Supreme Court of India
RAMNARESH & ORS.versusSTATE OF CHHATTISGARH
- Citation
- 2012 INSC 117
- Decided
- 28 February 2012
- Disposal
- Case Partly allowed
- Bench
- A K PATNAIK
Holding
The Court upheld the convictions but held that the case did not meet the "rarest of rare" standard for death, thereby commuting the death sentence to life imprisonment.
Summary
The Supreme Court examined the conviction of four accused for the rape and murder of Rajkumari, based primarily on the testimony of a 16‑year‑old servant, PW6, who was the sole eye‑witness. The Court found that PW6's statement was reliable, corroborated by medical evidence and the testimony of the victim's mother, and that the accused failed to establish an alibi. While the prosecution proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the Court held that the case did not satisfy the "rarest of rare" criteria required for a death sentence. Considering mitigating factors such as the young age of the accused, the possibility of reform, and the lack of a clear intent to kill, the death penalty was commuted to life imprisonment of 21 years. The convictions under IPC sections 302, 376(2)(g) and 499 were upheld, and the appeal was partially allowed.
Issues considered
- The credibility and sufficiency of the sole eye‑witness testimony of PW6.
- Whether the delay in lodging the FIR vitiates the prosecution case.
- The adequacy of forensic evidence to link the accused to the crime.
- Whether the death sentence is justified under the "rarest of rare" doctrine.
- The impact of mitigating circumstances on the appropriate quantum of sentence.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 161, s. 293, s. 313, s. 354(3)
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 34, s. 376(2)(g), s. 499
Subjects
rapemurderdeath penaltyrarest of raresentencing policysole eyewitnessforensic evidencealibicommutationIPC sections 302, 376, 499
Judgment
[2012] 3 S.C.R. 630
A RAMNARESH & ORS.
v.
STATE OF CHHATTISGARH
(Criminal Appeal Nos. 166-167 of 2010)
FEBRUARY 28, 2012
B
[A.K. PATNAIK AND SWATANTER KUMAR, JJ.)
PENAL CODE, 1860: ss.302, 376(2)(g}, 499 - Rape and
murder - Four accused - A/legation against the accused that
C they raped victim-deceased and thereafter strangulated her
to death - Testimony of servant aged 16 years (PW6) who was
present at the time of incident and was threatened by the
accused not to tell anyone about· the incident - Conviction u/
ss. 302, ·376(2)(g), 499 based on testimony of PW6 and award
D of death sentence - On appeal, held: There was no
contradiction in the testimony of PW6 - His statement was fully
corroborated by medical evidence - Both the external and
internal injuries that the deceased suffered as a consequence
of rape and the strangulation clearly indicated that the crime
E could not have been committed by a single person - Once
that possibility is ruled out, testimony of PW6, despite he
being the sole eye-witness, need not be doubted - In
statement made u/s.313, CrPC accused denied their presence
on the spot, at the time of occurrence - Thus, it was for them
F to prove that they were not present at the place of occurrence
and were entitled to plea of alibi - They miserably failed to
establish this fact - Delay in lodging FIR duly explained -
The cumulative effect of the oral/documentary and expert
evidence was that the prosecution was able to prove its case
beyond any reasonable. doubt - The accused were guilty of
G committing the offence ulss. 499, 376(2)(g) and 302 - As
regard sentencing, the possibility of their being reformed not
ruled 'out - Considering the age of the accused, possibility of
· the death of the deceased occurring accidently and the
H 630
RAMNARESH & ORS. v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 631
possibility of the accused reforming themselves, they cannot A
be termed as 'social menace' - All these accused committed
a heinous and inhuman.e crime for satisfaction of their lust,
but it cannot be held with certainty that the case fell in the
'rarest of rare' cases - Accordingly, the sentence of death
commuted to that for life imprisonment (21 years). B
SENTENCE/SENTENCING: Sentencing policy -
Guiding principles - Death sentence and principles governing
its conversion to life sentence - Held: The law requires Courts
to record special r~asons for awarding death sentence - Court C
has to consider matters like nature of the offence, how and
under what circumstances it was committed, the extent of
brutality with which the offence was committed, the motive for
the offence, any provocative or aggravating circumstances at
the time of commission of the crime, the possibility of the
convict being reformed or rehabilitated, adequacy of the D
sentence of life imprisonment and other attendant
circumstances - These factors cannot be similar or identical
in any two given cases - Thus, it is imperative for the Court
to examine each case on its own facts, in light of the
enunciated principles - It is only upon application of these E
principles to the facts of a given case that the Court can arrive
at a final conclusion whether the case is one of the 'rarest of
rare' cases and imposition of death penalty alone shall serve
the ends of justice - Both aspects have to be given their
respective weightage - The Court has to strike a balance F
between the two and see towards which side the scale/balance
of justice tilts - The principle of proportion between the crime
and the punishment is the principle of Just deserts' that serves
as the foundation of every criminal sentence that is justifiable
- In other words, the 'doctrine of proportionality' has a valuable G
application to the sentencing policy under the Indian criminal
jurisprudence - Thus, the court will not only have to examine
what is just but also as to what the accused deserves keeping
in view the impact on the society at large - Every punishment
imposed is bound to have its effect not only on the accused H
632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 3 S.C.R.
A alone, but also on the society as a whole - Thus, the Courts
should consider retributive and deterrent aspect of
punishment while imposing the extreme punishment of death.
WITNESSES: Sole witness - TestimonY of - Evidentiary
value of - Discussed.
B
The prosecution case was that on the fateful day, the
victim-deceased was sleeping in her house. PW-6, the
servant aged 16 years was watching television in .the
verandah. All the accused came to her house. One of the
C accused was the brother of PW-1 (the husband of the
deceased). PW-1 was not in the house. Two accused sat
with PW6 and the other two accused went inside the
room where the deceased was sleeping and committed
rape on her, After committing rape, they came out and sat
o · with PW6 and the other two accused went inside and
committed rape on her. The accused asked PW6 to go
away to which he objected. Upon his objection, he was
threatened of elimination. Thereafter PW6 went to the
room of the deceased and saw that she was breathing
E heavily and was not able to speak and blood was oozing
out from her mouth. PW6 came out and he was again
threatened by all the accused. Thereafter all the accused
asked PW6 to go to the mother of the deceased (PW12)
and tell her that the deceased was not waking up. PW6
F went to PW12 and narrated the incident as directed by
the accused. PW12 went to the house of the deceased
where she found the deceased lying dead. She called the
neighbours and thereafter, information was given to PW1,
husband of the deceased. PW1 stated in his statement
under·Section 161, Cr.P.C. that PW6 had not told him as
G to how the deceased had died. In his statement, he had
also stated that he had not married the deceased and she
was staying with him as his mistress and the deceased
was married to one 'B'. He also stated that he suspected
'B' of committing the said crime. The other witnesses, i.e.
H PW2, PWS and PW10, had seen the accused-brother of
RAMNARESH & ORS. v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 633
PW1 and the other accused assembling outside the A
house of the deceased became hostile during their
examination before the court. The trial court convicted the
four accused (the appellants), for offences under
Sections 499, 376(2)(g) and 302 read with Section 34, IPC
and passed death sentence. The High Court upheld the B
conviction and the sentence. The instant appeal was filed
challenging the order of the High Court.
Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1. PW6 who was the main witness of the C
prosecution, was about 16 years old at the time of
recording of his statement in the Court. He fully supported
the case of the prosecution and was subjected to a
lengthy cross-examination. PW12 was the mother of the
deceased and she corroborated the statement of PW6. o
PW1, PW6 and PW12 substantially supported the case of
the prosecution and there was no substantial conflict or
contradiction in their statements. The report of the FSL
was inconclusive but not negative so as to provide the
accused with any material benefit. [Paras 7, 9, 10, 11) E
[653-F; 654-C-E; 655-B-C]
Joseph v. State of Kera/a (2003) 1 SCC 465: 2002 (4)
Suppl. SCR 439; State of Haryana v. lnder Singh & Ors.
(2002) 9 sec 537 - referred to.
F
2. One very important aspect of the instant case was
that the accused were not declared accused
instantaneously. PW6 was kept in the Police Station for
two days apparently for the purposes of verifying and
investigating what he informed the police. The needle of G
suspicion pointed towards PW6 and 'B' for the reason
that 'B' was earlier married to the deceased and PW6 with
reference to the circumstances in existence at the spot
and he being the only person available. The possibility
of PW6 having committed the crime is ruled out in view H
634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 3 S,C.R.
A of the evidence collected during the investigation. It was
nobody's case that there was even an iota of evidence
pointing towards '8' for commission of such an offence.
[Paras 12, 13] [655-C-B, H; 656-A]
3. It is not the quantity but the quality of the witnesses
8
which matters for determining the guilt or innocence of
the accused. The testimony of a sole witness must be
confidence-inspiring and beyond suspicion and should
not leave any doubt in the mind of the Court and has to
be corroborated by other evidence produced by the
C prosecution in relation to commission of the crime and
involvement of the accused in committing such a crime.
In the instant case, PW6, at the time of occurrence and
even at the time of recording of the statement, was a
young boy of 16 years. He had been serving in the house
D of PW1, for a number of years prior to the date of incident.
It was his regular feature to have his meals as well as
sleep in the verandah of the house of PW1. There existed
no motive for him to commit the crime. He was kept under
continuous threat to his life right from the time the
E accused entered the house of the deceased till the
accused were taken in· police custody after re.cording
evidence of various persons, more importantly, PW1,
PW12, PW6 and PW7. His statement clearly narrated how
the offence was committed by the accused and there was
F nothing abnormal and inconsistent in his testimony.
Furthermore, his statement was fully corroborated by
medical evidence of PW7 and the testimony of PW12. The
confirmation of blood on the piece of saree used for
gagging the mouth of the deceased and the confirmation
G of presence of semen and human spermatozoa on the
vaginal slides of the deceased and the findings during
autopsy duly proved by PW7 and the corroboration of
other witnesses including that of the Investigating Officer
would leave no room for any doubt that the appellants
H had committed house trespass in the house of the
RAMNARESH & ORS. v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 635
deceased and committed the offence with which they A
were charged. A very significant piece of evidence in the
instant case was the medical evidence and the injuries
inflicted upon the body of the deceased. Both, the
external and internal injuries that the deceased suffered
as a consequence of rape and the strangulation clearly B
indicated that the crime could not have been committed
by a single person. Once that. possibility is ruled out, it
· would attach greater reliability to the testimony of PW6.
Thus, the statement of PW6, despite he being the sole
eye-witness, need not be doubted. [Paras 14, 15, 16] [656- c
G; 657-8-H; 658-A-B]
State of Gujarat v. Patel Mohan Mu/ji AIR 1994 SC 250
- distinguished.
