification of the matter. Mere in-action need not
always necessarily be neutral. Serious acts of calumny could be done in
H silence. A disregard of a direction to accept food might assume the
RANJIT v. U.0.1. 515

complexion of disrespect to, and even defiance of authority. But an
A
unduly harsh and cruel reaction to the expression of the injured feelings
may be counter-productive and even by itself be subversive of disci-
pline. [522E-F]

In the instant case, appellant was perhaps expressing his anguish
at, what he considered, an unjust and disproportionate punishment for B
airing his grievances before his superior officers. [S22G]

5. Judicial review generally speaking, is not directed against a
decision, but is directed against the "decision making process". The
question of the choice and quantum of punishment is within the juris-
diction and discretion of the Court-Martial. But the sentence has to suit C
the offence and the offender. It should not be vindictive or unduly
harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the offence as to shock the
conscience and amount in itself to conclusive evidence of bias. The
doctrine of proportionality, as part of the concept of ,judicial review,
would ensure that even on an aspect which is, otherwise, within D
the exclusive province of the Court-Martial, if the decision of the
Court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of logic, then the
sentence would not be immune from correction. Irrationality and
perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review. All powers have
legal limits. [S22G-H; 523A-C]
E
Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service,
[1984] 3 Weekly Law Reports 1174 HL and Bhagat Ram v. State of
• Himachal Pradesh, A.I.R. 1983 SC 454 referred to.

In the instant case, the punishment is so strikingly disproportion-
ate as to call for and justify interference. [S23G] F

The Court order set aside. The writ petition in the High Court
allowed, and the impugned proceedings of Summary Court-Martial and
the consequent order and sentence quashed. Appellant entitled to be
reinstated with all monetary and service benefits. [S23H, 524Al G

(Note: On point 1.3 the finding is to be read with and subject to
A. the subsequent order dated 10.8.88).

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2630
of 1987. H
516 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 1 S.C.R.

A From the Judgment and Order dated 3. 7.1986 of the Patna High ).,
Court in C. W.J.C. No. 2823 of 1986.

R.N. Sinha, M.M. Prasad Sinha and P.C. Kapur for the
Appellant.

B B. Datta, Additional Solicitor General, M.S. Rao, C. Ramesh
and C. V.S. Rao for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

VENKATACHALIAH, J. This appeal, by special leave, prefer-
C red against the order dated July 3, 1986, of the Division Bench of the
Patna High Court in C.W.J.C. No. 2823 of 1986 raises a substantial
question as to the scope and content of the procedural safe-guards in
Section 130 of the Indian Army Act, 1950 ('Act') in the conduct of the
Courts-Martial.

D The High Court dismissed, in limine, the appellant's writ peti-
tion, under Article 226, challenging the proceedings dated March 30,
1985, of the Summary Court-Martial imposing the punishment of dis-
missal from service and a sentence of an year's rigorous imprisonment
on the appellant.

E 2. Appellant, Ranjit Thakur, joined the Armed Services on
September 7, 1972, and was, at the relevant time, a Signal Man in "4,
Corps Operating Signal Regiment." Apparently, appellant had not
commended himself well to respondent No. 4, who was the command-
ing officer of the regiment. On March 29, 1985, appellant was already
serving-out a sentence of 28 days' rigorous imprisonment imposed on
F him for violating the norms for presenting representations to higher
officers. Appellant is stated to have sent representation complaining of
ill-treatment at the hands of Respondent 4 directly to the higher offi-
cers. Appellant was punished for that by Respondent 4. Appellant was
held in the Quarter-guard Cell in handcuffs to serve that sentence of
rigorous imprisonment.
G
3. While so serving the sentence appellant is stated to have com-
mitted another offence on March 29, 1985, for which the punishment
now impugned was handed down by Respondent 4. The nature of this
offence had better be excerpted from the charge-sheet itself:

H "The accused No. 1429055 M Signalman Ranjit Thakur of
RANJIT v. U.0.1. [VENKATACHALIAH, J.) 517

4 Corps Operating Signal Regiment is charged with- A
Anny Act Disobeying a lawful command given by his superior officer
Section
41<2l In that he

at 15.30 hrs. on 29.5.1985 when ordered by JC 106251P Sub B
Ram Singh, the Orderly Officer of the same Regiment to
eat his food, did not do so."

