RAMNATH AGRAWAL & ORS.versusFOOD CORPORATION OF INDIA & ORS.

552                      [2020]REPORTS
               SUPREME COURT    4 S.C.R. 552               [2020] 4 S.C.R.


A                      RAMNATH AGRAWAL & ORS.
                                        v.
                 FOOD CORPORATION OF INDIA & ORS.
                         (Civil Appeal No. 1305 of 2010)
B                                MAY 13, 2020
                    [N. V. RAMANA, SANJIV KHANNA
                      AND KRISHNA MURARI, JJ.]
            Transfer of Property Act, 1872 – s.105 – Agreement when not
      a lease – In 1976, Food Corporation of India (‘FCI’) invited offers
C
      for construction of godowns on the lands of interested parties and
      subsequently taking over possession of the godowns on lease –
      Appellants’ offer accepted – Agreement dated 16.12.1976 entered
      between the parties – Appellants had to construct six godowns, to
      be taken over by FCI on rent – Appellants informed FCI that the
D     construction of godowns was complete and the possession be taken
      over – Competent officer of FCI on inspection recommended taking
      over the possession of only four out of six godowns and pointed
      out defects in respect of remaining two – Appellants sought damages
      from FCI on account of non-realization of rent towards the remaining
      two godowns – Demand not complied with – Appellants filed suit
E
      for damages – Decreed – High Court allowed appeal filed by FCI –
      Held: For an agreement to be considered as a lease and not as an
      agreement to lease it is important that there must be an actual demise
      of property on the date of the agreement – Agreement dated
      16.12.1976 was not a lease but simply an agreement giving rise to
F     contractual obligations – Terms and conditions clearly demonstrate
      that the execution of the lease deed was contingent upon the
      construction of godowns being completed and the same being
      approved by issuance of completion certificate by the Competent
      Authority of FCI – Appellants did not dispute the facts that the
      officers of FCI refused to take over the possession of the two
G
      godowns in view of the defects pointed out by them and the said
      defects were never rectified – As per Clause 6 of the agreement, in
      case of defects, the findings of the officers of FCI were to be final
      and there was no obligation to take such structure on lease – High
      Court rightly discarded the evidence of PW-1, 2 & 5 (who issued
H
                                       552
 RAMNATH AGRAWAL & ORS. v. FOOD CORPORATION OF                           553
                INDIA & ORS.

certificates in respect of completion and fitness of the godowns) as     A
neither the inspection was carried out by an independent agency in
presence of the representatives of the appellants and respondents
nor the same was in accordance with the specifications laid down
by FCI in the agreement – Therefore, no rent was payable in respect
of the two disputed godowns as they were not completed as per
                                                                         B
FCI’s specifications and the possession thereof were not taken over
by FCI at the time of filing of the suit by the appellants – No reason
to take a view different from the one taken by the High Court.
      Dismissing the appeal, the Court
      HELD: 1.1 For an agreement to be considered as a lease             C
and not as an agreement to lease it is important that there must
be an actual demise of property on the date of the agreement.
The agreement dated 16.12.1976 was not a lease but simply an
agreement giving rise to contractual obligations. The terms and
conditions clearly demonstrate that the execution of the lease
deed was contingent upon the construction of godowns being               D
completed and the same being approved by issuance of
completion certificate by the Competent Authority of FCI. [Paras
24, 25][562-F-H]
       1.2 Clause 6 of the agreement dated 16.12.1976 made it
imperative for the appellants to obtain a completion certificate         E
from the competent officers of FCI, prior to execution of lease
agreement and handing over the possession of the godowns. In
case of defects and faulty workmanships, the findings of the
officials of FCI were final. The appellants contended that letter
dated 02.12.1977 issued by FCI was the completion certificate            F
and no subsequent certificate was to be issued. However,
inspection was carried out on 05.01.1978, whereafter FCI vide
letter dated 14.02.1978 had recommended taking over the
possession of only four out of six godowns. There arises no
question of waiver, acquiescence or estoppel, as all along FCI
has contended that two godowns were defective and the                    G
possession of the same can not be taken over till the rectification
of the defects. The reliance placed on the letter dated 15.05.1978,
wherein FCI is said to have acknowledged taking over
possession is totally misplaced. No reliance can be placed on the
said letter which was manufactured in connivance with the                H
554            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2020] 4 S.C.R.


