Holding

A bail order must be based on a reasoned exercise of judicial discretion that duly considers the nature and gravity of the offence, the individual role of the accused, and the principle of parity; failure to do so renders the order perverse and liable to be set aside.

Summary

The Supreme Court examined six bail orders granted by the Gujarat High Court to accused involved in a violent incident that resulted in five homicides. The Court held that the High Court failed to consider the seriousness and gravity of the offences, the role of each accused, and the material evidence contained in the FIR and cross‑FIR, and that it did not provide adequate reasons for its decisions, violating the duty under s.439 CrPC. The Court also found the High Court’s application of the principle of parity to be superficial, focusing merely on the similarity of weapons rather than individual roles. Consequently, the bail orders were deemed perverse and set aside. The accused were ordered to surrender, and the appeals were allowed.

Issues considered

The appropriateness of granting bail to accused in a case involving five homicidal deaths, considering the nature and gravity of the offence.
Whether the High Court correctly applied the principle of parity in extending bail to other accused.
Whether the High Court complied with the statutory requirement to record reasons for a bail order under s.439 CrPC.
Whether observations that parties did not press for further reasoned orders can justify granting bail.
The relevance of the cross‑FIR and other material evidence in the bail determination.

Legislation cited

Arms Acts. 25(1-b)A, s. 27, s. 29
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 439
Gujarat Police Acts. 135
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120B, s. 143, s. 144, s. 147, s. 148, s. 149, s. 302, s. 34, s. 341, s. 384, s. 506(2)

Subjects

bailSection 439 CrPCparityjudicial discretionreasoned orderperverse orderhomicideFIRcross FIRgravity of offencecriminal procedure

Judgment

[2021] 7 S.C.R. 17 17

RAMESH BHAVAN RATHOD A
v.
VISHANBHAI HIRABHAI MAKWANA MAKWANA (KOLI) & ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No 422 of 2021)
APRIL 20, 2021 B
[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD AND
M. R. SHAH, JJ.]
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:
s. 439 – Special powers of High Court or Court of Session C
regarding bail – On facts, six persons implicated in five homicidal
deaths – Grant of bail by High Court – Correctness of – Held: Nature of
the offence, its gravity is a circumstance which has an important bearing
on the grant of bail – On facts, while granting bail to the six accused,
the High Court committed serious mistake by failing to recognize material
D
aspects of the case, rendering the orders of the High Court vulnerable to
assail on the ground of perversity – High Court failed to look into the
seriousness and gravity of the offences – FIR lodged adverts to the
murder of five persons on the side of the informant in the course of the
incident as a result of which offences punishable under Penal Code,
Arms Act and Gujarat Police Act, were alleged – FIR specifically refers E
to the presence of the accused persons and that they had all come to the
scene of offence with weapons – Plain reading of the cross FIR indicates
both the presence of the accused and the execution of their plan to
assault the side of the informant with the weapons in their possession –
High Court overlooked the cross FIR and the implications of its content
F
– Thus, the order granting bail to accused persons having failed to pass
muster under the law, set aside.
s. 439 – Bail – Grant of – Application of principle of parity –
Held: In deciding the aspect of parity, the role attached to the accused,
their position in relation to the incident and to the victims is of utmost
importance – Merely observing that another accused who was granted G
bail was armed with a similar weapon is not sufficient, but individual
role attributed to each accused must be considered.
s. 439 – Grant of bail under – Recording of reasons – Held:
Grant of bail u/s. 439 is a matter involving the exercise of judicial
H
17
18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.

