Holding

The conviction under Section 304B IPC stands as the prosecution discharged its burden and the appellant failed to discharge the statutory onus, making the offence non‑compoundable and the minimum seven‑year sentence mandatory.

Summary

The appellant, Rameshwar Dass, was convicted under Section 304B of the IPC for the dowry death of his pregnant wife, Sushma Rani, who allegedly committed suicide after being tortured for a dowry demand of Rs 40,000. The prosecution relied on the husband’s telegram to the father‑in‑law, testimony of the brother‑in‑law, medical evidence of pregnancy, and evidence of unpaid dowry demands, while the defence argued that the marital relationship was cordial, the letters purportedly written by the wife were not produced, and a later acquittal in a separate dowry‑related case proved his innocence. The Supreme Court held that the prosecution had discharged its primary burden under Section 304B and, under Section 113B of the Evidence Act, the onus shifted to the accused who failed to rebut it. The Court rejected the relevance of the subsequent acquittal, affirmed that an offence under Section 304B is non‑compoundable, and upheld the minimum sentence of seven years rigorous imprisonment. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.

Issues considered

The prosecution proved the elements of dowry death under Section 304B of the IPC.
Whether the demand for dowry of Rs 40,000 was established.
Whether the letters allegedly written by the deceased were admissible evidence.
Whether the subsequent acquittal in a separate case under Sections 405, 406 IPC and the Dowry Prohibition Act is relevant to the present conviction.
Whether an offence under Section 304B is compoundable and the appropriate quantum of sentence.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 313
Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961s. 3, s. 4
Indian Evidence Act, 1872s. 113B, s. 65
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 304B, s. 313, s. 405, s. 406

Subjects

dowry deathSection 304B IPCsuicidepregnant womanonus of proofnon‑compoundable offenceminimum sentenceevidence admissibilitytelegraph messagedowry demand

Judgment

__.., }-
RAMESHWAR DASS A
V.
STATE OF PUNJAB & ANR.

DECEMBER 13, 2007
B
[S.B. SINHA AND HARJIT SINGH BEDI, JJ.]
-A_

Penal Code, 1860; Ss. 304B, 405 & 406/Dowry Prohibition Act;
Ss.3 &4:
c
Unnatural death of wife/Dowry Death-Torturing of wife by
husband and in-laws for demand of dowry forcing her to commit
suicide-Relationship between husband and deceased-Whether
cordial-Held: Accused-husband could not prove on the basis ofletters
allegedly written by the deceased that his relationship with the deceased D
i.
was cordial-Acquittal ofaccused in complaint case filed against him
later alleging commission ofan offence by him u/ss. 405 & 406 !PC
and ss. 3 & 4 ofDowry Prohibition Act not relevant as charges in the
present case were not same-Apart from oral testimony ofprosecution
witnesses, the accused himselfsent a telegraph message to his fat her- E
in-law to come immediately, which is a pointer to the fact that the
spouses were not on good terms-A pregnant woman ordinarily would
not commit suicide unless relationship with her husband reaches a stage
. I> that she would be compelled to do so-Accused could not explain his
absence for six days since his wife committed suicide-Defence taken F
by the accused that he along with DWI got the deceased admitted in
the hospital, has not been established-No reason found to interfere
with the judgment ofconviction ofaccused uls.304B /PC by the Courts
below-Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-S.313-Evidence Act,
1872-S.65. G
Presence ofaccused-husband with deceased-wife in the hospital-
Onus ofproof-Held: Onus ofprooflies upon the accused-Who has
not discharged it.
527 H
)

528 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 13 (Addi.) S.C.R. !

A Compounding ofan offence u/s.304B !PC-Held: An offence u/ { ,
s. 304B !PC is not compoundable.
Conviction of accused u/s.304B !PC-Quantum of sentence-
Reduction to-Held: Not allowed as minimum sentence ofseven years
B has been awarded to the accused.