A     delinquent officers of the FCI who were charge-sheeted and
      subsequently punished in a departmental enquiry for the same.
      The appellants have not disputed the facts that the officers of
      FCI refused to take over the possession of the two godowns in
      view of the defects pointed out by the officers of FCI and the said
      defects were never rectified. As per Clause 6 of the agreement
B
      dated 16.12.1976, in case of defects, the findings of the officers
      of FCI were to be final and there was no obligation to take such
      structure on lease. The High Court rightly discarded the evidence
      of PW-1,2 & 5 as neither the inspection was carried out by an
      independent agency in presence of the representatives of the
C     appellants and respondents nor the same was in accordance with
      the specifications laid down by FCI in the agreement dated
      16.12.1976. Therefore, no rent was payable in respect of the two
      disputed godowns as they were not completed as per the
      specifications of FCI and the possession of the disputed godowns
      were not taken over by FCI at the time of filing of the suit by the
D
      appellants. The appellants were not entitled for claim of rent prior
      to 08.02.1978 as rent was payable only after taking over of
      possession as per Clause 8 of the agreement dated 16.12.1976.
      [Paras 27 -29][563-B-H; 564-A]
            1.3 Further, there is no covenant in the agreement dated
E     16.12.1976, which admittedly is not a lease, stipulating
      enhancement of the rent after particular period once possession
      of the godowns has been taken over by FCI, which may entitle
      the appellants for payment of an enhanced rent. No reason to
      take a view different from the one taken by the High Court while
F     allowing the first appeal of the respondents and dismissing the
      Civil Suit of the appellants herein. [Paras 30-31][546-B-C]
            Tiruvenibai v. Lilabai [1959] 2 Supp SCR 107; State of
            Maharashtra & Ors. v. Atur India Pvt. Ltd. (1994) 2
            SCC 497 : [1994] 1 SCR 881 – relied on.
G           Rani Hemanta Kumari Debi v. Midnapur Zamindari
            Company Ltd AIR 1919 PC 79 – referred to.




H
 RAMNATH AGRAWAL & ORS. v. FOOD CORPORATION OF                              555
                INDIA & ORS.

                        Case Law Reference                                  A
AIR 1919 PC 79                   referred to                  Para 20
[1959] Supp 2 SCR 107            relied on                    Para 21
[1994] 1 SCR 881                 relied on                    Para 22
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1305                   B
of 2010.
     From the Judgment and Order dated 02.07.2008 of the High Court
of Madhya Pradesh at Indore in F.A. No. 64 of 1990.
     P.S. Narasimha, Sr. Adv., Gaurav Behl, Ms. Aditi Tripathi,
                                                                            C
Sudhansu Palo, Advs. for the Appellants.
     Ajit Pudussery, Vijayan K., Ajeet Singh Verma, Advs. for the
Respondents.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
      KRISHNA MURARI, J.                                                    D

       1. The present appeal arises out of the judgment and final order
dated 02.07.2008 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench
at Indore in first appeal bearing F.A. No. 64/90. The High Court vide
impugned order dated 02.07.2008 allowed the first appeal preferred by
the respondents – Food Corporation of India thereby dismissing the Civil    E
Suit No. 3-B/81 and setting aside the judgment and decree dated
29.04.1990 passed by the VI-Additional District Judge, Indore in favour
of the appellant – plaintiffs.
      2. The facts giving rise to the dispute in brief can be summarized
as under :-                                                                 F
       In 1976, Food Corporation of India (hereinafter referred to as
‘FCI’) invited offers for construction of godowns on the lands of
interested parties and subsequently taking over possession of the godowns
on lease. The offers so made also included a stipulation to provide
assistance for securing loan for the purpose of construction from State     G
owned banks. The loan was to be repaid in the form of FCI depositing
the rent with the banks.
     3. The offer made by the appellants herein was accepted by the
FCI and accordingly an agreement dated 16.12.1976 was entered
between the parties. As per the terms and conditions of the agreement       H
556             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 4 S.C.R.