.. To try this offence a Summary .Court Martial was assembled the very
next day i.e. March 30, 1985. Respondent 4 and 2 others were on the
Court-Martial. Some witnesses were examined. Appellant is stated to
have pleaded guilty. A sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one year c
was imposed, in pursuance of which appellant was removed imme-
diately to the civil prison at Tejpur to serve out the sentence. Appel-
lant has served out the sentence. He was also dismissed from service,
with the added disqualification of being declared unfit for any future
civil employment. The representation of the appellant to the confir-
ming-authority under Section 164 of the Act was rejected by General D
Officer Commanding on 24. 5. 1985.

The High Court, however, persuaded itself to dismiss, in limine,
appellant's writ petition challenging the proceedings of the Summary
Court Martial.
E

- 4. We have heard learned counsel on both sides. The matter was
adjourned on two earlier occasions on the submission of the learned
Additional Solicitor General, that the question whether a lesser
punishment was warranted was engaging the attention of the appro-
priate authorities. Apparently, nothing came out of it.
F
The submissions of Shri Sinha, in support of the appeal, admit of
being formulated thus:
(a) (i) The proceedings of the Court-Martial are vitiated by
non-compliance with the mandate of Section 130(1) of
the Act in that the Summary Court Martial did not G
afford to the appellant an opportunity to challenge its
constitution as required by that section;

(ii) The proceedings of the Court-Martial were vitiated by
bias on the part of Respondent 4 who participated in and
dominated the proceedings; H
518 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988) 1 S.C.R.

(b) In as much as the appellant was then serving a sentence of
A rigorous imprisonment, he was not in "active service" and
that no question of disobeying any lawful command could at
all arise;

(c) Appellant's refusal, while serving a sentence to accept food
B did not amount to disobedience, under Section 41, of any
lawful command of a superior officer in such manner as to
show a wilful defiance of authority;

(d) At all events, the punishment handed down is so dispro-
portionate to the offence as to amount, in itself to conclusive
..
evidence of bias and vindictiveness.
c
5. Re: contention (a):

The records of the proceedings of the Special Summary Court-
Martial do not indicate that the procedural safeguard against bias con-
D tained in Section 130 of the Act was complied with. Section 130 provides:

"130(1) At all trials by general district or summary general
court-martrial, as soon as the court is assembled, the names
of the presiding officer and members shall be read over to
the accused, who shall thereupon be asked whether he )<
E objects to being tried by any officer sitting on the court.

(2) !f the accused objects to any such officer, his objection,
and also the reply thereto of the officer objected to, shall
be heard and recorded, a1'd the remaining officers of the
Court shall, in the absence of the challenged officer decide
F on the objection."

The proceedings do not indicate-this was not disputed at the
hearing-that appellant was asked whether he objects to be tried by
any officer, sitting at the Court-Martial. This, in our opinion, imparts a
basic infirmity to the proceedings and militates against and detracts
G from the concept of a fair trial.

The "Act" constitutes a special Jaw in force conferring a special
jurisdiction on the Court-Martial prescribing a special procedure for
the trial of the offences under the 'Act'. Chapter VI of the 'Act'
comprising of sections 34 to 68 specify and define the various offences
H under the 'Act'. Sections 71 to 89 of Chapter VII specify the various
RANJIT v. U.0.1. (VENKATACHALIAH, J.] 519

punishments. Rules 106 to 133 of the Army Rules 1954 prescribe the A
procedure of, and before, the Summary Court-Martial. The Act and
the Rules consitute a self contained Code, specifying offences and the
procedure for detention, custody and trial of the offenders by the
Courts-Martial.

The procedural safe-guards contemplated in the Act must be B
considered in the context of and corresponding to the plenitude of the
Summary jurisdiction of the Court-Martial and the severity of the

.. consequences that visit the person subject to that jurisdiction. The
procedural safe-guards should be commensurate with the sweep of the
powers. The wider the power, the greater the need for the restraint in
its exercise and correspondingly, more liberal the construction of the
procedural safeguards envisaged by the Statute. The oft-quoted words C
of Frankfurter, J. in Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535 are again worth
re-calling;

" ... if dismissal from employment is based on a defined proce-
dure, even though generous beyond the requirements that o
bind such agency, that procedure must be scrupulously ob-
~~ ............................................. .

This judicially evolved rule of administrative law is now
firmly established and, if I may add, rightly so. He that
takes the procedural sword shall perish with that sword." E

"The history of liberty" said the same learned .Judge "has largely ·

- been the history of observance of procedural safeguards." (318 US
332).

