Supreme Court of India
RAMJAS FOUNDATION AND ANOTHERversusUNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
- Citation
- 2010 INSC 763
- Decided
- 9 November 2010
- Disposal
- Dismissed
- Bench
- G S SINGHVI
Holding
The appeal is dismissed; the land is not Wakf property and the appellants are not entitled to any relief.
Summary
The Ramjas Foundation owned land in Delhi that was acquired under a 1959 notification issued under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for planned development. The Foundation claimed the land was a Wakf property, exempt under clause (d) of the notification, and argued that a non‑Muslim could create a Wakf and that the acquisition violated Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. The High Court and a Division Bench held the land to be a public charitable trust, not a Wakf, and refused to nullify the acquisition. The Supreme Court affirmed this view, emphasizing that the appellants suppressed material facts, did not approach the Court with clean hands, and failed to produce evidence of a Wakf. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the land remained subject to acquisition for Delhi’s development.
Issues considered
- Whether the land of the Ramjas Foundation qualifies as Wakf property exempt from acquisition under clause (d) of the 1959 notification.
- Whether a non‑Muslim can validly create a Wakf and whether clause (d) should be interpreted to include charitable trusts of non‑Muslims.
- Whether the acquisition infringes Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution.
- Whether the appellants were denied a personal hearing under Section 5‑A of the Land Acquisition Act.
- Whether the doctrine of clean hands bars relief to the appellants.
Legislation cited
- Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 4, s. 5-A, s. 6
- Wakf Act, 1954s. 3(1)
Subjects
Land acquisitionWakfCharitable trustClean hands doctrineExemption clauseConstitutional lawArticles 14 and 15Section 5-APublic purposeDelhi development
Judgment
(20101 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 364
A RAMJAS FOUNDATION AND ANOTHER
~ v.
UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS
(Civil Appeal No. 6662 of 2004)
NOVEMBER 09, 2010
B
[G.5. SINGHVI AND ASOK KUMAR GANGULY, JJ.]
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - ss. 4 and 6 - Notification
and declaration under - For planned development of Delhi
C - Challenged by land owners - Plea that the land was
dedicated for charitable purpose, intending to create wakf
property and was exempted from acquisition - Single Judge
and the Division Bench of the High Court declined to nullify
the acquisition of the land holding that land owner created a
o public charitable trust and not a Wakf - Interference with -
Held: Not called for - No evidence produced before the High
Court to prove that dedicator created a Wakf - Ceremonies
performed shows that he did not intend to create a Wakf - Also 1
landowners deliberately refrained from mentioning details of
E the cases instituted by them in respect of their other land and
rejection of their claim for exemption in respect of such land
by the High Court as also the Supreme Court - Wakf.
Wakf - Creation of - Held: Non-Muslim can create a
Wakf for any purpose which is religious under the
F Mohammedan Law - However, the object of the Wakf must
be lawful according to the religious creed of the maker as well
- Mohammedan Law.
Relief - Entitlement of, to party whose conduct is
G blameworthy and does not approach court with clean hands
- Held: Such person is not entitled to any relief.
One 'RS' started three schools in memory of his
father. He purchased certain properties in villages 'CM'
H 364
RAMJAS FOUNDATION AND ANR. v. UNION OF 365
INDIA AND ORS.
and 'SK' from his resources and recourses of other A
philanthropists. Thereafter, in a public function 'RS' is
said to have made an announcement that he had created
a wakf and dedicated and donated al! his properties
including the land in the said villages to th~ three schools
for charitable purposes. Thereafter, 'RS' formed a B
registered College Society and became the President of
-the managing committee of the Society. Subsequently, he
transferred the entire land to the society by executing a
release deed. The name of the College Society was
changed to 'R' Foundation and the sarne was regj~tered. c
Thereafter, Notification dated 13.11.1959 was issued
under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,
proposing to acquire certain lands including .the
appellant's land situated at villages 'CK' and 'SK' for
planned development of Delhi. Three different D
notifications were issued under Section 6 of the Act.
Several petitions were filed challenging the acquisition of
land by Notification dated 13.11.1959 which were
dismissed by the High Court as also this Court. The ..
appellant also filed several cases challenging the E
acquisition of its land. As regards, the land in village 'CK',
bo.tb the Single Judge as also the Division Bench of the
· t-iigh Court declined to nullify the acquisition of the land.
Therefore, the appellants filed the instant appeal.
Dismissing the appeal, the Court F
. .
. ·!i'ELD: 1.1 The principle that a person who does not
J;·ome to the Court with clean hands is not entitled to be
heard on the merits of his grievance and, in any case,
such person is not entitled to any relief is applicable not G
only to the petitions filed under Articles 32, 226 and 136
of the Constitution but also to the cases instituted in
othE;!.rs courts and judicial forums. The object underlying
the principle is that every Court is not only entitled but is
H
366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R
A duty bound to protect itself from unscrupulous litigants
who do not have any respect for truth and who try to
pollute the stream of justice by resorting to falsehood or
by making mis-statement or by suppressing facts which
have bearing on adjudication of the issue(s) arising in the
B case. [Para 14) [385-G-H; 386-A]
Hari Narain v. Badri Das AIR 1963 SC 1558; Welcome
Hotel v. Stateof A.P. (1983) 4 SCC 575; G. Narayanaswamy
Reddy v. Governmentof Karnataka (1991) 3 SCC 261; S.P.
Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath (1994) 1 sec 1; A. v.
C Papayya Sastry v. Government of A.P. (2007) 4 SCC 221;
Prestige Lights Limited v. SB/ (2007) 8 SCC 449; Sunil
Poddar v. Union Bank of India (2008) 2 SCC 326; K.D.
Sharma v. SAIL (2008) 12 SCC 481; G. Jayashree v.
Bhagwandas S. Patel (2009) 3 SCC 141; Dalip Singh v. State
D of UP. (2010) 2 SCC 114- referred to.
Dalglish v. Jarvie 2 Mac. & G. 231, 238; Castelli v. Cook
(1849) 7 Hare, 89, 94; Republic of Peru v. Dreyfus Brothers
and Company 55 L.T. 802, 803; R. v. Kensington Income Tax
E Commissioner (1917) 1 K.B. 486- referred to.
1.2 The appellants are not entitled to any relief
because despite strong indictment by this Court in
*Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India, they deliberately
refrained from mentioning details of the cases instituted
F by them in respect of the land situated at 'SK' and
rejection of their claim for exemption under clause (d) of
Notification dated 13.11.1959 by the High Court and this
Court. [Para 16) [389-G]
G Aflatoon v Lt. Governor of Delhi (1975) 4 SCC 285; Lila
Ram v Unoin of India (1975) 2 SCC 547; *Ramjas
Foundation v. Union of India (1993) Supp 2 SCC 20 -
referred to.
2.1 The institution of Wakf owes its origin to a rule
H
RAMJAS FOUNDATION AND ANR. v. UNION OF 367
INDIA AND ORS.
laid down by the prophet of Islam. It means "the tying up A
of property in the ownership of God the Almighty and the
devotion of the profits for the benefit of human beings.