4. There were four or five prosecution witnesses who D
had been declared hostile during the course of hearing
of the trial. These witnesses were not the witnesses to the
scene of crime. They were witnesses only to support the
fact that the accused persons were seen together near
the house of the deceased after all others had gone to E
their respective houses, after watching television at the
house of the deceased. This fact is not the determinative
factor and does not demolish the case of the prosecution
in its entirety or otherwise. The presence of the accused-
brother of PW1 at the house of the deceased immediately F
after the occurrence and trying to keep a watch on PW6
clearly showed that the most likely and truthful witness
in the case of the prosecution was PW6. PW6 had
withstood the long cross-examination despite his young
age, the threat extended to him by the accused and being G
the sole eye-witness of such a heinous crime. It goes to
the credit of this witness that despite the fact that other
·five witnesses had turned hostile being the person of the
village, he nevertheless stood to his testimony. [Para 17]
[658-F-H; 659-A-C]
H
636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 3 S.C.R.
A 5. The occurrence took place at about 11 p.m. at
night in a village area where normally by this time, people
go to their respective houses and stay inside thereafter.
After committing the rape on the deceased and her
subsequent death which itself took a considerable time,
B the accused persons remained in the house for some
time. Thereafter, they made it sure that PW6 goes to the
house ·of PW12 and tells her incorrectly and without
disclosing the true facts that the deceased was not
waking up despite efforts, which he did and this fact was
c fully established by the statement of PW12. In the
meanwhile, the news had spread and one 'A' rung up
PW1 who came to the spot of occurrence. After seeing
his wife in that horrible condition and doubting that 'B'
might have committed the crime since by that time PW6
had not told him the correct story, he went to the Police
0
Station and lodged the FIR. Police registered the FIR
under Sections 376 and 302 IPC. Thus, there was
plausible explanation available on record of the case file
which explained the delay in lodging the FIR. [Para 18]
E [659-D-G]
6. Exhibit P/12 was the post mortem report which
depicted various external and internal injuries on the
body of the deceased. The cause of death of the
deceased was asphyxia due to throttling. As per the post
F mortem report, petechial hemorrhage of lungs was
present, the right side of heart was filled with blood while
the left chamber was empty and bloody froth was oozing
from nostrils and mouth of the deceased. The expert
evidence. clearly demonstrated, particularly in view of the
G injuries caused to the deceased during the heinous
crime, that it could not have been done by a single
person and, therefore, involvement of two or more
persons was most probable and in line with the story of
the prosecution. The cumulative effect of the oral/
H documentary and expert evidence was that the
RAMNARESH & ORS. v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 637
prosecution was able to prove its case beyond any A
reasonable doubt. [Para 19) [661-A-E]
7 .1. It was a case where not only the entire
incriminating material evidence was put to the accused
while they were being examined under Section 313 8
Cr.P.C. but also that the accused examined two
witnesses DW1, and DW2, wife of accused-brother of
PW1. In their statements under Section 313 Cr.P.C., they
had taken the stand that they were not present at the
place of occurrence but, in fact, they were present in their C
respective houses and as such they were falsely
implicated. The two witnesses were examined in support
of this fact. DW1 stated that he lived near the house of
the deceased and he_ did not hear any noise or cries on
the fateful night. The cross examination of these two
witness~s clearly created a doubt in regard to the D
authenticity of their statements. Firstly, as per the version
of the prosecution and as is even clear from the medical
evidence, the mouth of deceased had been gagged.
Therefore, the question of hearing any noise or
screaming would not arise and, secondly, DW2 is the wife E
of the accused and is bound to speak in his favour as
an interested witness. Furthermore, both these witnesses
had not informed the Police during the course of
investigation and even when the accused were arrested
that they had been present at their respective houses and F
not at the place of occurrence. In fact, this has not even
been the suggestion of the defence while cross-
examining the prosecution witnesses. [Para 20] [661-F-
H; 662-B-D]
G
7.2. In terms of Section 313 Cr.P.C., the accused has
the freedom to maintain silence during the investigation
as well as before the Court. The accused may choose to
maintain silence or complete denial even when his
statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is being recorded,
H
638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 3 S.C.R.
A of course, the Court would be entitled to draw an
inference, including adverse inference, as may be
permissible to it in accordance with law. Right to fair trial,
presumption of innocence unless proven guilty and proof
by the prosecution of its case beyond any reasonable
B doubt are the fundamentals of our criminal jurisprudence.
When speaking of prejudice to an accused, it has to be
shown that the accused has suffered some disability or
detriment in relation to any of these protections
substantially. Such prejudice should also demonstrate
c that it has occasioned failure of justice to the accused.
One of the other cardinal principles of criminal justice
administration is that the courts should make a close
examination to ascertain whether there was really a
failure of justice or whether it is only a camouflage, as
this expression is perhaps too pliable. [para 21] [662-E-
0
H; 663-A]
Rafiq Ahmed@ Rafi v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2011) 8
sec 300 - relied on.
E 7.3. It is a settled principle of law that the obligation
to put material evidence to the.accused under Section
313 Cr.P.C. is upon the Court. One of the main objects of
recording of a statement under this provision of the
Cr.P.C. is to give an opportunity to the accused to explain
F the circumstances appearing against him as well as to
put forward his defence, if the accused so desires. But
once he does not avail this opportunity, then
consequences in law must follow. Where the accused
takes benefit of this opportunity, then his statement made
G under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in so far as it supports the
case of the prosecution, can be used against him for
rendering conviction. Even under the latter, he faces the
consequences in law. In the instant case, the accused
have denied their presence on the spot, at the time of
occurrence. Thus, it was for them to prove that they were
H not present at the place of occurrence and were entitled
RAMNARESH & ORS. v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 639
to plea of alibi. They miserably failed to establish this fact. A
On the contrary, the behaviour explained by the defence
witnesses appeared to be somewhat unnatural in the
social set up in which the accused, the deceased and
even some of the prosecution witnesses were living. They
knew each other very well and the normal course of life B
in a village is that they are quite concerned with and
actively participate in each other's affairs, particularly sad
occasions. The accused brother of PW1, was present at
the place of occurrence and was holding one of the minor
children of PW1. This supported th.e statement of PW6 c
that he was constantly under threat and watch from either
of the accused. The version put forward by the accused
in their statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was
unbelievable and unacceptable. There was no cogent
evidence on record to support their plea. The prosecution
0
was able to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The
accused were guilty of committing the offence under
Sections 499, 376(2)(g) and 302 IPC. [Paras 22-24] [663-
B-G; 664-A]
8.1. The death sentence and principles governing its E
conversion to life imprisonment
Despite the transformation of approach and radical
changes in principles of sentencing across the world, it
has not been possible to put to rest the conflicting views F
on sentencing policy. The sentencing policy being a
significant and inseparable facet of criminal
jurisprudence, has been inviting the attention of the
Courts for providing certainty and greater clarity to it.
Capital punishment has been a subject matter of great G
social and judicial discussion and castacism. From
whatever point of view it is examined, one undisputable
statement of law follows that it is neither possible nor
prudent to state any universal formula which would be
applicable to all the cases of criminology where capital H
640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012} 3 S.C.R.
A punishment has been prescribed. It shall always depend
upon the facts and circumstances of a given case. This
Court has stated various legal principles which would be
precepts on exercise of judicial discretion in cases where
the issue is whether the capital punishment should or
B should not be awarded. The law requires the Court to
record special reasons for awarding such sentence. The
Court, therefore, has to consider matters like nature of the
offence, how and under what circumstances it was
committed, the extent of brutality with which the offence
C was committed, the motive for the offence, any
provocative or aggravating circumstances at the time of
commission of the crime, the possibility of the convict
being reformed or rehabilitated, adequacy of the
sentence of life imprisonment and other attendant
circumstances. These factors cannot be similar or
0
identical in any two given cases. Thus, it is imperative for
the Court to examine each case on its own facts, in light
of the enunciated principles. It is only upon application
of these principles to the facts of a given case that the
Court can arrive at a final conclusion whether the case
E in hand is one of the 'rarest of rare' cases and imposition
of death penalty alone shall serve the ends of justice.
Further, the Court would also keep in mind that if such a
punishment alone would serve the purpose of the
judgment, in its being sufficiently punitive and
F purposefully preventive. [Paras 25-26] [664-8-H; 665-A-B]
8.2. Merely because a crime is heinous per se may
not be a sufficient reason for the imposition of death
penalty without reference to the other factors and
G attendant circumstances. Most of the heinous crimes
under. the IPC are punishable by death penalty or life
imprisonment. That by .itself does not suggest that in all
such offences, penalty of death alone should be
awarded. In such cases awarding of life imprisonment
H would be a rule, while 'death' would be the exception .. The
RAMNARESH & ORS. v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 641
term 'rarest of rare' case which is the consistent A
· determinative rule declared by this Court, itself suggests
that it has to be an exceptional case. The life of a
particular individual cannot be taken away except
according to the procedure established by law and that
is the constitutional mandate. The law contemplates B
recording of special reasons and, therefore, the
expression 'special' has tO be given a definite meaning
and connotation. 'Special reasons' in contra-distinction
to 'reasons' simplicitor conveys the legislative mandate
of putting a restriction on exercise of judicial discretion c
by placing the requirement of special.reasons. [Paras 36-
37] [677-B-E]
8.3. The judgments in Bachan Singh and Machhi Singh
primarily dissect the principles into two different
compartments - one being the 'aggravating D
circumstances' while the other being the 'mitigating
circumstances'. The Court would consider the cumulative
effect of both these aspects and normally, it may not be
very appropriate for the Court to decide the most
significant aspect of sentencing policy with reference to E
one of the classes under any of the following heads while
completely ignoring other classes under other heads. To
balance the two is the primary duty of the Court. It will be
. appropriate for the Court to come to a final conclusion
upon balancing the exercise that would help to administer F
the criminal justice system better and provide an effective
and meaningful reasoning by the Court as contemplated
under Section 354(3) Cr.P.C.
Aggravating Circumstances : G
(1) The offences relating to the commission of
heinous crimes like murder, rape, armed dacoity,
kidnapping etc. by the accused with a prior record
of conviction for capital felony or offences committed
by the person having a substantial history of serious H
642 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 3 S.C.R.
A assaults ancl criminal convictions. ·
(2) The offence was committed while the offender
was engaged in the commission of another serious
offence.
B (3) The offence was committed with the intention to
create a fear psychosis in the public at large and was
committed in a public place by a weapon or device
which clearly could be hazardous to the life of more
than one person.
c
(4) The offence of murder was committed for ransom
or like offences to recerve money or monetary
benefits.
(5) Hired killings.
D
(6) The offence was committed outrageously for want
only while involving inhumane treatment and torture
to the victim.
E (7) The offence was committed by a person while in
lawful custody.
(8) The murder or the offence was committed to
prevent a person lawfully carrying out his duty like
arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement of
F himself or another. For instance, murder is of a
person who had acted in lawful discharge of his duty
under Section 43 Cr.P.C.
(9) When the crime is enormous in proportion like
G making an attempt of murder of the entire family or
members of a particular community.