We ·are afraid, the non-compliance of the mandate of section 130 F
is an infirmity which goes to the root of the jurisdiction and without
more, vitiates the proceedings. Indeed it has been so held by this
Court in Prithvi Pal Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 1413 where
Desai, J referring to the purpose of section 130 observed:

" .......... Whenever an objection is taken it has to be G
recorded. In order to ensure that anyone objected to does
not participate in disposing of the objection ........ .
A
........ This is a mandatory requirement because the
officer objected to cannot participate in the decision dis-
posing of the objection. H
520 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1988] I S.C.R.

A
....... The provision conferring a right on the accused to
object to a member of the Court-MaFtial sitting as a
member and participating in the trial ensures that a charge
of bias can be made and investigated against individual
members composing the Court-Martial. This is pre-
eminently a rational provision which goes a long way to
B ensure a fair trial."

What emerges, therefore, is that in the present case there is a
non-compliance with the mandate of section 130 with the attendant
consequence that the proceedings of the Summary Court-Martial are
rendered infirm in law. This disposes of the first limb of the contention
(a).
c
6. The second limb of the contention is as to the effect of the
alleged bias on the part of respondent 4. The test of real likelihood of
bias is whether a reasonable person, in possession of relevant informa-
tion, would have thought that bias was likely and is whether respon-
D dent 4 was likely to be disposed to decide the matter only in a parti-
cular way.

It is the. essence of a judgment that it is made after due obser-
vance of the judicial process; that the Court or Tribunal passing it
observes, at least the minimal requirements of natural justice, is com-
E posed of impartial persons acting fairly and without bias and in good
faith. A judgment which is the result of bias or want of impartiality is a
nullity and the trial "coram non-judice". (See Vassiliadas v. Vassi-
liades-AIR 1945 PC 38).

7. As to the tests of the likelihood of bias what is rel~vant is the
-
F reasonableness of the apprehension in that regard in the mind of the
party. The proper approach for the judge is not to look at his own l
mind and ask himself, however, honestly. "Am I biased? "but to look /-
at the mind of the party before him.

Lord Esher in Al/inson v. General Council of Medical Education
G and Registration, (1894] 1 Q.B. 750 at 758 said:

"The question is not, whether in fact he was or was not
biased. The Court cannot inquire into that . . . . . . . . . . A
............. In the administration of justice, whether by
a recognised legal court or by persons who, although not a
H legal public court, are acting in a similar capacity, public
RANJIT v. U.O.l. [VENKATACHALJAH, J.I 521

policy requires that, in order that there should be no doubt
about the purity of the administration any person who is to A
take part in it should not be in such a position that he might
be suspected of being biased."

In Metropolitan Properties Co. (F.G.C.) Ltd. v. Lannon, [1969)
1Q.B.577, at 599, Lord Denning M.R. observed: B

" ... in considering whether there was a real likelihood of bias,
the court does not look'at the mind of the justice himself or
at the mind of the chairman of the tribunal, or whoever it
may be, who sits in a judicial capacity. It does not look to
see if there was a real likelihood that he would, or did, in
fact favour one side at the expense of the other. The court C
looks at the impression which would be given to other
people. Even if he was as impartial as could be never-the- _..
less if right minded persons would think that in the circum-
stances there was a real likelihood of bias on his part, then
he should not sit ...................... ". D

Frankfurter J in Public Utilities Commission o'f the District of
Columbia v. Pollack (343 US 451at466) said:

"The judicial process demands that a judge move within
the frame work of relevant legal rules and the court E
covenanted modes of thought for ascertaining them. He
must think dispassionately and submerge private feeling on
every aspect of a case. There is a good deal of shallow talk
that the judicial robe does not change the man within it. It
does. The fact is that on the whole judges do lay aside
private views in discharging their judicial functions. This is F
achieved through training, professional habits, self-disci-
pline and that fortunate alchemy by which men are loyal to
the obligation with which they are interested. But it is also
true that reason cannot control the subconscious influence
of feelings of which it h unaware. When there is ground
for believing that such unconscious feelings may operate in G
the ultimate judgment or may not unfairly lead others to
believe they are operating, judges recuse themselves. They
. m
do not sit . JU
. dgment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ." .