A discretion – Judicial discretion in granting or refusing bail is not
unstructured – Duty to record reasons is a significant safeguard which
ensures that the discretion which is entrusted to the court is exercised in
a judicious manner – Recording of reasons in a judicial order ensures
that the thought process underlying the order is subject to scrutiny and
that it meets objective standards of reason and justice.
B
s. 439 – Bail – Grant of, by High Court – Order passed by the
Judge observing that the order granting bail to the concerned accused
not be treated as a precedent to claim bail on the basis of parity in any
other case – Correctness of – Held: Said observation is inappropriate
and erroneous – Whether parity can be claimed by any other accused on
C the basis of the order granting bail to concerned accused ought not to
have been pre-judged by the Single Judge who was dealing only with
the application for the grant of bail to the accused concerned – Whether
an order granting bail is a precedent on grounds of parity is a matter
for future adjudication if and when bail application is moved on the
D grounds of parity on behalf of the accused.
s. 439 – Bail – Grant of, by High Court – Observations of the
High Court in succession of orders that the counsel for the parties “do
not press for a further reasoned order” – Correctness of – Held:
Observations of the High Court is disapproved – Consent of parties
E cannot obviate the duty of the High Court to apply a judicial mind and
indicate its reasons why it has either granted or refused bail – Outcome
of the application has a significant bearing on the liberty of the accused
on one hand as well as the public interest in the due enforcement of
criminal justice on the other.

F Allowing the appeals, the Court
HELD: 1.1 The first aspect of the case which stares in the
face is the singular absence in the judgment of the High Court to
the nature and gravity of the crime. The incident which took place
on 9 May 2020 resulted in five homicidal deaths. The nature of
G the offence is a circumstance which has an important bearing on
the grant of bail. The orders of the High Court are conspicuous in
the absence of any awareness or elaboration of the serious nature
of the offence. The perversity lies in the failure of the High Court
to consider an important circumstance which has a bearing on

H
RAMESH BHAVAN RATHOD v. VISHANBHAI HIRABHAI MAKWANA 19
MAKWANA (KOLI)

whether bail should be granted. The orders passed by the High A
Court granting bail fail to pass muster under the law. They are
oblivious to, and innocent of, the nature and gravity of the alleged
offences and to the severity of the punishment in the event of
conviction. [Paras 20, 22][36-F-H; 37-A; 38-G-H; 39-A]
Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudharshan Singh (2002) 3 B
SCC 598:[2002] 2 SCR 526; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar
v. Ashis Chatterjee (2010) 14 SCC 496 : [2010] 12
SCR 1165 – referred to
1.2 The High Court by its two orders granted bail to A-10
and A-15. Parity was sought with A-13 to whom bail was granted C
on the ground (as the High Court recorded) that he was “assigned
similar role of armed with stick (sic)”. Again, bail was granted to
A-16 on the ground that he was armed with a wooden stick and on
the ground that A-10, A-15 and A-13 who were armed with sticks
had been granted bail. The High Court evidently misunderstood
the central aspect of what is meant by parity. Parity while granting D
bail must focus upon role of the accused. Merely observing that
another accused who was granted bail was armed with a similar
weapon is not sufficient to determine whether a case for the grant
of bail on the basis of parity has been established. In deciding the
aspect of parity, the role attached to the accused, their position E
in relation to the incident and to the victims is of utmost
importance. The High Court proceeded on the basis of parity on
a simplistic assessment, which cannot pass muster under the law.
[Para 23][39-D-H]
Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. (2014) 16 SCC 508: [2014] F
12 SCR 453 – referred to
1.3 It is evident that essentially the only order which contains
a semblance of reasoning is the order dated 22 October 2020 granting
bail to A-13. As a matter of fact, the submissions which have been
made on behalf of the accused substantially dwell on the same line G
of logic in justifying the grant of bail on the ground that in the
subsequent statement dated 3 June 2020 of the informant, the genesis
and details of the incident which took place on 9 May 2020 as
elaborated in the FIR have undergone a substantial change. [Para
26][40-G-H]
H
20 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.