(10) When the victim is innocent, helpless or a
person relies upon the trust of relationship and social
norms, like a child, helpless woman, a daughter or a
H
RAMNARESH & ORS. v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 643
niece staying with a father/uncle and is inflicted with A
the crime by such a trusted person.
(11) When murder is committed for a motive which
evidences total depravity and meanness.
(12) When there is a cold blooded murder without 8
provocation.
(13) The crime is committed so brutally that it pricks
or shocks not only the judicial conscience but even
the conscience of the society. C
Mitigating Circumstances :
(1) The manner and circumstances in and under
which the offence was committed, for example,
extreme mental or emotional disturbance or extreme D
provocation in contradistinction to all these
situations in normal course.
(2) The age of the accused is a relevant consideration
but not a determinative factor by itself. E
(3) The chances of the accused of not indulging in
commission of the crime again and the probability of
the accused being reformed and rehabilitated.
(4) The condition of the accused shows that he was F
mentally defective and the defect impaired his
capacity to appreciate the circumstances of his
criminal conduct.
(5) The circumstances which, in normal course of life, G
would render such a behavior possible and could
. have the effect of giving rise to mental imbalance in
that given situation like persistent harassment or, in
fact, leading to such a peak of human behavior that,
in the facts and circumstances of the case, the H
644 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 3 S.C.R.
A accused believed that he was morally justified in
committing the offence.
(6) Where the Court upon proper appreciation of
evidence is of the view that the crime was not
B committed in a pre-ordained manner and that the
death resulted in the course of commission of
another crime and that there was a possibility of it
being construed as consequences to the
commission of the primary crime.
c (7) Where it is absolutely unsafe to rely upon the
testimony of a sole eye-witness though prosecution
has brought home the guilt of the accused .
.While determining the questions relateable to
D sentencing policy, the Court has to follow certain
principles and those principles are the loadstar
besides the other considerations in imposition or
otherwise of the death sentence.
Principles :
E
(1) The Court has to apply the test to determine, if it
was the 'rarest of rare' case for imposition of a death
sentence.
F (2) If in the opinion of the Court, imposition of any
other punishment, i.e., life imprisonment would be
completely inadequate and would not meet the ends
of justice.
(3) Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence
G is an exception.
(4) The option to impose sentence of imprisonment
for life cannot be cautiously exercised having regard
to the nature and circumstances of the crime and all
H relevant considerations.
RAMNARESH & ORS. v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 645
(5) The method (planned or otherwise) and the A
manner (extent of brutality and inhumanity, etc.) in
which the crime was committed and the
circumstances leading to commission of such
heinous crime.
8
These are the accepted indicators for the exercise of
judicial discretion but it is always preferred not to fetter
the judicial discretion by attempting to make the
excessive enumeration, in one way or another. In other
words, these are the considerations which may
collectively or otherwise weigh in the mind of the Court, C
while exercising its jurisdiction. It is difficult to state it as
an absolute rule. Every case has to be decided on its own
merits. The judicial pronouncements, can only state the
precepts that may govern the exercise of judicial
discretion to a limited extent. Justice may be done on the D
facts of each case. These are the factors which the Court
may consider in its endeavour to do complete justice
between the parties. The Court then would draw a
balance-sheet of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. Both aspects have to be given their E
respective weightage. The Court has to strike a balance
between the two and see towards which side the scale/
balance of justice tilts. The principle of proportion
between the crime and the punishment is the principle of
'just deserts' that serves as the foundation of every F
criminal sentence that is justifiable. In other words, the
'doctrine of proportionality' has a valuable application to
the sentencing policy under the Indian criminal
jurisprudence. Thus, the court will not only have to
examine what is just but also as to what the accused G
deserves keeping in view the impact on the society at
large. Every punishment imposed is bound to have its
effect not only on the accused alone, but also on the
society as a whole. Thus, the Courts should consider
retributive and deterrent aspect of punishment while H
646 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 3 S.C.R.
A imposing the extreme punishment of death. [paras 39-43]
[677-G-H; 678-A-H; 679-A-H; 680-A-H; 681-A-H; 682-A-D]
8.4. Wherever, the offence which is committed,
manner in which it is committed, its attendant
circumstances and the motive and status of the victim,
8
undoubtedly brings the case within the ambit of 'rarest
of .rare' cases and the Court finds that the imposition of
life imprisonment would be inflicting of inadequate
punishment, the Court may award death penalty.
Wherever, the case falls in any of the exceptions to the
C 'rarest of rare' cases, the Court may exercise its judicial
discretion while imposing life imprisonment in place of
death sentence. In the instant appeals, accused were
guilty of the offences under Sections 376(2)(g) and 302
read with Section 34 IPC. On the question of quantum of
D sentence, the argument raised on behalf of the appellants
was that all the accused were of young age at the time
of commission of the crime, i.e. 21 to 31 years of age. The
possibility of their being reformed cannot be ruled out.
The Court has to consider various parameters and
E balance the mitigating circumstances against the need
for imposition of capital punishment. The factors to be
considered could be different than the mitigating
circumstances. The age of the accused, possibility of the
de.ath of the deceased occurring accidently and the
F possibility of the accused reforming themselves, they
cannot be termed as 'social menace'. It is unfortunate but
a hard fact that all these accused have committed a
heinous and inhumane crime for satisfaction of their lust,
but it cannot be held with certainty that this case falls in
G the 'rarest of rare' cases. Accordingly, the sentence of
death is commuted to that for life imprisonment (21
years). [paras 44, 46, 49-50] [682-0-F, G-H; 683-A; 684-H;
685-A-D]
Machhi Singh & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan (1983) 3 SCC
H 470: 1983 (3) SCR 413; Dhananjoy Chatterjee @ Dhana v.
RAMNARESH & ORS. v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 647
State of West Bengal (1994) 2 SCC 220: 1994 (1) SCR 37; A
Surja Ram v. State of Rajasthan (1996) 6 SCC 271: 1996 (6)
Suppl. SCR 783; Prajeet Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar
(2008) 4 SCC 434: 2008 (5) SCR 969; B.A. Umesh v.
Registrar General, High Court of Karnataka (2011) 3 SCC 85:
2011 (2) SCR 367; State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram (2006) B
12 SCC 254: 2006 (8) Suppl. SCR 501; Atbir v. Government
of NCT of Delhi (2010) 9 SCC 1: 2010 (7) SCR 424; Ronny
@ Ronald James Alwaris Etc. v. State cf Maharashtra (1998)
3 SCC 625: 1998 (2) SCR 162; Allauddin Mian & Ors. v. State
of Bihar (1989) 3 SCC 5: 1989 (2) SCR 498; Bantu @ Nareshc
Giri v. State of MP. (2001) 9 SCC 615: 2001 (4) Suppl. SCR
298 - relied on.
Case Law Reference:
2002 (4) Suppl. SCR 439 referred to Para 14 D
(2002) 9 sec 537 referred to Para 14
AIR 1994 SC 250 Distinguished Para 17
(2011) 8 sec 300 relied on Para 21
E
1983 (3) SCR 413 relied on Para 28,
38,39
1994 (1) SCR 37 relied on Para 29
1996 (6) Suppl. SCR 783 relied on Para 31
F
2008 (5) SCR 969 relied on Para 32
2011 (2) SCR 367 relied on Para 32
2006 (8) Suppl. SCR 501 relied on Para 32
2010 (7) SCR 424 relied on Para 32 G
1998 (2) SCR 162 relied on Para 33
1989 (2) SCR 498 relied on Para 34
2001 (4) Suppl. SCR 298 relied on Para 35 H
648 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 3 S.C.R.
A CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 166-167 of 2010.
From the Judgment & Order dated 24.07.2009 of the High
Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in Criminal Appeal No. 1117
of 2007 & Criminal Reference No. 3 of 2007.
8
Vias Upadhyay, Vikram Patralekh, B.S. Banthia for the
Appellants.
Atul Jha, Sandeep Jha, Dharmendra Kumar Sinha for the
c Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
SWATANTER KUMAR, J. 1. The present appeals are
directed against the concurrent judgments of conviction and
D award of capital punishment. The Additional Sessions Judge,
Pendra Road, District Bilaspur, convicted the four accused (the
appellants herein), for offences under Sections 499, 376(2)(g)
and 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
(for short 'IPC') and sentenced them vide judgment and order
E of sentence dated 20th November, 2007 as follows:
.
Offences PunishmenUSentence
302/34 IPC Award of capital sentence and ordered that
they be hanged till death.
F
376(2)(g) IPC Life Imprisonment and fine of Rs.200/-
each. In case of default in the payment of
fine, each accused to further undergo an
additional rigorous imprisonment of one
G month each.
449 IPC Ten years rigorous imprisonment with fine
of Rs.200/- and in default to undergo
additional rigorous imprisonment for one
H month.
RAMNARESH & ORS. v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 649
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
2. The Division Bench of the High Court vide its judgment A
dated 24th July, 2009 confirmed the judgment and order of
sentence passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge
giving rise to the present appeal.
3. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant, inter alia,
B
but primarily, has raised the 'following challenges to the
judgments under appeal:
(1) That the prosecution has failed to prove its case
beyond any reasonable doubt.
c
(2) That the sole witness, PW6, Dhaniram is not a
credible witness and, in fact, he himself falls within
the realm of suspicion as being an accused.
Number of other witnesses including, PW2, Sunita,
PW5, Bela Bai, and PW10, Kamlesh, turned hostile 0
in the court. This clearly is indicative of false
implication of the accused.
(3) That there are variations and serious
contradictions in the statements of the witnesses,
which have been relied upon by the courts, while E
convicting the accused.
(4) Furthermore, there is an inordinate and
unexplained delay in lodging the FIR Therefore, the
conviction of the accused is unsustainable. The F
contention is that the linking evidence is missing
in the present case. The incriminating evidence
produced by the prosecution does not connect the
appellants with the commission of crime.
(5) The High Court has erred in law in relying upon the G
statement of the witnesses which are not reliable.
The courts are expected to examine statements of
such witnesses and/or sole witness cautiously. The
learned Trial Court as well as the High Court has·
failed to apply these settled principles correctly to H
650 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 3 S.C.R.
A the facts of the present case.
(6) FSL report does not clearly state or link the
appellants with the commission of the crime.
For these reasons and grounds, the appellant
B claims acquittal.
4. Before we proceed to discuss the merits or otherwise
of the above contentions, it will be necessary for us to state the
case of the prosecution and the evidence on record. Rajkumari
c (the deceased) was residing at Village Gullidand, Police
Station Marwahi, with her husband lndrajeet and two infant
children. On 8th August, 2006, her husband had gone to the
house of his father at Rajnagar. Rajkumari was at her residence
with her children. On 9th August, 2006, Rajkumari had called
0 Dhaniram, their domestic servant, to sleep in their house in the
night. It was the day of Raksha Bandhan. Anita (PW3), Savita
(PW2) and Bela Bai (PW5), neighbours of Rajkumari, visited
her house to view television in the night. At about 9 o'clock, they
went back to their houses after viewing television. Ranjeet
E Kewat, is the brother of lndrajeet and brother-in-law of
Rajkumari. He had a house near the house of lndrajeet.