Appellant-husband and his parents allegedly tortured the
deceased-wife for demand of dowry. A telegraphic message was sent
by the accused-husband to his father-in-law to resolve the
misunderstanding ensued between them. Later, brother-in-law of the
C deceased-PW! along with his brother-in-Law-PW2 visited the house of
the deceased, he found the accused quarreling with the deceased in
connection with demand of dowry. He tried to pacify them and then left
the house. When he came back, he found the house locked. On an
enquiry having been made from the neighbours, he was informed that
D
the deceased had been taken to hospital as she had consumed .r
something. When he reached the hospital his sister had expired. The
deceased was pregnant at the time of her death. On receipt of a report,
Police investigated the matter and arrested the accused-husband. The
trial Court convicted him under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code
E
and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years.
An appeal filed thereagainst by the accused was dismissed by the High
Court. Hence the present appeal.

Accused-appellant contended that the relation between him and
F the deceased being cordia~ the prosecution cannot be said to have proved
its case of causing harassment by him to the deceased; that the
prosecution has not been able to prove demand of dowry; that father of
the deceased in his previous statement did not state about the demand
ofdowry; that a complaint petition was later on filed by the father ofthe
G deceased against him under Sections 405 and 406 of the Indian Penal
Code and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act which ended in
acquittal by the trial Court and a revisim, 1 ;etition filed thereagainst by
PW-11 was withdrawn, which clearly ffltablishes innocence on his part;
and that even after the conviction, a settlement had been arrived at by
H
RAMESHWAR DASS v. STATE OF PUNJAB 529

-> and between the parties and in fact the cousin of the deceased was A
married to the appellant whereafter an application for compromise had
also been filed

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1. The defence of the appellant was that the relationship B
' between the parties was cordial. An attempt was made to prove a few
~
letters allegedly written by the deceased to the accused. The said letters
were soughtto be proved by DWl. [Para 16) (536-E, F]

1.2. A document in terms of Section 65 of the Evidence Act is to c
be proved by a person who is acquainted with the handwriting of the
author thereof. DW-1 claimed his acquaintance with the handwriting of
the deceased on the basis of the letters written to him and his wife. He
claimed thatthe deceased had written a large number ofletters. It was,
therefore, expected that some of them would be preserved. He did not D
produce any letter. [Para 17) [537-B, CJ
1.3. DW-1 was a prosecution witness. He evidently was won over
and, thus, prosecution did not examine him as its witness. Submission
of the counsel for the appellant that he was the only independent witness
who was available and was not examined must be considered from that E
angle. In response to the questions posed by the trial Court, he even
denied making any statement before the police. The Magistrate was
,__) requested to recall the investigating officer to bring the earlier
statements ofDW-1 to his notice. Unfortunately, no such step was taken.
Furthermore, this Court failed to comprehend as to why the father and F
brother of the deceased in the course of their depositions were not
confronted with the said letters. In ordinary course, it should have been
done. Why such a course ofaction was not taken recourse to is anybody's
guess. The purported explanation of the appellant that the said letters
were taken into custody of the investigating officer and later on returned G
•
..a,
__...
to him is wholly unbelievable. An investigating officer would not seize
letters without preparing any seizure list. [Para 18) (537-C, D, E, F]
1.4. If seizure list had been prepared, there does not appear to be
any reason whatsoever as to why the letters purported to have been H
530 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2007] 13 (Addi.) S.C.R.

A written by the deceased would not be mentioned in the seizure list. This -( ,>

Court does not find any reason to differ with the view taken by the trial
Court as also the High Court in this behal~ [Para 18) [537-F, G]

2.1. A complaint made subsequently by father of the deceased as
against the appellant for commission of an offence under Sections 405
B
and 406 of the Indian Penal Code read with Sections 3 and 4 of the
Dowry Prohibition Act ended in acquittal of the accused, the same is
not very relevant. [Para 19] [538-A]

2.2. The judgment of acquittal was passed on 5.11.1992, whereas
c judgment ofthetrial Court was passed on 18.10.1989 in the instant case.
The chargt~s in both the cases were not same. They were based on
different tnmsactions. Further, no attempt was made even to bring the
judgment dated 5.11.1992 to the notice before the High Court. Had an
application for adducing additional evidence been filed, the High Court
D not only could have considered the same, it could have also called for t
the record of the said case to examine the matter at some length.
[Para 20) [538-D, E, F]

