RAMESH SINGH AND ANR.versusCINTA DEVI AND ORS.

                                                                                      l
A                          RAMESH SINGH AND ANR.
                                     v.
                            CINTA DEVI AND ORS.

                                FEBRUARY 23, 1996

B            [AM. AHMADI, CJ. AND SUJATA V. MANOHAR, J.]

            Motor Vehicles Act, 1939/Motor Vehicles Act, 1988:

            Right of appeal under the old Act-Whether swvives even after its repeal
C by the new Act-Held, the claimant would be entitled to file an appeal without
    being required to make the deposit under the proviso to S.173 of the 1988 Act.

          Oliental Insurance Company Ltd. Haldwani, v. Dhanram Singh and
    Others, AIR (1990) Allahabad 104 and Jaswant Rao v. Kamlabai & Anr.,
    AIR (1990) MP 354, approved.
D         Husain Kasim Dada v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Others, [1953] SCR
    987 at 991; State of Bombay v. Supreme General Films Exchange Limited,
    [1960] 3 SCR 640 and Vithal Bhai Narang Bhai Patel v. Commissioner of
    Sales Tax, M.P. & Nagpur, AIR (1967) SC 344, relied on.

E           CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 4255 of
    1996.

         From the Judgment and Order dated 11.10.93 of the Patna High
    Court in M.A. No. 252 of 1992.

F           AK. Pandey for R.P. Singh for the Appellants.

            Vishnu Mehra for K.M.K. Nair for the Respondents.

            The following Order of the Court was delivered :

G           Special leave granted.

          The short question is : does a right of appeal accrued to a claimant
    under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, hereinafter called the 'Old Act', on
    the institution of a claim application in the Motor Accident .claims
    Tribunal, notwithstanding its repeal by the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988,
H   hereinafter called the 'New Act'? In other words, does the right of appeal
                                       1036
1                        RAMESHSINGHv. CINTADEVI.                           1037

    under the Old Act survive even after its repeal by the New Act? The brief       A
    facts are that an accident took place on"27.5.1988 which gave rise to a claim
    for a compensation under the Old Act. The claim application was filed on
    23.12.1988. Thereafter the new Act came into force with effect from
    1.7.1989. The claim application which was instituted under the Old Act was
    disposed of on 29.6.1992 after the new Act came into force. That gave rise
    to a right to file an appeal. The appeal was preferred under the Old Act
                                                                                    B
    on 25.9.1992. However, the Division Bench of the High Court by the
    impugned order dismissed the appeal on the ground that the appellant·had
    not deposited the amount as required by the proviso to section 173 of the
    New Act. Section 173 of the New Act, insofar as is relevant for our
    purposes, reads as under :                                                      c
            "Section 173. Appeals (1.) Subject to the provisions of sub-section
            (2), any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may,
            within ninety days from the date of the award, prefer an appeal to
            the High Court : Provided that no appeal by the person who is
            required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall be              D
            entertained by the High Court unless he has deposited with it
            twenty five thousand rupees or fifty per cent of the amount so
            awarded, whichever is less, in the manner directed by the High
            Court."
                                                                                    E
    Admittedly, the appellant had not deposited the amount as required by the
    said proviso. The High Court, therefore, came to the conclusion that the
    appeal was not maintainable and dismissed the same. It is against the said
    order of the High Court that the present appeal is preferred.

           We have heard learned counsel for the appellant and have perused F
    the relevant provisions of the Old Act as well as the New Act bearing on
    the question whether or not the appellant was required to make the deposit
    and we may state that the repealing clause, namely sub-section (4) of
    section 217, preserves Section 6 of the General Clauses Act. We may at
    this stage reproduce Section 217 (4) of the New Act and Section 6 of the G
    General clauses act.

             "Section 217(4). The mention of particular matters in this Section
             shall not be held to prejudice or affect the general application of
             section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (1.0of1897), with regard
             to the effect of repeals."                                             H
    1038                 SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [1996] 2 S.C.R.

A           "Section 6. Effect of repeal. Where this Act, or any (Central Act)
            or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals
            any enactment hitherto made of hereafter to be made, then, unless
            a different intention appears, the repeal shall not -

                 (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at
B                which the repeal takes effect; or;

                 (b) affect the previous operation of any enactmt?nt so
                 repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder ; or

                 (c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired,
c                accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or

                 (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in
                 respect of any offence committed against any enactment so
                 repealed; or
D
                 (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in
                 respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, pe.nal-
                 ty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid.

    and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted,
E continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may
    be imposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed."

    Suffice it to say that the New Act does not expressly or by necessary
    implication make the relevant provisions retrospective in character.

F         The High Court of Allahabad and Madhya Pradesh have, Vide AIR
    1990 Allahabad 104 and AIR 1990 MP 354, held that in such circumstances
    the appellants's right to appeal without being required to make the deposit
    under the first proviso to Section 173 of the New Act remains unaffected.
    However, the judgment impugned herein takes a different view. Hence
G   there is a controversy which need to be resolved.

          In our view the point at issue stands squarely covered by three
    decisions of this Court reported in Hussain Kasim Dada v. State or Madhya
    Pradesh & Others, [1953] SCR 987 at 991, State of Bombay v. Supreme
    General Films Exchange Limited, [1960] 3 SCR 640 and Vithal Bhai Narang
H   Bhai Patel v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, M.P. & Nagpur, AIR (1967) SC
l                       RAMESH SINGH v. CINTA DEVI

    344. In all these decisions the view taken is that unless the New Act A
                                                                           1039



    expressly or by necessary implication makes the provision applicable
    retrospectively, the right to appeal will crystalise in the appellant on the
    institution of the application in the Tribunal of first instance and that vested
    right of appeal would not be dislodged by the enactment of the New Act.
    In other words, the appellant would be entitled to a file the appeal without B
    being required to make the deposit under the proviso to Section 173 of the
    New Act. The law, therefore, seems to be fairly well settled by the said
    three decisions of this Court.

          In the result, the appeal succeeds. The impugned judgment of the
    High Court dismissing the appellant's appeal against the award made by        C
    the Tribunal is set aside. The matter will go back to the High Court for
    disposal of the appeal in accordance with law without insisting on deposit
    of the amount. There will, however, be no order as to costs.

    G.N.                                                       Appeal allowed.