When once it is declared that a particular property is
Wakf, or any such expression is used as implies Wakf,
or the tenor of the document shows, if there is a wakf- B
nama that a dedication to pious or charitable purpose is
meant, the right of Wakf is extinguished and the
ownership is transferred to the Almighty. A non Muslim
can also create a Wakf for any purpose which is religious
under the Mohammedan Law. However, the object of the c
Wakf must be lawful according to the religious creed of
the maker as well. [Para 17] (390-A-B-E]
Vidya Viruthi v. Baluswami AIR 1922 PC 123; Marni v.
Kal/andarAmmal 54 I.A. 23; Motishah v. Abdul Gaffar AIR
1956 Nagpur 38; Arur Singh v. Badar Din AIR 1940 Lahore D
119; Fuzlur Rahaman v. Anath Bandhu Pal (1911) 16 Cal.
WN 114; Misra Hidavat Beg v. Seth Behari Lal AIR 1941 All.
225; Jai Dayal v..Dewan Ram Saran Das AIR 1939 Lahore
686 - referred to.
E
Mohammadan law by Prof. A.A.A. Fayzee Chapter IX
p 274 - 275 - referred to.
2.2 The submission that by dedicating the land for a
charitable purpose 'RS' intended to create a Wakf lacks
F
merit and is to be rejected. In the function organized in
the School, the dedicator is said to have made an
announcement that he had created a Wakf and donated
all his moveable and immoveable properties to the
Society for charitable purposes but no evidence was
produced before the Single Judge of the High Court to G
prove this. Rather, the evidence produced before the
Single Judge shows that even after the so called
dedication of land for charitable purposes, lhe same·
continued in the name of 'RS' till 1936 when he executed
H
368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A the release deed in favour of the Trust of which he himself
was the founder trustee apart from being the Manager of
the school and the President of the Society. The hawan
ceremony performed by 'RS' which was preceded by
Samarpan and Sankalp also shows that he did not intend
B to create a Wakf. This is the reason why the objects of
the College Society formed in 1917 did not make a
mention of the Wakf allegedly created by 'RS'. In the deed
of settlement executed by the British Government, the
institution was described as a public educational charity
c and not as a Wakf. Therefore, the concurrent finding
recorded by the Single Judge and the Division Bench
that what was created by 'RS' was a public charitable
trust and not a Wakf and the property acquired by
Notification dated 13.11.1959 was not a Wakf property,
does not call for interference. [Para 20] [394-B-G]
0
2.3 The Division Bench also rejected the argument
that if Wakf created by non-Muslims is excluded from
clause (d) then the same would be violative of Articles 14
and 15 of the Constitution by observing that the said plea
E was not pressed before the Single Judge and even in the
grounds of appeal, this plea was not taken. In the opinion
of the Division Bench, by omitting to press the point
before the Single Judge and not taking a ground in the
memo of appeal, the appellants would be deemed to have
F abandoned this part of challenge to the acquisition
proceedings. [Para 19] [393-G-H; 394-A-B]
3. The appellants would have been saddled with
exemplary costs but keeping in view the fact that they are
G running educational institutions for benefit ,of the
community, no order is passed to that effect and the
parties are left to bear their own costs. However, it is
made clear that in future the respondents would be free
to use the acquired land for the purpose of planned
~H
development of Delhi and the appellant would not be
RAMJAS FOUNDATION AND ANR. v. UNION OF 369
INDIA AND ORS.
entitled to obstruct the proceedings which may be taken A
by the respondents for utilization of land for the purpose
for which it was acquired or for any other public purpose.
[Para 21] [394-H; 395-A-B]
Case Law Reference:
B
(1917) 1 K.B. 486 Referred to Para 14
AIR 1963 SC 1558 Referred to Para 15
(1983) 4 sec 575 Referred to Para 15
c
(1991) 3 sec 261 Referred to Para 15
(1994) 1 sec 1 Referred to Para 15
(2007) 4 sec 221 Referred to Para 15
(2001) 8 sec 449 Referred to Para 15 D
(2008) 2 sec 326 Referred to Para 15
(2008) 12 sec 481 Referred to Para 15
(2009) 3 sec 141 Referred to Para 15 E
(2010) 2 sec 114 Re1erred to Para 15
AIR 1922 PC 123 Referred to Para 18
54 I.A. 23 Referred to Para 18
F
AIR 1956 Nagpur 38 Referred to Para 18
AIR 1940 Lahore 119 Referred to Para 18
(1911) 16 Cal. WN 114 Referred to Para 18
AIR 1941 All. 225 Referred to Para 18
G
AIR 1939 Lahore 686 Referred to Para 18
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
6662 of 2004.
H
370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A From the Judgment & Order dated 18.05.2001 of the High
Court of Delhi at New Delhi in RF.A. (OS) No. 13 of 1977.
R. Venkatramni, Aljo K. Joseph, S.P. Sharma for the
Appellants. ·
B Geeta Luthra, A. Sharan, D.N. Goburdhan, Vishnu B.
Saharya, Viresh B. Saharya for the Respodents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
C G.S. SINGHVI, J. 1. This appeal is directed against
judgment dated 18.5.2001 of the Division Bench of the Delhi
High Court whereby the first appeal preferred by the appellants
against the judgment of the learned Single Judge, who declined
to nullify the acquisition of their land was dismissed.
D 2. Rai Sahib Kedar Nath, who retired as District Judge
from the Punjab Judicial Service started three schools in Kucha
Ghasi Ram, Chandni Chowk, Bazar Sita Ram and Daryaganj,
Delhi between 1912 and 1916 in the memory of his father, Lala
Ramjas Mal. He purchased land measuring about 1800 bighas
E in villages Chowkri Mubarikabad and Sadhora Khurd, which
now form part of NCR Delhi from his own resources and by
collecting money in the form of donations from other
philanthropists. In a public function held on 25.12.1916 in
Ramjas School, Kucha Ghasi Ram, Chandani Chowk, Rai
F Sahib Kedar Nath is said to have made an announcement that
he had created a Wakf and dedicated and donated all his
movable and immovable properties including the land in
villages Chowki Mubarikabad and Sadhora Khurd to the said
school for charitable purposes, namely, advancement and
G promotion of education to the public and poor students. In
1917, he formed Ramjas College Society and got the same
registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 as a
charitable institution. The objects of the Society were as under:
"(i) To provide school and university education for boys
H and girls.
RAMJAS FOUNDATION AND ANR. v. UNION OF 371
INDIA AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI •. J.]
(ii) To maintain schools, colleges, boarding houses A
and training institutes for training of teachers.
(iii) To provide means for imparting technical and
industrial education in connection with the
institutions under the control of foundation.
B
(iv) To provide meaps for imparting a sound moral and
catholic religiou~education free from superstitious
and controversial ~ers and based on the Vedas
and ancient shastr
c
(v) To encourage and take part in Scientific Research
of various kinds as well as iii the study translation ·
and publication of the Sanskrit literature and
philosophy of ancient India.