A 1.4 In granting bail to the six accused, the High Court
committed a serious mistake by failing to recognize material
aspects of the case, rendering the orders of the High Court
vulnerable to assail on the ground of perversity. The first
circumstance which should have weighed with the High Court
but which has been glossed over is the seriousness and gravity of
B
the offences. The FIR which has been lodged on 9 May 2020
adverts to the murder of five persons on the side of the informant
in the course of the incident as a result of which offences
punishable under Sections 302, 143, 144, 147, 148, 149, 341, 384,
120B, 506(2) r/w Section 34 of the Penal Code were alleged. This
C is apart from the invocation of the provisions of Sections 25(1-b)
A, 27 and 29 of the Arms Act and Section 135 of the Gujarat Police
Act. The FIR specifically refers to the presence of the accused
A-6, A-13, A-16, A-15, A-10 and A-17. It states that the accused
had all come to the scene of offence with pistols, dhariyas and
knives. A-6 and two others had fired from their rifles. Some of
D
these accused-A-6, A-13, A-16, A- 15, A-10 and A-17 are alleged
to have assaulted with dhariyas and lathis over the head and body
of victims. All of them were rushed to the Government Hospital
where they were pronounced dead. [Para 27][41-A-C; D-F]
1.5 Four days after the FIR was lodged by the informant on
E 9 May 2020, a cross FIR was lodged by A-6. This FIR contains a
narration of the pre-existing dispute over land and to an incident
which had taken place on 7 May 2020. A reading of the cross FIR
indicates that an intent on the part of the accused to launch an
assault on the deceased; the manner in which their pre-meditated
F design was sought to be achieved by assaulting the deceased persons.
With the contents of the cross FIR as they stand, it was impossible
for any judicial mind, while adjudicating upon the applications for
the grant of bail, to gloss over the presence of the accused at the
scene of occurrence, the accused being armed with weapons and
their intent to assault them; and the actual incident, resulting in five
G homicidal deaths. [Paras 28-30][41-F-G; 42-C-D; E-G]
1.6 The Post Mortem reports which have been produced
on the record indicate the extensive nature of the bodily injuries
which were sustained by each of the five deceased persons. It is
true that in the FIR it was alleged that the deceased were fired
H upon as a result of which they fell to the ground whereas, in the
RAMESH BHAVAN RATHOD v. VISHANBHAI HIRABHAI MAKWANA 21
MAKWANA (KOLI)

subsequent statement, it has been stated that the injuries were A
sustained as a result of dhariyas and sticks. Whether the deaths
occurred as a result of bullet wounds or otherwise can make no
difference on whether a case for the grant of bail was made out
once a plain reading of the cross FIR indicates both the presence
of the accused and the execution of their plan to assault the side
B
of the informant with the weapons which were in the possession
of the accused. The High Court in its first order was persuaded
to grant bail on the specious ground that the details of the incident
as they appeared in the subsequent statement of the informant
are at variance with the FIR. These are matters of trial. The High
Court has, however, clearly overlooked the cross FIR and the C
implications of the content of the FIR on the basic issue as to
whether bail should be granted. It is also important to note that the
presence of women on the side of the accused is a fact which is noted
in the cross FIR itself. [Para 31][42-G-H; 43-A-D]
1.7 There has been a manifest failure of the High Court to D
advert to material circumstances, especially the narration of the
incident as it appears in the cross FIR. Above all, the High Court
has completely ignored the gravity and seriousness of the offence
which resulted in five homicidal deaths. This is clearly a case where
the orders passed by the High Court suffered from a clear perversity.
[Para 32][43-E-F] E

1.8 In the order of the High Court granting bail to A-13,
there was a reference to the submission of the Public Prosecutor
to the criminal antecedents of A-13 bearing on previous FIRs
registered against him in 2017 and 2019. This aspect bearing on
the criminal antecedents of A-13 was not considered in the reasons F
which have been adduced by the Single Judge. That apart, the
ground on which A-13 was granted bail is that in the subsequent
statement dated 3 June 2020, the overt act which was attributed
in the FIR was found to be missing. Having said this, the Judge
observed that the order shall not be treated as a precedent to G
claim bail on the basis of parity in any other case. The said
observation of the Single Judge is disapproved. Whether parity
can be claimed by any other accused on the basis of the order
granting bail to A-13 ought not to have been pre-judged by the
Single Judge who was dealing only with the application for the
grant of bail to A-13. The observation that the grant of bail to H
22 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.