2.3. The fard-bayan was recorded in the hospital. When the
E investigating officer on receipt of the report went to the hospital, there
was none. In normal course, the appellant should have been in the
hospital The first informant arrived atthe hospital within a few minutes.
He upon receipt of the news of his sister's death made a statement at
the hospital at about 2.30 p.m. In a situation of this nature, he would not "-.,,
F make a statement which is imaginary so as to implicate the appellant
falsely. Apart from the oral testimony of the prosecution witnesses, the
very fact that the appellant himself had sent the telegram asking PW-
1, father of the deceased, to come immediately is also a pointer to the
fact that the spouses were not on good terms. [Para 21] [539-A, B, CJ
G 3.1. There appears to be a ring of truth in the statement of the first
informant, brother of the deceased, that a telegram was sent. He came
to see his sister. His brother-in-law was the resident of the same village.
.....
•
After he spent his night at his brother-in law's place, he had visited tlie
appellant's house together with him. He tried to pacify them. Only when
H
RAMESHWARDASS v. STATE OF PUNJAB 531

lf >
~
·.ii
the appellant went out, they also went out and came back after a few A
hours to find the door closed. Appellant evidently tried to show that he
had gone to office. It was a Sunday and as such the question ofhis going
to office did not arise. [Para 22) [539-D, E]

3.2. Another factor which is of some significance cannot also be
B
lost sight of. The deceased was in the family way. She was carrying for
..),
5-6 months. Apart from the statement of her father and brother to that
effect, even the post mortem report clearly proved the said fact.
[Para 23) [539-E, F)

3.3. A pregnant woman ordinarily would not commit suicide unless c
relationship with her husband comes to such a pass that she would be
compelled to do so. [Para23) [539-F, G]
3.4. An attempt had also been made to show that there was death
of two children in the family as also a brother of the deceased. It was D
stated that one of sisters committed suicide and the 'taveej' was given
for her warding off the evil spirits of her deceased sister. No such
evidence has been brought on record. (Para 24) [539-G; 540-A)
4.1. In his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, the appellant accepted that at the time of his marriage, a E
demand for Rs. 40,000/- was made from the parents of the deceased
and they showed their inability to pay the same. [Para 25) [540-B]
_,. 4.2. It was only on 12.06.1988 that the Sub-Inspector had arrested
him. Why he was not available for six days has not been explained by F
the appellant Even there was nothing on record to show that it was either
DW-1 or the appellant, who gotthe deceased admitted in the hospital.
The prosecution has discharged its primary onus, as envisaged under
Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code. In terms ofSection 113B of the
Indian Evidence Act, onus of proof was upon the appellant. As the G
defence taken by the appellant has not ber.n established, he cannot be
held to have discharged the said onus. [Para 25) [540-C, D, E]
State ofKarnataka v. M V Manjunathegowda and Anr., [2003] 2
sec 188, relied on. H
532 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 13 (Addl.) S.C.R.

A 5. An offence under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code is not
compoundable. Why and under what circumstances the cousin of the
deceased, if any, has been married to the appellant is not known. Only
because such a marriage has allegedly taken place, the same by itself
cannot be said to be a ground for rejecting the prosecution story. These
B contentions cannot also persuade this Court to impose a lesser
punishment upon the appellant as in terms ofSection 304B of the Indian
Penal Code the minimum sentence is seven years rigorous
imprisonment Appellant has been awarded only the minimum sentence.
This Court, therefore, cannot even interfere with the quantum of the
C sentence. [Para28] [540-G; 541-A, BJ
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.
1021 of 2002.
From the final Judgment and Order dated 4.4.2002 of the High Court
D of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Cr!. Appeal No. 467 SB of 1989.
Rajiv K. Garg and Ashish Garg (for Annam D.N. Rao) for the
Appellant.
Gagan Deep Sharma, Ajay Pal, Kuldip Singh, V. Kadam and Suruchi
E Aggaiwal for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Appellant stood trial for commission of an
offence under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code in connection with ' -
F unnatural death of his wife Sushma Rani.
2. They were married on 11.03.1986. An engagement ceremony
took place twenty days prior thereto. A demand for dowry was made. It
was met in part. A sum of Rs. 25,000/- by way of a demand draft was
G handed over to the husband's family at Mansa when shagun ceremony
was performed. Allegedly another sum of Rs. 11,000/-was paid in cash,
as further demand was made by the family of the appellant. However,
allegedly at the time of marriage the parents of the appellant demanded a
further sum of Rs. 40,000/- in cash which could not be fulfilled. For non-
H fulfillment of the said demand, the deceased was allegedly tortured.
RAMESHW AR DASS v. ST ATE OF PUNJAB [SINHA, J .] 533