(vi) To amalgamate with the foundation any, other D
societies having objects similar to those or aliy-of
these of the Foundation.
(vii) To give loans to the institutions aided, run managed
by or under the control of the Foundation and for the E
benefits of the students studying in the said
institutions, aid, grants, donations, subscrib~ to
Government and/or semi-Government relief funds,
award scholarships, fellowships, stipends of any
kind as also to take/accept donations, gifts and F
charities etc."
3. After some time, Rai Sahib Kedar Nath formed a
managing committee of which he was the President. On ,
25.6.1936, he transferred the entire land to the Society by /
executing a release deed. In 1967, the name of the Society G
was changed from Ramjas College Society to Ramjas
Foundation and the same was registered as such.
4. By notification dated 13.11.1959 issued under Section
4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, 'the Act'), the H
.--
372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A Chief Commissioner of Delhi proposed acquisition of 34070
acres land including 872 bighas and 17 biswas land of appellant
No.1 situated at Chowkri Mubarikabad and 730 bighas land
situated at Sadhora Khurd for planned development of Delhi
excluding the following categories of land:
B
(a) Government land and evacuee land;
(b) the land already notified under Section 6 of the Land
Acquisition Act for any Government Scheme;
c (c) the land already notified either under Section 4 or
· 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, for House Building
Cooperative Societies mentioned in Annexure Ill;
(d) the land under graveyards, tombs, shrines and the
land attached to religious institutions and Wakf
D property.
5. The objections filed on behalf of appellant No.1 under
Section 5-A of the Act through Shri Ratan Lal Gupta, Advocate
were rejected by the competent authority. Thereafter, three
E different notifications were issued under Section 6 of the Act.
6. The acquisition of land vide notification dated
13.11.1959 was challenged in large number of petitions filed
in Delhi High Court which were dismissed. The appeals filed
F against the orders of the Delhi High Court were dismissed by
this Court in Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (1975) 4 SCC
285 and Lila Ram v. Union of India (1975) 2 SCC 547.
7. Appellant No.1 also filed several cases in the Delhi High
Court and this Court questioning the acquisition of its land and
G consequential actions taken by the respondents. The particulars
of the cases filed by appellant No.1 and their result are detailed
below:
Chowkri Mubarikabad
H (i) The first writ petition bearing No.409/1968 ~s filed by
RAMJAS FOUNDATION AND ANR. v. UNION OF -373
INDIA AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
appellant No.1 in the Delhi High Court for quashing notifications A
dated 13.11.1959 and 28.2.1968 issued under Sections 4 and
6 of the Act respectively mainly on the ground that its land is
exempted from acquisition in terms of clause (d) of notification
dated 13.11.1959 because it was a Wakf property. This
assertion was contested by the respondents. They pleaded that B
the property in dispute is neither a Wakf nor it can be treated
as Wakf because it had not been created by a Muslim. The
learned Single Judge was of the view that the adjudication of
the writ petition would need determination of complicated
questions of fact and such questions cannot be decided under c
Article 226 of the Constitution. Thereupon, the counsel
appearing on behalf of appellant No.1 sought leave of the Court
to withdraw the writ petition with liberty to file a civil suit. His
prayer was granted by the Court.
(ii) Immediately after disposal of the writ petition, appellant D
No.1 filed Suit No.451/1971 with the following substantive
prayer:
"A decree for declaration be passed in favour of the
plaintiffs and against the defendants to the effect that since E
the plaintiffs society is a charitable education institution and
the land in dispute is a wakf property or in the _nature of
wakf property, the same is exempt from· the purview of
notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act by
virtue of clause (d) of para 2 of the Notification No.F.15(iii)/ F
59-L.S.G dated 13.11.1959 and the impugned
notifications, acquisition notices and the proceedings
consequent thereon are void abinitio, without jurisdiction,
discriminatory, arbitrary, vague, indefinite, ultra vires,
against the principles of natural justice and the provisions G
of the_ Land Acquisition Act and are liable to be set aside
and cancelled." \
(iii) After detailed consideration of the pleadings and
documents produced by,,.the parties, the learned Single Judge
H
374 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A dismissed the suit. Appellant No.2 - Shri Ram Kanwar Gupta
joined appellant No.1 in filing appeal against the judgment of
the learned Single Judge, which was dismissed by the Division
Bench of the High Court vide judgment dated 18.5.2001.
Thereafter, notification under Section 17 of the Act was issued
B on 23.7.2001 and possession of the land was taken by the
Land Acquisition Collector and handed over to the Delhi
Development Authority.
Sadhora Khurd
C (i) W.P. No.213/1973 filed by appellant No.1 challenging
the acquisition of land situated at Sadhora Khurd was dismissed
by the learned Single Judge as withdrawn.
(ii) After 5 years, appellant No.1 filed CWP No.106/1978
D for quashing the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6
and notices issued under Sections 9 and 10 of the Act. The
same was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court
vide its order dated 31.1.1978.
(iii) Civil Appeal No. 2213 of 1978 filed by appellant No.1
E against the order of the Division Bench was dismissed by this
Court on 13.11.1972 on the ground of delay and blameworthy
conduct of appellant No.1 - Ramjas Foundation v. Union of
India (1993) Supp 2 SCC 20.
F (iv) After dismissal of the civil appeal, the Land Acquisition
Collector passed Award No.10/94-95 dated 7 .6.1994 and
supplementary Award Nos.10-A/94-95, 10-8/94-95, 10-C/94-
95 and 10-D/94-95 all dated 11.11.1994 in respect of 718
bighas 14 biswas land situated at Sadhora Khurd and took
G possession of 676 bighas and 8 biswas of land.
(v) Appellant No.1 challenged the awards in CWP No.4343/
1997 and prayed for quashing the action of the respondents
to take possession of the acquired land. It further prayed for
issue of a mandamus to respondents to release land by issuing
H notification under Section 48 of the Act. Appellant No.1 filed
RAMJAS FOUNDATION AND ANR. v. UNION OF 375
INDIA AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
another writ petition (CWP No.5493/1999) for grant of a A
declaration that land situated in village Sadhora Khurd
continues to be in its possession. By an order dated
26.4.2000, the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed
CWP No. 4343/1997 but gave a direction to the Lt. Governor
to pass appropriate order on the application made by appellant B
No.1 for denotification of the acquired land. Similar order
appears to have been passed in CWP No. 5493/1999.
(vi) In the meanwhile, Bhagwan Dass filed CWP No.1811/
1995 by way of public interest litigation and prayed for issue C
of a mandamus to the respondents to take possession of 730
bighas of land and use the same as per the plan of Zone B-5.
That petition was disposed of by the Division Bench of the High
Court on 26.4.2000 by taking cognizance of the statement
made by the counsel appearing for the Delhi Development
Authority that a decision had been taken not to release land of D
appellant No.1 from acquisition.
