Holding

The appellants' convictions were quashed because the prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the key eyewitness testimony was unreliable, the CCTV evidence was inadmissible, and the confessional statements were not permissible under the Evidence Act.

Summary

The appellants were convicted under Sections 364, 302, 120-B and 201 of the IPC for the abduction and murder of Gurpal Singh, based largely on the testimony of an alleged eyewitness, CCTV footage, and confessional statements made to police. The Supreme Court examined the credibility of the eyewitness, noting material omissions, lack of a test identification parade, and the non‑examination of her husband, leading to an adverse inference against the prosecution. The Court held that the CCTV footage was inadmissible because the required Section 65B certificate was not produced and the witnesses had not personally viewed the footage. Confessions recorded by police while the accused were in custody were found inadmissible under Sections 25, 26 and only partially admissible under Section 27, which the trial courts had misapplied. Applying the principles of circumstantial evidence, the Court concluded that the prosecution failed to establish a chain of facts beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, the convictions of the appellants were quashed and the appeal was allowed, ordering their immediate release.

Issues considered

The prosecution must prove the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt under Sections 364, 302, 120-B and 201 IPC.
Whether the eyewitness testimony of PW‑26 is reliable and admissible despite omissions and lack of a test identification parade.
Whether the CCTV footage evidence is admissible without a Section 65B certificate and without personal verification by witnesses.
Whether confessional statements made to police while the accused were in custody are admissible under Sections 25, 26 and 27 of the Evidence Act.
Whether the circumstantial evidence presented satisfies the criteria laid down in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra for a conviction.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 161, s. 162
Evidence Act, 1872s. 25, s. 26, s. 27, s. 65B
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120-B, s. 201, s. 212, s. 302, s. 364

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Issue arose as regards conviction and sentence of the appellants u/ss.364, 302, 120-B and 201 IPC for abduction and brutal murder of the victim, if justified. Headnotes† Penal Code, 1860 – ss.364, 302, 120-B and 201 – Abduction and Criminal conspiracy – Prosecution case that accused persons abducted the victim, thereafter murdered him and the next day the torso with other body parts of the deceased were recovered from the canal – Conviction of the appellants-accused along with others u/ss.364, 302, 120-B and 201

Subjects

AbductionBrutal murderCriminal conspiracyProof beyond reasonable doubtOmissionsIdentificationTest identification paradeCCTV footageAdmissible in evidenceEvidence of recoveryConfessional statementConfessionsPolice custody

Judgment

[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1425 : 2024 INSC 887

Randeep Singh @ Rana & Anr.
v.
State of Haryana & Ors.
(Criminal Appeal No. 297 of 2024)
22 November 2024
[Abhay S. Oka,* Ahsanuddin Amanullah and
Augustine George Masih, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Issue arose as regards conviction and sentence of the appellants
u/ss.364, 302, 120-B and 201 IPC for abduction and brutal murder
of the victim, if justified.

Headnotes†

Penal Code, 1860 – ss.364, 302, 120-B and 201 – Abduction
and brutal murder – Criminal conspiracy – Prosecution case
that accused persons abducted the victim, thereafter murdered
him and the next day the torso with other body parts of the
deceased were recovered from the canal – Conviction of the
appellants-accused along with others u/ss.364, 302, 120-B
and 201 and sentenced accordingly – High Court upheld the
conviction of the appellants-accused while acquitted the other
persons – Correctness:
Held: Brutality of the offence does not dispense with the legal
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt – No legal
evidence to prove the involvement of the accused – Courts can
convict an accused only if his guilt is proved beyond a reasonable
doubt on the basis of legally admissible evidence – There cannot
be a moral conviction – Appellants’ guilt not established beyond
a reasonable doubt – Material part of the testimony of eyewitness
full of omissions – Identification of the accused by the eye-witness
doubtful in the absence of the test identification parade – Thus,
the evidence to be kept out of consideration – Also the husband
of the eyewitness who, according to her, was an eyewitness,