A     the appellants had to construct six godowns, which would be subsequently
      taken over by FCI on rent. On 16.12.1976 itself, loan was sanctioned to
      the appellant by State Bank of Indore on the recommendation of FCI.
            4. FCI vide letters dated 06.02.1977, 27.07.1977, 06.11.1977 and
      02.12.1977 notified the progress of the construction of the godowns to
B     the bank on the basis whereof the funds were disbursed to the appellants
      by the bank. The appellants asserts that the letter dated 02.12.1977 of
      the FCI certified cent percent completion of the godowns.
             5. However, FCI vide a subsequent letter dated 17.12.1977 called
      upon the appellants to complete the construction of godowns and handover
C     the possession of the same latest by 31.12.1977. The appellants vide
      letter dated 25.12.1977, informed FCI that the construction of the
      godowns was complete and the possession of the same be taken over.
             6. On 05.01.1978, inspection of the godowns was conducted by
      the officials of the FCI and on the basis of the inspection report submitted
D     by one Shri K. N. Rao, the competent officer of FCI vide letter dated
      14.02.1978, recommended taking over the possession of only four out of
      six godowns by the FCI and pointed out certain defects in respect of
      remaining two godowns. The case set up by the appellants is that
      possession of the four godowns was already taken over on 08.02.1978.

E            7. The appellant issued a legal notice dated 14.05.1978 calling
      upon FCI to pay rent with interest @ 11% in respect of all six godowns
      for the period of January to April, 1978 along with charges towards
      electricity and wages for the security guard.
            8. FCI vide its reply dated 09.06.1978, informed that rent is payable
F     from actual date of possession i.e., 08.02.1978 and not from 01.01.1978.
      It was also stated that in respect of the four godowns, the appellants
      have not issued the necessary bills for payment of the rent and as far as
      the two disputed godowns are concerned, no rent is payable as the
      possession of the same was not taken over by FCI and the rent in respect
      thereof would become payable only after the said two godowns are
G     handed over after rectification of the defects pointed out.
             9. The possession of the remaining two godowns was subsequently
      taken over by FCI on 14.05.1979 which fact was duly acknowledged by
      FCI vide letter dated 15.05.1979. The appellants vide letter dated
      11.08.1979, sought damages from FCI on account of non-realization of
H     rent towards the remaining two godowns.
 RAMNATH AGRAWAL & ORS. v. FOOD CORPORATION OF                              557
        INDIA & ORS. [KRISHNA MURARI, J.]

       10. As the demands of the appellants were not complied with, the     A
appellants filed Civil Suit No.3-B/81 for damages amounting to
Rs. 5,90,000/- before the Trial Court at Indore, averring the above-
mentioned facts. The claim of the appellants consisted of arrears of rent
for the periods when the possession of the godowns was not taken over
by FCI, non-payment of rent at enhanced rates, along with wages for
                                                                            B
security guard, electricity charges and interest.
       11. FCI filed its written statement before the Trial Court denying
the assertions of the appellants on the following grounds:-
      i.   The letter dated 02.11.77 was not a certificate of final
           completion as no inspection was carried out by the competent     C
           officials of the FCI by the said date.
      ii. After carrying out the inspection on 05.01.1978, the Deputy
          Manager had recommended taking over the possession of only
          four godowns and had pointed out the defects in respect of
          the other two godowns.                                            D
      iii. Rent was payable to the plaintiffs as per measurements from
           the date of actual possession i.e., 08.02.1978. In respect of
           the remaining two godowns no rent was payable as the
           possession of the said godowns were not handed over to FCI,
           after rectification of the defects pointed out in letter dated   E
           05.01.1978.
      iv. The alleged possession on 14.05.1979 was taken by officials
          of FCI who were not competent to do so and the said officials
          were punished in departmental enquiry.
       12. During the pendency of the suit before the Trial Court, the      F
appellants and the FCI entered into a lease agreement dated 06.02.1986
in respect of all six godowns.
       13. The Trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 29.04.1990
decreed the suit in favour of the appellants and directed the respondents
to pay a sum of Rs. 5,77,274.59/- along with interest @ 11% per annum       G
and also an enhanced rent of Rs. 20,68,950/- along with interest @ 11 %
per annum. According to the Trial Court, the plaintiff had proved the
completion of all the six godowns on the basis of the evidence of PW-1,2
& 5 who had issued certificates in respect of completion and fitness of
the godowns. While returning the finding, the Trial Court also placed
                                                                            H
558            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 4 S.C.R.