3. Appellant had sent a telegram on 16.04.1988 to Des Raj stating: A
"MUTUAL MISUNDERSTANDING REACH IMMEDIATELY
- RAMESHWAR"

On or about 4.06.1986, Sat Paul, brother of the deceased (PW-
1), visited the house of his brother-in-law Raj Kumar (PW-2), which is B
situate in the village, where the incident took place and stayed there for
the night. On the morning of the next day, both of them visited the house
of the appellant. Appellant and the deceased were found quarreling with
each other on account of demand of dowry of Rs. 40,0001-. He tried to
pacify _them. Appellant left his house at about 9 a.m. Sat Paul and Raj C
Kumar also went to the town. However, when they returned after three
or four hours, the house was found to be locked. On an enquiry having
been made from the neighbours, they were informed that the deceased
had been taken to hospital as she had consumed something. At about
-\. 1.30 p.m., they reached the hospital at Bhatinda and came to know that D
Sushrna Rani had expired. She admittedly was pregnant at that time.
4. On receipt of a report in this behalf, ASI Mal Singh visited the
hospital at about 1.20 p.m. It was at a distance of about 1 km. from the
police post. Statement was made before him by Sat Paul at about 2.45 E
p.m. The said statement was sent to the police station and the same was
recorded at 4 p.m. on the same day on the basis whereof the F.1.R. was
recorded. The statement of PW-2 Raj Kumar was also recorded on the
.· _;;. same day. Appellant was arrested on 12.06.1988.
5. The learned Sessions Judge, Bhatinda convicted the appellant F
under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced him to
undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years. An appeal filed
thereagainst by the appellant was dismissed by the High Court by reason
of the impugned judgment.
G
6. Mr. Rajiv K. Garg, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
appellant in support of this appeal inter alia would submit:
(i) The relation between the parties being cordial, the prosecution
cannot be said to have proved its case of causing harassment
by the appellant to his wife. H
534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 13 (Addl.) S.C.R.

A (ii) The prosecution has not been able to prove demand of dowry
of Rs. 40,000/-.
(Iii) Des Raj in his previous statement did not state about the
demand of dowry of Rs. 40,000/-. A complaint petition was
later on filed under Section5 405 and 406 of the Indian Penal
B Code and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act
which ended in acquittal by a judgment dated 5.11.1992 and
a revision petition filed thereagainst by Des Raj was withdrawn
on 2.03.1995 which clearly establishes innocence on the part
of the Appellant.
c
(iv) The family of the deceased having suffered several deaths, the
deceased started suffering from severe depression wherefor
she was given a 'taveej' which also goes to show that she had
committed suicide.
D (v) Even after the conviction, a settlement had been arrived at by
and between the parties and in fact the cousin of the deceased
was married to the appellant whereafter an application for
compromise had also been filed.
E 7. The learned counsel for the State, on the other hand, supported
the impugnt>,d judgment.
8. The fact that the deceased committed suicide is not in dispute.
The only question is whether the appellant is guilty of commission of an
offence under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code. Before the learned
F Sessions Judge, the prosecution inter alia examined PW-1 Sat Paul, PW-
2 Raj Kumar, PW-3 Dr. Balbir Singh, PW-4 Dr. S.K. Gupta, PW-5
Gurjant Singh Record Keeper), PW-6 Anup Krishan (Branch Manager
State Bank of Patiala, Chandigarh), PW-7 G.S. Mann, (Manager, State
Bank of Patiala, Bhatinda), PW-8 Guiab Chand (Supervisor Telegraph
G Office), Bhatinda, PW-11 Des Raj and PW-12 ASI Mal Singh.
9. The defence of the appellant was that she had been suffering from
several diseases like depression, leucorrhea, abdominal trouble and was
on medicine. He also denied that Sat Paul came to Bhatinda on 4.06.1988.
H According to him, Shri Joginder Singh Bedi was requested to inform his
RAMESHWAR DASS v. STATE OF PUNJAB [SINHA, J.] 535