* Author
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not examined by the Police – Thus, an adverse inference to
be drawn against the prosecution for withholding evidence of
an eyewitness – Prosecution failed to produce the certificate
u/s. 65B of the Evidence Act concerning the CD prepared from
the CCTV footage concerning the incident outside the premises of
the bank – Neither the Bank Manager nor the CCTV engineer saw
the CCTV footage downloaded on the CD – Thus, the evidence
in the form of the CD to be kept out of consideration as it is not
admissible in evidence – In view thereof, it is not possible to
sustain the conviction of the accused only based on the evidence
of recovery – Moreover, all the circumstances forming part of
the chain not proved – Confessional statement made by the
accused to a police officer while in custody not admissible in the
evidence – Judgments passed by the trial court as well as the
High Court quashed and set aside. [Paras 7-13, 16-18]
Evidence Act, 1872 – ss.25-27 – Confession to police officer not
to be proved – Confessions allegedly made by the accused to a
police officer when they were in Police custody – Admissibility:
Held: s.27 is an exception to ss.25 and 26 – It permits certain parts
of the statement made by the accused to a police officer while
in custody to be proved – U/s. 27 only that part of the statement
made by the accused is admissible, which distinctly relates to the
discovery – It becomes admissible when a fact is discovered as a
consequence of the information received from the accused – What
is admissible is only such information furnished by the accused as
relates distinctly to the facts thereby discovered – No other part
is admissible – Confessional statement made by the accused to
a police officer while in custody is not admissible in the evidence
except to the extent to which s.27 is applicable – If such inadmissible
confessions are made part of the depositions of the prosecution
witnesses, then there is every possibility that the trial courts may
get influenced by it. [Paras 16, 17]

Case Law Cited
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra [1985] 1 SCR
88 : (1984) 4 SCC 116; Pulukuri Kotayya & Ors. v. King Emperor
(1946) SCC OnLine PC 47 : AIR 1947 PC 67; K. Chinnaswamy
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1427

Randeep Singh @ Rana & Anr. v. State of Haryana & Ors.

Reddy v. State of A.P. [1963] 3 SCR 412 : (1962) SCC OnLine
SC 32; Subhash Chand v. State of Rajasthan [2001] Supp. 4 SCR
163 : (2002) 1 SCC 702 – referred to.

List of Acts
Penal Code, 1860; Evidence Act, 1872; Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973.

List of Keywords
Abduction; Brutal murder; Criminal conspiracy; Proof beyond
reasonable doubt; Omissions; Identification; Test identification
parade; CCTV footage; Admissible in evidence; Evidence of
recovery; Confessional statement; Confessions; Police custody.

Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
297 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 10.02.2020 of the High Court
of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in CRLA No. 398 of 2017

Appearances for Parties
Vinay Navare, Sr. Adv., Arpit Rai, Ankit Ahluwalia, Ms. Tushima,
Aviral Kashyap, Advs. for the Appellants.
Samar Vijay Singh, Amit Ojha, Ms. Sabarni Som, Azeem A. Dost,
Fateh Singh, Prashant Sharma, Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

ABHAY S. OKA, J.

FACTUAL ASPECTS
1. The present appellants accused were charged for committing the
offences punishable under Sections 364, 302, 201, 212 and 120-B of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘the IPC’). There were eight
accused persons. The respondent nos. 2 to 6 and one Bhim Sain
@ Kaka Ganth were the other accused. All of them were convicted
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by the Sessions Court for the offences punishable under Sections
364, 302 and 120-B of the IPC and sentenced to undergo life
imprisonment. They were also convicted for the offence punishable
under Section 201 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for 3 years. All of them preferred appeals to the High
Court. By the impugned judgment, the High Court confirmed the
appellants’ conviction. But other accused were acquitted.
2. The deceased-Gurpal Singh was the father of the complainant-
Jagpreet Singh (PW-8). The case of the prosecution is that on 8th
July 2013, the deceased left his house in his Ford Fiesta car. The
deceased had gone to meet his sister-Paramjeet Kaur (PW-26). He
had visited PW-26 at about 06:30 pm. After meeting PW-26, when the
deceased was returning to his house and had reached the main gate
of Prabhu Prem Puram Ashram, a few unknown persons travelling
in a white car stopped the car of the deceased and abducted him.
He was put in the car brought by the accused. The accused persons
also took away the car of the deceased. After conducting a search,
PW-8 could not locate his father, and therefore, a First Information
Report was lodged at his instance. On 9th July 2013, the torso with
other body parts of the deceased was recovered from a canal. The
prosecution examined twenty-nine witnesses.