A A-13 shall not be considered as a precedent for any other person
who is accused in the FIR on grounds of parity does not constitute
judicially appropriate reasoning. Whether an order granting a bail
is a precedent on grounds of parity is a matter for future
adjudication if and when an application for bail is moved on the
grounds of parity on behalf of another accused. In the event that
B
parity is claimed in such a case thereafter, it is for that court before
whom parity is claimed to determine whether a case for the grant
of bail on reasons of parity is made out. In other words, the
observations of the Single Judge are inappropriate and erroneous.
Bail was thereafter granted to A-10 and A-15 on the ground of
C parity as claimed with the order granting bail to A-13. The Single
Judge observed that the Additional Public Prosecutor had not
made any point of distinction. Subsequently, parity was the basis
on which bail was sought in the case of A-16. While granting bail
the Single Judge observed that parties did not press for further
reasoned orders. A similar observation is contained in the order
D
of the Single Judge granting bail to A-17. The order of the High
Court granting bail to A-6 again contains the same statement.
The observations of the High Court in a succession of orders in
the present case recording that the Counsel for the parties
“do not press for a further reasoned order”, is disapproved.
E [Paras 33-34][43-F-G, H; 4-A-D, E-H; 45-A]
Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh (2012) 9 SCC 446:
[2012] 7 SCR 584 – referred to
1.9 The grant of bail is a matter which implicates the liberty
of the accused, the interest of the State and the victims of crime
F in the proper administration of criminal justice. It is a well-settled
principle that in determining as to whether bail should be granted,
the High Court, or for that matter, the Sessions Court deciding
an application under Section 439 of the CrPC would not launch
upon a detailed evaluation of the facts on merits since a criminal
G trial is still to take place. These observations while adjudicating
upon bail would also not be binding on the outcome of the trial.
But the Court granting bail cannot obviate its duty to apply a
judicial mind and to record reasons, brief as they may be, for the
purpose of deciding whether or not to grant bail. The consent of
parties cannot obviate the duty of the High Court to indicate its
H
RAMESH BHAVAN RATHOD v. VISHANBHAI HIRABHAI MAKWANA 23
MAKWANA (KOLI)

reasons why it has either granted or refused bail. This is for the A
reason that the outcome of the application has a significant bearing
on the liberty of the accused on one hand as well as the public
interest in the due enforcement of criminal justice on the other.
The rights of the victims and their families are at stake as well.
These are not matters involving the private rights of two individual
B
parties, as in a civil proceeding. The proper enforcement of
criminal law is a matter of public interest. Thus, the manner in
which a succession of orders in the present batch of cases has
recorded that counsel for the “respective parties do not press
for further reasoned order” are disapproved. If this is a
euphemism for not recording adequate reasons, this kind of a C
formula cannot shield the order from judicial scrutiny. [Para 35]
[45-A-F]
1.10 Grant of bail under Section 439 of the CrPC is a matter
involving the exercise of judicial discretion. Judicial discretion in
granting or refusing bail as in the case of any other discretion which D
is vested in a court as a judicial institution is not unstructured. The
duty to record reasons is a significant safeguard which ensures that
the discretion which is entrusted to the court is exercised in a judicious
manner. The recording of reasons in a judicial order ensures that the
thought process underlying the order is subject to scrutiny and that
it meets objective standards of reason and justice. [Para 36] E
[45-F-G]
Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. (2004) 7 SCC 525: [ 2004]
3 Suppl. SCR 584 – referred to
1.11 As regards the application for bail of A-6, the High F
Court sought to support its decision to grant bail by stating that it
had perused the material on record and was granting bail “without
discussing the evidence in detail” taking into consideration the facts
of the case; the nature of allegations; gravity of offences; and the
role attributed to the accused. As a matter of fact there was no
discussion or analysis of circumstances at all. This lone sentence in G
the order of the Single Judge leaves a Court before which the order
granting bail is challenged, completely without guidance on the
considerations which weighed with the High Court in granting
bail. In deciding whether or not to grant bail the High Court is
not at a stage where it adjudicates upon guilt. This is to be analyzed H
24 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.

