Holding

The chain of circumstantial evidence was not complete; therefore, the conviction could not be sustained and the appellant was acquitted.

Summary

Ramesh Chand was convicted under sections 302 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code for the murder of Om Prakash based on the prosecution's claim that he, along with two others, stabbed the victim at night near Hindon Bridge and was found with a blood‑stained knife. The defence argued that Chand was merely the taxi driver, that the passengers quarreled, and that he attempted to rescue the dying man, which explained the blood‑stained clothes and the presence of the knife. The trial court relied on direct and circumstantial evidence and sentenced him to life imprisonment; the High Court dismissed the direct evidence of the blow but upheld the conviction on five circumstantial points. The Supreme Court examined whether the chain of circumstantial evidence was complete and found it insufficient to exclude reasonable doubt, noting the lack of reliable light, the short chase distance, and the implausibility of Chand retaining a blood‑stained knife. It also affirmed that under Article 136 the Court may re‑appreciate evidence when a conviction appears unjustified. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, acquitted Chand, and cancelled his bail bond.

Issues considered

Whether the circumstantial evidence presented was sufficient to sustain a conviction for murder under sections 302 and 34 IPC.
Whether the chain of circumstances must be complete and point unequivocally to the accused's guilt.
Whether possession of a blood‑stained knife and blood‑stained clothing constitute conclusive circumstantial proof of participation in the murder.
The scope of the Supreme Court's power under Article 136 of the Constitution to re‑appreciate evidence and interfere with lower court findings.

Legislation cited

Constitution of Indias. 136
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 302, s. 34

Subjects

murdercircumstantial evidenceconvictionacquittalArticle 136Indian Penal Codeburden of proofchain of circumstancesevidence appraisal

Judgment

573
A

RAMESH CHAND
B
v.
.... I.

.,, STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

January 17, 1985
c
I V.D. TULZAPURKAR, RANGANATH MISRA AND v. KHALID, JJ.)

Jndian Er/deuce Act, l872-Circun1stantial Evidence-Req14ir1ne11t.~ lo be
satisfied for basing conclusions on circurnstantial el'l·ndence.
D
Constitution of India, 1950-Art.136-Scope of-Power o[Supre111e
Court to reapreciate evide1;ce-Whe11 can be exercised.

The appellant was charged with the murder of one Om Prakash. The
prosecution story was (i) that at about 10 p.m. in the night, at a place where
there was no light and which was about 2 furlongs away from the guard room at E
Hindon Bridge towards Ghaziabad, the appellant along with two others killed
the deceased by stabbing with knife ; (ii) that three police personnal posted at the
guard room, one of whom had a torch, ran to the spot on being informed by
some passerby and caught hold of the appellant who had a knife stained with
blood; (iii) that the other two assailants managed to escape. The appe11ant
pleaded (1) that he was a taxi driver in which the three passengers including the
deceased were travelling; (2) that after crossing the Bridge the passengers started
quarre1ling among themselves, with the result his attention was diverted resulting F
in a cyclist being dashed against (3) that when the car stopped, the three passen-
gers got down, went a little away from the road and started assaulting the deceas-
.. ed with a knife (4) that he went there to rescue the det.:eased and in that process
his wearing apparel got blood soaked ; (5) that the assailants ran away after
assaulting the deceased; and (6) · that no blood staintd knife was received from
him. Out of the six eye witnessess examined, four did not support the prosecu-
tion story and were declared hostile. One of the remaining two police witnesses
denied the fact of seeing the appellant giving any knife blow while the other bad G
made a firm statement that he did see the act of giving the knife blow.

The trial court convicted the appellant u/s. 302/34 IPC and sentenced
him to imprisonment for life. In appeal, the High Court discarded the evidence in
regard to the infliction of the blows, but, affirmed the conviction on circumsta i· I
ev1"dence wh"1ch _accord"ing to the High Court was : (1) an attempt b; the appeUant
n ia
to escape and h1s arrest after a chase ; (ii) he being found to be 1·0 · f
possession o
574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] 2 s.c-R. ·

A the blood stained knife ; (iii) his clothes having become blood· stained; (iv) if the
appellant was trying to rescue the deceased, he would have received injuries in the
scuffle; and (v) if the appellant had really tried to intervene in the \Vay he claims,
he being a well built man could have saved the life of the deceased.