in-laws on telephone about the death of Sushma, whereupon his father- A
~ >" in-law and other relations came in the night and demanded valuables
including the ornaments and on his refusal to give the same, they had filed
a false case. He also alleged that he was detained by the police in the
hospital.
B
10. To prove mal-treatment of the deceased on the part of the
appellant, three witnesses were examined, viz., PW-1 Sat Paul, PW-2
..J Raj Kumar and PW-11 Des Raj. PW-3 Dr. Balbir Singh examined the
deceased when she was brought to the Civil Hospital. PW-4 Dr. S.K.
Gupta conducted the post mortem examination at 9 a.m. on 6.06.1988.
The report reads as under:
c
"Post-mortem staining was present on the dependant part of the
body. Rigor mortis was present. Eyes were congested enclosed.
Fluid was coming out from nostrils and mouth. Level of the uterus
was 3" above the umbilicus. Ants were creeping on the body. D
~ Multiple abrasions were seen on the waist line, neck, arm with
clotted blood. These abrasions and clotted blood was post-mortem
and is caused by ants. Lungs were congested. Stomach contained
about l/4th ounce of semi <ligested food small intestines contained
a small amount of chime. Large intestines contained some faecal E
matter. Bladder contained 2 ounces of urine. On dissection of the
uterus, it was engorged with dilated veins and going into the
abdomen about 2-112" above the umbilicus. A male dead foetus
was lying in the utering cavity. The length of the foetus was 37 ems
; -- )I and weight was 1-2/4 kgs. Some cutaneus fat was.present. F
Meconium was present in the large intestines. There was a centre
of ossification of the talus bone. Skin was red. No centre was seen
in the upper end of femur. The probable time that elapsed between
injuries and death will be known after receiving the report of the
Chemical Examiner, Patiala. The time between death and post- G
mortem was within 24 hours."
..>-
11. The Branch Manager of the State Bank of India Shri Anup
Krishan PW-6 proved preparation of the demand draft of Rs. 25,000/-
from Sector 22-D Branch of Chandigarh on 1.02.1986 as also a draft
H
536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 13 (Addi.) S.C.R.

A dated 19.03.1986 for a sum of Rs. 5,000/- which was issued from
-L
Chandigarh in favour ofRameshwar Dass (appellant) payable at Mansa.
PW-7 G.S. Mann, Manager, State Bank of Patiala, Bhatihda proved
payment of the said drafts to the appellant.
12. Apart from the said draft of Rs. 25,000/- dated 1.02.1986 which
B
was encashed on 3.02.1986 at Mansa, the prosecution, thus, had also
been able to prove payment of a sum of Rs. 5,000/- to the appellant by
demand draft dated 19.03.1986.
13. The learned Sessions Judge relied upon the testimonies of Sat
C Paul and Des Raj. The court found corroboration in their testimonies from
the fact of payment of money by way of demand drafts. The learned
Sessions Judge also took into consideration the fact that some quarrel
must have taken place between the spouses wherefor the telegram dated
16.04.1988 was sent to Des Raj by the appellant himself.
D
14. The fact that the death took place within seven years from the
date of marriage is not in dispute. Commission of suicide by Sushma Rani
is also not in dispute.
15. The only question which is required to be taken into
E consideration is as to whether the deceased soon before her death was
subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband for or in connection
with the demand of dowry.
16. The defence of the appellant, as noticed hereinbefore, was that
F the relationship between the par:ties was cordial. An attempt was made l( -- '

to prove a few letters allegedly written by the deceased to the accused.
The said letters were sought to be proved by one Joginder Singh Bedi.
He was cited as a witness on behalf of the prosecution. He had made his
statement before the police under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code.
G Evidently, he was given up. The learned Sessions Judge disbelieved his
testimony opining that it is wholly unnatural that he would see the deceased
writing a letter. He made a statement that the deceased was writing letters
to him as also his wife. The said letters were not produced. The learned
Sessions Judge also took into consideration the fact that there was nothing
H to show as was contended by the appellant that the investigating officer
RAMESHWARDASS v. STATE OF PUNJAB [SINHA, J.] 537