SUBMISSIONS
3. Mr Vinay Navare, the learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellants, pointed out that the prosecution relied upon the CCTV
footage of the cameras installed in the branch of Bank of Baroda
near the place where the offence was allegedly committed. He
submitted that apart from the fact that the certificate under Section
65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (for short, ‘the Evidence
Act’) was not produced, the evidence of Mr Rajesh Gaba, Senior
Manager, Bank of Baroda (PW-1) and Mr Jeewan Sonkhla, CCTV
Engineer (PW-24) does not prove that the CD produced on record
contained what is recorded in the CCTV cameras installed by the
Bank. He submitted that though the prosecution claims that PW-26
is an eyewitness, the material part of her evidence is an omission.
Moreover, the husband of PW-26, who was stated to be an eyewitness,
has not been examined. He also invited our attention to the manner
in which the evidence of PW-27 [Investigating Officer] was recorded
by incorporating the incriminating portion of the statements of the
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1429

Randeep Singh @ Rana & Anr. v. State of Haryana & Ors.

present appellants in the alleged memorandum under Section 27 of
the Evidence Act. He submitted that except for the evidence of the
discovery of the car and the weapon used by the accused at the
instance of the accused, there is no other legal evidence on record.
He submitted that only based on discovery/disclosure statements,
the accused cannot be convicted.
4. The learned counsel appearing for the first respondent, the State of
Haryana, submitted that there is no reason to discredit the testimony
of PW-26, who is a natural eyewitness. He pointed out that she had
identified the accused in court. It was submitted that the circumstantial
evidence proves the appellants’ guilt even otherwise. He submitted
that the CCTV footage also proves the complicity of the accused. He
submitted that this case is of a very brutal and gruesome offence,
and, therefore, no interference should be made with concurrent
judgments of conviction.