Allowing the appeal by the appellant,
B
HELD : (l) There is no evidence as to whether apart from the torchlight
which the police witnesses focussed, if any other light was available. We agree
with the trial Court as also the High Court that the two police witnesses were
present at the spot and in the manner indicated by them. But the evidence regardw
ing the directions to which the three persons r3.n away is discrepant. Chase by
itself does not seem to be an important feature particularly when the total distance
c for which chase is said to have been made was about 22-2.5 feet. It is conceivable
that he had not moved but the police witnesses. ran to reach him because they
were anxious to catch hold of any one from the group who was available.
[576H; 577 AB;]
(2) The appellant's stand that in the process of rescuing the deceased his
wearing apparel were soaked with human blood is a sufficient explanation. The
D fact that no injuries have been sustained by him while trying to rescue the deceased
by itself is ncit an implicating circumstance becau.se the assailants having no
reason to inujre him may not have assaulted him. By sheer chance as well the
appellant may have escaped injuries. [577E; F and G)

(3) The evidence regarding the appellant holding the knife in the dark
night is not impressive and does not arouse confidence as it is against human
E conduct and no one would keep holding such an incriminating material as a
blood stained knife. Moreover, there is no justification to discard the evidence of
PW. 2, the cyclist who was injured by the appellant's car. (577E and 576G]

(4) In a case of 1.:ircumstantial evidence law is well settled that the chain
of circumstances must be complete and must clearly point to the guilt of the
accused. Broad perspectives have to be kept in view. Jn the instant case, the
circumstances do not really complete the chain so as to lead to the conclusion
F
that the appellant and no other could have been the assailant. [576F and G]

(5) lt is well established that the powers of Supreme Court under Article
136 of the Constitution are plenary and restrictions in the exercise, if any, are
self-imposed. Ordinarily Supreme Court does not enter into re-appreciation of
evidence but where evidence is placed and the conviction appears to the Court to
be not justified in law, nothing stands in the way in directing reversal of convic-
G tion. [578FI

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 575
of 1976.

From the Judgment and Order dated the 25th August, .1976
H of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. 686 of 1972.
RAMESH CHAND v. U.P. STATE (Ranganath Misra, J.) 575
A
A. N. Mu/la and S. K. Ga 11bhir for the Appellant.

Dalveer Bhandari and H. M. Singh for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
f1.ANGANATH MISRA, J. This appeal is by special leave and is
directed a~ainst the decision of the Allahabad High Court affirming
the appellant's conviction under section ?02 read withs 3i of the
Indian Penal Code and sentence of imprisonment of life for that
offence. Prosect<tion alleged that between 10 and 10.15 P.M. in the
night of January 2, 1970, a little distan~c away from the Hindon
Bridge tow1rds Ghaziabad on the G.T. Road, the appellant along with c
two . thers killed oae Om Prakash by stabbing him with a knife. Six
eye witnesses were examined to support this charge. Of them one was
the Havildar Mir Singh (PW.4) and the other was a Police Constable
Gyan Singh (PW.6). These two witnesses along with one Jagdish Singh
were on guard duty at the Hindon Bridge. They were informed by
some passersby that a man was being stabbed at a distance of about D
two furlongs from the place where the guard room was located. On
getting the information the three police personnel ran to the spot.
With the help of the torchlight which one of them held, they saw from
a distance that three persons were engaged in stabbing the deceased
but when the torch was focussed, the assailants started decamping.
They were chased. Two of them managed to escape but the appel- E
lant was caught with the knife stained with blood. The other two
were not traced. The four other eye witnesses did not support the
prosecution story and were declared hostile.

The appellant in his defence took the stand that was the driver
of the taxi in which three persons came as passengers. Soon after the F
bridge had been crossed, the passengers started quarrelling among
themselves. That diverted the attention of the appellant and resulted
in a cyclist bcng dashed against. When the car came to a standstill
the three people who were quarrelling among themselves got down
and two of them started assaulting the deceased with a knife after
go'.ng a little away from the road. The appellant went there to G
rescue the deceased. In that process his wearing apparel got blood
soaked. After fatally assaulting the deceased the assailants ran
away when some people started collecting there. He denied the
recovery of the blood stained knife from him. Four of
the hostile witnesses supported the defence plea that the appellant
had been attempting to rescue the deceased anc;I Ii~\\ not himself H
576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985) 2 S.C.R.
A
given any assault. The trial Court held that the hostile witnesses
were not speaking the truth ; it relied upon the two police
witnesses, accepted the prosecutfon version that the blood stained
knife had been recovered from the appellant and drew support for
the charge from the blood stained wearing apparel to hold that it
was he who had stabbed the deceased to death along with two other
B unknown people. Accordingly be was convicted under s. 302/34, IPC,
and sentenced to imprisonment for life.

The appellant appealed to the High Court against his conviction.
Of the two police witnesses, one bad denied seeing the appellant giving
any knife blow while the other had made a firm statement that he did
see the act of giving the knife blow. The High Court accepted the
appellant's contention that neither had seen actual infliction of knife
blow by the appellant. Once the evidence in regard to the infliction
of the blows was discarded, the High Court proceeded to examine
circumstantial evidence to ascertain whether the charge can be said
to have been established. These circumstances as indicated by the
D High Court are : (i) an attempt by the appellant to escape and his
arrest after a chase ; (ii) he being found to be in possession of the
blood stained knife ; (iii) his clothes having become blood stained :
(iv) if the defence version was true, namely, that the appellant was
trying to rescue the deceased, be would have received injuries in the
scuffle; and (v) if the appellant had really tried to intervene in the
E way he claims, he being a well built man could have saved the life of
the deceased.