(vii) The orders passed by the High Court in CWP
Nos.181111995, 4343/1997 and 5493/1999 were challenged
before this Court in S.L.P. (C) Nos.15017, 15216 and 19741 E
of 2000 on several grounds including the following: ·
"(iii) Because the .petitioner society having been created
by Rai Sahab Kedar Nath, Retired District Judge, Punjab
thereby dedicating all his movable and immovable
properties, for Charitable purposes establishing to run the F
schools and colleges for public charity of education
covered under and/or is. waqf and property held is or in
the nature of a waqf properly even if the Waqf Act may
not be applicable to suc_h society being not attached to
any specific caste and/or religion. G
(iv) Because a notification issued under the provisions of
the Land Acquisition Act also being "Law" is liable to be
struck down if it is contrary to the fundamental rights
guaranteed under Part Ill of the Constitution of India, as in H
376 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A view of the decision of this Hon'ble Court in Indian Express
Newspapers Vs Union of India, reported at [1985] 1 SCC
641, para 83 at 693.
(v) Because any law and/or notification under the statute
i.e. the Land Acquisition Act being discriminatory on
B
ground of caste or religion is liable to be declared as ultra
vires of the Constitution and must be quashed as a whole."
(emphasis supplied)
c (viii) All the special leave petitions were disposed by this
Court on 4.2.2002 in the following terms:
"We have heard Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned senior
counsel, appearing for the petitioners. We are not
satisfied that this petition merits further consideration by
D this Court. However, it is pointed out that in spite of the
directions issued by the High Court that the representation
filed by the petitioners before the Lt. Governor of Delhi for
considering their case for denotification of the land in
question has not been disposed of till date. If that be so
E we direct that the application so filed will be disposed of
within a period of six weeks from today."
(ix) In compliance of the direction given by the High Court
and this Court Lt. Governor, Delhi passed order dated
F 18.6.2002 and rejected the prayer of appellant No.1 for
denotification of its land by recording the following reasons:
"I have gone through all the papers on record and have
considered the matter at length. Possession of area
admeasuring 563 bighas 07 biswas was taken by DOA
G on "as is where is" basis as land was not physically vacant.
The said area is replete with factories. The Anand Parbat
Industrial Area as it has come to be popularly known, has
come up in a haphazard and unplanned manner and has
over the years, also become degraded and decrepit. The
H
RAMJAS FOUNDATION AND ANR. v. UNION OF 377
INDIA AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
congested and unsystematic growth of factories in the area A
has turned it into a veritable public hazard. Safety
considerations are wanting. Most of the lanes are too
narrow for a fire tender to ent~r. The electricity distribution
system is problematic., The other infrastructure and basic
services are also~ffr~d.equate. Apart from being a 8
congested and degraded cluster of factories operating in
sub-optirruit-conditions, the area is also hazardous where
public safety requirements warrant early remedial
· measures. The area is mentioned in the Master Plan of
Delhi as "Industrial".
c
There are thus sound and compelling reasons to effect
redevelopment of the area in the overall public interest.
For this the entire land mass needs to be physically taken
over, planned, roads and lanes straightened and widened
to the extent feasible and new infrastructure laid down as' D
per the plans. Institutional services like fire service,
electricity substations etc. will have to be properly located .
.A redevelopment plan on these lines has, in fact, been
prepared after consulting the occupants. The only possible
way to achieve implementation of the redevelopment plan E
is through land acquisition. Without physically taking over
the entire chunk of land, laying of infrastructure as per the
redevelopment plans will not be possible. Nor is it
desirable or safe to delay any longer redevelopment of the
area, which is an imminent necessity. F
For the aforesaid considerations, I do not find it prudent,
desirable or feasible to denotify the said chunk of land.
Denotification of 67 bigha 14 biswas land has already
· been made in favour of the petitioners who have thereby G
received a fair degree of consideration from the
government already. Any further denotification will be
contrary to public interest and as such cannot be made.
The petitions/representations in this regard are hereby
disposed of accordingly."
H
378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A (x) Appellant No.1 challenged the order of the Lt. Governor
in W.P. No.5138/2002, which was dismissed by the Division
Bench of the High Court by detailed judgment dated 6.2.2004.
S.L.P. (C) No)026 of 2004 filed against that judgment was
dismissed as withdrawn.
B 8. Shri R. Venkataramani, learned senior counsel for the
appellants reiterated the argument made before the High Court
-that in view of clause (d) of notification dated 13.11.1959, the
land of the appellant was liable to be excluded from acquisition
because it was a Wakf property. Learned counsel argued that
C the dedication of land by Rai Sahib Kedar Nath was for a
charitable purpose and this, by itself, is conclusive evidence of
his intention to create a Wakf. Learned counsel emphasized
that dedication made by Rai Sahib Kedar Nath was ~ithout any
reservation in favour of any beneficiary as trustee or otherwise
D and, as such, the land in question became part of Wakf
property and argued that the same could not be acquired in the
name of planned development of Delhi. learned counsel
invited the Court's attention to the amended definition of 'Wakf
contained in Section 3(1) of the Wakf Act, 1954 and argued
E that a non-Muslim can also create Wakf. Learned senior
counsel submitted that there is no injunction under the
uncodified or codified Muslim Law against dedication of
property to a charitable purpose recognized by Muslim Law by
a non-Muslim or a person not professing the Islamic faith. He
F further submitted that merely because Rai Sahib Kedar Nath
was a Hindu and had performed havan etc. before renouncing
the property in favour of the Society for a charitable purpose is
not sufficient to deny benefit of exemption to appellant No.1 in
terms of clause (d) of notification dated 13.11.1959. Learned
G counsel further argued that exemption clause contained in
notification dated 13.11.1959 should be liberally construed in
a manner which will benefit dedication made for charitable
purpose irrespective of caste and/or religion, else the impugned
notification will become discriminatory and violative of Articles
H 14 and 15 9f the Constitution. In support of his arguments,
RAMJAS FOUNDATION AND ANR. v. UNION OF 379
INDIA AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
learned counsel produced three compilations of which one A
· contains copies of the orders passed by the Delhi High Court,
this Court as also the one passed by the Lt. Governor ~f Delhi
and a copy of notification dated 4.4.2002 issued under Section
48 of the Act for release of 67 bighas 14 biswas of land of
village Sadhora Khurd. The second volume contains extracts B
of text books and commentaries on Mohammadan Law/Muslim
Law and the third volume contains compilation of various
judgments. During the course of submissions, Shri
Venkataramani produced a fresh compilation of the list of dates
incorporating therein the developments which have taken place c
after filing of the special leave petition. This compilation shows
that the area in which land of appellant No.1 is situated has
developed as a residential locality and is recognized as
unauthorized colony for the purpose of regularization; that some
parts of the land have also been developed as Anand Parbat D
Industrial Area and the Delhi Development Authority has invited
applications and declarations from the residents/unauthorized
occupants· of Anand Parbat Industrial Area for deciding the
licence fee. The appellants have also claimed that they are
running 19 schools and one degree college and one Sports and E
Mountaineering Institute at Chowkri Mubarikabad.