CONSIDERATION

EVIDENCE OF EYEWITNESS (PW-26)
5. PW-26 is the only alleged eyewitness examined by the prosecution.
She deposed that on 8th July 2013 at about 06:45 pm, the deceased,
who was her brother, had come to her house. At around 07:15 pm,
he left her home. Her brother had parked his car in the open plot
in front of her house. While the deceased was leaving the house,
she, along with her husband, went to see off the deceased. She
stated that the deceased sat in his car and left towards Prabhu Prem
Puram Ashram. She claimed that she and her husband went towards
that side. She noticed that a white Maruti car chased the car of the
deceased, and after crossing the car of the deceased, it stopped
in front of his car. She stated that seven to eight boys came out of
that Maruti car and cordoned off the car of the deceased. When
she swiftly walked towards that direction, she heard cries from her
brother to save him. She stated that these boys forcibly threw her
brother in the car. Some boys sat in her brother’s car and ran away.
She stated that two boys on a motorcycle came, lifted her brother’s
turban, and left the spot.
6. In her examination-in-chief, PW-26 did not state that she knew the
accused earlier. She described the accused as ‘seven to eight boys’.
She did not depose that a test identification parade was conducted.
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Moreover, she did not identify the accused in the examination-in-chief
by ascribing specific roles to them. She stated in the examination-
in-chief that “accused are present in the Court through video
conferencing”. She did not identify the accused who picked up her
brother and the accused who sat in her brother’s car. She did not
identify the boys who came on the motorcycle.
7. When she was confronted with her statement (Exhibit D6) recorded
under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short,
‘the CrPC’), she admitted that the following facts which she stated
before the Court were not mentioned in her statement recorded by
the Police:
i. The deceased had parked his car in the open plot in front of
her house;
ii. She, along with her husband, had gone out to see off the
deceased;
iii. She, along with her husband, went towards Prabhu Prem Puram
Ashram, in which direction the deceased left;
iv. She saw a Maruti car of white colour that chased her brother’s
car and, after crossing her brother’s car, stopped the car;
v. She saw seven to eight boys coming out of the Maruti car who
cordoned off her brother’s car, and she heard cries of “bachao
bachao” from her brother; and
vi. The boys threw the deceased in the car, and some of them sat
in the car of the deceased and ran away.
Therefore, the material part of the testimony of PW-26 (the so-called
eyewitness) is full of omissions. These omissions are very significant
and relevant as they relate to the most crucial part of the prosecution’s
case. Hence, these omissions amount to contradictions in view of the
explanation to Section 162 of the CrPC. Moreover, the identification
of the accused by PW-26 is very doubtful in the absence of the
test identification parade. For all the reasons recorded above, the
evidence of PW-26 will have to be kept out of consideration.
8. PW-26’s husband, who, according to her, was an eyewitness, was
not examined by the Police. She admitted that her husband had
accompanied her to the Police Station. She stated that she was not
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1431

Randeep Singh @ Rana & Anr. v. State of Haryana & Ors.

aware whether the Police recorded her husband’s statement. In her
cross-examination recorded on 13th May 2016, she admitted that her
husband was present in the Court. Therefore, an adverse inference
will have to be drawn against the prosecution for withholding evidence
of an eyewitness. Then, what remains is the circumstantial evidence.

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
9. We come to the evidence of PW-1. He was the Manager of the
Bank of Baroda, Kala Amb branch. The prosecution relied upon
the CCTV footage recorded on the camera installed by the Bank
outside its premises. The prosecution contends that the white car
and the accused were seen in the footage. PW-1 stated that based
on the application made by the Police, he got a CD prepared from
the CCTV footage of 8th July 2013 and produced the same before
the Investigating Officer. In the cross-examination, he admitted that
he had no personal knowledge about the contents of the CD and he
had not personally seen the CCTV footage. He stated that he had
not appended his signature on the parcel of the CD handed over to
the Police. He accepted that even the stamp of the Bank was not
put on the CD.
10. PW-24 claims to be a CCTV engineer. He stated that Balaji Digital
Security Advisor, where he worked as an engineer, had a contract
with the Bank. He claimed that he prepared a CD from the security
system of the Bank of Baroda as per the request made by the Police.
He accepted that he did not put his identification on the CD or make
any markings on the CD. He admitted that editing could be made of
the CCTV footage on the CD and that the CD could be tampered
with. He also did not depose that he had seen the CCTV footage
before downloading on the CD. Thus, neither PW-1 nor PW-24 had
seen the CCTV footage downloaded on the CD. Moreover, the CD
did not bear any marking or sign from either of the witnesses. Most
importantly, the prosecution failed to produce the certificate under
Section 65B of the Evidence Act concerning the CD. Therefore, the
evidence in the form of the CD will have to be kept out of consideration
as it is not admissible in evidence.
11. There is one more crucial aspect. Assuming that the CCTV footage
was admissible, the learned trial Judge and the Judges of the High
Court did not see the CCTV footage. Still, the Courts relied upon it.
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12. In the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra,1
which is a locus classicus on circumstantial evidence, this Court laid
down five principles. Paragraph 153 reads thus:
“153. A close analysis of this decision would show that
the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case
against an accused can be said to be fully established:
(1) The circumstances from which the conclusion of
guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It
may be noted here that this Court indicated that the
circumstances concerned “must or should” and not
“may be” established. There is not only a grammatical but
a legal distinction between “may be proved” and “must be
or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji
Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC
793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033 : 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where
the observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC
(Cri) p. 1047] “Certainly, it is a primary principle that the
accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a
court can convict and the mental distance between ‘may
be’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjectures
from sure conclusions.”
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with
the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say,
they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis
except that the accused is guilty,
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature
and tendency,
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except
the one to be proved, and
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as
not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion
consistent with the innocence of the accused and must
show that in all human probability the act must have
been done by the accused.”
(emphasis added)