took possession of the said letters wherefor no seizure memo was A
~) prepared and handed over the same to the accused. Such a statement
made by Joginder was held to be wholly unnatural. The High Court in its
impugned judgment endorsed the said view.
17. A document in terms of Section 65 of the Evidence Act is to B
be proved by a person who is acquainted with the handwriting of the
author thereof. DW-1 Joginder Singh Bedi claimed his acquaintance with
,.J
the handwriting of the deceased on the basis of the letters written to him
and his wife. He claimed that the deceased had written a large number of
letters. It was, therefore, expected that some of them would be preserved.
He did not produce any letter.
c
18. DW-1, as noticed hereinbefore, was a prosecution witness. He
evidently was won over and, thus, prosecution did not examine him as its
witness. Submission of Mr. Garg that he was the only independent witness
who was available and was not examined must be considered from that D
angle. In response to the questions posed by the learned Sessions Judge,
he even denied making any statement before the police. We wish that the
learned Magistrate had recalled the investigating officer to bring the earlier
statements ofDW-1 to his notice. Unfortunately, no such step was taken.
Furthermore, we fail to comprehend as to why the father and brother of E
the deceased in the course of their depositions were not confronted with
the said letters. In ordinary course, it should have been done. Why such
a course of action was not taken recourse to is anybody's guess. The
purported explanation of the appellant that the said letters were taken into
- - 'j F
custody of the investigating officer and later on returned to him is wholly
unbelievable. An investigating officer would not seize letters without
preparing any seizure list. When the investigating officer visited the place
of occurrence, the appellant was not present. Even a copy of the telegram
which was found in the house had been seized. Other articles had also
been seized. If seizure list had been prepared, there does not appear to G
be any reason whatsoever as to why the letters purported to have been
> written by the deceased would not be mentioned in the seizure list. We,
therefore, do not find any reason to differ with the view taken by the
learned Sessions Judge as also the High Court in this behalf.
H
538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 13 (Addi.) S.C.R.

A 19. So far as the submission of Mr. Garg that the subsequent
complaint made by father of the deceased as against the appellant for i. -
commission of an offence under Sections 405 and 406 of the Indian Penal
Code read with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act ended in
acquittal, is concerned, in our opinion, the same is not very relevant. The
B said complaint was in relation to a demand made before the marriage took
place. Allegations made therein were confined to non-return of the articles
which was allegedly given to the bride for her own use. Mis-appropriation
of the said articles was alleged on the part of the appellant therein. The
learned Magistrate while passing the said judgment of acquittal inter alia
C opined that whereas the letter containing the draft of Rs. 5,000/- was
addressed to Rameshwar Dass, it was encashed by Rameshwar Garg.
Even in the purported letters written by the deceased to the appellant,
the name of the appellant was stated to be Rameshwar Dass Garg. The
D learned Magistrate, therefore, in our opinion, misdirected himself in making
such observations but it is not necessary for us to express any opinion
thereupon.
20. The said judgment of acquittal was passed on 5.11.1992,
whereas the learned Sessions Judge passed his judgment on 18.10.1989
E in the instant case. The charges in both the cases were not same. They
were based on different transactions. Surprisingly, for reasons best known
to the appellant, no attempt was made even to bring the said judgment
dated 5.11.1992 to the notice before the High Court. Had an application
for adducing additional evidence been filed, the High Court not only could
F have considered the same, it could have also called for the record of the
said case to examine the matter at some length.
We, however, gave an opportunity to the appellant, in our anxiety
to do justice to him, to file an application for bringing the same on records.
G Such an application has been filed and we have taken into consideration
the effect of the said subsequent judgment. As two cases, it will bear
repetition to state, are on in respect of two different transactions, we are
of the opinion that the same does not have any relevance in the present
case. For the self-same reasons, the purported withdrawal of the criminal
H revision application filed by Des Raj thereagainst is also not Of much
RAMESHWAR DASS v. STATE OF PUNJAB [SINHA, J.] 539