A     reliance upon the letter dated 15.05.1979 issued by FCI, whereby it had
      acknowledged the handing over the possession of the two godowns.
             14. FCI preferred the first appeal bearing F.A. No. 64/90 before
      the High Court challenging the judgment and decree of the Trial Court
      dated 29.04.1990. Cross objections were also preferred by the appellants
B     herein in respect of certain claims which was rejected by the Trial Court.
             15. The High Court vide impugned judgment dated 02.07.2008
      allowed the appeal primarily on the ground that agreement dated
      16.12.1976 was not a lease agreement and merely a contract simplicitor
      and the rights and liabilities of the parties were governed strictly as per
C     the covenants prescribed by the agreement. Therefore, the claim for
      arrears of the rent was not made out.
            16. The evidence of PW-1,2 & 5 which was relied upon by the
      Trial Court was discarded by the High Court on the grounds that the
      inspection carried out by them was in the absence of the officials of FCI
D     and not in accordance with the specification laid down by FCI and as
      agreed between the parties.
             17. The sole question which arises for consideration before us is
      whether the agreement dated 16.12.1976 was a lease agreement under
      Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 or an agreement for
E     lease giving rise to only obligations arising out of the said contract.
            18. It may be relevant to reproduce Clauses 6 and 7 of the
      agreement dated 16.12.1976, which read as under :-
            “ 6. Upon completion of the godowns and the services referred
            to above in all respect, and after obtaining a completion
F           certificate from party no. 2 or any of its officers nominated
            by Party no. 2 in this behalf, party no. 1 would hand over the
            godown/godowns to party no. 2 under a lease agreement to
            be executed between parties in the standard form obtaining
            in the FCI.
G           7. It shall be understood that in the event of any delay in
            completion of the building or services or if there is a faulty
            workmanship or the structure is defective on the basis of the
            findings of the FCI officers, which will be final, party no. 2
            would not be bound to take the structure on lease.”
H
 RAMNATH AGRAWAL & ORS. v. FOOD CORPORATION OF                             559
        INDIA & ORS. [KRISHNA MURARI, J.]

       19. A perusal of the aforesaid, the two Clauses of the agreement    A
go to show that it was not a lease agreement but rather an agreement to
enter into lease.
      20. One of the earliest precedent, wherein the question whether
an agreement can be termed as lease arose in the case of Rani Hemanta
Kumari Debi Vs. Midnapur Zamindari Company Ltd, AIR 1919                   B
PC 79, wherein it was held as under :-
      “Their Lordships are of opinion that it cannot be so regarded.
      An “agreement to lease”, which a lease is by the statute
      declared to include, must in their Lordships’ opinion be a
      document which effects an actual demise and operates as              C
      a lease. They think that Jenkins C.J.., in the case of
      Panchanam Bose v. Chandra Charan Misra, correctly stated
      the interpretation of s. 17 in this respect. The present agreement
      is an agreement that upon the happening of a contingent event
      at a date which was indeterminate and having regard to the
      slow progress of Indian litigation, might be far distant, a lease    D
      would be granted. Until the happening of that event it was
      impossible to determine whether there would be any lease or
      not. Such an agreement does not in their Lordships’ opinion,
      satisfy the meaning of the phrase “agreement to lease,” which,
      in the context where it occurs and in the statute in which it is     E
      found must in their opinion relate to some document that
      creates a present and immediate interest in the land.”
      21. The decision of the Privy Council in Rani Hemanta Kumari
Debi (supra) was referred to by this Court in Tiruvenibai v. Lilabai
[1959 Supp 2 SCR 107 : AIR 1959 SC 620) wherein at page 111, it            F
was held as under:-
      “Before dealing with these points, we must first consider what
      the expression an agreement to lease’ means under Section
      2(7) of the Indian Registration Act, hereinafter referred to as
      the Act. Section 2(7), provides that a lease includes a              G
      counterpart, Kabuliyat, an undertaking to cultivate and
      occupy and an agreement to lease. In Hemanta Kumari Debi
      v. Midnapur Zamindari Co. Ltd. (LR (1919) 46 IA 240 : AIR
      1919 PC 79) the Privy Council has held that ‘an agreement
      to lease, which a lease is by the statute declared to include,
                                                                           H
560     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2020] 4 S.C.R.