1 [1985] 1 SCR 88 : (1984) 4 SCC 116
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1433

Randeep Singh @ Rana & Anr. v. State of Haryana & Ors.

CCTV footage is one of the circumstances in the chain of circumstances
relied upon by the prosecution. Even if one of the circumstances
forming part of the chain is not proved, the prosecution case cannot
be held as established.
13. Now, what remains is the evidence of recovery of the parts of the
dead body of the deceased. It must be noted here that the recovery
of the torso and other body parts was made on 9th July 2013. The
recovery cannot be said to be at the instance of the accused. The
reason is PW-27 stated that he received an information that one
dead body was found without head, hands and legs near village
Dhalla. This information was given to him on telephone by MHC,
Police Station at Mahesh Nagar. The evidence of recovery at the
instance of the accused is of the Maruti car used in the offence, the
weapon used in the offence and recovery of articles of the deceased
such as a driving licence. After disbelieving the testimony of PW-26,
who claims to be an eyewitness, after discarding the evidence of
the CD of the alleged CCTV footage and after finding that another
eyewitness, though available, has not been examined, it is not
possible to sustain the conviction of the accused only based on the
evidence of recovery. Moreover, all the circumstances forming part
of the chain have not been proved.

RELIANCE ON INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE
14. The evidence of PW-27 is relevant for different reasons. It is material
to state how his evidence has been recorded. In the examination-
in-chief, he has stated thus:
“.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. ..
.. .. .. I interrogated accused Randeep Rana and Rajesh
@ Don. Both the accused persons admitted about the
crime (objected to). Thereafter, they both brought to the
police station and were lodged in the lock-up.
On 10.7.2013, I interrogated accused Randeep @ Rana
and Rajesh @ Don while in police custody one by one,
who suffered disclosure statements Ex.P55 and Ex.P56
respectively. Said statements were signed by the respective
accused and were witnessed by ASI Dharamvir and
HC Sultan Singh. Accused Randeep @ Rana while
admitting his involvement in the present case, had
1434 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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disclosed that about 13-14 years back his uncle was
murdered by the family member of complainant. Due
to that revenge they have hatched a conspiracy and
after making planning with co-accused had abducted
Gurpal and committed his murder that he could identify
the place from where Gurpal was abducted, where
he was murdered and where his body was thrown.
He had also disclosed that Kaka @ Kanch in whose
office the murder of Gurpal was committed was having
the knowledge about all the conspiracy as he was
the party of the conspiracy. He also disclosed that
accused Chaman was also present in the said office.
He also disclosed about the role played by accused
Naini, Prabhjot, Rajesh @ Don, Vicky @ Kali, Parveen
@ Kala, Mohit @ Kaga in the commission of crime of
murder of Gurpal (object to being inadmissible)
Similarly, accused Rajesh @ Don admitting his
involvement in the commission of crime of the
present case, has disclosed about the conspiracy of
committing murder of Gurpal and he also disclosed
about the vehicle used in the crime. He had also
disclosed that Kaka @ Kanch in whose office the
murder of Gurpal was committed was having the
knowledge about all the conspiracy as he was the party
of the conspiracy and that accused Chaman Lal was
also present in the said office. He also disclosed about
the role played by accused Naini, Prabhjot, Randeep
Rana, Vicky @ Kali, Parveen @ Kala, Mohit @ Kaga
in the commission of crime of murder of Gurpal. The
accused also disclosed about the place where they
had left the car of Gurpal. He also offered to get the
aforesaid place of occurrence identified. The aforesaid
disclosure statements of the accused were reduced into
writing as per their version, which were attested by ASI
Dharamvir and HC Sultan Singh as witnesses (objected
to being inadmissible).
.. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
.. .. .. ..”
(emphasis added)
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1435

Randeep Singh @ Rana & Anr. v. State of Haryana & Ors.