A during the course of criminal trial where evidence has been
recorded. But surely, the order of the High Court must indicate
some reasons why the Court has either granted or denied bail.
The Sessions Judges in the instant case have indicated their
reasons for the ultimate conclusion. This unfortunately was not
observed in the order of the High Court. There is no question
B
now of ordering a remand to the High Court in the case of A-6
since the question of bail has been argued fully before this Court.
Moreover, the case of A-6 has been considered together with the
entire batch of cases in which bail has been granted initially in the
case of A-13, which has been followed on the grounds of parity in
C the case of the other accused. [Paras 37-38][46-C-H; 47-G-H;
48-A-B]
Sonu v. Sonu Yadav Crl Appeal No. 377 of 2021,
decided on 5.4. 2021 – relied on.
1.12 The orders granting bail to the respondent-accused
D A-6, A-10, A-13, A-15, A-16 and A-17 suffer from a clear perversity.
The orders of the High Court are set aside. All the said accused
are directed to surrender forthwith. [Paras 41- 42][51-C-D, F-G]
Sanjay Chandra v. Central Bureau of Investigation 2012
(1) SCC 40; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar Alias Polia (2020)
E 2 SCC 118; Prabhakar Tewari v. State of U.P. [2020] 11
SCC 648; Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh
(2002) 3 SCC 598:[2002] 2 SCR 526; Prasanta Kumar
Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee (2010) 14 SCC 496: [2010] 12
SCR 1165; The State of Kerala v. Mahesh Criminal Appeal
F No 343 of 2021 decided on 19.03.2021 – referred to
Case Law Reference
[2011] 13 SCR 309 referred to Para 9, 18
[2002] 2 SCR 526 referred to Para 20
G [2010] 12 SCR 1165 referred to Para 21
[2014] 12 SCR 453 referred to Para 22
[2012] 7 SCR 584 referred to Para 33
[2004] 3 Suppl. SCR 584 referred to Para 36
H
RAMESH BHAVAN RATHOD v. VISHANBHAI HIRABHAI MAKWANA 25
MAKWANA (KOLI)

[2012] 1 SCC 40 referred to Para 39 A
(2020) 2 SCC 118 referred to Para 39
(2020) 11 SCC 648 referred to Para 39
[2002] 2 SCR 526 referred to Para 40
[2010] 12 SCR 1165 referred to Para 40 B
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 422 of 2021
From the Judgment and Order dated 21.12.2020 of the High Court
of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in R/Criminal Misc. Application No. 19382 of
2020. C
With
Criminal Appeal Nos. 423, 426, 424-425 And 427 of 2021
J.S. Attri, Sr., Adv., Nikhil Goel, Ms. Naveen Goel, Dushyant Sarna,
Vinay Mathew, Aniruddha P Mayee, Haresh Raichura, Ms. Saroj
Raichura, Kalp Raichura, Ram Bhadauria, Purvish Jitendra Malkan, Ms. D
Dharita Purvish Malkan, Jitendra M. Malkan, Ms. Deepa Gorasia, Alok
Kumar, Ms. Neha Ambashtha, Ms. Nandini Chhabra, Ms. Bhavna Sarkar,
Advs. for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J. E
1. This batch of five appeals arises from orders of the High Court
of Gujarat granting bail, under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure 19731, to six persons who have been implicated in five homicidal
deaths.
2. A First Information Report (“FIR”) being CR No F
11993005200314 was registered on 9 May 2020 at Police Station Aadesar,
District East Kachchh - Gandhidham for offences under Sections 302,
143, 144, 147, 148, 149, 341, 384, 120B, 506(2) and 34 of the Indian
Penal Code, Sections 25(1-b) A, 27 and 29 of the Arms Act and Section
135 of the Gujarat Police Act. The appellant - Ramesh Bhavan Rathod - G
is the informant on whose statement, the FIR was registered at 1930
hours in respect of an incident which took place at 1300 hours. The
incident took place in village Hamirpur which is at a distance of 20 kms
from the police station. The incident which led to the commission of five
1
“CrPC” H
26 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.