• • I •
9. Shri Amarendra Sharan, Senior Advocate and Shri
Vishnu B. Saharya, Advocate appearing for the Delhi
Development Authority and Smt. Gita Luthra, Senior Advocate
and Shri D.N. Goburdhun, Advocate appearing for the Union F
of India supported the impugned judgment and argued that the
· appeal should be dismissed as a frivolous piece of litigation.
· Learned counsel extensively referred to the judgment in
Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India (supra), order dated
4.2.2002 passed in S.LP.(C) No. 15017/2000 and connected G
matters and argued that when this Court has already negatived
the plea of appellant No.1 that the property situated at Sadhora
Khurd is a Wakf property and is exempted from acquisition, the
-appellants cannot resurrect the same plea in respect of the land
situated at Chowkri Mubarikabad. Learned counsel then H
380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A argued that the appellants' claim for exemption was rightly
rejected by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench
of the Delhi High Court because no evidence was produced
to prove that Rai Sahib Kedar Nath had created a Wakf and
the property transferred to the Society became a Wakf property.
B Sh~i Amarendra Sharan emphasized that renouncement of
property by Rai Sahib Kedar Nath in favour of the Society
formed by him for educational purposes did not result in
creation of a Wakf and the property did not become Wakf
property because the dedication made by him was preceded
c by "Samarpan" and "Sankalp" which are well known concepts
of Hindu Law. Another argument of the learned senior counsel
is that clause (d) of notification dated 13.11.1959 cannot be
interpreted as including every dedication of property for
charitable purpose and the expression ·wakf property' must be
given a restricted interpretation so as to include the property
0
attached to.the Wakf created by Muslims only.
10. We have considered the respective submissions. In
our view, the appeal deserves to be dismissed because the
appellants have not approached the Court with clean hands. In
E Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India, acquisition of the land
situated at Sadhora Khurd was challenged on the ground of
violation of Section 5-A of the Act and also on the ground that
land in question is exempted from acquisition because it is a
Wakf property. Another plea taken by appellant No.1 was that
F if the land belonging to educational and charitable institutions
established by Hindus and non-Muslims is not treated as Wakf
property, then the exemption clause (d) is liable to be declared
void for violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. While rejecting
the argument that the acquisition proceedings were vitiated due
G to violation of Section 5-A of the Act, this Court noted that the
appellants had made a patently incorrect statement on the issue
of denial of opportunity of personal hearing and observed:
"As regards the objection of the violation of the mandatory
provisions of Section 5-A of the Act in not affording an
H
RAMJAS FOUNDATION AND ANR. v. UNION OF 381
INDIA AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
opportunity of personal hearing while deciding such A
·objections, we granted an opportunity to the learned
Additional Solicitor General to place material after
examining the original record. We granted this opportunity
to the respondents on account of the reason that the writ
petition had been dismissed by the High Court in limine B
without issuing notice to the respondents and as such the
respondents had not been given any opportunity before the
High Court to place any material to refute the allegations
· made by the appellants in this regard. The Additional
Solicitor General during the co;urse of the hearing of the c
matter placed an order of the Land Acquisition Collector,
Delhi dated February 23, 1968 which has been taken on
record and for the purposes of identification has been
marked as Annexure 'X'. A copy of the said Annexure 'X'
was also given to the learned counsel for the appellants. D
A peru~al of the aforesaid order dated March 22, 1968
clearly 1shqws that the Ramjas Foundation Society was
represented through Shri Ratan Lal Gupta, Advocate who
was given a personal hearing. From a perusal of the
aforesaid document Annexure 'X' dated February 23,
1968 it is clear that full opportunity of hearing through E
counsel was afforded to the Ramjas Foundation. It has
been further mentioned in this order that the Ramjas
Foundation Society was also allowed to file fresh
objections if so desired, butShri Ratan Lal Gupta, learned
Advocate for the petitioner Society declined and stated F
that there was nothing more to add in the previous
objection petition. After bringing the said document
Annexure 'X' to the notice of the learned counsel for the
appellants, no satisfactory explanation or argument came
forward on behalf of the appellants. The conduct of the G
appellants in raising the plea that no opportunity of 1
personal hearing was given to the appellants in respect
of the objections filed under Section 5-A of the Act was
totally baseless and factually incorrect and such conduct
is reprehensible. It is well settled that a person invoking H
382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010) 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
I
A an equital)le extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court under
Articje 1226 of the Constitution is required to come with
clean hands and should not conceal the material facts.
The objection regarding not affording an opportunity of
personal hearing in respect of objections filed under
B Section 5-A of the Act was one of the main planks of the
grounds raised in the writ petition as well as in the special
leave petition filed before this Court and ought we know
if such ground had not been taken this Court would have
entertained this appeal or not. The appellants have taken
c the advantage of obtaining the stay order also from this
Court which is continuing for the last 14 years as the
special leave petition was filed in 1978 itself.
It may be further noted that a common objection petition
under Section 5-A of the Act in respect of both the lands
situated in Mubarikabad as we// as in Sadhurakhurd was
filed on December 11, 1959 through Shri Ratan Lal
Gupta, Advocate. The said objections were heard in the
presence of Shri Ratan Lal Gupta, Advocate and
disposed of by one common order Annexure X' and we
E cannot believe an ipse dixit explanation made orally
during the course of arguments on behalf of the
appellants that they had no knowledge of any personal
hearing being given to Shri Ratan Lal Gupta, Advocate.
It is a/so important to note that no such objection was
F taken in respect of land in Mubarikabad."
(emphasis supplied) .
I
The Court also criticized appellant No.1 for playing a game
of hide and seek and observed:
G
"It may be noted that the reference with regard to suit No.
451 of 1971 decided on March 21; 1977 is in respect of
the land of petitioners situated in Mubarikabad. It is
surprising that though the opportunity was sought for filing
H a fresh suit, the appellants again filed a Writ Petition No.
RAMJAS FOUNDATION ANO ANR. v. UNION OF 383
INDIA AND ORS. [G.S. SWGHVI, J.]
106 of 1978 in the High Court on January 7, 1978 which A
was ultimately dismissed by the High Co.1,1rt in limine on
January 31, 1978 by a Division Bench comprising T.P.S.
Chawla and Awadh Behari, JJ. In this Writ Petition No. 106
of 1978 the appellants conveniently omitted to mention that
the permission to withdraw the Petition No. 213 of 1973 B
was granted on the statement of Shri M.C. Gupta that his
clients reserved the liberty to file a fresh suit and not writ.
Thus no liberty was sought or given for filing a fresh writ
petition~ In any case there were no fresh ground or
circumstances available to the appellants to file a fresh ~
Writ Petition No. 106 of 1978 on' January 7, 1978 on
identical grounds when the earlier Writ Petition No. 213
of 1973 had been dismissed as withdrawn on March 30,
1977. Nothing had happened between March 30, 1977
and January 7, 1978 for giving a fresh· cause of action to D
the appellants to file the Writ Petition No. 106 of 1978.