Vishwanath, Amar Singh, Kamlesh and Ramnaresh, who used
to reside at the house of Ranjeet came to his house, sat there
for some time and then went away. At about 11.30 p.m., they
are stated to have again come to the house of Ranjeet and
F consumed alcohol. Thereafter, at about 12 o'clock in the night,
when Rajkumari had gone to sleep in her room and the servant,
Dhaniram, was watching television in the verand~h, the
accused persons, Ranjeet, Vishwanath, Amar Singh and
Ramnaresh came into the house of Rajkumari and told
G Dhaniram that they would have illicit relations with Rajkumari
and if he disclosed anything to anybody, he would be eliminated.
Ramnaresh and Amar Singh sat down along with Dhaniram
while Ranjeet and Vishwanath went into the room of Rajkumari
and committed rape on her. After committing the offence, they
H
RAMNARESH & ORS. v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 651
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
came out and took Dhaniram into the courtyard. Then A
Ramnaresh and Amar Singh entered the room of Rajkumari.
They also committed rape on her and came out after some
time. Then, the accused asked Dhaniram to go away to which
he objected. Upon his objection, he was threatened of
elimination. Thereafter, Dhaniram went to the room of Rajkumari B
and saw that she was breathing heavily, was not able to speak
and blood was oozing from her mouth and nose. Dhaniram
came out of the room and was again threatened by all the
accused. Ranjeet asked him to go to the house of his aunt
(bua), mother of Rajkumari and tell her that Rajkumari is not c
waking up. Before leaving, they extended the threat again and
told him to act as per their directions. Dhaniram went to the
house of Sugaribai, mother of Rajkumari, PW12 and narrated
the incident as he was directed by the accused. Sugaribai
asked him to stay at her house while she went to the house of
0
Rajkumari. There she noticed that Rajkumari was lying dead.
She called the neighbours and thereafter, the information was
given to lndrajeet, husband of the deceased, who came in the
morning. lndrajeet visited the Police Station Marwahi and
informed about the death of Rajkumari vide Ex.P1. The police E
visited the spot and took the body of the deceased vide Ex.P3
and also collected other materials from the place of occurrence.
Dr. Sheela Saha and Dr. Mahesh Raj conducted the
postmortem of the dead body and submitted the postmortem
report, Ex.P12, wherein it was opined that death of Rajkumari
had taken place due to blockage of breathing on account of F
strangulation and the act of commission of rape on her was also
established. The police registered a case under Section 376/
302 IPC vide Ex.P16 and started its investigation. Statements
of as many as 14 witnesses were recorded by the police.
Various items like blood stained underwear and piece of G
yellow-coloured saree on which blood spots were visible at
various places were also seized from the place of occurrence
and were exhibited as Ex.P10. Slide of semen of the accused
from the hospital was seized vide seizure memo Ex.P13.
Thereafter, the accused were arrested. During further H
652 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012] 3 S.C.R.
A investigation, clothes, shirts and underwear of the other
accused persons and the petticot and saree of the deceased
were also seized. After the medical examination of the
accused, report of the FSL and recording of statements of the
witnesses, the police filed the· report before the court of
B competent jurisdiction. The accused were committed to the
Court of Sessions and tried in accordance with law, which
resulted in their conviction, as afore-noticed. As per Ex.P12,
there were following injuries upon the person of the deceased:-
"External Injury in the neck- (A) Abrasion with scratch mark
c by nail present. Abrasion in number, below the angle of
right mandible and sternocleidomastoideus muscles
present size measuring 0.5 x 0.5 cm (B) Scratch mark -
length 1" present above mentioned area. Abrasion on the
left side of Neck below the angle of mandible to mastoid
D process abrasion scratch mark 2 %" present.
(C) Abrasion in the thigh 1" x 0.5" and 1" x 1''.
1" x 1" contusion on private part on medial side of the Rt.
Present on both medial aspect of thigh.
E
ON PN EXAMINAL
Laceration plus abrasion 3 to 4" in no. over perineum.
Blood mix discharge present.
F
PN Ex-Uterus Anteverted normal size."
'
. 5. PW1, husband of the deceased had stated in his
statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (Cr.P.C.) that PW6 had not told him as to how
G Rajkumari had died. In his statement, he had also stated that
he had not married Rajkumari and she was staying with him
as his mistress. He had been married earlier to a girl from
village Pyari. However, he did not remember the name of the
girl; as it was more than 16 years ago. He further stated that
H the deceased Rajkumari was married to one Bhupendra, who
RAMNARESH & ORS. v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 653
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
was from the village of her father, i.e. village Khongapani. He A
admitted that he had two children from Rajkumari and also that
his relationship with Bhupendra were bitter on account of
retaining Rajkumari as his mistress. He also stated that he had
suspected Bhupendra of committing the said crime. According
to this witness, he was informed by one Mr. Ashok of the B
incident. He stated that Dhaniram had been serving as a
servant with them for the past three years and he used to have
his meals and sleep in the verandah of the house. The broken
pieces of bangles of Rajkumari were kept by Dhaniram when
he cleaned the room. c
6. The other witnesses, i.e. PW2, PW5 and PW10, who
had seen Ranjeet and the other accused assembling outside
the house of Rajkumari had been declared hostile during their
examination before the court by the prosecutor. These
witnesses, however, had admitted that they had acquaintance D
with the accused persons as well as with the deceased
Rajkumari. PW5, Bela Bai stated that she had gone to watch
television in the house of Rajkumari along with Anita and Savita
and nobody else was there. It was at that stage that the witness
was declared hostile and she denied the suggestion that she E
had seen the accused persons. This witness and all other
witnesses live in and around the house of Rajkumari.
7. PW6 who is the main witness of the prosecution, was
about 16 years old at the time of recording of his statement in F
the Court. He fully supported the case of the prosecution and
was subjected to a lengthy cross-examination. According to him,
he was watching television when Ranjeet along with other
accused had come to the house of Rajkumari. He also stated
that he did not raise hue and cry as he was under constant threat G
by the other co-accused, who were surrounding him. He also
stated that he was confused and was unable to point out
anything at that point of time. In his cross-examination, he was
posed the following question, which adds to the veracity of his
statement:
H
654 ·SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012] 3 S.C.R.
A "Question: - When Raj Kumari was restless due to pain,
did you go to call up Ranjeet?
Ans:- Why I should have gone to call up Ranjeet when he,
in person, was involved in this incident."
B 8. As already noticed, this witness was subjected to a
detailed cross-examination. He also admitted in his cross-
examination "it is correct to say that I was afraid whether the
police would not make me the accused."
c 9. PW12, Sugaribai, is the mother of the deceased and
she had also supported the case of the prosecution and
corroborated the statement of PW6. She stated that when she
visited the house of Rajkumari, Ranjeet was holding the
younger infant of Rajkumari in his lap and she had sent Ranjeet
0 to call the people but instead he called Rewa Lohar, a witch
doctor.
10. PW1, PW6 and PW12 had substantially supported the
case of the prosecution and w~ are unable to notice any
substantial conflict or contradiction in their statements. The
E semen, blood and blood-stained clothes, which had been
seized during the investigation, had been sent for examination.
The report of the FSL had been placed on record as Ex.P23.
Such evidence would be admissible in terms of Section 293
Cr.P.C. The merit or otherwise of this report was examined by
F the High Court as follows:-
"(8) During trial, report of the Forensic Science Laboratory,
Raipur Ex.P-23 dated 31-7-2007 was produced and
admitted in evidence under Section 293 of the Code by
G which presence of blood on Articles A, B, C, D, E, F1, F2
and presence of seminal stains and human spermatozoa
on Articles C, D, E, F1, F2, G1, H1, 11, J1 and K1 was
confirmed. Seminal stains and human spermatozoa was
not found on Articles A and B. The seminal stains on
Articles C, D, E, F1 and F2 were not sufficient for·
H
RAMNARESH & ORS. v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 655
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
serological examination. The Slides Articles G2, H2, 12, J2 A
and K2 were preserved if D.N.A. Test was felt necessary.
The prosecution examined as many as 16 witnesses. The
appellants/accused examined Samelal D.W.-1 and Kamla
D.W.-2 wife of Ranjeet to establish that the appellants/
accused had slept in their respective houses between 9 B
to 10 P.M. on 9-8-2006."
11. As is evident from the above findings, the report of the
FSL was inconclusive but not negative, which would provide the
accused with any material benefit.
c
12. We have examined this case in light of the above
ocular and documentary evidence. One very important aspect
of the present case is that the accused were not declared
accused instantaneously. Dhaniram had been kept in the
Police Station for two days thereafter apparently for the D
purposes of verifying and investigating what he informed the
police. The needle of suspicion pointed towards Dhaniram and
Bhupendra for the reason that Bhupendra was earlier married
to Rajkumari and Dhaniram with reference to the circumstances
in existence at the spot and he being the only person available. E
It was argued that Dhaniram could have committed the crime
as he was the only person present in the house when all the
persons watching the television had left the house. Thus, the
Investigating Agency had to conduct a proper investigation
before it could identify the real suspects and the accused in the F
case, which in our opinion, the police did.
13. The fact that at a given point of time, some person
other than the accused were suspected to have committed the
offence would lose its relevance once the investigation is
completed, report under Section 173 Cr.P.C. is filed before the G
Court of competent jurisdiction, of course, unless the Court,
upon presentation of the report finds that some other person
is also liable to be summoned as an accused or directs further
investigation. In the present case, the possibility of PW6,
Dhaniram, having committed the crime is ruled out in view of H
656 I ' SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012] 3 S.C.R.
A the evidence collected during the investigation. It is nobody's
case .before us that there is even an iota of evidence which
points towards Bhupendra for commission of such an offence.
14. Now, we may deal with the first contention raised on
behalf of the appellants with reference to the credibility of the
8
testimony of PW6. The learned counsel appearing for the
appellants, contended that PW6, the sole eye-witness, cannot
be relied upon to convict the accused for the reason that the
witness, being a suspect himself, is not credible and has not
spoken the truth before the Court. It is also contended that the
C Court should deal with the statement of a sole eye-witness
cautiously and it may not be very safe to rely upon the testimony
of such a witness. In support of his contention, he derives
strength from the judgments of this Court in the cases of Joseph
v. State of Kera/a [(2003) 1 SCC 465] and State of Haryana
D v. lnder Singh & Ors. [(2002) 9 SCC 537]. In the case of
Joseph, this Court has stated the principle that where there is
a sole witness to the incident, his evidence has to be accepted
with an amount of caution and after testing it on the touchstone
of evidence tendered by other witnesses or the material
E evidences placed on record. This Court further stated that
Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act does not provide for
any particular number of witnesses and it would be permissible
for the Court to record and sustain a conviction on the evidence
of a solitary eye-witness. But, at the same time, such a course
F can be adopted only if evidence tendered by such a witness is
credible, reliable, in tune with the case of the prosecution and
inspires implicit confidence. In the case of lnder Singh (supra),
the Court held that it is not the quantity but the quality of the
witnesses which matters for determining the guilt or innocence
G of the accused. The testimony of a sole witness must be
confidence-inspiring and beyond suspicion, thus, leaving no
doubt in the mind of the Court.
15. The principles stated in these judgments are
indisputable. None of these judgments say that the testimony
H
RAMNARESH & ORS. v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 657
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
of the sole eye-witness cannot be relied upon or conviction of A
an accused cannot be based upon the statement of the sole
eye-witness to the crime. All that is needed is that the statement
of the sole eye-witness should be reliable, should not leave any
doubt in the mind of the Court and has to be corroborated by
other evidence produced by the prosecution in relation to B
commission of the crime and involvement of the accused in
committing such a crime.
16. In light of this principle, now we may examine the facts
of the present case. PW6, at the time of occurrence and even C
at the time of recording of the statement, was a young boy of
16 years. He had been serving in the house of lndrajeet, PW1,
for a number of years prior to the date of incident. It was his
regular feature to have his meals as well as sleep in the
verandah of the house of PW1. There existed no motive for him
to commit the crime. He was kept under continuous threat to D
his life right from the time Ranjeet and others entered the house
of the deceased Rajkumari till the accused were taken in police
custody after recording evidence of various persons, more
importantly, PW1 (lndrajeet), PW12 (Sugaribai), PW6
(Dhaniram) and PW7 (Dr. Shila Saha). His statement clearly E
narrates haw the offence was committed by the accused and
there is nothing abnormal and inconsistent in his testimony.
Furthermore, his statement is fully corroborated by medical
evidence of PW7, Dr. Shila Saha and the testimony of PW12,
Sugaribai. The confirmation of blood on the piece of saree used F
for gagging the mouth of Rajmukari and the confirmation of
presence of semen and human spermatozoa on the vaginal
slides of Rajkumari and the findings during autopsy duly proved
by PW7, Dr. Shila Saha and the corroboration of other
witnesses including that of the Investigating Officer leave no G
room for any doubt that the appellants had committed house
trespass in the house of Rajkumari and committed the offence
with which they are charged. A very significant piece of
evidence in the present case is the medical evidence and the
injuries inflicted upon the body of the deceased. Both, the H
658 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012] 3 S.C.R.
A external and internal injuries that the deceased suffered as a
consequence of rape and the strangulation clearly indicate that
the crime could not have been committed by a single person.
Once that possibility is ruled out, it would attach greater
reliability to the testimony of PW6. Thus, the statement of PW6,
B despite he being the sole eye-witness, need not be doubted
by this Court. It fully satisfies the tests of law enunciated in the
above judgments of this Court. Resultantly, we find no merit in
this submission of the learned counsel appearing for the
appellants.
c 17. The next contention is that there was inordinate delay
in lodging the FIR which gave an opportunity to the police to
falsely implicate the accused. Thus, the entire prosecution story
being founded on the said FIR, needs to be disbelieved by the
Court and the appellants be entitled to acquittal. In this regard,
D reliance has been placed upon the judgment of this Court in
the case of State of Gujarat v. Patel Mohan Mu/ji [AIR 1994
SC 250]. At the very outset, we may notice that the facts of the
case in Patel Mohan Mu/ji (supra) are significantly different
from the facts of the case in hand. There, the Court had
E acquitted the accused not only for the sole reason of delay in
recording the FIR but also for the reason that there was close
relationship of witnesses with the deceased and the accused.
There were discrepancies in the inquest report and clear
conflict between the medical evidence and the oral evidence.
F The evidence of the prosecution was also found to be suffering
from serious infirmities. In the present case, none of these
exists. There are four or five prosecution witnesses, including
PW2, PW3, PW4, PW5 and PW10, who had been declared
hostile during the course of hearing of the trial. These witnesses
G were not the witnesses to the scene of crime. They were
witnesses only to support the fact that the accused persons
were seen together near the house of the deceased Rajkumari,
after all others had gone to their respective houses, after
watching television at the house of the deceased. This fact is
H not the determinative factor and does not demolish the case
RAMNARESH & ORS. v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 659
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
of the prosecution in its entirety or otherwise. The presence of A
Ranjeet Kewat at the house of the deceased, Rajkumari,
immediately after the occurrence and trying to keep a watch
on PW6 clearly shows that the most likely and truthful witness
in the case of the prosecution is PW6. PW6, as already noticed,
ha_d withstood the long cross-examination despite his young B
age~he threat extended to him by the accused and being the
sole eye-witness of such a heinous crime. It goes to the credit
of this witness that despite the fact that other five witnesses had
turned hostile being the person of the village, he nevertheless
stood to his testimony. c
18. As far as the delay is concerned, we are not in
agreement with the learned counsel appearing for the
appellants that the delay does not stand explained in the
present case. The occurrence took place at about 11 p.m. at
night in a village area where normally by this time, people go D
to their respective houses and stay inside thereafter. After
committing the rape on the deceased and her subsequent
death which itself took a considerable time, the accused
persons remained in the house for some time. Thereafter, they
made it sure that PW6 goes to the house of PW12 and tells E
her incorrectly and without disclosing the true facts that the
deceased was not waking up despite efforts, which he did and
this fact is fully established by the statement of PW12. In the
meanwhile, the news had spread and one Ashok had rung up
PW1 who came to the spot of occurrence. After seeing his wife F
in that horrible condition and doubting that Bhupendra might
have committed the crime since by that time PW6 had not told
him the correct story, he went to the Police Station and lodged
the FIR at about 10.50 a.m. on 10th August, 2006. Police
registered the FIR under Sections 376 and 302 IPC vide Exhibit G
P16. Thus, there is plausible explanation available on record
of the case file which explains the delay in lodging the FIR. We
also cannot lose sight of the statement of PW4, father of PW6,
who stated that when he went to the Police Station, he found
his son there who informed him that he was in the Police Station H
660 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 3 S.C.R.
A since the past two days. His son had challenged all the four
accused persons in his presence and later he was informed
by the Police that his son was a witness in the case. This
witness knew the accused persons as well as the deceased
Rajkumari. He was a party to the seizure memo, Exhibit P/7 to
s P/10 though in the Court he stated that nothing was seized in
his presence and, at this stage, he was declared hostile. The
statement of PW6 does not suffer from any legal or factual
infirmity and appears to be the true and correct version of what
actually happened at the scene of occurrence. The delay, if any,
c in lodging the FIR, thus, stands explained and is, in no way, fatal
to the case of the prosecution.
19. Now, we would deal with the contention that the
recoveries effected during the period of investigation are
improper and inadmissible. The report submitted by the FSL,
D as per Exhibit P/23, does not indicate or connect the accused
with the commission of the crime and, therefore, the case of
the prosecution should essentially fail. This argument, again, is
without any merit. Firstly, Exhibit P/23 and the effect of the FSL
Report have been appropriately discussed by the High Court
E in its judgment. The articles seized, the human blood noticed
on Articles A, B, C, D, E, F1 and F2 and.presence of seminal
stains and human spermatozoa on Articles C, D, E, F1, F2, G1,
H1, 11, J1 and K1 confirmed. Seminal stains and human
spermatozoa were not found on Articles A and 8. The seminal
F stains on Articles C, D, E, F1 and F2 were not sufficient for
serological examination. This was so recorded in Exhibit P23.
This document further stated that Articles G2, H2, 12, J2 and
K2 were not examined by the FSL, Raipur. It was further
recorded that in case of necessity, the DNA test could be
G performed at Hyderabad. The report also stated that the articles
with regard to the blood group and serum had been sent to
Kolkata Laboratory for futher investigation. Indefinite conclusion
of the expert to this extent, cannot be treated as a report entirely
in favour of the accused which ipso facto would entitle them for
H an order of acquittal. This expert report, has to be examined in
RAMNARESH & ORS. v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 661
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
conjunction with the oral evidence and particularly the medical A
evidence. Exhibit P/12 is the post mortem report which has
depicted various external and internal injuries on the body of
the deceased as afore-noticed. It is also clear that the cause
of death of Rajkumari was asphyxia due to throttling. It is further
clear from the findings in the post mortem report that petechial B
hemorrhage of lungs was present, the right side of heart was
filled with blood while the left chamber was empty and bloody
froth was oozing from nostrils and mouth of the deceased.
There has to be a very strong and compelling reason for the
Court to disbelieve an eye-witness. Statement of PW6 does not c
suffer from any contradictions nor is at variance with the case
of the prosecution. He was being kept under a constant watch
inasmuch as he was the servant of PW1, whose brother Ranjeet
was one of the accused. Accused was even present near the
dead body of Rajkumari till she was taken for post mortem. We
0
have already noticed that the expert evidence clearly
demonstrates, particularly in view of the injuries caused to the
deceased during the heinous crime, that it could not have been
done by a single person and, therefore, involvement of two or
more persons is most probable and in line with the story of the
prosecution. The cumulative effect of the oral/documentary and E
expert evidence is that the prosecution has been able to prove
its case beyond any reasonable doubt.
20. It is a case where not only the entire incriminating
material evidence was put to the accused while they were being F
examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. but also that the accused
examined two witnesses DW1, Samelal Kewat and DW2,
Kamla, wife of Ranjeet Singh. In their statements under Section
313 Cr.P.C., they have taken the stand that they were not
present at the place of occurrence but, in fact, they were present G
in their respective houses and as such they have been falsely
implicated. The two witnesses were examined in support of this
fact. DW1 has stated that he lives nearby the house of
Rajkumari and he did not hear any noise or cries on the fateful
night. He also stated that Ramnaresh came to his house at H
662 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 3 S.C.R.
A about 10:00 o'clock when he was going to attend the
Ramayana. He further stated that Ramnaresh was in his house
and, thus, he could not have committed the crime. DW2 is the
wife of Ranjeet. She stated that his husband was sleeping in
the house only and on the said date Ramnaresh, Vishwanath
B and Amar Singh had not visited their house. The cross
examination of these two witnesses has clearly created a doubt
in regard to the authenticity of their statements. Firstly, as per
the version of the prosecution and as is even clear from the
medical evidence, the mouth of deceased Rajkumari had been
c gagged. Therefore, the question of hearing any noise or
screaming would not arise and, secondly, DW2 is the wife of
the accused and is bound to speak in his favour as an
interested witness. Furthermore, both these witnesses had not
informed the Police during the course of investigation and even
when the accused were arrested that they had been present
0
at their respective houses and not at the place of occurrence.
In fact, this has not even been the suggestion of the defence
while cross-examining the prosecution witnesses.
21. In terms of Section 313 Cr.P.C., the accused has the
E freedom to maintain silence during the investigation as well as
before the Court. The accused may choose to maintain silence
or complete denial even when his statement under Section 313
Cr.P.C. is being recorded, of course, the Court would be
entitled to draw an inference, including adverse inference, as
F may be permissible to it in accordance with law. Right to fair
trial, presumption of innocence unless proven guilty and proof
by the prosecution of its case beyond any reasonable doubt
are the fundamentals of our criminal jurisprudence. When we
speak of prejudice to an accused, it has to be shown that the
G accused has suffered some disability or detriment in relation
to any of these protections substantially. Such prejudice should
also demonstrate that it has occasioned failure of justice to the
accused. One of the other cardinal principles of criminal justice
administration is that the courts should make a close
H examination to ascertain whether there was really a failure of
RAMNARESH & ORS. v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 663
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
justice or whether it is only a camouflage, as this expression A
is perhaps too pliable. [Ref. Rafiq Ahmed @ Rafi v. State of
Uttar Pradesh [(2011) 8 SCC 300].
22. It is a settled principle of law that the obligation to put
material evidence to the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. B
is upon the Court. One of the main objects of recording of a
statement under this provision of the Cr.P.C. is to give an
opportunity to the accused to explain the circumstances
appearing against him as well as to put forward his defence, if
the accused so desires. But once he does not avail this
opportunity, then consequences in law must follow. Where the C
accused takes benefit of this opportunity, then his statement
made under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in so far as it supports the
case of the prosecution, can be used against him for rendering
conviction. Even under the latter, he faces the consequences
in law. D
23. In the present case, the accused have denied their
presence on the spot, at the time of occurrence. Thus, it was
for them to prove that they were not present at the place of
occurrence and were entitled to plea of alibi. In our considered E
opinion, they have miserably failed to establish this fact. On the
contrary, the behaviour explained by the defence witnesses
appears to be somewhat unnatural in the social set up in which
the accused, the deceased and even some of the prosecution
witnesses were living. They knew each other very well and the F
normal course of life in a village is that they are quite concerned
with and actively participate in each other's affairs, particularly
sad occasions. Ranjeet was present at the place of occurrence
and was holding one of the minor children of PW1. This
supports the statement of PW6 that he was constantly under G
threat and watch from either of the accused. The version put
forward by the accused in their statement under Section 313
Cr.P.C. is unbelievable and unacceptable. There is no cogent
evidence on record to support their plea.
24. For the reasons afore-recorded, we have no hesitation H
664 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 3 S.C.R.
A in holding that the prosecution has been able to prove its case
beyond reasonable doubt. The accused are guilty of committing
the offence under Sections 499, 376(2)(g) and 302 IPC. We
hold them guilty of committing these offences.
The death sentence and principles governing its
8
conversion to life imprisonment
25. Despite the transformation of approach and radical
changes in principles of sentencing across the world, it has not
been possible to put to rest the conflicting views on sentencing
C policy. The sentencing policy being a significant and
inseparable facet of criminal jurisprudence, has been inviting
the attention of the Courts for providing certainty and greater
clarity to it. Capital punishment has been a subject matter of
great social and judicial discussion and catechism. From
D whatever point of view it is examined, one undisputable
statement of law follows that it is neither possible nor prudent
to state any universal formula which would be applicable to all
the cases of criminology where capital punishment has been
prescribed. It shall always depend upon the facts and
E circumstances of a given case. This Court has stated various
legal principles which would be precepts on exercise of judicial
discretion in cases where the issue is whether the capital
punishment should or should not be awarded.
:26. The law requires the Court to record special reasons
F for awarding such sentence. The Court, therefore, has to
consider matters like nature of the offence, how and under what
circumstances it was committed, the extent of brutality with
which the offence was committed, the motive for the offence,
any provocative or aggravating circumstances at the time of
G commission of the crime, the possibility of the convict being
reformed or rehabilitated, adequacy of the sentence of life
imprisonment and other attendant circumstances. These
factors cannot be similar or identical in any two given cases.
Thus, it is imperative for the Court to examine each case on
H its own facts, in light of the enunciated principles. It is only upon
RAMNARESH & ORS. v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 665
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
application of these principles to the facts of a given case that A
the Court can arrive at a final conclusion whether the case in
hand is one of the 'rarest of rare' cases and imposition of death
penalty alone shall serve the ends of justice. Further, the Court
would also keep in mind that if such a punishment alone would
serve the purpose of the judgment, in its being sufficiently B
punitive and purposefully preventive.
27. In order to examine this aspect in some greater depth
and with objectivity, it is necessary for us to reiterate the various
guiding factors. Suffices it to make reference to a recent C
judgment of this Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v.
Goraksha Ambaji Adsu/ [(2011) 7 SCC 437], wherein this
Court discussed the law in some detail and enunciated the
principles as follows :
"30. The principles governing the sentencing policy in our D
criminal jurisprudence have more or less been consistent,
right from the pronouncement of the Constitution Bench
judgment of this Court in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab.
Awarding punishment is certainly an onerous function in the
dispensation of criminal justice. The court is expected to E
keep in mind the facts and circumstances of a case, the
principles of law governing award of sentence, the
legislative intent of special or general statute raised in the
case and the impact of awarding punishment. These are
the nuances which need to be examined by the court with F
discernment and in depth.
31. The legislative intent behind enacting Section 354(3)
CrPC clearly demonstrates the concern of the legislature
for taking away a human life and imposing death penalty
upon the accused. Concern for the dignity of the human G
life postulates resistance to taking a life through law's
instrumentalities and that ought not to be done, save in the
rarest of rare cases, unless the alternative option is
unquestionably foreclosed. In exercise of its discretion, the
court would also take into consideration the mitigating H
666 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 3 S.C.R.
A circumstances and their resultant effects.
32. The language of Section 354(3) demonstrates the
legislative concern and the conditions which need to be
satisfied prior to imposition of death penalty. The words,
"in the case of sentence of death, thfi special reasons for
B
such sentence" unambiguously demonstrate the
command of the legislature that such reasons have to be
recorded for imposing the punishment of death sentence.
This is how the concept of the rarest of rare cases has
emerged in law. Viewed from that angle, both the
c legislative provisions and judicial pronouncements are at
ad idem in law. The death penalty should be imposed in
the rarest of rare cases and that too for special reasons
to be recorded. To put it simply, a death sentence is not a
rule but an exception. Even the exception must satisfy the
D prerequisites contemplated under Section 354(3) CrPC in
light of the dictum of the Court in Bachan Singh.
33. The Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in
Bachan Singh has been summarised in para 38 in Machhi
E Singh v. State of Punjab and the following guidelines have
been stated while considering the possibility of awarding .
sentence of death: (Machhi Singh case, SCC p. 489)
"(1) The extreme penalty of death need not be
inflicted except in gravest cases of extreme
F
culpability.
(ii) Before opting for the death penalty the
circumstances of the 'offender' also requires to be
taken into consideration along with· the
G circumstances of the 'crime'.
(iii) Life imprisonment is the rule and death
sentence is an exception .... death sentence must
be imposed only when life imprisonment ap1Pears
H
RAMNARESH & ORS. v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 667
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.] .
to be an altogether inadequate punishment having A
regard to the relevant circumstances of the crime,
and provided, and only provided the option to
impose sentence of imprisonment for life cannot be
conscientiously exercised having regard to the
nature and circumstances of the crime and all the B
relevant circumstances.
(iv) A balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances has to be drawn up and in doing so
the mitigating circumstances have to be accorded C
full weightage and a just balance has to be struck
between the aggravating and the mitigating
circumstances before the option is exercised."
(emphasis supplied)
D
34. The judgment in Bachan Singh, did not only state the
above guidelines in some elaboration, but also specified
the mitigating circumstances which could be considered
by the Court while determining such serious issues and
they are as follows: (SCC p. 750, para 206)
E
"206. .. . ·Mitigating circumstances.-1 n the
exercise of its discretion in the above cases, the
court shall take into account the following
circumstances:
F
( 1) That the offence was committed under the
influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance.
(2) The age of the accused. If the accused is
young or old, he shall not be sentenced to death. G
(3) The probability that the accused would not
commit criminal acts of violence as would constitute
a continuing threat to society.
H
668 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 3 S.C.R.
A (4) The probability that the accused can be
reformed and rehabilitated.
The State shall by evidence prove that the accused
does not satisfy Conditions (3) and (4) above.
B (5) That in the facts and circumstances of the
case the accused believed that he was morally
justified in committing the offence.
(6) That the accused acted under the duress
c or domination of another person.
(7) That the condition of the accused showed
that he was mentally defective and that the said
defect impaired his capacity to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct."
D
35. Now, we may examine certain illustrations arising from
the judicial pronouncements of this Court.
36. In D.K. Basu v. State of W.B. this Court took the view
that custodial torture and consequential death in custody
E
was an offence which fell in the category of the rarest of
rare cases. While specifying the reasons in support of such
decision, the Court awarded death penalty in that case.
37. In Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of
F Maharashtra this Court also spelt out in paras 56 to 58
that nature, motive, impact of a crime, culpability, quality
of evidence, socio-economic circumstances, impossibility
of rehabilitation are the factors which the court may take
into consideration while dealing with such cases. In that
G case the friends of the victim had called him to see a movie
and after seeing the movie, a ransom call was made, but
with the fear of being caught, they murdered the victim. The
Court felt that there was no evidence to show that the
criminals were incapable of reforming themselves, that it
H was not a rarest of the rare case, and therefore, declined
RAMNARESH & ORS. v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 669
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
to award death sentence to the accused. A
38. Interpersonal circumstances prevailing between the
deceased and the accused was also held to be a relevant
consideration in Vashram Narshibhai Rajpara v. State of
Gujarat where constant nagging by family was treated as
the mitigating factor, if the accused is mentally unbalanced
8
and as a result murders the family members. Similarly, the
intensity of bitterness which prevailed and the escalation
of simmering thoughts into a thirst for revenge and
retaliation were also considered to be a relevant factor by
this Court in different cases. C
39. This Court in Satishbhushan Bariyar also considered
various doctrines, principles and. factors which would be
considered by the Courts while dealing with such cases.
The Court discussed in some elaboration the applicability o
of the doctrine of rehabilitation and the doctrine of
prudence. While considering the application of the doctrine
of rehabilitation and the extent of weightage to be given
to the mitigating circumstances, it noticed the nature of the
evidence and the background of the accused. The E
conviction in that case was entirely based upon the
statement of the approver and was a case purely of
circumstantial evidence. Thus, applying the doctrine of
prudence, it noticed the fact that the accused were
unemployed, young men in search of job and they were not F
criminals. In execution of a plan proposed by the appellant
and accepted by others, they kidnapped a friend of theirs.
The kidnapping was done with the motive of procuring
ransom from his family but later they murdered him
because of the fear of getting caught, and later cut the
body into pieces and disposed it off at different places. G
One of the accused had turned approver and as already
noticed, the conviction was primarily based upon the
statement of the approver.
40. Basing its reasoning on the application of doctrine of H
670 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 3 S.C.R.
A prudence and the version put forward by the accused, the
Court, while declining to award death penalty and only
awarding life imprisonment, held as under:
(Satishbhushan Bariyar case, SCC pp. 551 & 559-60,
paras 135, 168-69 & 171-73)
B "135. Right to life, in its barest of connotation would
imply right to mere survival. In this form, right to life
is the most fundamental of all rights. Consequently,
a punishment which aims at taking away life is the
gravest punishment. Capital punishment imposes
c a limitation on the essential content of the
fundamental right to life, eliminating it irretrievably.
We realise the absolute nature of this right, in the
sense that it is a source of all other rights. Other
rights may be limited, and may even be withdrawn
D and then granted again, but their ultimate limit is to
be found in the preservation of the right to life. Right
to life is the essential content of all rights under the
Constitution. If life is taken away, all other rights
cease to exist.
E
* * *
168. We must, however, add that in a case of
this nature where the entire prosecution case
revolves round the statement of an approver or is
F dependant upon the circumstantial evidence, the
prudence doctrine should be invoked. For the
aforementioned purpose, at the stage of sentencing
evaluation of evidence would not be permissible,
the courts not only have to solely depend upon the
G findings arrived at for the purpose of recording a
judgment of conviction, but also consider the matter
keeping in view the evidences which have been
brought on record on behalf of the parties and in
particular the accused for imposition of a lesser
H
RAMNARESH & ORS. v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 671
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
punishment. A statement of approver· in regard to A
the manner in which crime has been committed vis-
a-vis the role played by the accused, on the one
hand, and that of the approver, on the other, must
be tested on the touchstone of the prudence
doctrine. B
169. The accused persons were not criminals.
They were friends. The deceased was said to have
been selected because his father was rich. The
motive, if any, was to collect some money. They
were not professional killers. They have no criminal C
history. All were unemployed and were searching
for jobs. Further, if age of the accused was a
relevant factor for the High Court for not imposing
death penalty on Accused 2 and 3, the same
standard should have been applied to the case of D
the appellant also who was only two years older and
still a young man in age. Accused 2 and 3 were as
much a part of the crime as the appellant. Though
it is true, that it was he who allegedly proposed the
idea of kidnapping, but at the same time it must not E
be forgotten that the said plan was only executed
when all the persons involved gave their consent
thereto.
* * * F
171. Section 354(3) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure requires that when the conviction is for
an offence punishable with death or in the
alternative with imprisonment for life or
imprisonment for a term of years, the judgment shall G
state the reasons for the sentence awarded, and in
the case of sentence of death, the special reasons
thereof. We do not think that the reasons assigned
by the courts below disclose any special reason to
uphold the death penalty. The discretion granted to H
672 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 3 S.C.R.
A the courts must be exercised very cautiously
especially because of the irrevocable character of
death penalty. Requirements of law to assign
special reasons should not be construed to be an
empty formality.
B
172. We have previously noted that the judicial
principles for imposition of death penalty are far
from being uniform. Without going into the merits
and demerits of such discretion and subjectivity, we
must nevertheless reiterate the basic principle,
c stated repeatedly by this Court, that life
imprisonment is the rule and death penalty an
exception. Each case must therefore be analysed
and the appropriateness of punishment determined
on a case-by-case basis with death sentence not
D to be awarded save in the 'rarest of the rare' case
where reform is not possible. Keeping in mind at
least this principle we do not think that any of the
factors in the present case discussed above
warrants the award of the death penalty. There are
E no special reasons to record the death penalty and
the mitigating factors in the present case,
discussed previously, are, in our opinion, sufficient
to place it out of the 'rarest of rare' category.
F 173. For the reasons aforementioned, we are
of the opinion that this is not a case where death
penalty should be imposed. The appellant,
therefore, instead of being awarded death penalty,
is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for
life. Subject to the modification in the sentence of
G
the appellant (A-1) mentioned hereinbefore, both the
appeals of the appellant as also that of the State
are dismissed."
(emphasis in original)
H
RAMNARESH & ORS. v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 673
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
41. The above principle, as supported by case illustrations, A
clearly depicts the various precepts which would govern
the exercise of judicial discretion by the courts within the
parameters spelt out under Section 354(3) CrPC.
Awarding of death sentence amounts to taking away the
life of an individual, which is the most valuable right B
available, whether viewed from the constitutional point of
view or from the human rights point of view. The condition
of providing special reasons for awarding death penalty
is not to be construed linguistically but it is to satisfy the
basic features of a reasoning supporting and making c
award of death penalty unquestionable. The circumstances
and the manner of committing the crime should be such
that it pricks the judicial conscience of the court to the
extent that the only and inevitable conclusion should be
awarding of death penalty."
D
28. In Machhi Singh & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan [(1983)
3 sec 470], this Court stated certain relevant considerations
like the manner of commission of murder, motive for
commission of murder, anti-social or socially abhorrent nature
of the crime, magnitude of crime and the personality of the E
victim of murder. These considerations further demonstrate that
the matter has to be examined with reference to a particular
case, for instance, murder of an innocent child who could not
have or has not provided even an excuse, much less a
provocation for murder. Similarly, murder of a helpless woman F
who might be relying on a person because of her age or
infirmity, if murdered by that person, would be an indicator of
breach of relationship or trust as the case may be. It would
neither be proper nor probably permissible that the judicial
approach of the court in such matters treat one of the stated G
considerations or factors as determinative. The court should
examine all or majority of the relevant considerations to spell
comprehensively the special reasons to be recorded in the
order, as contemplated under Section 354(3) of the Cr.P.C.
H
674 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 3 S.C.R.
A 29. In the case of Dhananjoy Chatterjee@ Dhana v. State
of West Bengal [(1994) 2 SCC 220] while affirming the award
of death sentence by the High Court, this Court noticed that 'in
recent years, the rising crime rate-particularly violent crime
agairist women has made the criminal sentencing by the courts
B a subject of concern'. The Court reiterated the principle that it
is not possible to lay down any cut and dry formula relating to
imposition of sentence but the object of sentencing should be
to see that the crime does not go unpunished and the victim of
crime, as also the society, has the satisfaction that justice has
c been done to it. The Court held as follows:-
"15. In our opinion, the measure of punishment in a given
case must depend upon the atrocity of the crime; the
conduct of the criminal and the defenceless and
unprotected state of the victim. Imposition of appropriate
D punishment is the manner in which the courts respond to
the society's cry for justice against the criminals. Justice
demands that courts should impose punishment befitting
the crime so that the courts reflect public abhorrence of the
crime. The courts must not only keep in view the rights of
E the criminal but also the rights of the victim of crime and
the society at large while considering imposition of
appropriate punishment."
30. In this case, the Court was concerned with the case of
F a security guard who had been transferred at the complaint of
a lady living in the flats with regard to teasing of her young girl
child. The security guard went up to the flat of the lady,
committed rape on her daughter and then murdered her brutally.
The Court found it to be a fit case for imposition of capital
G punishment.
31. Again, in the case of Surja Ram v. State of Rajasthan
[(1996) 6 SCC 271], this Court affirmed the death sentence
awarded by the High Court primarily taking into consideration
that there was no provocation and the manner in which the
H
RAMNARESH & ORS. v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 675
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
crime was committed was brutal. Noticing that the Court has A
to award a punishment which is just and fair by administering
justice tempered with such mercy not only as the criminal may
justly deserve but also to the rights of the victims of the crime
to have the assailant appropriately punished and the society's
reasonable expectation from the court for the appropriate B
deterrent punishment conforming to the gravity of the offence
and consistent with the public abhorrence for the heinous crime
committed by the accused. The Court further held as under:-
"18 ..After giving our anxious consideration to the facts and C
circumstances of the case, it appears to us that for
deciding just and appropriate sentence to be awarded for
an offence, the aggravating and mitigating factors and
circumstances in which a crime has been committed are
to be delicately balanced in a dispassionate manner. Such
act of balancing is indeed a difficult task. It has been very D
aptly indicated in Dennis Councle McGautha v. State of
California that no formula of a foolproof nature is possible
that would provide a reasonable criterion in determining a
just and appropriate punishment in the infinite variety of
circumstances that may affect the gravity of the crime of E
murder. In the absence of any foolproof formula which may
provide any basis for reasonable criteria to correctly
assess various circumstances germane to the
consideration of gravity of crime of murder, the
discretionary judgment in the facts of each case, is the only F
way in which such judgment may be equitably
distinguished."
32. This Court in Prajeet Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar
((2008) 4 SCC 434], B.A. Umesh v. Registrar General, High G
Court of Karnataka [(2011) 3 SCC 85], State of Rajasthan v.
Kashi Ram ((2006) 12 SCC 254] and Atbir v. Government of
NCT of Delhi ((2010) 9 SCC 1] had confirmed the death
sentence awarded by the High Courts for different reasons after
H
676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 3 S.C.R.
A applying the principles enunciated in one or more afore-referred
judgments.
33. Now, we may notice the cases which were relied upon
by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants and
wherein this Court had declined to confirm the imposition of
8
capital punishment treating them not to be the rarest of rare
cases.
34. In Ronny@ Ronald James Alwaris Etc. v. State of
Maharashtra [(1998) 3 SCC 625], the Court while relying upon
C the judgment of this Court in the case of Allauddin Mian & Ors.
v. State of Bihar ((1989) 3 SCC 5], held that the choice of the
death sentence has to be made only in the 'rarest of rare' cases
and that where culpability of the accused has .assumed depravity
or where the accused is found to be an ardent criminal and
D menace to the society. The Court also noticed the above-stated
principle that the Court should ordinarily impose a lesser
punishment and not the extreme punishment of death which
should be reserved for exceptional cases only. The Court, while
considering the cumulative effect of all the factors such as the
E offences not committed under the influence of extreme mental
or emotional disturbance and the fact that the accused were
young and the possibility of their reformation and rehabilitation
could not be ruled out, converted death sentence into life
imprisonment.
F 35. Similarly, in the case of Bantu @ Naresh Giri v. State
of M.P. [(2001) 9 sec 615] while dealing with the case of rape
and murder of a six year old girl, this Court found that the case
was not one of the 'rarest of rare' cases. The Court noticed
that, accused was less than 22 years at the time of commission
G of the offence, there were no injuries on the body of the
deceased and the death probably occurred as a· result of
gagging of the nostrilby the accused. Thus, the Court while
noticing that the crime was heinous, commuted the sentence
of death to one of life imprisonment. · · ·
H
RAMNARESH & ORS. v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 677
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
36. The above judgments provide us with the dicta of the A
Court relating to imposition of death penalty. Merely because
a crime is heinous per se may not be a sufficient reason for
the imposition of death penalty without reference to the other
factors and attendant circumstances.