A murders had its genesis in a land dispute. The informant alleged that he
and his brother Pethabhai had gone to their farm at 6:00 am. At 1 pm, the
informant, Pethabhai and his brother-in-law Akhabhai were returning
home in a Scorpio vehicle with five other persons. When the vehicle
reached the untarred road passing through the farm of Lakha Hira Koli
and Kanji Bijal Koli, these two persons came out along with Lakha Hira
B
Koli. Lakha Koli dashed his tractor on the front portion of the Scorpio
vehicle. Kanji Koli parked his tractor on the rear side of the Scorpio,
behind which another Sumo vehicle came to be stationed. The Scorpio
and its occupants were waylaid. As the informant and others attempted
to run away from the scene, he saw the homicidal incident which he
C describes in the following terms:
“..At that time I saw that Dhama Ghela Koli, Devendrsinh alias
Lalubha Ghelubha Vaghela, Vishan Hira Koli, Bharat Mamu Koli,
Dilip Mamu Koli, Ramshi Hira Koli, Pravin Hira Koli, Bhaghubha
Hasubha Vaghela, Mohansang Umedasng Vaghela and Vanraj Karsan
D Koli and Dinesh Karsan Koli all come with weapons Pistol, Dhariya,
Knife from the thorny fence nearby, in which Dhama Gela Koli
and Devendrasinh alias Lalubha Gelubha Vaghela and Visan Hira
Koli and Bharat Mamu Koli had fired rounds from Rifles in their
hand targeting Akhabhai and others at that time. Akhabhai
Jeshangbhai Umat my Brother Pethabhai Bhavanbhai Rathod and
E Amara Jeshang Umat and Lalji Akhabhai Umat and Vela Panchabhai
Umat injured due to firing and laying on land and that time Lakha
Hira Koli’s Wife, Kanji Bijal Koli’s Wife Lakhman Bijal Koli’s
Wife and Dhama Ghela Koli’s Wife and Vishan Hira Koli’s Wife
also come there, their name is I do not know, and Visan Hira Kofi
F talk with Akhabhai that why you are cultivating my father and
grand father’s land that is our land we also said before that this
land you do not cultivate so today your life is over. This was said
by Visan Hira Koli and thereafter Dilip Mamu Koli, Ramshi Hira
Kofi, Bhaghubha Hasubha Vaghela Mohansang Umedsang Vaghela
and Prabhu Ghela Koli, with Dhariya in their hands and in the
G hands Pravin Hira Koli, Siddhrajsinh Bhaghubha Vaghela, Kheta
Parbat Koli, Vanraj Karsan Koli, and Dinesh Karsan Kofi with
Lathi (Wooden Stick) and all together assaulted blindly with Dhariya
& Lathi over the head and body of Akhabhai Jeshangbhai Umat
and my brother Pethabhai Bhavanbhai Rathod and Amara Jeshang
H Umat and Lalji Akhabhai Umat and Vela Panchabhai Umat and
RAMESH BHAVAN RATHOD v. VISHANBHAI HIRABHAI MAKWANA 27
MAKWANA (KOLI) [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

those people when assaulted that time all five are shouting “save A
save” but those people are in large gathering so I cannot go near
so I cannot save those five those because they will kill me so I ran
away from and I go to my Village…”
3. The incident resulted in the death of five persons. Among the
twenty-two accused are Vishan Heera Koli (A-6), Pravin Heera Koli (A- B
10), Sidhdhrajsinh Bhagubha Vaghela (A-13), Kheta Parbat Koli (A-15),
Vanraj Karshan Koli (A-16) and Dinesh Karshan Akhiyani (Koli) (A-17).
The post-mortem was conducted on 10 May 2020. A panchnama is alleged
to have been conducted at the scene of offence on the next day, i.e. on 10
May 2020, resulting in the recovery of, inter alia, two country made
guns, two indigenous counterfeit guns, four dhariyas and one wooden C
stick.
4. On 13 May 2020, a cross FIR was registered at the behest of
Vishan Heera Makwana (Koli) being FIR No 11993005200315 at Police
Station Aadesar. The informant in the cross FIR claims to be an original
resident of village Hamirpar and is presently residing at Village Anjar. The D
FIR states that after the lockdown had been declared on 25 March 2020,
the informant had left Anjar to go to village Hamirpar. About fifteen years
ago certain agricultural land had been sold to another person, who
subsequently gave it for cultivation to Akhabhai. Akhabhai was refusing
to give the fields for cultivation to the informant as a result of which a E
quarrel had taken place on 7 May 2020. The informant’s motor cycle had
been taken away by the police. The issue had been settled at the intervention
of persons belonging to the community and no complaint was filed.
According to the cross FIR on 9 May 2020, the informant Vishan sent his
nephew to the Police Station together with Akhabhai to retrieve the motor
cycle. The cross FIR narrates Vishan’s version of the incident which took F
place on 9 May 2020 in the following terms:
“..We have decide to kill Akhabhai hence I myself along with my
Brother Lakhbhai Hira Koli, Dinesh Karshan Koli, and Lalubha
Ghelubha Vaghela sat in Ritz Car and proceeded towards Bhimasar
at the time I was driving the said Car and I tried to dash the said G
Car with Akhabhai and tried to kill him. But Akhabhai ran away
nearby and we came to our field (Wadi) There after around 12’0
Clock noon Akhabhai ring me on my mobile phone and said that
why you have tried to dashed by car of Lalubha. I have given
false reply that I am sitting on my field (Wadi) I am not involved.
H
28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.

A Akhabhai told me we are coming to you field (Wadi) for quarrel
be ready for quarrel at that time I myself along with my brother
Lakha Hira Koli, Ramsi Koli, Pravin, Dhama Gela Koli,
Devendrasinh , Iliyas Lalubha Vaghela, Bharat Mamu Koli, Dilip
Mamu Koli, Bhagubha Hansubha Vaghela, and his son Monsang
Umedsang Vaghela, Prabhu Gela Koli, Kheta Parbar Koli, Vanraj
B Karshan Koli, Dinesh Darshan Koli were present their I have told
this fact to them that Jeseng Umat along with his men are coming
at our wadi for quarreling with us so we all armed with weapons
we came near by our field’s boundary and we all are become
ready for quarrel and sat nearby Lakhman Bijal’s field and that
C time white color jeep came that at about place near about wadi
Ramesh Bhavan Rathod come down for jeep along with dhariya
in his hand, Akhabhai came down with his gun, Akhabhai abused
me “I have pride to save” at that time Ramesh Bhavan Rathod
given blow with dhariya I have tried to save myself and I have
lifted up my left hand so dhariya blow caused injury in my left
D hand I have fallen down on earth and blood coming out for my left
hand at the time Akhabhai given blow of gun on my brother namely
Ramsi on his hand- at that time Akha son Lalji - Amra Jeseng
Umat - Vela Pancha Umat - Petha Bhavan Rathod - Akhabhai’s
younger son Dharmendra - Papu Gabha Umat, came down from
E jeep and tried to attack on me at that time my brother Pravin
Dhama Gela Koli, Devendrasinh, Iliyas Lalubha Vaghela, Bharat
Mamu Koli, Dilip Mamu Koli, Bhagubha Hansubha Vaghela, and
his son Mohansang Umedsang Vaghela, Prabhu Gela Koli, Kheta
Parbat Koli, Vanraj Karsan Koli, Dinesh Karsan Koli, came along
with the arms at that time Akho and his person’s tried to ran away
F with the Scorpio jeep. My brother namely Lakhabhai dashed that
jeep by tractor at that time my another cousin brother Kanji Bijal
came with the another tractor and Lakhman Bijal came with the
sumo jeep and dashed with the jeep of Akhabhai. At that time our
ladies came down during quarrel Ramesh Bhavan Rathod- Papu
Gabha Umat - Akhabhai Son Dharmendra ran away at that time
G the our persons who came there assaulted with the dhariya and
lakdi’s on Akhabhai- Velabhai-Pethabhai-Amrabhai And Lalji and
this quarrel i have been injured…”
5. Vishan was arrested on 18 May 2020. A further statement of
the informant in the original FIR dated 9 May 2020 was recorded on 3
H June 2020. After investigation, the charge-sheet was submitted by the
RAMESH BHAVAN RATHOD v. VISHANBHAI HIRABHAI MAKWANA 29
MAKWANA (KOLI) [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