Awadh Behari, J. had dismisse_d the suit No. 451 of 1971
by order dated March 21; 197.7 in regard to the lands in
Mubarikabad and he was also one of the Judges of the
Division Bench who passed the impugned order dated
January 31, 1978 dismissing the writ petition in limine as E
he was fully aware of the mtire background of this
litigation. The appellants are themselves responsible for
creating confusion in initiating separate proceedings at
different periods of time in respect of the lands situated
in Mubarikabad and Sadhurakhurd though challenge to F
the acquisition proceedings was on common grounds.
Learned counsel for the appellants was unable to satisfy
in respect of such conduct of hide and seek on the part
of the appellants. In case, as sought to be explained by
Mr. Tarkunde, learned senior counsel for the appellants, the G
appellants were depending on the result of the civil suit
filed in respect of the lands situated in Mubarikabad there
was no justification for filing the Writ Petition No. 213 of
1973 in respect of the land situated in Sadhurakhurd as
the suit was not decided in 1973 but was in fact dismissed H
384 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [20 IJ] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A on March 21, 1977. We find no justification for filing the
writ petition in respect of the land situated in Sadhurakhurd
in 1973 and subsequently withdrawing the writ petition on
March 30, 1977 reserving tt J liberty to file a fresh suit but
thereafter again filing the writ petition on January 7, 1978
s. instead of suit."
(emphasis supplied)
11. In S.l.P.(C) No. 15017/2000 and connected matters,
appellant No.1 had specifically raised a plea that its property
C is exempted from acquisition because it is a Wakf property,
but failed to convince the Court to nullify the acquisition
proceedings on that ground.
12. A careful reading of the judgment in the Ramjas
0 Foundation v. Union of India (supra) and the order passed in
the special leave petitions clearly shows that even though the
question whether the land belonging to appellant No.1 is
exempted from acquisition in terms of clause (d) of notification
dated 13.11.1959 was not decided in the first case and the
E appeal was dismissed mainly on the ground of delay and
contumacious conduct of the appellants, that question will be
deemed to have been answered in negative in the second case
because in the special leave petitions it was specifically
pleaded that the land belonging to appellant No.1 is exempted
from acquisition being Wakf property and this Court held that
F there was no merit in the appellant's case. It is true that the
Court did not record detailed reasons for not entertaining the
special leave petitions but use of the expression "we are not
satisfied that this petition merits further consideration by this
Court" clearly shows that the claim of exemption was turned
G down by this Court. If appellant No.1 did not feel satisfied with
order dated 4.2.2002 and felt that its claim for exemption under
clause (d) of notification dated 13.11.1959 was on firm footing,
then it could have applied for review of that order. However,
as the subsequent events reveal, instead of questioning
"H
· . RAMJAS FOUNDATION AND ANR v. UNION OF 385
INDIA AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
correctness of order dated 4.2.2002, appellant No.1 accepted A ~'
the negation of its claim based on clause (d) of the notification :
and vigorously pursued the case for denotification of the land
and partially succeeded inasmuch as vide notification dated
4.4.2002 issued under Section 48 of the Act, the Lt. Governor
released 67 bighas 14 biswas of the acquired land. B
13. Strangely, in the list of dates of the special leave
petition out of which this appeal arises, there is not even a
whisper about large number of cases filed by appellant No.1
challenging the acquisition of land situated at village Sadhora C
Khurd, the grounds on which the challenge was founded and
the orders passed by the High Court and this Court. The
appellants also suppressed the fact that after dismissal of the
first appeal by the Division Bench of the High Court, possession
of the land was taken by the Land Acquisition Collector on
13.7.2001 and transferred to the Delhi Development Authority. D1
What could be the possible reason for these omissions? Any
person of reasonable prudence will at once respond to this
question by saying that sole object of not disclosing the facts ·
relating to other cases was to keep the Court in dark. about
rejection of challenge to the acquisition of a portion of land E
which the appellants are claiming to be Wakf property. We have
no doubt that the appellants Jid so for the purpose of
persuading this Court to pass an interim order and they
succeeded in this venture because while issuing notice on
'26.11.2001, this Court directed that there shall be stay of F
dispossession.
14. The principle that a person who does not come to the
Court with clean hands is not entitled to be heard on the merits
of his grievance and, in any case, such person is not entitled G
to any relief is applicable not only to the petitions filed under
Articles 32, 226 and 136 of the Constitution but also to the
cases instituted in others courts and judicial forums. The object
underlying the principle is that every Court is not only entitled
but is duty bound to protect itselffrom unscrupulous litigants who H
386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A do not have any respect for truth and who try to pollute the
stream of justice by resorting to falsehood or by making
misstatement or by suppressing facts which have bearing on
adjudication of the issue(s) arising in the case. In Da/g/ish v.
Jarvie 2 Mac. & G. 231, 238, Lord Langdale and Rolfe B.
B observed: "It is the duty of a party asking for an injunction to
bring under the notice of the Court all facts material to the
determination of his right to that injunction; and it is no excuse
for him to say that he was not aware of the importance of any
fact which he has omitted to bring forward. In Castelli v. Cook
c (1849) 7 Hare, 89, 94 Wigram V.C. stated the rule in the
following words: "A plaintiff applying ex parte comes under a
contract with the Court that he will state the whole case fully and
fairly to the Court. If he fails to do that, and the Court finds, when
other party applies to dissolve the injunction, that any material
fact has been suppressed or not property brought forward, the
0
plaintiff is told the Court will not decide on the merits, and that,
as he has broken faith with the Court, the injunction must go."
In Republic of Peru v. Dreyfus Brothers & Company 55 L.T.
802, 803, Kay J. held as under:
E "I have always maintained, and I think it most important to
maintain most strictly, the rule that, in ex parte applications
to this Court, the utmost good faith must be observed. If
there is an important misstatement, speaking for myself,
I have never hesitated, and never shall hesitate until the rule
F is altered, to discharge the order at once, so as to impress
upon all persons who are suitors in this Court the
importance of dealing in good faith in the Court when ex
pa rte applications are made."
The same rule was restated by Scrutton L., J in R. v.
G Kensington Income Tax Commissioner (1917) 1 K.B. 486.