Law is well settled that the chain of circumstances must be com·
plete and must clearly point to the guilt of the accused. The circum·
stances indicated here, in our opinion, do not really complete the
chain so as to lead to the conclusion that the appellant and no other
F could have been the assailant. Broad perspectives have to be kept in
view· The appellant was admittedly the driver of the taxi in which
the others were the passengers. From the recoveries made, it appears
that two liquor bottles have been found from the car-one from the
back seat where the three passengers were seated and the other from
(he front portion. There is no justification to discard the evidence of
G PW. 2, the cyclist who was injured by the appellant's car.

Admittedly, the incident occurred at a place which was not
lighted. There is no evidence as to whether apart from the torchlight
which the police witnesses focussed, if any other light was available.
Once the car stopped and the lights of the car were no more avialable
H to help seeing things around, a confusion must have prevailed when
RAMESH CHAND v. U.P. STATE (Ranganarh Misra, J.) 577

the assault started. We agree with the trial Court as also the High A
Court that the two police witnesses 1•. ere present at the spot and
in t11e mrnner indicated by them. 1 he evidence regarding the direc-
tion~ tJ which the three persons ran away is discrepant. While some
said 'hat they ran away to counter directions-t11 o to one side and the
one tJ t' c other, the appellant appears to I ave been apprehended
from t:ie said direction. Chase by itsdf does not seem to be an B
' important feature particularly when the total distance for which chase
is said to have been made was about 22-25 feet. It is conceivable, as
Mr. Mulla for the appellant has argued, that he had not moved but
• the police witnesses ran to reach him because they were anxious to
catch hold of any one from the group who was available. The appel-
lant's stand had been that he volunteered to rescue the deceased. In c
that process his wearing apparel being soaked with human blood is a
sufficient explanati~n. The allegation that the knife was seized from
·him has been sto11'!y denied. The evidence also seems not to be very
clear. It is some what unnatural that the appellant should be holding
the knife when he was cau.~ht and would continue to carry the knife
till he reached the polico station quite a distance away. When he was
D
about to be apprehended in the dark night, he could have thrown
away the knife ii' he hacl been holding it or he could have refused to
carry knife to the police station in case he had really been hue.ct to
be with the knife when he was arrested. The evidence regarding the
appellant holding the knife at that point of time is not impressive
and does not arouse confidence in our mind, as it is against human
conduct and no one would keep holding such an incriminating
E
material as a bJood stained knife. The other two circumstances which
are indeed negative in the setting are innocuous. Merely because the
appellant, a young man of about 23 at the time of occurrence, was of
stout built, was not a sufficient circumstance to give him the confi-
dence to match against two of whom one had an open knife in hand.
The fact that no injuries have been sustained by him while trying to F
rescue the deceased by itself is not an implicating circumstance
because the assailants having no reason to injure him may have not
assaulted him. By sheer chance as well the appellant may have
escaped injuries. The two assailants may be looking for a further ride
in the taxi to reach their destination and if the driver was injured that
would not have been possible. These circumstances on which the G
High Court has relied, therefore, are really not available to be props
for the prosecution case.

There are certain other features which were placed by Mr.
Mulla in support of the appeal which may be noticed ill \lri~C The H
578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985] 2 S.C.R.
A .distance from the spot to the guard room is said to be 420 paces
which easily works out to a furlong's distance. If the informants of
the police had noticed the assault and then proceeded to give infor-
mation to the police, the time lag between their seeing the assault and
the police people reaching the spot would at least be 15 to 20 minutes.
The assailants would have b:en anxious to commit the crime and get
B away from the spot. It is true that as many as 18 (not 16 as stated by
the High Court) injuries have been found during post-mortem exami-
nation of the dead body. But for inflicting 18 injuries by two assai-
lants armed with knife it need not have taken that length of time.
Again, when the police people were coming from Hindon Bridge side
they must have already been flashing their torch from a distance and
when the assailants would have noticed that light in the midst of
c darkness they must have been already alerted. If they were to escape
before the police people came close they must have left the place.
The presence of the liquor bottles as Mr. Mulla has emphasised, can
· have some place of importance in assessing the evidence. We, howe-
ver, do not think it is necessary to enter into the field of conjecture
over the bottles of liquor. We are of the view that the prosecution has
D failed to establish the charge.

It is pertinent to take note of the submission made by Mr.
Dalveer Bhandari for the respondent before we conclude the judg-
ment. He contended that this Court does not, in exercise of its juris-
diction under Article 136 of the Constitution, enter into a re-appre-
"I
E ciation of the evidence and, therefore, the. facts found should not
be interfered with. It is well established that the powers of this
Court under Article 136 of the Constitution are plenary and restric-
tions in the exercise, if any, are self-imposed. We agree with Mr.
Bhandari that ordinarily this Court does not enter into re-apprecia-
tion of evidence but where evidence is placed and the conviction ap·
F pears to the Court to be not justified in Jaw, nothing stands in the
way in directing reversal of conviction.

We allow the appeal, set aside the conviction of the appellant
and direct his acquital. He is already on bail. We, therefore, direct
cancellation of his bail bonds.
G

M.L.A. Appeal allowed.

H