Holding

An execution court is devoid of jurisdiction to amend a decree or award compensation to non‑parties; such orders are nullities.

Summary

The State acquired land in Etmadpur Village under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the Collector awarded compensation under Section 11. Ramesh Singh and Hari Singh sought a reference under Section 18, which was dismissed, while Ruma Singh obtained a higher award after a reference and a decree under Section 26. The petitioners then applied in the execution court to have the same higher compensation awarded to them; the execution court enhanced their compensation, but the High Court set aside that order on revision. The Supreme Court examined whether an execution court can implead non‑parties and amend a decree or award compensation under the Act, and whether the denial of equal compensation violates Article 14. It held that an execution court has no jurisdiction to go beyond the decree, cannot implead third parties, and cannot award or modify compensation absent a proper reference or appeal; the principle of equality is not infringed. Consequently, the petition was dismissed.

Issues considered

Whether the execution court has jurisdiction to implead non‑parties and award them compensation under Section 26 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
Whether the denial of equal compensation to co‑owners violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Whether the petitioners have any remedy under Section 28A after having availed themselves of the remedy under Section 18.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 115
Constitution of Indias. 136, s. 14
Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 11, s. 18, s. 26, s. 28-A, s. 54

Subjects

Land acquisitionCompensationExecution court jurisdictionEquality clauseArticle 14Section 18 referenceSection 26 awardSection 28ASection 54 appeal

Judgment

\
A RAMESH SINGH (DIED) BY L.RS. AND ORS.
v.
STATE OF HARYANA AND ORS.

JANUARY 15, 1996

B . [K. RAMASWAMY AND G.B. PATTANAIK, JJ.]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 :
...
Sections 11, 18, 26, 28-A, 54--Power to amend decree or award compen-
sation and statutory benefits-Execution court devoid of jurisdiction--One
c clai1nant getting higher conzpensation-Other claim.ants do not automatically
get the same compensation unless the remedies provided under the Act are
availed of--Principle of equality not violated-Constitution of India, Art. 14.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition (C) No.
D 3469196.

From the Judgment and Order dated 2.9.93 of the Punjab and Haryana
High Court in Civil Rev. No. 2248/92.

Ms. Aparna ·Rohtagi and K.B. Rohtagi for the Petitioners.
E The following Order of the Court was delivered :

Notification under Section 4 of Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894) (for
short, 'the Act') was published on August 2, 1973 acquiring the lands situated
in Etmadpur Village for public purpose. The Collector awarded compensation
'
under Section 11 by his award dated February 19, 1974. Dissatisfied therewith,
F
Ramesh Singh and Hari Singh filed application under Section 18 which was
duly referred by the Collector to the Civil Court. The Addi. District Judge,
Gurgaon dismissed the reference petition on May 3, 1978. Ruma! Singh, one
of the claimants equally sought a separate reference in respect of his claim.
Thereon, the Addi. District Judge, Gurgaon enhanced the compensation. The
G Legal Representatives of Ramesh Singh, the petitioners and Hari Singh filed
an application to implead themselves in the reference of Ruma! Singh which
was also dismissed by the District Judge on May !, 1986. The petitioners
allege that they challenged the order in a revision said to have been filed on
November 3, 1986 and is stated to be pending decision in the High Court.
H However, we are not concerned with the same.
484
I RAMESH SINGH (DIED) BY LRS. v. STATE 485
When Ruma! Singh filed execution application to enforce his award A
made under Section 26, the petitioners filed an application in the execution
Court to award the same compensation on par with Ruma! Singh and the Addi.
District Judge, Gurgaon, by his order dated April 8, 1992 allowed the
application and enhanced the compensation as awarded to Ruma! Singh. The
State filed the Revision No. 2248 of 1992 and by the impugned order dated
B
September 2, 1993, the learned single Judge allowed the revision and set aside
the order of the District Judge. Thus this special leave petition.

Shri Rohtagi, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the
petitioners have a joint interest in the lands acquired admeasuring 20 kanals
4 marlas and, therefore, being co-owners, they are entitled to the same
compensation as was awarded to Ruma! Singh. The execution Court, there-
c
fore, has rightly granted the enhanced compensation to the petitioners. The
High Court was not right in its revisionaljurisdiction under Section 115, C.P.C.
to interfere with and set aside the order. There is manifest error of jurisdiction
committed by the High Court. We find no force in the contention. Jn view of
the narration of the fact, it is clear that Ramesh Singh and Hari Singh D
dissatisfied with the award made by the Collector under Section 11 had sought
reference under Section 18 which was duly made to the Civil Court. The
District Judge dismissed the reference. Ruma! Singh equally sought reference
and he had the compensation enhanced in the award and decree dated May
I, 1986 under Section 26. The only remedy to the petitioners and Hari Singh E
is to have corrected the illegality in the order of reference under Section 18.
It does not appear to have been availed of. The remedy under Section 28A
is not available to the petitioners since they have availed of the remedy under
Section 18.

The question then is : whether the execution Court which passed the p
award in the case of Ruma! Singh had jurisdiction to implead the non-parties
to the award and make the award in their favour. It is settled law that execution
Court cannot go behind the award and decree. It has jurisdiction only to
execute the decree made under Section 26 and in case of an appeal, under
Section 54 and further appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitution to this Court
as may be modified in the appellate decree which ultimately would be the G
executable decree. Besides the decree, the execution Court is devoid of
jurisdiction and power to go behind the decree either to implead third parties
to it who are not persons claiming right, title and interest in the decree through
the decree-holder nor does it have power to pass an independent award and
decree under Section 26 in favour of the third parties. The civil Court gets H
\ \
486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] 1 S:C.R.
A jurisdiction to award compensation higher than the compensation made under
Section 11 in respect of the acquired land only on reference under Section 18.
It is not an ordinary Civil Court under Section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code
but a Court constituted for the purpose of deciding the compensation for the
acquired land under the Act on reference to an established Court. Under the
Act even a Special Judge could award compensation on reference under
B
Section 18. The execution Court cannot even amend the decree of inter-
parties. The only remedy for the inter-par.ties would be to have the decree, as
engrafted under Section 26, or modified or affirmed in appeal either under
Section 54 or under Article 136 of the Constitution, as the case may be. The
execution Court, therefore, is devoid of jurisdiction and power to amend the
c decree or to award compensation and statutory benefits to the petitioners. The
order is a nullity. The High Court, therefore, has rightly corrected obvious and
palpable error of jurisdiction committed by the Addi. District Judge, Gurgaon,
i.e., execution Court in awarding compensation and statutory benefit Section.

It is argued by Shri Rohtagi that the petitioners being co-owners, they
D are entitled to compensation on parity with other co-owners and the denial
thereof is violative of Art. 14. We find no force in the contention. Having laid
independent claims and sought reference under Section 18, the right and '
remedy are only as provided under Section 18 or on an appeal under Section
54 but not by way of getting impleaded on the premise of a co-owner. Merely
E because one of the claimants had got higher compensation, others do not
automatically get the same compensation unless the remedies, as provided
under the Act, are availed of. One of the remedies under the Act is Section
28A; if it is available according to law. Determination of.higher compensation
in favour of some claimants or so-called co-owners and denial thereof to other
claimants is not violative of Al1icle 14 of the Constitution. The subject matter
F having been regulated under the provisions of the Act, the right and remedy
for higher compensation should be sought and had only \lnder the Act. The
principle of equality of Art. 14 cannot be extended in that behalf.

The S.L.P. is accordingly dismissed.

G.N. Petition dismissed.