15. Sections 25 to 27 of the Evidence Act read thus:
“25. Confession to police-officer not to be proved.––
No confession made to a police-officer, shall be proved
as against a person accused of any offence.
26. Confession by accused while in custody of police
not to be proved against him.–– No confession made
by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police-
officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a
Magistrate, shall be proved as against such person.
Explanation.––In this section “Magistrate” does not include
the head of a village discharging magisterial functions in
the Presidency of Fort St. George or elsewhere, unless
such headman is a Magistrate exercising the powers of a
Magistrate under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882
(10 of 1882).
27. How much of information received from accused
may be proved.–– Provided that, when any fact is deposed
to as discovered inconsequence of information received
from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of
a police-officer, so much of such information, whether it
amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the
fact thereby discovered, may be proved.”
16. A perusal of the deposition of PW-27, which we have quoted above,
shows that he attempted to prove the confessions allegedly made
by the accused to a police officer when they were in Police custody.
There is a complete prohibition on even proving such confessions.
The learned Trial Judge has completely lost sight of Sections 25
and 26 of the Evidence Act and has allowed PW-27 to prove the
confessions allegedly made by the accused while they were in
police custody. PW-27 stated that the appellant “suffered disclosure
statement at Exhibits ‘P55’ and ‘P56’ respectively”. Obviously, he
is referring to disclosure of the information under Section 27 of
the Evidence Act. The law on disclosure under Section 27 is well
settled right from the classic decision of the Privy Council in the
case of Pulukuri Kotayya & Ors. v. King-Emperor.2 In the case of

2 1946 SCC OnLine PC 47 : AIR 1947 PC 67
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K. Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of A.P.,3 this Court relied upon
the decision of the Privy Council and in paragraph 9 held thus:
“9. Let us then turn to the question whether the statement
of the appellant to the effect that “he had hidden them (the
ornaments)” and “would point out the place” where they
were, is wholly admissible in evidence under Section 27
or only that part of it is admissible where he stated that
he would point out the place but not that part where he
stated that he had hidden the ornaments. The Sessions
Judge in this connection relied on Pulukuri Kotayya v. King-
Emperor [(1946) 74 IA 65] where a part of the statement
leading to the recovery of a knife in a murder case was
held inadmissible by the Judicial Committee. In that case
the Judicial Committee considered Section 27 of the Indian
Evidence Act, which is in these terms:
“Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as
discovered in consequence of information received
from a person accused of any offence, in the custody
of a police officer, so much of such information,
whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates
distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be
proved.”
This section is an exception to Sections 25 and 26, which
prohibit the proof of a confession made to a police officer
or a confession made while a person is in police custody,
unless it is made in immediate presence of a Magistrate.
Section 27 allows that part of the statement made by the
accused to the police “whether it amounts to a confession or
not” which relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered to
be proved. Thus even a confessional statement before
the police which distinctly relates to the discovery of
a fact may be proved under Section 27. The Judicial
Committee had in that case to consider how much of
the information given by the accused to the police
would be admissible under Section 27 and laid stress
on the words “so much of such information…as

3 [1963] 3 SCR 412 : 1962 SCC OnLine SC 32
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1437

Randeep Singh @ Rana & Anr. v. State of Haryana & Ors.

relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered” in that
connection. It held that the extent of the information
admissible must depend on the exact nature of the
fact discovered to which such information is required
to relate. It was further pointed out that “the fact
discovered embraces the place from which the object
is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to
this, and the information given must relate distinctly
to this fact”. It was further observed that—
“Information as to past user, or the past history of
the object produced is not related to its discovery
in the setting in which it is discovered.”
This was exemplified further by the Judicial Committee
by observing—
“Information supplied by a person in custody that
‘I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my
house’ leads to the discovery of the fact that a
knife is concealed in the house of the informant
to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to
have been used in the commission of the offence,
the fact discovered is very relevant. If however
to the statement the words be added ‘with which
I stabbed A’, these words are inadmissible since
they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in
the house of the informant.”
(emphasis added)
Section 27 is an exception to Sections 25 and 26. It permits certain
parts of the statement made by the accused to a police officer while
in custody to be proved. Under Section 27, only that part of the
statement made by the accused is admissible, which distinctly relates
to the discovery. It becomes admissible when a fact is discovered as
a consequence of the information received from the accused. What
is admissible is only such information furnished by the accused as
relates distinctly to the facts thereby discovered. No other part is
admissible. By Exhibits ‘P55’ and ‘P56’, it is alleged that the accused
showed the places where the deceased was abducted, where he was
murdered and where his body was thrown. In this case, even the
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inadmissible part of the statement under Section 27 of the Evidence
Act has been incorporated in the examination-in-chief of PW-27.
The learned trial judge should not have recorded an inadmissible
confession in the deposition. A confessional statement made by the
accused to a police officer while in custody is not admissible in the
evidence except to the extent to which Section 27 is applicable. If
such inadmissible confessions are made part of the depositions of
the prosecution witnesses, then there is every possibility that the
Trial Courts may get influenced by it.

THE GRAVITY OF THE OFFENCE
17. It is true that this is a case of a brutal murder. The brutality of the
offence does not dispense with the legal requirement of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt. In this case, there is no legal evidence to prove
the involvement of the accused. The Courts can convict an accused
only if his guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of
legally admissible evidence. There cannot be a moral conviction. We
are tempted to quote what this Court observed in paragraph 24 of
its decision in the case of Subhash Chand v. State of Rajasthan.4
It reads as follows:
“24. Thus, none of the pieces of evidence relied on as
incriminating, by the trial court and the High Court, can be
treated as incriminating pieces of circumstantial evidence
against the accused. Though the offence is gruesome
and revolts the human conscience but an accused
can be convicted only on legal evidence and if only a
chain of circumstantial evidence has been so forged
as to rule out the possibility of any other reasonable
hypothesis excepting the guilt of the accused. In
Shankarlal Gyarasilal Dixit case [(1981) 2 SCC 35: 1981
SCC (Cri) 315: AIR 1981 SC 765] this Court cautioned —
“human nature is too willing, when faced with brutal
crimes, to spin stories out of strong suspicions” (SCC
p. 44, para 33). This Court has held time and again that
between may be true and must be true there is a long
distance to travel which must be covered by clear, cogent

4 [2001] Supp. 4 SCR 163 : (2002) 1 SCC 702
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 1439

Randeep Singh @ Rana & Anr. v. State of Haryana & Ors.

and unimpeachable evidence by the prosecution before
an accused is condemned a convict.”
(emphasis added)

CONCLUSION AND OPERATIVE PART
18. The appellants’ guilt has not been established beyond a reasonable
doubt. Accordingly, we allow the appeal. We quash and set aside the
judgments dated 14th February 2017 and 17th February 2017 passed
by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ambala in Sessions Case
no. 16 of 2013, as well as the impugned judgment dated 10th February
2020 passed in Criminal Appeal Nos. D-335-DB and D-398-DB of
2017 (O&M) by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh
and acquit the appellants. The impugned judgments have already
been set aside as far as the other accused are concerned. That part
is not disturbed. If appellants are in prison, they shall be immediately
set at liberty unless required in connection with any other offence.

Result of the case: Appeal allowed

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain