Supreme Court of India
RAMJI LAL BAIRWA & ANR.versusSTATE OF RAJASTHAN & ORS.
- Citation
- 2024 INSC 846
- Decided
- 7 November 2024
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- C T RAVIKUMAR
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred in quashing the FIR; compromise cannot justify quashing for heinous offences, and a third party has locus standi to challenge such orders under Article 136.
Summary
The case arose from an FIR lodged under the IPC, POCSO Act and SC/ST Act against a school teacher for allegedly rubbing the breast of a 16‑year‑old girl, a sexual assault under Section 7 of the POCSO Act. The teacher and the victim's father later entered into a compromise, and the teacher sought quashment of the FIR under Section 482 of the CrPC, which the High Court granted. Three ordinary residents of the same district challenged the quashment in a Special Leave Petition, raising the issues of third‑party locus standi and whether a compromise can justify quashing proceedings for a heinous offence. The Supreme Court held that the High Court misapplied the law, as offences under the POCSO Act are not private matters and cannot be quashed merely on the basis of compromise, and that a public‑spirited third party has locus standi to invoke Article 136. Consequently, the Court set aside the High Court’s order and reinstated the FIR and investigation. The appeal was allowed.
Issues considered
- Whether a third party to a criminal proceeding has locus standi to challenge an order quashing an FIR under Article 136 of the Constitution.
- Whether the power under Section 482 of the CrPC can be exercised to quash criminal proceedings for heinous offences like sexual assault under the POCSO Act solely on the ground of a compromise between the parties.
Legislation cited
- Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 173(2), s. 320, s. 482
- Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 342, s. 354A, s. 504, s. 509
- Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012s. 7, s. 8
- Schedule Cast and Schedule Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989s. 3(1)(b), s. 3(1)(r), s. 3(1)(s), s. 3(2)(vii)
Headnote
Issue for Consideration Issue arose as regards whether a third party to a criminal proceeding got locus standi to challenge the order quashing the FIR lodged against the teacher by the father of the minor victim under the Penal Code, POCSO Act and SC/ST Act, for sexually assaulting the minor based on a compromise arrived at by the parties, in a Special Leave Petition u/Art.136; and whether the power to quash criminal proceedings or FIR in regard to heinous and serious offences having serious impact on society, is exercisable merely because the offender and victim or parents of the
Subjects
Locus standi of third party to challenge criminal proceedingSexually assaulting minor girlCompromise between the partiesPower to quash criminal proceedings or FIRHeinous and serious offencesRubbing the breast of a childQuashing the FIROffence having serious impact on societyOffences of private natureOffences against the societyObjects and reasons for the enactment of the POCSO ActRight to a third party to prefer petition under Art.136Miscarriage of justice
Judgment
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 641 : 2024 INSC 846
Ramji Lal Bairwa & Anr.
v.
State of Rajasthan & Ors.
(Criminal Appeal No. 3403 of 2023)
07 November 2024
[C.T. Ravikumar* and Sanjay Kumar, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Issue arose as regards whether a third party to a criminal proceeding
got locus standi to challenge the order quashing the FIR lodged
against the teacher by the father of the minor victim under the
Penal Code, POCSO Act and SC/ST Act, for sexually assaulting
the minor girl pursuant thereto based on a compromise arrived at
by the parties, in a Special Leave Petition u/Art.136; and whether
the power to quash criminal proceedings or FIR in regard to
heinous and serious offences having serious impact on society,
is exercisable merely because the offender and victim or parents
of the victim arrived at a compromise.
Headnotes†
Constitution of India – Art. 136 – Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 – s. 482 – Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 354A, 342, 509, and
504 – Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 –
ss. 7 and 8 – Schedule Cast and Schedule Tribe (Prevention
of Atrocities) Act, 1989 – School teacher sexually assaulted
the girl student in the Higher Secondary aged 16 years, by
rubbing her breast – FIR lodged against the teacher by the
father of the minor victim under Penal Code, POCSO Act and
SC/ST Act – Three weeks later the offender and the complainant
entered into a compromise, and the teacher filed petition u/s.
482 for quashing the FIR – Thereafter, the High Court quashed
the FIR and all further proceedings – Appellant, ordinary
men residing in the same District to which the complainant
belongs, challenged the order quashing the FIR and all further
proceedings u/Art. 32 which was converted into a Special
Leave Petition u/Art. 136 – High Court, if has power to quash
the proceedings and the FIR in regard to heinous and serious
offence having serious impact on society, merely because
* Author
642 [2024] 11 S.C.R.
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the offender and victim or parents of the victim arrived at a
compromise – Third party to a criminal proceeding, if has
locus standi to challenge the order quashing the FIR and all
further proceedings pursuant thereto based on a compromise
arrived at by the parties:
Held: Rubbing the breast of a child would constitute an offence
of ‘sexual assault’ u/s.7 of POCSO Act – Commission of such
offences against the children should be viewed as heinous
and serious – Commission of such offences cannot be taken
lightly as offences of private nature and in fact, such offences
are bound to be taken as offences against the society –
Objects and reasons for the enactment of the POCSO Act, show
that quashment of proceeding initiated under POCSO Act abruptly
by invoking the power u/s.482, without permitting it to mature
into a trial, except on extremely compelling reasons, would go
against the very intention of the legislature behind the enactment –
Power u/s.482 cannot be used to quash proceedings based on
compromise if it is in respect of heinous offence which are not
private in nature and have a serious impact on the society –
Without even referring to the alleged offence and thereby without
looking into the nature and gravity of the offence, solely relying
upon the compromise, impugned order was passed – High Court
misread and misapplied the law laid down to quash the FIR and
all further proceedings based in pursuance thereof – Statement
annexed to the FIR of the complainant itself reveal that the teacher
had put pressure on the complainant to restrain him from lodging
report, and thereafter, compromise was entered immediately –
Despite the said position, the Court did not chose to consider
whether the compromise entered into between the parties could
be acted upon or not, in the interest of justice, taking note of
the serious allegations levelled against the teacher – Right
to a third party to prefer petition u/Art.136 is certainly to be
recognised and respected in a case where seemingly miscarriage
of justice had occurred and still, neither State nor victim or any
relative falling under the term ‘victim’ approached this Court –
In view of compromise entered into between the parties, chance
of conviction is remote and bleak also cannot be a ground to
abruptly terminate the investigation, by quashing FIR and all
further proceedings pursuant thereto, by invoking the power
u/s.482 – Thus, the impugned order of High Court quashed and
set aside. [Paras 12, 20, 25-28, 32, 33]
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 643
Ramji Lal Bairwa & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.
Case Law Cited
Gian Singh v. State of Punjab [2012] 8 SCR 753 : (2012) 10 SCC
303 – relied on.
P.S.R. Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam [1980] 2 SCR 873 : (1980)
3 SCC 141; Sheonandan Paswan v. State of Bihar and Ors [1987]
1 SCR 702 : (1987) 1 SCC 288; Amanullah and Anr. v. State of
Bihar [2016] 2 SCR 1027 : (2016) 6 SCC 699; V.S Achuthanandan
v. R. Balakrishna Pillai [2011] 2 SCR 762 : (2011) 3 SCC 317;
Rajiv Ranjan Singh ‘Lalan’ v. Union of India [2006] Supp. 4 SCR
742 : (2006) 6 SCC 613; Simranjit Singh Mann v. Union of India
[1992] Supp. 1 SCR 592 : (1992) 4 SCC 653; Bar Council of
Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar [1976] 1 SCR 306 : (1975) 2
SCC 702; S.P. Gupta v. Union of India (1981) Supp. SCC 87;
Attorney General for India v. Satish and Anr [2021] 10 SCR 955 :
(2022) 5 SCC 545; Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai and Ors. [2003]
Supp. 4 SCR 17 : (2003) 12 SCC 395; Arunachalam v. P.S.R.
Sadhanantham [1979] 3 SCR 482 : (1979) 2 SCC 297; Mohan
Lal v. Ajit Singh [1978] 3 SCR 823 : (1978) 3 SCC 279; State of
M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan [2019] 2 SCR 864 : (2019) 5 SCC 688;
Sunil Raikwar v. State and Another (2021) SCC OnLine Del
258 – referred to.
Books and Periodicals Cited
Marcus Tullins Cicero (106-43 BC) in ‘De Officiis’ (on duties) –
referred to.
List of Acts
Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012; Schedule
Cast and Schedule Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989;
Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
List of Keywords
Locus standi of third party to challenge criminal proceeding;
Sexually assaulting minor girl; Compromise between the parties;
Power to quash criminal proceedings or FIR; Heinous and serious
offences; Rubbing the breast of a child; Quashing the FIR; Offence
having serious impact on society; Locus standi; Offences of private
nature; Offences against the society; Objects and reasons for
the enactment of the POCSO Act; Right to a third party to prefer
petition u/Art.136; Miscarriage of justice.
644 [2024] 11 S.C.R.
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Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
3403 of 2023
From the Judgment and Order dated 04.02.2022 of the High Court
of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur in SBCRMP No. 1348 of 2022
Appearances for Parties
R Basant, Sr. Adv., Amicus Curiae.
Chetan Bairwa, Vikas Jain, Ms. Shrawani Verma, Advs. for the
Appellants.
Milind Kumar, Ashutosh Shekhar Paarcha, Ms. Neha Kapoor,
Pankaj Singhal, Ms. Ashima Gupta, Sarad Kumar Singhania, Anuj
Bhandari, Gaurav Jain, Rajat Gupta, Mrs. Disha Bhandari, Mrs.
Anjali Doshi, Aviral Saxena, Manu Krishnan, Jatin Bhatt, Sanawar,
Harshit Gahlot, Advs. for the Respondents.
R. H. A. Sikander, Intervener.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
C.T. Ravikumar, J.
1. The renowned American poet H. W. Longfellow penned to the effect
that a torn jacket might soon be mended, but a bruised heart of a
child would be beyond reviviscence. Certainly, it contains the gospel
truth as relates a child subjected to sexual assault, be it aggravated
or penetrative; or any kind of sexual abuse or exploitation. It is more
so, in the case of a female child as it may hound her and hack her
family life.
On pedagogy Marcus Tullins Cicero (106-43 BC) in ‘De Officiis’
(on duties) said: “What nobler employment, or more valuable to the
State, than that of the man who instructs the rising generation?”
2. May be a jinx on pedagogy unfortunate, unconscionable and
unpardonable things happen, though not often-times. The following
factual narration will unravel the raison d’etre for the above prelude: -
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 645
Ramji Lal Bairwa & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.
FIR No.6/2022 dated 08.01.2022 was registered at Sardar Gangapur
City Police Station, District Sawai Madhopur, Rajasthan at the
instance of the 4th respondent, the father of the victim involved in
the case, against the 3rd respondent herein under Sections 354A,
342, 509 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘the
IPC’) and Sections 7 and 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual
Offences Act, 2012 (for short, ‘the POCSO Act’) and Sections 3(1)(r),
3(1)(s), 3( 1)(b) & 3(2) (vii) of the Schedule Cast and Schedule Tribe
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short, ‘the SC/ST Act’). The
allegations thereunder are to the effect that on 06.01.2022 when
the victim child, then a student of Class XI in Higher Secondary
School was alone in the classroom, the 3rd respondent, who is a
teacher, came there. After gazing through the window to ensure
that nobody is there near to the classroom, he reached behind her
and started patting her cheeks and soon put his hand inside bodice
and rubbed her breast. In anguish and anger, she got up and ran
away. The accused followed to stop her and hurled abuses with ugly
words like ‘dedh Chamar’ etc. Thereupon, she sat down near the
gate and beseeched the teachers for help, but it was of no avail.
They persuaded her to be tight-lipped about the incident. Though,
the Principal came to know about it, he only took her signature on a
blank paper. Meanwhile, one teacher came to the residence of the 4th
respondent and took his wife to the school telling that her daughter
was not feeling well. On reaching there his wife found the daughter
in a deadly terrified and numbed state and she could say nothing
to the mother. But, on reaching home, she divulged the incident,
to the mother viz., the wife of the 4th respondent and she, in turn,
informed him on his mobile phone as he was away in another village
for employment purpose. On the next day, the 4th respondent came
back home and the victim narrated the whole incident to him and
then, he lodged the aforesaid FIR.
3. Obviously, the subject FIR was filed on 08.01.2022. The third
respondent herein compromised the matter with the fourth respondent,
who is the father of the victim, on 31.01.2022 and thereupon, moved
S.B (Crl.) Misc. Petition No.1348/2022 before the High Court of
Rajasthan at Jaipur under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (for short the ‘Cr.P.C.’), seeking quashment of the
said FIR and all further proceedings thereon. As per the impugned
order dated 04.02.2022 the High Court, despite the opposition by
646 [2024] 11 S.C.R.
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the learned public prosecutor, allowed the said petition and quashed
the subject FIR and all further proceedings in pursuance thereof.
The impugned order would reveal that based on the fact that the 3rd
respondent has settled the dispute amicably with the 4th respondent
and relying on the decision of this Court in Gian Singh v. State of
Punjab,1 the High Court quashed the FIR and all further proceedings
therefrom. The High Court held thus:-
“…The offence alleged in this matter is non compoundable,
however Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Gian Singh
Vs. State of Punjab [(2012) 10 SCC 303] has propounded
that if it is convinced that offences are entirely personal
in nature and do not affect the public peace or tranquillity
and where it feels that quashing of such proceedings on
account of compromise would bring about peace and
would secure ends of justice, the High Court should not
hesitate to quash the same by exercising the inherent
powers vested in it. It is observed that in such cases, the
prosecution becomes the lame prosecution and pursuing
such a lame prosecution would be a waste of time and
energy. That will also unsettle the compromise and
obstruct restoration of peace. This court is aptly guided
by the principles propounded by Hon’ble the Supreme
Court and feels that whether dispute is essentially inter se
between the parties, either they are relatives, neighbours
or having business relationship and which does not affect
the society at large, then in such cases, with a view to
maintain harmonious relationships between the two sides
& for restitution of relationship. and with a view to end-up
the dispute in between them permanently, the High Court
should exercise its inherent power to quash the FIR and
all other subsequent proceedings initiated thereto.”
4. The appellants state that they are ordinary men residing in the very
same Tehsil and District to which the 4th respondent belongs. They
moved this Court challenging the order quashing the subject FIR and
all further proceedings therefrom under Article 32 of the Constitution
of India contending that the FIR registered against the 3rd respondent
1 [2012] 8 SCR 753 : (2012) 10 SCC 303
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 647
Ramji Lal Bairwa & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.
carried serious allegation of commission of acts involving offence(s)
under various sections of the IPC, and POCSO Act; that they are not
purely private in nature; that they are offences against the society, that
the quashment of the subject FIR was solely based on compromise
between the third respondent accused and the fourth respondent,
the father of the minor victim and that the first respondent State did
not choose to challenge the said order dated 04.02.2022 though it
was so quashed ignoring the opposition of the public prosecutor.
They would further contend that the offences alleged against the 3rd
respondent were serious offences having impact on the society and
letting off the third respondent untried might result in recurrence of
such instances besides it being injustice to the victim and society as
a whole. On 30.09.2022, this Court issued notice and taking note of
the involvement of important issues in the matter, requested Mr. R.
Basant, learned Sr. advocate to assist the Court as amicus curiae,
which request was graciously accepted by the learned counsel. On
13.10.2022, Mr. Aviral Saxena, learned advocate, agreed to assist the
learned Senior Counsel. On 02.12.2022, upon hearing the learned
counsel appearing for the parties and the learned amicus curiae and
taking note of difficulty to continue the writ petition filed under Article
32 of the Constitution of India this Court converted the writ petition
into Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of
India and further ordered thus:-
“Let the parties address the Court on merits on the next
date of hearing. List on 20.01.2023”
5. The learned counsel appearing respectively for the third and fourth
respondents vehemently challenged the locus standi of the appellants
to challenge the order dated 04.02.2022 passed thereon as they
were not parties to the above mentioned Crl. Misc. Petition. Besides
challenging the locus standi of the appellants they would contend that
the quashment of the subject FIR and all further proceedings therefrom
is legally permissible in view of the law laid down by this Court in
Gian Singh’s case (supra) and the reason for such interference and
consequential quashment are specifically mentioned in the impugned
order. According to the said respondents the appellants besides being
total strangers to the Misc. Petition and are not at all affected by
the impugned order. Meanwhile Delhi Commission for Protection of
Child Rights (DCPCR) have filed an intervention application seeking
permission to assist the Court for proper adjudication of the issues
648 [2024] 11 S.C.R.
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raised in the Special Leave Petition. Considering the nature of the
issues involved and the fact that intervention is sought for by the
Commission for Protection for Child Rights we have heard learned
counsel for the intervenor, besides the learned amicus curae Sri
R. Basant, with the able assistance of Mr. Avival Saxena and the
learned counsel for the parties.
6. Considering the conspectus of facts and taking note of the rival
contentions, the following twin questions of relevance arise for
consideration in this appeal: -
(I.) Whether a third party to a criminal proceeding got locus standi to
challenge the order quashing the FIR concerned and all further
proceedings pursuant thereto based on a compromise arrived
at by the parties, in a Special Leave Petition under Article 136
of the Constitution of India?
(II.) Whether the power to quash criminal proceedings or complaint
or FIR in regard to heinous and serious offences having serious
impact on society, is exercisable merely because the offender
and victim or parent(s) of the victim arrived at a compromise,
relying on the dictum laid down by this Court in Gian Singh’s
case (supra)?
7. Needless to say, that answers to the above questions would decide
the fate of this appeal. For answering the first question, various
factors have to be looked into. Necessarily the questions as to
whether the offender is accused of commission of offence(s) involving
moral turpitude or against the society or whether they are purely of
private nature have to be taken note of. As some of the offence(s)
alleged fall under special statute relating children, the very object
and purpose of the said enactment may also require consideration
in the above regard. The learned amicus curiae relied on various
decisions of this Court to drive home the point that when criminal
proceedings are abruptly terminated based on compromise between
the offender and the victim or on behalf of the victim by the parent(s),
despite the alleged offence being one having impact on the society
and of heinous and serious in nature and still, the State did not
take up the matter further in accordance with law, ignoring the fact
that such quashment of the proceedings was done disregarding the
opposition of the public prosecutor, a public spirited person should
be having the locus standi to challenge such an order in the interest
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 649
Ramji Lal Bairwa & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.
of justice. It is furthermore submitted that in such circumstances if
a public-spirited person is non-suited on the ground of locus standi
it would only help the offender to escape even without facing the
trial. Such situations may result in recurrence of commission of such
offences detrimental to the interests of the society. To buttress the
point that a spirited citizen has the locus standi to petition under
Article 136 of the Constitution of India to ensure that justice is done,
the learned amicus curiae relied on the decisions of this Court in
P.S.R. Sadhanantham v. Arunachalam,2 Sheonandan Paswan v.
State of Bihar and Ors.,3 Amanullah and Anr. v. State of Bihar4
and V.S Achuthanandan v. R. Balakrishna Pillai.5 The learned
counsel for the intervenor also endorsed the said submissions and
contentions made by the learned amicus curiae on the question of
locus standi.
8. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the third respondent,
who is the accused on whose instance the subject FIR was quashed,
contended that it is impermissible for a third party/strangers to
interfere in criminal proceedings. In support of the said contention,
he relied on various decisions such as Rajiv Ranjan Singh ‘Lalan’
v. Union of India,6 Simranjit Singh Mann v. Union of India7 and
Bar Council of Maharashtra v. M.V. Dabholkar.8
9. It is disheartening to note that with tooth and nail, the learned
counsel appearing for the fourth respondent, the father of the victim,
challenged the appellants’ locus standi to maintain the Special Leave
Petition against the impugned order whereunder the FIR registered
against the third respondent, the accused was quashed based on
the compromise between third and the fourth respondents. It is
contended that since none of the fundamental rights under part III
of the appellants are infringed, they could not maintain a petition
under Article 32 of the Constitution of India and merely because
the petition filed by them under Article 32 was converted to one
2 [1980] 2 SCR 873 : (1980) 3 SCC 141
3 [1987] 1 SCR 702 : (1987) 1 SCC 288
4 [2016] 2 SCR 1027 : (2016) 6 SCC 699
5 [2011] 2 SCR 762 : (2011) 3 SCC 317
6 [2006] Supp. 4 SCR 742 : (2006) 6 SCC 613
7 [1992] Supp. 1 SCR 592 : (1992) 4 SCC 653
8 [1976] 1 SCR 306 : (1975) 2 SCC 702
650 [2024] 11 S.C.R.
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under Article 136, of the Constitution of India, the appellants would
not acquire locus standi to challenge the order dated 04.02.2022
passed by the High Court in exercise of its power under Section 482,
Cr. P.C. The learned counsel relied on the decision of this Court in
S.P. Gupta v. Union of India9 in support his contentions.
10. Before dealing with the contentions on behalf of the respondents and
also the submissions of the learned amicus curiae and the counsel
for the intervenor, we think it only appropriate to refer to certain
relevant aspects of the POCSO Act. As introduction to the POCSO
Act, what actually actuated the Parliament to enact ‘POCSO Act’
has been stated thus:-
“Sexual offences against children are not adequately
addressed by the existing laws. A large number of such
offences are neither specifically provided with nor are they
adequately penalised. Such offences against children need
to be defined explicitly and countered through adequate
penalties as an effective deterrence. This Act provides
for protection of children from offences of sexual assault,
sexual harassment and pornography with due regard for
safeguarding the interest and well-being of children.”
11. Contextually, it is worthy to refer to the statement of objects and
reasons for the enactment of the POCSO Act. It reads as follows: -
“STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS
Article 15 of the Constitution, inter alia, confers upon
the State powers to make special provision for children.
Further, article 39, inter alia, provides that the State shall in
particular direct its policy towards securing that the tender
age of children are not abused and their childhood and
youth are protected against exploitation and they are given
facilities to develop in a healthy manner and in conditions
of freedom and dignity.
2. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Children,
ratified by India on 11th December, 1992, requires the
State Parties to undertake all appropriate national, bilateral
9 (1981) Supp. SCC 87
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 651
Ramji Lal Bairwa & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.
and multilateral measures to prevent (a) the inducement
or coercion of a child to engage in any unlawful sexual
activity; (b) the exploitative use of children in prostitution or
other unlawful sexual practices; and (c) the exploitative use
of children in pornographic performances and materials.
3. The data collected by the National Crime Records
Bureau shows that there has been increase in cases of
sexual offences against children. This is corroborated by
the ‘Study on Child Abuse: India 2007’ conducted by the
Ministry of Women and Child Development. Moreover,
sexual offences against children are not adequately
addressed by the existing laws. A large number of such
offences are neither specifically provided for nor are they
adequately penalised. The interests of the child, both as
a victim as well as a witness, need to be protected. It
is felt that offences against children need to be defined
explicitly and countered through commensurate penalties
as an effective deterrence.
4. It is, therefore, proposed to enact a self contained
comprehensive legislation inter alia to provide for
protection of children from the offences of sexual assault,
sexual harassment and pornography with due regard for
safeguarding the interest and well being of the child at
every stage of the judicial process, incorporating child-
friendly procedures for reporting, recording of evidence,
investigation and trial of offences and provision for
establishment of Special Courts for speedy trial of such
offences.
5. The Bill would contribute to enforcement of the right of
all children to safety, security and protection from sexual
abuse and exploitation.
6. The notes on clauses explain in detail the various
provisions contained in the Bill.
7. The Bill seeks to achieve the above objectives.”
12. The objects and reasons for the enactment of the POCSO Act,
as extracted above, would undoubtedly show that quashment of
proceeding initiated under POCSO Act abruptly by invoking the
652 [2024] 11 S.C.R.
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power under Section 482, Cr. PC without permitting it to mature into
a trial, except on extremely compelling reasons ex facie malafidely
initiated or initiated solely to settle the score etc., would go against
the very intention of the legislature behind the enactment. As noted
earlier, it is the inadequacy of the existing laws to address certain
issues relating sexual offences against the children that made the
legislature to come up with the aforesaid legislation with a view to
protect and respect the privacy and confidentiality of children and to
ensure their physical, emotional, intellectual and social development.
The POCSO Act also addressed the lack of provisions defining
various offences against the children and also adequate penal
provisions therefor. A careful scanning of the various provisions
under the POCSO Act would reveal that with a view to achieve the
aforesaid objects and purposes various offences against the children
are specifically defined and provisions for adequate penalisation
are also inserted in the Act. Obviously, rubbing the breast of a child
would constitute an offence of ‘sexual assault’ under Section 7 of
POCSO Act, punishable with imprisonment of either description for
a term which shall not be less than three years and may extend to
five years and also fine. They would reveal that the commission of
such offences against the children should be viewed as heinous
and serious. Needless to say, that commission of such offences
cannot be taken lightly as offences of private nature and in fact, such
offences are bound to be taken as offences against the society. In
the decision in Attorney General for India v. Satish and Anr.10 at
paragraph 38, this Court held thus:-
“The act of touching any sexual part of the body of a
child with sexual intent or any other act involving physical
contact with sexual intent, could not be trivialised or held
insignificant or peripheral so as to exclude such act from
the purview of “sexual assault” under Section 7. As held
by this Court in Balram Kumawat v. Union of India, the
law would have to be interpreted having regard to the
subject-matter of the offence and to the object of the law
it seeks to achieve. The purpose of the law cannot be to
allow the offender to sneak out of the meshes of law.”
10 [2021] 10 SCR 955 : (2022) 5 SCC 545
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 653
Ramji Lal Bairwa & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.
13. This Court went on to hold that the legislature had incorporated
certain statutory presumptions having regard to the seriousness of
the offences under the POCSO Act.
14. Bearing in mind the aforesaid aspects we will consider the submissions
and contentions made relying on the aforementioned decisions.
15. With respect to the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the
third respondent, it can be seen that they deal with the locus standi
of a third party to petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India.
But then, this Court has already passed an order on 02.12.2022
converting the petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India as a Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution
of India and further ordered to list the matter for hearing the parties
on merits. Hence, the fact is that the present matter has already
shed its character as a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of
India pursuant to the order of this Court on 02.12.2022. The power
of this Court to pass such an order cannot be disputed in view of the
inherent power in this Court or in view of the power under Article 142
of the Constitution of India. In this context, it is also relevant to refer
to Article 136 of Constitution of India and the following decisions of
this Court describing the nature of power of this Court under Article
136 of the Constitution of India.
“Article 136 (1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter,
the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special
leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination,
sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made
by any court or tribunal in the territory of India.
(2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment,
determination, sentence or order passed or made by any
court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating
to the Armed Forces.”
16. In the decision in Kunhayammed and Ors. v. State of Kerala and
Anr.,11 this Court held:-
“.…Article 136 of the Constitution of India is a special
jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court which is
sweeping in its nature. It is a residuary power in the sense
11 [2000] Supp. 1 SCR 538 : (2000) 6 SCC 359
654 [2024] 11 S.C.R.
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that confers an appellate jurisdiction on the Supreme
Court subject to the special leave being granted in such
matters as may not be covered by the preceding articles.
It is an overriding provision conferring a special jurisdiction
providing for invoking of the appellate jurisdiction of
Supreme Court not fettered by the sweep of preceding
articles. Article 136 opens with a non obstante clause and
conveys that even in the field covered by the preceding
articles, jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 is available
to be exercised in an appropriate case. It is untrammelled
reservoir of power incapable of being confined to
definitional bounds; the discretion being subjected only
to one limitation i.e., wisdom and good sense of justice
of the judges. No right of appeal is conferred upon any
party; only a discretion is vested in the Supreme Court to
interfere by granting leave to an applicant to enter in its
appellate jurisdiction not open otherwise and as of right.”
17. In the decision in Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh
and others,12 this Court in paragraph 5 observed and held thus:-
“5. …… The powers given by Article 136 of the Constitution
however are in the nature of special or residuary powers
which are exercisable outside the purview of ordinary law,
in cases where the needs of justice demand interference by
the Supreme Court of the land. The article itself is worded
in the widest terms possible. It vests in the Supreme Court
a plenary jurisdiction in the matter of entertaining and
hearing appeals, by granting of special leave, against any
kind of judgment or order made by a court or tribunal in
any cause or matter and the powers could be exercised in
spite of the specific provisions for the best of reasons did
not choose to fetter or circumscribe the powers exercisable
under this article in any way. ……”
18. In the said circumstances, the question whether there is any violation
of fundamental right(s) under part III of the Constitution of India of the
appellants herein need no consideration as it pales into insignificance.
According to us, in the said circumstances, while considering the
12 [1955] 1 SCR 267 : (1954) 2 SCC 20
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 655
Ramji Lal Bairwa & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.
locus standi of the appellants herein to challenge the order dated
04.02.2022 in S.B. CR. M.P. No.1348/2022, what is to be looked
into is whether the parameters laid down in P.S.R. Sadhanantham’s
case (supra) and such other relevant decisions are satisfied or not.
19. Now, we will refer to the decisions referred to by the learned amicus
curiae, in regard to the locus standi of the appellants to challenge
the order dated 04.02.2022. We have already noted that this Court
converted the petition filed under Article 32 by the appellants herein
as Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India
and specifically listed to hear the parties on merits. In the aforesaid
circumstances, the decision in Ramakant Rai v. Madan Rai and
Ors.13 assumes relevance. That was a case where the acquittal of
the convicts, who originally stood convicted by the Trial Court, in
an appeal by the High Court was challenged before this Court by
a third party to the criminal proceedings (father of the deceased)
in a Special Leave Petition. Leave was granted, though he was
not a party to the original criminal proceedings under Article 136 of
the Constitution of India overruling the objection that a third party
to a criminal proceeding could not invoke the power of this Court
under Article 136 of the Constitution of India to appeal against an
acquittal. This Court considered the power available to this Court
under Article 136 of the Constitution of India and held that such a
Special Leave Petition is maintainable. It was held that Article 136
of the Constitution of India neither confers on anyone the right to
invoke jurisdiction of the Supreme Court nor inhibits anyone from
invoking its jurisdiction and that the said power is actually vested in
the Supreme Court. It was also held that the exercise of the power
under Article 136 by the Supreme Court is circumscribed by any
limitation as to ‘who may invoke it’. Paragraph 12 of the decision
in Ramakant Rai’s case is relevant in the contextual situation and
it read thus:-
“12. A doubt has been raised about the competence of a
private party as distinguished from the State, to invoke the
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution
of India (in short “the Constitution”) against a judgment of
acquittal by the High Court. We do not see any substance
13 [2003] Supp. 4 SCR 17 : (2003) 12 SCC 395
656 [2024] 11 S.C.R.
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in the doubt. The appellate power vested in this Court
under Article 136 of the Constitution is not to be confused
with the ordinary appellate power exercised by appellate
courts and Appellate Tribunals under specific statutes. It
is a plenary power, “exercisable outside the purview of
ordinary law” to meet the pressing demands of justice
(See Durga Shankar Mehta v. Raghuraj Singh [AIR 1954
SC 520]). Article 136 of the Constitution neither confers on
anyone the right to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court nor
inhibits anyone from invoking the Court’s jurisdiction. The
power is vested in this Court but the right to invoke the
Court’s jurisdiction is vested in no one. The exercise of the
power of this Court is not circumscribed by any limitation
as to who may invoke it. Where a judgment of acquittal by
the High Court has led to a serious miscarriage of justice,
this Court cannot refrain from doing its duty and abstain
from interfering on the ground that a private party and not
the State has invoked the Court’s jurisdiction. We do not
have slightest doubt that we can entertain appeals against
judgments of acquittal by the High Court at the instance
of interested private parties also. The circumstance that
the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (in short “the Code”)
does not provide for an appeal to the High Court against
an order of acquittal by a subordinate court, at the instance
of a private party, has no relevance to the question of the
power of this Court under Article 136. We may mention
that in Mohan Lal v. Ajit Singh [(1978) 3 SCC 279 this
Court interfered with a judgment of acquittal by the High
Court at the instance of a private party. An apprehension
was expressed that if appeals against judgments of
acquittal at the instance of private parties are permitted
there may be a flood of appeals. We do not share the
apprehension. Appeals under Article 136 of the Constitution
are entertained by special leave granted by this Court,
whether it is the State or a private party that invokes the
jurisdiction of this Court, and special leave is not granted
as a matter of course but only for good and sufficient
reasons, on well-established practice of this Court.
(Underline supplied)
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 657
Ramji Lal Bairwa & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.
20. The view expressed in paragraph 13 was virtually the view expressed
by this Court in Arunachalam v. P.S.R. Sadhanantham14, as held
in Ramakant Rai’s case itself. In Arunachalam’s case (supra), the
acquittal of P.S.R. Sadhanantham and four others by the High Court
upon reversing the judgment of their conviction was challenged by
the brother of the deceased viz., Arunachalam by filing a Special
Leave Petition. Virtually, leave was granted only against the first
accused P.S.R. Sadhanantham. Though the locus standi of the
private party in the sense, one who was not a party to the original
criminal proceedings to maintain a Special Leave Petition under
Article 136 was raised, this Court, relying on the decision in Mohan
Lal v. Ajit Singh,15 held that this Court could entertain appeal
against a judgment of acquittal at the instance of private parties
also. Furthermore, it was held that Article 136 of the Constitution of
India neither confers on anyone the right to invoke the jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court nor inhibits anyone from invoking the Court’s
jurisdiction and where a judgment of acquittal by the High Court
led to a miscarriage of justice, the Supreme Court would not refrain
from doing its duty and abstain from interfering on the ground that a
private party and not the State has invoked the Court’s jurisdiction.
We may hasten to add here that the said decisions were rendered
prior to the amendment brought to Section 372, Cr. P.C., conferring
the victim a right to prefer an appeal against an order passed by
a Court acquitting the accused and expanding the scope of the
expression “victim” under Section 2 (wa), Cr. P.C. by including his
or her guardian or legal heir, vide Act No.5 of 2009 with effect from
31.12.2009 to prefer an appeal against acquittal in the Cr. P.C. That
apart, this Court in those decisions specifically held that a private
party could prefer an appeal against acquittal invoking the jurisdiction
of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution if the judgment
of acquittal led to serious miscarriage of justice. According to us,
such right to a third party to prefer a petition under Article 136 of
the Constitution is certainly to be recognised and respected in a
case where seemingly miscarriage of justice had occurred and still,
neither State nor the victim or any relative falling under the term
‘victim’ approached this Court.
14 [1979] 3 SCR 482 : (1979) 2 SCC 297
15 [1978] 3 SCR 823 : (1978) 3 SCC 279
658 [2024] 11 S.C.R.
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21. According to us, the case on hand stands on a much firmer footing
than those cases. When leave is sought to challenge a judgment of
acquittal would undoubtedly reveal the fact that the acquitter was
made to face the trial before a Court and acquittal is the outcome
of appreciation of evidence by the trial Court concerned.
22. The case on hand is not one where the third party sought leave to
challenge a judgment of acquittal. In the case on hand, the very
FIR registered against the third respondent for the serious offences,
as mentioned above, was quashed by the High Court invoking the
power under Section 482, Cr. P.C. solely based on the fact that
a compromise was arrived at between the third and the fourth
respondents, as mentioned above. It is a fact that the compromise
was acted upon despite the opposition of the public prosecutor and
even then, the State has not chosen to file petition seeking leave to
challenge the order passed by the High Court. Though, the fourth
respondent is the father of the victim, who suffered sexual assault
and such other offences under the POCSO Act and IPC offences
in view of the fact that he had compromised the offences with the
third respondent accused, and in view of the manner in which he
supports the impugned order, it is evident that he would not invoke
the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution
of India. While considering the locus standi of the appellants to
challenge the order dated 04.02.2022 the aforesaid aspects are
also to be borne in mind. The appellants are ordinary men residing
in the very same village to which the fourth respondent belong.
There is absolutely no case for the third and fourth respondents that
they filed the Special Leave Petition due to any private revenge or
personal vendetta. No ill motive has been attributed on them. We
have already taken note of the fact that the very object and purpose
of enactment of the POCSO Act and also taken note of the offences
alleged against the third respondent which are heinous and serious
in nature. The definition to crimes by Blackstone was taken note
of in P.S.R. Sadhanantham’s case (supra) by this Court as “the
breach and violation of public rights and duties which affect the
whole community” to observe that in such circumstances a crime
is an act deemed by law to be harmful to society in general, even
though its immediate victim is an individual. In view of the nature
of the offences alleged against the third respondent, one can only
say that if they are proved they could be treated only as offences
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 659
Ramji Lal Bairwa & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.
against the society and at any rate, it cannot be said that prosecuting
an offender against whom such allegations are made is not in the
interest of the society. In fact, it would only be in the interest of the
society. In that view of the matter, when by quashing the FIR by
invoking the power under Section 482, Cr. P.C., the accused was
relieved of the liability to face the trial coupled with the aforesaid
circumstances and the position of law qua locus standi of third party
to maintain a petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, as
revealed from the decisions referred above, we have no hesitation
to hold that the challenge based on the appellants’ locus standi got
no merit at all. We do not think it necessary to deal with the other
decisions cited before us on the aforesaid question. In short, we find
no ground or reason to revoke the grant of leave to the appellants
to assail the order dated 04.02.2024.
23. We will now, consider the second question as to whether the power
to quash criminal proceedings invoking the power under Section 482,
Cr. PC be exercisable solely by relying on the fact that the parties
have arrived at a compromise and the decision of this Court in Gian
Singh’s case (supra).
24. The learned amicus curiae submitted that a scanning of the decision
of this Court in Gian Singh’s case (supra) itself would reveal the
legal position in regard to the said question. The learned amicus
curiae drew our attention to paragraphs 48, 57, 58 and 61 of the
said decision. Paragraph 57 and the relevant portions of paragraphs
48, 58 and 61 read thus: -
“48.……….While parting with this part, it appears necessary
to add that the settlement or compromise must satisfy the
conscience of the court. The settlement must be just and
fair besides being free from the undue pressure, the court
must examine the cases of weaker and vulnerable victims
with necessary caution…...”
57. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the
ground of settlement between an offender and victim is
not the same thing as compounding of offence. They are
different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the
power of compounding of offences given to a court under
Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of
criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its
660 [2024] 11 S.C.R.
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inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, power
of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions
contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and
squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of
opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence
or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by
the material on record as to whether the ends of justice
would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate
consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment.
58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding
having regard to the fact that the dispute between the
offender and the victim has been settled although the
offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its opinion,
continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in
futility and justice in the case demands that the dispute
between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored;
securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding
factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have harmful effect
on the public and consist in wrongdoing that seriously
endangers and threatens the well-being of the society and
it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and
the victim have settled the dispute amicably or that the
victim has been paid compensation, yet certain crimes
have been made compoundable in law, with or without
the permission of the court. In respect of serious offences
like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences of mental
depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude under
special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the
offences committed by public servants while working in that
capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim
can have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences
which overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour
having arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial,
partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising
out of matrimony, particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the
family dispute, where the wrong is basically to the victim
and the offender and the victim have settled all disputes
between them amicably, irrespective of the fact that such
offences have not been made compoundable, the High
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 661
Ramji Lal Bairwa & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.
Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash
the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it
is satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is
hardly any likelihood of the offender being convicted and
by not quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall
be casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The
above list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will
depend on its own facts and no hard-and-fast category
can be prescribed.
61. The position that emerges from the above discussion
can be summarised thus : the power of the High Court
in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different
from the power given to a criminal court for compounding
the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power
is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has
to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in
such power viz. : (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to
prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases
power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or
FIR may be exercised where the offender and the victim
have settled their dispute would depend on the facts
and circumstances of each case and no category can
be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power,
the High Court must have due regard to the nature and
gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of
mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity,
etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or
victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute.
Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious
impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the
victim and the offender in relation to the offences under
special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or
the offences committed by public servants while working
in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for
quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences.
But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and
predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for
the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising
662 [2024] 11 S.C.R.
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from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership
or such like transactions or the offences arising out of
matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes
where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature
and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this
category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal
proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise
between the offender and the victim, the possibility of
conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the
criminal case would put the accused to great oppression
and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to
him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and
complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In
other words, the High Court must consider whether it would
be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue
with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal
proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law
despite settlement and compromise between the victim and
the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice,
it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and
if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative,
the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash
the criminal proceeding.”
(Underline supplied)
25. Thus, in unambiguous terms this Court held that before exercising
the power under Section 482, Cr. PC the High Court must have due
regard to the nature and gravity of the crime besides observing and
holding that heinous and serious offences could not be quashed even
though a victim or victim’s family and the offender had settled the
dispute. This Court held that such offences are not private in nature
and have a serious impact on the society. Having understood the
position of law on the second question that it is the bounden duty
of the court concerned to consider whether the compromise is just
and fair besides being free from undue pressure we will proceed to
consider the matter further. A bare perusal of the impugned order
dated 04.02.2022 would reveal that the High Court has erred in not
bestowing proper consideration the law laid down in Gian Singh’s
case (supra) while rendering the same. The impugned order would
reveal that the allegations contained in the subject FIR was not at
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 663
Ramji Lal Bairwa & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.
all even adverted to, before quashing the same. We have referred
to the allegations which are of serious nature revealed from the FIR.
The complaint in this case is annexed to the FIR produced in this
proceeding as Annexure P-1. In the said complaint which led to the
registration of the FIR reads thus:-
“Hence my report may be lodged and action may be taken
against the offender Vimal Kumar Gupta as he is making
pressure on me not to lodge report.”
(underline supplied)
26. In this context, it is to be noted that the complaint which led to the
registration of the FIR was filed on 08.01.2022 and the compromise
was entered into between the third and fourth respondents within a
few weeks thereafter viz., on 31.01.2022. A perusal of the impugned
order would reveal that without even referring to the alleged offence
and thereby without looking into the nature and gravity of the offence,
solely relying upon the compromise, the High Court observed thus: -
“This Court is aptly guided by the principles propounded by
Hon’ble the Supreme Court and feels that whether dispute
is essentially inter se between the parties, either they are
relatives, neighbours or having business relationship and
which does not affect the society at large, then in such
cases, with a view to maintain harmonious relationships
between the two sides & for restitution of relationship
and with a view to end-up the dispute in between them
permanently, the High Court should exercise its inherent
power to quash the FIR and all other subsequent
proceedings initiated thereto. Here in this case, though
the offences are not compoundable but the parties have
settled the dispute amicably and that is essentially in
between the parties which is not-affecting public peace and
tranquillity therefore with a view to maintain the harmony
and to resolve the dispute finally in between the parties,
it is deemed appropriate to quash the FIR and all further
proceedings undertaken in pursuance thereof.”
(underline supplied)
27. It is also to be noted that after quashing the FIR and further
proceedings, the SHO of the Police Station concerned was directed
664 [2024] 11 S.C.R.
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to file a closure report with the concerned Judicial Magistrate within a
period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of the order.
28. A bare perusal of the impugned order and in the light of the
observations and binding conclusions in Gian Singh’s case (supra),
bearing in mind the allegations in the subject FIR, it would reveal
that the High Court has misread and misapplied the law laid down
in Gian Singh’s case (supra) to quash the subject FIR and all
further proceedings based in pursuance thereof. We are at a loss
to understand how the High Court arrived at the conclusion that
in the case on hand a dispute to be resolved exists between the
parties and further that to maintain harmony the FIR and all further
proceedings thereto should be quashed even without adverting to
the allegations raised against the 3rd respondent in the subject FIR.
It is also a fact that though in terms of the decision in Gian Singh’s
case (supra) an irrecusable duty of the Court to consider whether
the compromise could be acted upon or not in the interest of justice,
the impugned order would reveal that the High Court has failed to
bestow proper consideration in that regard as well.
29. In the contextual situation, it is also relevant to refer to a Three Judge
Bench decision of this Court in State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan16.
This Court held that whether an FIR is quashable or not would
depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and while
considering that question, the Court has to apply its mind to (i)
whether the crime is one against the society or against an individual
alone, nature of the dispute, (ii) seriousness and how the crime was
committed (iii) whether offence(s) is one under a special statute (iv)
stage of proceedings and how the accused managed to compromise
with the complainant.
30. In this regard, it is relevant to note that in the case on hand the
victim was then a student of Class 11th in the Higher Secondary
aged 16 years. The statement annexed to the FIR of the complainant
viz., the 4th respondent itself would reveal that on 08.01.2022 he
complained about the pressure from the 3rd respondent to restrain
him from lodging report. The compromise was entered immediately
thereafter on 31.01.2022. Despite the said position, the Court has not
chosen to consider whether the compromise entered into between the
16 [2019] 2 SCR 864 : (2019) 5 SCC 688
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 665
Ramji Lal Bairwa & Anr. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.
parents and the accused could be acted upon or not, in the interest
of justice, taking note of the serious allegations levelled against
the 3rd accused and in view of the law laid down in Gian Singh’s
case (supra). In that context, it is relevant to refer to a decision of
a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Sunil Raikwar
v. State and Another17. Paragraph 12 therein, to the extent it is
relevant reads thus:-
“12. The father of the victim cannot be permitted to settle
the dispute with the accused. He is not the victim and
the courts have to safeguard and protect the interest of
children against onslaught by bad forces. We cannot lose
sight of the fact that the accused is being prosecuted
for an offence that shocks the value system of a society
and this is not a matter that can be permitted to be
settled as a compoundable minor offence. Deterrence
to others committing similar offence is a must and they
cannot get a signal that anything and everything can be
compromised……”
31. In view of the very object and purpose of enacting the POCSO Act,
we find no reason to disagree with the conclusions in paragraph 12
extracted above in the given case. It is more so, when the extracted
portion from the complaint that was annexed to the FIR and extracted
hereinbefore would reveal that the accused was making pressure
on him not to lodge any report. Despite giving such statement in
the complaint, within a couple of weeks, the accused managed to
compromise the case with the 4th respondent and his wife.
32. In the decision relied on by the High Court to quash the proceedings
viz., Gian Singh’s case (supra) and the decision in Laxmi Narayan’s
case (supra) in unambiguous terms this Court held that the power
under Section 482, Cr. P.C. could not be used to quash proceedings
based on compromise if it is in respect of heinous offence which are
not private in nature and have a serious impact on the society. When
an incident of the aforesaid nature and gravity allegedly occurred
in a higher secondary school, that too from a teacher, it cannot be
simply described as an offence which is purely private in nature and
have no serious impact on the society.
17 2021 SCC OnLine Del 258
666 [2024] 11 S.C.R.
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33. In view of the reasons as aforesaid and in the light of the decisions
referred supra, the impugned order dated 04.02.2022 of the High
Court in S.B.C.R.M.P. No.1348/2022, quashing the FIR No.6/2022
dated 08.01.2022 and all further proceedings pursuant thereto solely
on the ground that the accused and the complainant had settled the
matter, invites interference. We have no hesitation to hold that in
cases of this nature, the fact that in view of compromise entered into
between the parties, the chance of a conviction is remote and bleak
also cannot be a ground to abruptly terminate the investigation, by
quashing FIR and all further proceedings pursuant thereto, by invoking
the power under Section 482, Cr. P.C. In the said circumstances,
this appeal is allowed. The impugned order dated 04.02.2022 of the
High Court in S.B.C.R.M.P. No.1348/2022 is hereby quashed and set
aside. Consequently, the FIR No.6/2022, investigation and criminal
proceedings pursuant thereto subject to the nature of the report to
be filed under Section 173(2), Cr. P.C., be proceeded with against
the accused, in accordance with law.
34. We make it clear that we shall not be understood to have made any
observations on the merits of the case.
35. Before parting with this case, we would render our gratitude and
appreciation for the invaluable assistance provided to the Court
by Mr. R. Basant, learned Senior Counsel as amicus curiae, ably
assisted by Mr. Aviral Saxena, Advocate on Record.
Result of the case: Appeal allowed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain
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