A     must be a document which effects an actual demise and
      operates as a lease’. In other words, an agreement between
      two parties which entities one of them merely to claim the
      execution of a lease from the other without creating a present
      and immediate demise in his favour is not included under
      Section 2, sub-section (7). In Hemanta Kumari Debi case (LR
B
      (1919) 46 IA 240 : AIR 1919 PC 79) a petition setting out the
      terms of an agreement in compromise of a suit stated as one
      of the terms that the plaintiff agreed that if she succeeded in
      another suit which she had brought to recover certain land,
      other than that to which the compromised suit related she would
C     grant to the defendant a lease of that land upon specified
      terms. The petition was recited in full in the decree made in
      the compromised suit under Section 375 of the Code of Civil
      Procedure, 1882. A subsequent suit was brought for specific
      performance of the said agreement and it was resisted on the
      ground that the agreement in question was an agreement to
D
      lease under Section 2(7) and since it was not registered it
      was inadmissible in evidence. This plea was rejected by the
      Privy Council on the ground that the document did not effect
      an actual demise and was outside the provisions of Section
      2(7). In coming to the conclusion that the agreement to lease
E     under the said section must be a document which effects an
      actual demise the Privy Council has expressly approved the
      observations made by Jenkins, C.J., in the case of Panchanan
      Bose v. Chandra Charan Misra (ILR (1910) 37 Cal 808 : 14
      CWN 874) in regard to the construction of Section 17 of the
      Act. The document with which the Privy Council was
F
      concerned was construed by it as “an agreement that, upon
      the happening of a contingent event at a date which was
      indeterminate and, having regard to the slow progress of
      Indian litigation, might be far distant, a lease would be
      granted” and it was held that ‘until the happening of that
G     event, it was impossible to determine whether there would be
      any lease or not’. This decision makes it clear that the meaning
      of the expression ‘an agreement to lease’ ‘which, in the context
      where it occurs and in the statute in which it is found, must
      relate to some document that creates a present and immediate
      interest in the land’. Ever since this decision was pronounced
H
 RAMNATH AGRAWAL & ORS. v. FOOD CORPORATION OF                           561
        INDIA & ORS. [KRISHNA MURARI, J.]

      by the Privy Council the expression ‘agreement to lease’ has       A
      been consistently construed by all the Indian High Courts as
      an agreement which creates an immediate and a present demise
      in the property covered by it.”
      22. This court in State of Maharashtra & Ors. v. Atur India
Pvt. Ltd. (1994) 2 SCC 497, quoting Hill & Redman distinguished          B
between an agreement to lease and a lease. The relevant paragraph of
Atur India Pvt. Ltd. (supra) are reproduced as under:-
      “25. Hill & Redman in Law of Landlord and Tenant, 17th
      Edn., Vol. 1 at page 100 dealing with this aspect of the matter
      states as under:-                                                  C
      22. “DISTINCTION BETWEEN LEASE AND AGREEMENT
      FOR LEASE
      40. (1) A lease is a transaction which as of itself creates a
      tenancy in favour of the tenant.
                                                                         D
      (2) An agreement for a lease is a transaction whereby the
      parties bind themselves, one to grant and the other to accept
      a lease.
      (3) If the agreement for a lease is one of which specific
      performance will be granted the parties are, for most but not
                                                                         E
      all purposes, in the same legal position as regards each other
      and as regards third parties as if the lease had been granted.
      (4) Whether an instrument operates as a lease or as an
      agreement for a lease depends on the intention of the parties,
      which intention must be ascertained from all the relevant
                                                                         F
      circumstances.
      50. An instrument in proper form (a); by which the conditions
      of a contract of letting are finally ascertained, and which is
      intended to vest the right of exclusive possession in the lessee
      - either at once, if the term is to commence immediately, or at
      a future date, if the term is to commence subsequently - is a      G
      lease which takes effect from the date fixed for the
      commencement of the term without the necessity of actual entry
      by the lessee (b). An instrument which only binds the parties,
      the one to create and the other to accept a lease thereafter, is
      an executory agreement for a lease, and although the               H
562            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2020] 4 S.C.R.


A           intending lessee enters the legal relation of landlord and tenant
            is not created.”
           23. This Court in Atur India Pvt. Ltd. (supra) also relied upon
      Mulla on The Transfer of Property Act to enumerate the distinction
      between a lease and an executory agreement to lease in the Indian
B     Context, which is as under :-
            27. We will now turn to Indian law. Mulla in The Transfer of
            Property Act (7th Edn.) at page 647 dealing with agreement
            to lease states as under:
               “An agreement to lease may effect an actual demise in which
C              case it is a lease. On the other hand, the agreement to
               lease may be a merely executory instrument binding the
               parties, the one, to grant, and the other, to accept a lease
               in the future. As to such an executory agreement the law in
               England differs from that in India. An agreement to lease
D              not creating a present demise is not a lease and requires
               neither writing nor registration.
               As to an executory agreement to lease, it was at one time
               supposed that an intending lessee who had taken
               possession under an agreement to lease capable of specific
E              performance, was in the same position as if the lease had
               been executed and registered. These cases have, however,
               been rendered obsolete by the decisions of the Privy
               Council that the equity in Walsh v. Lonsdale does not apply
               in India.”