The facts of that case were that in April, 1916, the General
Commissioners for the Purposes of the Income Tax Acts for
the district of Kensington made an additional assessment upon
the applicant for the year ending April 5, 1913, in respect of
H
RAMJAS FOUNDATION AND ANR. v. UNION OF 387
INDIA AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
profits arising from foreign possessions. On May 16, 1916, A
the applicant obtained a rule nisi directed to the Commissioners
calling upon them to show cause why a writ of prohibition
should not be awarded to prohibit them from proceeding upon
the assessment upon the ground that the applicant was not a
subject of the King nor resident within the United Kingdom B
and had not been in the United Kingdom, except for temporary
purposes, nor with any view or intent of establishing her
residence therein, nor for a period equal to six months in any
one year. In the affidavit on which the rule was obtained the
applicant stated that she was a French subject and resident in c
France and was not and had not been a subject of the United
Kingdom nor a resident in the United Kingdom; that during the
year ending April 5, 1913, she was in the United Kingdom for
temporary purposes on visits for sixty-eight days; that she spent
about twenty of these days in London at her brother's house, D
213, King's Road, Chelsea, generally in company with other
guests of her brother; that she was also in the United Kingdom
during the year ending April 5, 1914, for temporary purposes
on visits, and spent part of the time at 213, King's Road
aforesaid; and that since the month of November, 1914, she
had not been in the United Kingdom. From the affidavits filed E
on behalf of the Commissioners and of the surveyor of taxes,
who showed cause against the rule nisi, and from the affidavit
of the applicant in reply, it appeared that in February, 1909, a
leasehold house, 213, King's Road, Chelsea, had been taken
in the name of the applicant's brother. The purchase-money F
for the lease of the house and the furniture amounted to 40001.,
and this was paid by the applicant out of her own money. The
accounts of household expenses were paid by the brother and
. subsequently adjusted between him and the applicant. The
Divisional Court without dealing with the merits of the case G
discharged the rule on the ground that the applicant had
suppressed or misrepresented the facts material to her
application. The Divisional Court observed that the Court, for
its own protection is entitled to say "we refuse this writ of
prohibition without going into the merits of the case on the H
r
388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A ground of the conduct of the applicant in bringing the case
before us". On appeal, Lord Cozens-Hardy M.R. and
Warrington L.J. approved the view taken by the Divisional
Court. Scrutton L.,J. who agreed that the appeal should be
dismissed observed:
B
"and it has been for many years the rule of the Court, and
one which it is of the greatest importance to maintain, that
when an applicant comes to the Court to obtain relief on
an ex parte statement he should make a full and fair
disclosure of all the material facts - facts, not law. He must
c not misstate the law if he can help it - the court is supposed
to know the law. But it knows nothing about the facts, and
the applicant must state fully and fairly the facts, and the
penalty by which the Court enforces that obligation is that
if it finds out that the facts have not been fully and fairly
D stated to it, the Court will set aside any action which it has
taken on the faith of the imperfect statement."
15. The above noted rules have been applied by this Court
in large number of cases for declining relief to a party whose
E conduct is blameworthy and who has not approached the Court
with clean hands - Hari Narain v. Badri Das AIR 1963 SC
1558, Welcome Hotel v. State of A.P. (1983) 4 SCC 575, G.
Narayanaswamy Reddy v. Government of Karnataka (1991)
3 SCC 261, S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath (1994)
• F 1 SCC 1, A. V. Papayya Sastry v. Government of A.P. (2007)
4 SCC 221, Prestige Lights Limited v. SB/ (2007) 8 SCC
449, Sunil Poddar v. Union Bank of India (2008) 2 SCC 326,
K.D. Sharma v. SAIL (2008) 12 SCC 481, G. Jayashree v.
Bhagwandas S. Patel (2009) 3 SCC 141 and Dalip Singh v.
State of UP. (2010) 2 SCC 114. In the last mentioned
G judgment, the Court lamented on the increase in the number of
cases in which the parties have tried to misuse the process of
Court by making false and/or misleading statements or by
suppressing the relevant facts or by trying to mislead the Court
in passing order in their favour and observed:
H
RAMJAS FOUNDATION AND ANR. v. UNION OF 389
INDIA AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
"For many centuries Indian society cherished two basic A
values of life i.e. "satya" (truth) and "ahimsa" (non-violence).
Mahavir, Gautam Buddha and Mahatma Gandhi guided
the people to ingrain these values in their daily life. Truth
constituted an integral part of the justice-delivery system
which was in vogue in the pre-Independence era and the B
people used to feel proud to tell truth in the courts
irrespective of the consequences. However, post-
Independence period has seen drastic changes in our
value system. The materialism has overshadowed the old
ethos and the quest for personal gain has become so C
intense that those involved in litigation do not hesitate to
take shelter of falsehood, misrepresentation and
suppression of facts in the court proceedings.
In the last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has cropped D
up. Those who belong to this creed do not have any
respect for truth. They shamelessly resort to falsehood and
unethical means for achieving their goals. In order to meet
the challenge posed by this new creed of litigants, the
courts have, from time to time, evolved new rules and it is
'
now well established that a litigant, who attempts to pollute
E
the stream of justice or who touches the pure fountain of
justice with tainted hands, is not entitled to any relief,
interim or final."
(emphasis supplied)
16. In our view, the appellants are not entitled to any relief
because despite strong indictment by this Court in Ramjas
Foundation v. Union of India, they deliberately refrained from
·mentioning details of the cases instituted by them in respect ' ..
( J.
of the land situated at Sadhora Khurd and rejection of their
claim for exemption under clause (d) of notification dated
13.11.1959 by the High Court and this Court.
17. Notwithstanding the above noted conclusion, we have
thought it proper to deal with the issue raised in the appeal on H
390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A merits. The institution of Wakf owes its origin to a rule laid
down by the prophet of Islam. It means "the tying up of property
in the ownership of God the Almighty and the d~votion of the
profits for the benefit of human beings. When once it is
declared that a particular property is Wakf, or any such
B expression is used as implies Wakf, or the tenor of the
document shows, if there is a wakf-nama that a dedication to
pious or charitable purpose is meant, the right of Wakif is
extinguished and the ownership is transferred to the Almighty.
In his book on Mohammadan Law (Fourth Edition) Volume I,
c Ammer Ali has said "Any person or whatever creed may create
Wakf, but the law requires that the object for which the
dedication is made should be lawful according to the creed of
the dedicator as well as the Islamic doctrines. Divine
approbation being the essential in the constitution of a Wakf if
the object for which a dedication is made is sinful, either
0
according to the laws of Islam or to the creed of the dedicator
it would not be valid." This shows that a non Muslim can also
create a Wakf for any purpose which is religious under the
Mohammedan Law. However, the object of the Wakf must be
lawful according to the religious creed of the maker as well.
E
18. While dealing with the question whether the land --
belonging to c;ippellant No.1 is Wakf property and is exempted
from acquisition, the learned Single Judge analysed the
pleadings and documents produced by the parties, referred to
F the concept of 'Wakf' propounded by Ammer Ali, outlines of
Mohammadan Law by Prof. A.A.A. Fayzee (Chapter IX pg.274-
275), the judgments of the Privy Council and various High
Courts in Vidya Viruthi v. Baluswami AIR 1922 PC 123, Marni
v. Kallandar Ammal 54 I.A. 23, Motishah v. Abdul Gaffar AIR
G 1956 Nagpur 38, Arur Singh v. Badar Din AIR 1940 Lahore
119, Fuzlur Rahaman v_ Anath Bandhu Pal (1911) 16 Cal.
WN 114, Misra Hidavat Beg v. Seth Behari Lal AIR 1941 All.