B
37. Most of the heinous crimes under the IPC are
punishable by death penalty or life imprisonment. That by itself
does not suggest that in all such offences, penalty of death alone
should be awarded. We must notice, even at the cost of
repetition, that in such cases awarding of life imprisonment C
would be a rule, while 'death' would be the exception. The term
'rarest of rare' case which is the consistent determinative rule
declared by this Court, itself suggests that it has to be an
exceptional case. The life of a particular individual cannot be
taken away except according to the procedure established by
law and that is the constitutional mandate. The law D
contemplates recording of special reasons and, therefore, the
expression 'special' has to be given a definite meaning and
connotation. 'Special reasons' in contra-distinction to 'reasons'
simplicitor conveys the legislative mandate of putting a
restriction on exercise of judicial discretion by placing the E
requirement of special reasons.
38. Since, the later judgments of this Court have added to
the principles stated by this Court in the case of Bachan Singh
(supra) and Machhi Singh (supra), it will be useful to re-state F
the stated principles while also bringing them in consonance,
with the recent judgments.
39. The law enunciated by this Court in its recent
judgments, as already noticed, adds and elaborates the
principles that were stated in the case of Bachan Singh (supra) G
and thereafter, in the case of Machhi Singh (supra). The
aforesaid judgments, primarily dissect these principles into two
different compartments - one being the 'aggravating
circumstances' while the other being the 'mitigating
H
678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012) 3 S.C.R.
A circumstances'. The Court would consider the cumulative effect
of both these aspects and normally, it may not be very
appropriate for the Court to decide the most significant aspect
of sentencing policy with reference to one of the classes under
any of the following heads while completely ignoring other
B classes under other heads. To balance the two is the primary
duty of the Court. It will be appropriate for the Court to come to
a final conclusion upon balancing the exercise that would help
to administer the criminal justice system better and provide an
effective and meaningful reasoning by the Court as
c contemplated under Section 354(3) Cr.P.C.
Aggravating Circumstances :
(1) The offences relating to the commission of heinous
crimes like murder, rape, armed dacoity,
D kidnapping etc. by the accused with a prior record
of conviction for capital felony or offences
committed by the person having a substantial
history of serious assaults and criminal convictions.
(2) lhe offence was committed while the offender was
E
engaged in the commission of another serious
offence.
(3) The offence was committed with the intention to
create a fear psychosis in the public at large and
F was committed in a public place by a weapon or
device which clearly could be hazardous to the life
of more than one person.
(4) The offence of murder was committed for ransom
G or like offences to receive money or monetary
benefits.
(5) Hired killings.
(6) The offence was committed outrageously for want
H
RAMNARESH & ORS. v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 679
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
only while involving inhumane treatment and torture A
to the victim.
(7) The offence was committed by a person while in
lawful custody.
(8) The murder or the offence was committed to B
prevent a person lawfully carrying out his duty like
arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement
of himself or another. For instance, murder is of a
person who had acted in lawful discharge of his duty
under Section 43 Cr.P.C. c
(9) When the crime is enormous in proportion like
making an attempt of murder of the entire family or
members of a particular community.
(10) When the victim is innocent, helpless or a person D
relies upon the trust of relationship and social
norms, like a child, helpless woman, a daughter or
a niece staying with a father/uncle and is inflicted
with the crime by such a trusted person.
E
(11) When murder is committed for a motive which
evidences total depravity and meanness.
(12) When there is a cold blooded murder without
provocation.
F
(13) The crime is committed so brutally that it pricks or
shocks not only the judicial conscience but even the
conscience of the society.
Mitigating Circumstances : G
(1) The manner and circumstances in and under which
the offence was committed, for example, extreme
mental or emotional disturbance or extreme
provocation in contradistinction to all these
situations in normal course. H
RAMNARESH & ORS. v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 681
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
Principles : A
(1) The Court has to apply the testto determine, if it was
the 'rarest of rare' case for imposition of a death sentence.
(2) In the opinion of the Court, imposition of any other
punishment, i.e., life imprisonment would be completely 8
inadequate and would not meet the ends of justice.
(3) Life imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is an
exception.
(4) The option to impose sentence of imprisonment for life
c
cannot be cautiously exercised having regard to the nature
and circumstances of the crime and all relevant
considerations.
(5) The method (planned or otherwise) and the manner D
(extent of brutality and inhumanity, etc.) in which the crime
was committed and the circumstances leading to
commission of such heinous crime.
41. Stated broadly, these are the accepted indicators for E
the exercise of judicial discretion but it is always preferred not
to fetter the judicial discretion by attempting to make the
excessive enumeration, in one way or another. In other words,
these are the considerations which may collectively or otherwise
weigh in the mind of the Court, while exercising its jurisdiction.
F
It is difficult to state it as an absolute rule. Every case has to
be decided on its own merits. The judicial pronouncements, can
only state the precepts that may govern the exercise of judicial
discretion to a limited extent. Justice may be done on the facts
of each case. These are the factors which the Court may
consider in its endeavour to do complete justice between the G
parties.
42. The Court then would draw a balance-sheet of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Both aspects have
H
682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 3 S.C.R.
A to be given their respective weightage. The Court has to strike
a balance between the two and see towards which side the
scale/balance of justice tilts. The principle of proportion between
the crime and the punishment is the principle of Just deserts'
that serves as the foundation of every criminal sentence that is
B justifiable. In other words, the 'doctrine of proportionality' has
a valuable application to the sentencing policy under the Indian
criminal jurisprudence. Thus, the court will not only have to
examine what is just but also as to what the accused deserves
keeping in view the impact on the society at large.
c 43. Every punishment imposed is bound to have its effect
not only on the accused alone, but also on the society as a
whole. Thus, the Courts should consider retributive and
deterrent aspect of punishment while imposing the extreme
punishment of death.
D
44. Wherever, the offence which is committed, manner in
which it is committed, its attendant circumstances and the
motive and status of the victim, undoubtedly brings the case
within the ambit of 'rarest of rare' cases and the Court finds
E that the imposition of life imprisonment would be inflicting of
inadequate punishment, the Court may award death penalty.
Wherever, the case falls in any of the exceptions to the 'rarest
of rare' cases, the Court may exercise its judicial discretion
while imposing life imprisonment in place of death sentence.
F 45. Guided by the above principles, now, we shall proceed
to deal with the contentions raised on behalf of the appellants
that the present case is not one of the 'rarest of rare' cases
where the Court should find that imposition of life imprisonment
would be entirely inadequate, even if the accused are held guilty
G of the offences charged.
46. We have already held that all the accused in the
present appeals are guilty of the offences under Sections
376(2)(g) and 302 read with Section 34 IPC. On the question
H of quantum of sentence, the argument raised on behalf of the
RAMNARESH & ORS. v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 683
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
appellants is that all the accused were of young age at the time A
of commission of the crime, i.e. 21 to 31 years of age. They
had no intention to kill the deceased and it was co-accidental
that the death of the deceased occurred. Even if the accused
are held guilty for the offences under Sections 376{2)(g) and
302 IPC, still it is not the 'rarest of rare' case which would justify B
imposition of capital punishment, particularly in the facts and
circumstances of the case.
47. To the contra, the learned counsel for the State has
contended that the crime has been committed brutally. Accused- C
Ranjeet, being the brother-in-law of the deceased owed a duty
to protect rather than expose her to such sexual assault and
death, along with his friends. The manner in which the crime
has been committed and the attendant circumstances fully justify
imposition of death sentence upon the accused. The crime is
heinous and has been committed brutally, without caring for the D
future of the two infants of the deceased, who were sleeping
by her side at the time of the crime. There cannot be two
opinions that the offence committed by the appellants is very
heinous and all of them have taken advantage of the
helplessness of a mother of two infants at that odd hour of the E
night and in the absence of her husband.
48. There are certain circumstances, which if taken
collectively, would indicate that it is not a case where the Court
would inevitably arrive at only one conclusion, and no other, that F
imposition of death penalty is the only punishmerit that would
serve the ends of justice. Firstly, the age of all the appellants
is one of the relevant considerations before the Court.
Secondly, according to PW1, lndrajeet, the deceased
Rajkumari was his mistress and he had not married her, though G
he had two children with her. According to him, she was earlier
married to one Bhupendra and he was not maintaining good
relations with the said Bhupendra on account of his living with
the deceased. This may have been a matter of some concern
for the family, including Ranjeet, the brother of PW1. Thirdly, it H
684. SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 3 S.C.R.
A has come. in evidence that during investigation, the Investigating
Officer recovered a piece of saree from the place of
occurrence, which was blood-stained. According to the
statement of the PW?, Dr. Shila Saha, there were external
injuries on the body of the deceased. Petechial hemorrhage
B was present in the left and right lungs. Blood mixed with froth
was flowing out from the mouth of the deceased which was
indicative of the possibility of the accused persons having
gagged her mouth with the piece of the saree while committing
rape upon her. Thus, the possibility of death of the deceased
c occurring co-accidentally as a result of this act committed on
her by the accused cannot be ruled out In similar
circumstances, in the case of Bantu @ Naresh Giri (supra)
(supra), this Court took the view that it was not a death caused
intentionally, despite the fact that it was a case of rape being
committed on a minor girl. Lastly, there is no attempt made by
0
the prosecution to prove on record that these accused are
crimi~als or are incapable of being reformed even if given a
chance to improve themselves. While relying upon the judgment
of this Court in the case of Goraksha Ambaji Adsur (supra), ·
the contention raised on behalf of the accused is that, it is not
E a case where no other alternative is available with the Court
except to award death sentence to the accused and that they
are likely to prove a menace to the society. It is further stated
that the statement of the sole witness is not credible as he
·himself .fell within the range of suspicion and a number of other
F · witnesses had turned hostile. There are contradictions and
discrepancies in the statements of the witnesses. The accused
are neither previous convicts nor involved in any other crime.
Thus, given a chance, they are capable of being reformed and
be law-abiding citizens.
G
49. f-javing dealt with these contentions at some length in
the earlier part of the judgment, we do not consider it necessary
to again deliberate on these questions. Suffices it to note that
the accused are guilty of the offences for which they were
H charged. It is correct that the possibility of their being reformed
RAMNARESH & ORS. v. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH 685
[SWATANTER KUMAR, J.]
cannot be ruled out. The Court has to consider various A
parameters afore-stated and balance the mitigating
circumstances against the need for imposition of capital
punishment. The factors to be considered could be different
than the mitigating circumstances. While we cumulatively
examine the various principles and apply them to the facts of s
the present cas~."it appears to us that the age of the accused,
possibility of the death of the deceased occurring accidently
and the possibility of the accused reforming themselves, they
cannot be termed as 'social menace'. It is unfortunate but a
hard fact that all these accused have committed a heinous and c
inhumane crime for satisfaction of their lust, but it cannot be held
with certainty that this case falls in the 'rarest of rare' cases.
On appreciation of the evidence .on record and keeping the
facts and circumstances of the case in mind, we are unable to
hold that any other sentence but death would be inadequate.
D
50. Accordingly, while commuting the sentence of death
to that for life imprisonment (21 years), we partially allow their
appeals only with regard to the quantum of sentence.
D.G. Appeal partly allowed. E
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