F            24. From the aforesaid it is evident that for an agreement to be
      considered as a lease and not as an agreement to lease it is important
      that there must be an actual demise of property on the date of the
      agreement.
             25. A perusal of the terms and conditions quoted herein above
      and the legal position discussed clearly demonstrates that the agreement
G
      dated 16.12.1976 was not a lease but simply an agreement giving rise to
      contractual obligations. The terms and conditions clearly demonstrate
      that the execution of the lease deed was contingent upon the construction
      of godowns being completed and the same being approved by issuance
      of completion certificate by the Competent Authority of FCI.
H
 RAMNATH AGRAWAL & ORS. v. FOOD CORPORATION OF                               563
        INDIA & ORS. [KRISHNA MURARI, J.]

       26. The suit preferred by the appellants is a suit for damages        A
arising out of breach of agreement dated 16.12.1976. It is well settled
law that the rights and obligations of the parties have to be decided in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract.
        27. Clause 6 of the agreement dated 16.12.1976 made it imperative
for the appellants to obtain a completion certificate from the competent     B
officers of FCI, prior to execution of lease agreement and handing over
the possession of the godowns. In case of defects and faulty
workmanships, the findings of the officials of FCI were final. The
appellants have contended that letter dated 02.12.1977 issued by FCI
was the completion certificate and no subsequent certificate was to be
issued. However, it is noteworthy to point out that inspection was carried   C
out on 05.01.1978, whereafter FCI vide letter dated 14.02.1978 had
recommended taking over the possession of only four out of six godowns.
There arises no question of waiver, acquiescence or estoppel, as all
along FCI has contended that two godowns were defective and the
possession of the same can not be taken over till the rectification of the   D
defects. The reliance placed by the appellants on the letter dated
15.05.1978, wherein FCI is said to have acknowledged taking over
possession is totally misplaced. No reliance can be placed on the said
letter which was manufactured in connivance with the delinquent officers
of the FCI who were charge-sheeted and subsequently punished in a
departmental enquiry for the same.                                           E

       28. The appellants have not disputed the facts that the officers of
FCI refused to take over the possession of the two godowns in view of
the defects pointed out by the officers of FCI and the said defects were
never rectified. As per Clause 6 of the agreement dated 16.12.1976, in
case of defects, the findings of the officers of FCI were to be final and    F
there was no obligation to take such structure on lease. The High Court
has rightly discarded the evidence of PW-1,2 & 5 as neither the inspection
was carried out by an independent agency in presence of the
representatives of the appellants and respondents nor the same was in
accordance with the specifications laid down by FCI in the agreement         G
dated 16.12.1976. Therefore, no rent was payable in respect of the two
disputed godowns as they were not completed as per the specifications
of FCI and the possession of the disputed godowns were not taken over
by FCI at the time of filing of the suit by the appellants.

                                                                             H
564            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2020] 4 S.C.R.


A            29. Insofar as claim for rent prior to 08.02.1978 is concerned, the
      appellants were not entitled for any such claim as rent was payable only
      after taking over of possession as per Clause 8 of the agreement dated
      16.12.1976.
             30. The other question which remains to be considered is whether
B     the appellants were entitled to claim enhanced rent in respect of the
      godowns. We fail to find any such covenant in the agreement dated
      16.12.1976, which admittedly is not a lease, stipulating enhancement of
      the rent after particular period once possession of the godowns has been
      taken over by FCI, which may entitle the appellants for payment of an
      enhanced rent.
C
             31. In view of the above facts and discussions, we find no reason
      to take a view different from the one taken by the High Court while
      allowing the first appeal of the respondents and dismissing the Civil Suit
      of the appellants herein. Accordingly, the appeal stands dismissed.
D           32. In the circumstances, we do not make any order as to costs.


      Divya Pandey                                               Appeal dismissed.



E




F




G




H