225 and Jai Dayal v. Dewan Ram Saran Das AIR 1939 Lahore
686 and observed:
H
RAMJAS FOUNDATION AND ANR. v. UNION OF 391
INDIA AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
"I cannot read the term 'wakf' property as embracing A
property impressed with the character of a charitable trust
amongst the Hindus. A property burdened with the
obligation of a charitable trust as understood in Hindu law
cannot be called a wakf property in a legal sense. In a
non-legal, popular sense it may be possible to use the B
expression wakf indiscriminately for and in relation to any
property set apart for charity. But in legal technology the
word 'wakf' has a definite and accepted connotation. It is
in that sense that the word has to be understood. For the
true interpretation of the word one must turn to c
Mohammadan law and see what it means.
Now the question is was Rai Kedar Nath making a wakf
of his properties when in the meeting of 1916 he made a
declaration in favour of charity. The answer to this question
is in a resounding negative. This is on the assumption that D
a Hindu can create a wakf though such cases are rare.
The function held at that meeting shows that Rai Kedar
Nath did two things. He renounced his interest in his
private property. He dedicated everything to ·the institution E
he founded. These are known as Samarpan and Sankalp
in Hindu Law. There was a clear and unequivocal
declaration of intention to create trust and vesting :of the
same in the doner as a Trustee. There was clear proof of
dedication in the ceremony he performed. He divested F
himself of the property dedicated.
There was a Hawan ceremony. This shows that Rai Kedar
Nath was an orthodox Hindu. He was a believer in
religious ceremonies. What he wanted to do was to found
a charitable trust of which he himself was the founder G
trustee, apart from being the Manager of the school and
the President of the Society. He created a Foundation as
the name of the plaintiff now shows. He established an
institution together with provision for its perpetual
maintenance. H
392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
/. In evidence this trust has been called by the Secretary as
'Educational Charitable Institution'. In the deed of
settlement dated November 26, 1946, it was described by
the British Government as "a public educational charity".
All in all it comes to a charitable endowment. It can be
R propefi~1 called a charitable trust. The Indian Trust Act will
not govern it, as section 1 of that Act lays down what Rai
Kedar Nath crt.:ated was a charitable trust as known to
Hindu Law. Reading the notification as a whole it appears
to me that the wakf property as known to Muslim Law has
been excepted from the acquisition proceedings. This has
c
been done by the Government in exercise of its powers
of eminent domain. I do not think that it will be proper to
call the lands in question as wakf property. This is not the
sense which the word bears in the notification. In my
opinion, the Chief Commissioner's notification uses the
D
expression 'Wakf property' in the sense in which wakf is
understood in Mohammadan Law.
The Chief Commissioner's notification under Section 4
La11d Acquisition Act is in the nature of a statutory
instrument. It uses the expression 'wakf property'. How
do we interpret those words? I think these words must be
construed according to the legal and technical meaning
given to them by Muslim Law. They are not to be given
the more popular, non-legal or ordinary dictionary meaning
F of the words. These words must be taken in their legal
sense."
The Division Bench agreed with the learned Single Judge
and observed:
G "In view of the aforesaid legal exposition of the 'waqf it
cannot be said that the property of appellants, which may
be Hindu charitable trust, would be termed as 'waqf
property'. The learned Single Judge, to our mind, rightly
held that while using his expression in the impugned
H Notification issued by the statutory authority under Section
RAMJAS FOUNDATION AND ANR. v. UNION OF 393
INDIA AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
4 of the Act the statutory authority would be presumed to A
be aware of the legal implication of the term 'waqf
property'. Therefore, this term cannot be read as to
embrace property impressed with the character of a
charitable trust amongst the Hindus. Once the meaning
. of the words 'waqf property' is clear, it is difficult to accept B
the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants that
'popular' meaning should be given or that statutory authority
loosely used the expression 'waqf' and 'trust'. If the
interpretation suggested by the appellants of the term 'waqf
property' is accepted, it would amount to obliterating the C
distinction otherwise statutorily recognized by the Indian
Trusts Act. No such interpretation can be given which
nullifies the effect of the Provision of a Statute. While
interpreting such a Notification like the one is.sued under
Section 4 of the Act, the connotation of the word 'waqf' as D
legally accepted is to be preferred to a non-legal
connotation. After all the Notification passed under
Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act is in exercise
of statutory powers and may have the effect of subordinate
legislation. Such Notification has serious ramifications. It
cannot be inferred, therefore, that framers of the Notification E
did not know the technical or legal meaning of the word
'waqf property' or used the expression loosely. It also
cannot be presumed that authors of such statutory
Notification were not aware of other religious charitable
institutions and intended to include the same by the F
expression 'waqf property'. It appears that exclusion of
'Waqf property' was intentional knowing fully well the
meaning thereof in Muslim Law with no intention to cover
other religious charitable institutions."
G
19. The Division Bench also rejected the argument that if
Wakf created by non-Muslims is excluded from clause (d) then
the same would be violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the
Constitution by observing that the said plea was not pressed
before the learned Single Judge and even in the grounds of H
394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2010] 15 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A appeal, this plea was not taken. In the opinion of the Division
Bench, by omitting to press the point before the learned Single
Judge and not taking a ground in the memo of appeal, the
appellants will be deemed to have abandoned this part of
challenge to the acquisition proceedings.
B
20. The argument of Shri R. Venkataramani that by
dedicating the land for a charitable purpose Rai Sahib Kedar
Nath intended to create a Wakf lacks merit and deserves to
be rejected. In the function organized on 25.12.1916 in Ramjas
School, Kucha Ghasi Ram, Chandani Chowk, the dedicator is
C said to have made an announcement that he had created a
Wakf and donated all his moveable and immoveable properties
to the Society for charitable purposes but no evidence was
produced before the learned Single Judge to prove this.
Rather, the evidence produced before the learned Single Judge
D shows that even after the so called dedication of land for
charitable purposes, the same continued in the name of Rai
Sahib Kedar Nath till 1936 when he executed the release deed
in favour of the Trust of which he himself was the founder trustee
apart from being the Manager of the school and the President
E of the Society. The hawan ceremony performed by Rai Sahib
Kedar Nath which was preceded by Samarpan and Sankalp
also shows that he did not intend to create a Wakf. This is the
reason why the objects of Ramjas College Society formed in
1917 do not make a mention of the Wakf allegedly created by
F Rai Sahib Kedar Nath. In the deed of settlement executed by
the British Government, the institution was described as a public
educational charity and not as a Wakf. Therefore, the
concurrent finding recorded by the learned Single Judge and
the Division Bench that what was created by Rai Sahib Kedar
G Nath was a public charitable trust and not a Wakf and the
property acquired vide notification dated 13.11.1959 was not
a Wakf property does not call for interference.
21. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. We would have
saddled the appellants with exemplary costs but keeping in
H
RAMJAS FOUNDATION AND ANR. v. UNION OF 395
INDIA AND ORS. [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
view the fact that they are running educational institutions for A
benefit of the community, we refrain from passing an order to
that effect and leave the parties to bear their own costs.
However, it is made clear that henceforth the respondents shall
be free to use the acquired land for the purpose of planned
development of Delhi ~nd the appellant shall not be entitled to . B
obstruct the proceedings which may be taken by the
respondents for utilization of land for the purpose for which it
was acquired or for any other public purpose.
N.J. Appeal dismissed.
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