,j relevance. Both PWs 1 and 2 in no uncertain terms stated about the A
demand of dowry of Rs. 40,000/-.
21. Apart therefrom, we have noticed hereinbefore that the fard-
bayan was recorded in the hospital. When the investigating officer on
receipt of the report went to the hospital, there was none. In normal
B
course, the appellant should have been in the hospital. The first informant
arrived at the hospital within a few minutes. He upon receipt of the news
of his sister's death made a statement at the hospital at about 2.30 p.m.
In a situation of this nature, he would not make a statement which is
imaginary so as to implicate the appellant falsely. Apart from the oral
testimony of the prosecution witnesses, the very fact that the appellant
c
himself had sent the telegram asking Des Raj to come immediately is also
a pointer to the fact that the spouses were not on good terms.
22. There appears to be a ring of truth in the statement of the first
"-\ informant that a telegram was sent. He came to see his sister. His brother- D
in-law was the resident of the same village. After he spent his night at his
brother-in law's place, he had visited the appellant's house together with
him. He tried to pacify them. Only when the appellant went out, they also
went out and came back after a few hours to find the door closed.
Appellant evidently tried to show that he had gone to office. It was a E
Sunday and as such the question of his going to office did not arise.
23. Another factor which is of some significance cannot also be lost
.... 'I sight of. The deceased was in the family way. She was carrying for 5-6
months. Apart from the statement of her father and brother to that effect, F
even the post mortem report clearly proved the said fact. Des Raj in his
testimony denied and disputed that a 'taveej" was given to her because
she was suffering from depression. According to him, it was given for the
birth of a child. A pregnant woman ordinarily would not commit suicide
unless relationship with her husband comes to such a pass that she would G
be compelled to do so .
..>
24. An attempt had also been made to show that there was death
of two children in the family as also a brother of the deceased. It was
stated that one of sisters committed suicide and the 'taveej' was given
H
540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2007] 13 (Addl.) S.C.R.
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A for her warding off the evil spirits of her deceased sister. No such evidence
has been brought on record.
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25. We must also notice the conduct of the appellant.
In his statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal
B Procedure, the appellant accepted that at the time of his marriage, a
demand for Rs. 40,000/- was made from the parents of the deceased
and they showed their inability to pay the same.
ASI Mal Singh, investigating officer stated that when he had visited
c the Hospital, nobody was present. If the statement of the appellant is to
be believed that he immediately rushed to the hospital, there was no reason
of his not being there. According to him, he was detained in the hospital
but the same has not been proved. It was only on 12.06.1988 that Sub-
Inspector Sukhdev Ram had arrested him. Why he was not available for
D six days has not been explained by the appellant. Even there was nothing
on record to show that it was either DW-1 or the appellant, who got the
deceased admitted in the hospital. The prosecution has discharged its
primary onus, as envisaged under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code.
In terms of Section l 13B of the Indian Evidence Act, onus of proof was
E upon the appellant. [See State ofKarnataka v. M V Manjunathegowda
and Anr., [2003] 2 SCC 188] As the defence taken by the appellant
has not been established, he cannot be held to have discharged the said
onus.
26. We, therefore, are of the opinion that there is no merit in this ~ 'L

F appeal which is dismissed accordingly.

27. Before parting, however, we must notice the submissions made
by Mr. Garg that 21 years have passed, the appellant has married a cousin
of the deceased and an application has been filed by Des Raj for
G condoning the offence.
28. An offence under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code is not ......
compoundable. Why and under what circumstances the cousin of the
deceased, if any, has been married to the appellant is not known. Only "'
because such a marriage has allegedly taken place, the same by itself
H
RAMESHWAR DASS v. STATE OF PUNJAB [SINHA, J.] 541

, .- ; cannot be said to be a ground for rejecting the prosecution story. These A
contentions cannot also persuade us to impose a lesser punishment upon
the appellant as in tenns of Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code the
minimum sentence is seven years rigorous imprisonment. Appellant has
been awarded only the minimum sentence. We, therefore, cannot even
interfere with the quantum of the sentence. B
29. The appeal, for the reasons stated above, is dismissed.
S.K.S. Appeal dismissed.

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