Referring to the proper test, Ackner LJ in Regina v. Liverpool
City Justices, Ex-parte Topping, [1983) 1WLR119 said: H
522 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988] 1 S.C.R.

"Assuming therefore, that the justices had applied the test
A
advised by Mr. Pearson-Do I feel prejudiced? then they
would have applied the wrong test, exercised their discre-
tion on the wrong principle and the same result, namely, the
quashing of the conviction would follow."

B Thus tested the conclusion becomes inescapable that, having re-
gard to the antecedent events, the participation of Respondent 4 in the
Courts-Martial rendered the proceedings coram non-judice.
~

7. Re: contention (b): The mere circumstance that the appellant
was, at the relevant point of time, serving a sentence of imprisonment
and could not therefore, be said to be in 'active service' does not
c detract from the fact that he was still "a person subject to this Act."
This is clear from the second clause of Section 41(2) which refers to .. ~
offences committed when not in 'active service'. The difference is in
the lesser punishment contemplated. We are, therefore, unable to
appreciate the appositeness of this contention of Shri Sinha.
D
8. Re: contention (c): The submission that a disregard of an
order to eat f6od does not by itself amount to a disobedience to a
lawful command for purposes of section 41 has to be examined in the
context of the imperitives of the high and rigorous discipline to be
maintained in the Armed Forces. Every aspect of life of a soldier is
E regulated by discipline. Rejection of food might, under circumstances,
amount to an indirect expressfon of remonstrance and resentment
against the higher authority. To say that, a mere refusal to eat food is
an innocent, neutral act might be an over-simplification of the matter.
Mere in-action need not always necessarily be neutral. Serious acts of
calumny could be done in silence. A disregard of a direction to accept
F food might assume the complexion of disrespect to, and even
defiance of authority. But an unduly harsh and cruel reaction to the
expression of the injured feelings may be counter-productive and even
by itself be subversive of discipline. Appellant was perhaps expressing
his anguish at, what he considered, an unjust and disproportionate
punishment for airing his grievances before his superior officers. How-
G ever, it is not necessary in this case to decide contention (c) in view of
our finding on the other contentions.

9. Re: contention (d): Judicial review generally speaking; is not
directed against a decision, but is directed against the "decision mak-
ing process". The question of the choice and quantum of punishment is
H within the jurisdiction and discretion of the Court-Martial. But the
RANJIT v. U.0.1. [VENKATACHALIAH. J.] 523

sentence has to suit the offence and the offender. It should not be
A
vindictive or unduly harsh. It should not be so disproportionate to the
offence as to shock the conscience and amount in itself to conclusive
evidence of bias. The doctrine of proportionality, as part of the con-
cept of judicial review, would ensure that even on an aspect which is,
otherwise, within the exclusive province of the Court-Martial, if the
decision of the Court even as to sentence is an outrageous defiance of B
logic, then the sentence would not be immune from correction. Irra-
tionality and perversity are recognised grounds of judicial review. In
Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, [1984]
3 Weekly Law Reports 1174 (HL) Lord Deplock said:

" .... .Judicial Review has I think developed to a stage
today when without reiterating any analysis of the steps by C
which the development has come about, one can conve-
niently classify under three heads the grounds upon which
administrative action is subject to control by judicial
review. The first ground l would call 'illegality'. the second
'irrationality' and the third 'procedural impropriety'. That D
is not to say that further development on a case by case
basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have
in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of
the principle of 'proportionality' which is recognised in the
administrative law of several of our fellow members of the
European Economic Community ..................... " E

- In Bhagat Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh, A.LR. 1983 SC 454
this Court held:

"It is equally true that the penalty imposed must be com-
mensurate with the gravity of the misconduct and that any F
--\ penalty disproportionate to the gravity of the misconduct
would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.

The point to note, and emphasise is that all powers have legal limits.

In the present case lhe punishment is so strikingly disproportion- G
ate as to call for and justify interference. It cannot be allowed to
remain uncorrected in judicial review.

10. In the result, for the foregoing reasons, the appeal is
allowed, the order of the High Court set aside, the writ petition prefer-
red in the High Court allowed and the impugned proceedings of the H
524 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1988) 1 S.C.R.

A Summary Court-Martial dated March 30, 1985, and the consequent ~
order and sentence are quashed. The appellant is entitled to and shall
be reinstated with all monetary and service benefits. There will, how-
ever, be no order as to costs.

N.P.V. Appeal allowed.