investigating officer against Vishan and twenty-two co-accused. On 31 A
August 2020, an application for interim bail moved by Vishan on medical
grounds was rejected by the Sessions Judge, Bhachau, Kachchh taking
note of the fact that the accused had produced fake documents for the
purpose of obtaining bail. An application seeking regular bail under Section
439 of the CrPC was rejected by the Additional Sessions Judge, Bhachau
on 4 December 2020. B
6. Among the twenty-two accused, who are named in the charge-
sheet, these proceedings arise out of the applications for bail which were
moved before the High Court on behalf of the six persons namely:
Vishan Heera Koli - Accused no.6
C
Pravin Heera Koli - Accused no.10
Sidhdhrajsinh Bhagubha Vaghela - Accused no.13
Kheta Parbat Koli - Accused no.15
Vanraj Karshan Koli - Accused no.16
Dinesh Karshan Akhiyani (Koli) - Accused no.17 D
7. The orders passed by the High Court granting bail to the above
persons are tabulated below:
At this stage, it is necessary to note that A-10 and A-15 were both
granted bail on 21 December 2020 on the basis of parity claimed on the
basis of the order dated 22 October 2020 granting bail to A-13. The E
orders dated 19 January 2021 granting bail to A-16 and to A-17 on 20
January 2021 are also based on parity.
8. Chronologically, the first order of the High Court granting bail
was to Sidhdhrajsinh Bhagubha Vaghela (A-13) on 22 October 2020.
The High Court observed thus: F
Sl No. Name of the accused Accused No. Date of order
1 Vishan Heera Koli 6 21 December 2020
2 Pravin Heera Koli 10 21 December 2020
3 Sidhdhrajsinh Bhagubha Vaghela 13 22 October 2020
4 Kheta Parbat Koli 15 21 December 2020
5 Vanraj Karshan Koli 16 19 January 2021
6 Dinesh Karshan Akhiyani (Koli) 17 20 January 2021 G

“14. Having considered the rival submissions and having gone
through the materials on record, it appears that though the name of
the applicant and is shown in the FIR for the alleged offences
punishable under Sections 302, 143, 144, 147, 148, 149, 341, 384, H
30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.

A 120B, 506 and 34 of the I.P.C., offence punishable under Section
25(1-b)A, 27 and 29 of the Arms Act and Section 135 of the Gujarat
Police Act, for the incident which took place on 9th May 2020, on
perusal of the charge-sheet papers, it appears that the complainant
in the subsequent statement dated 3rd June 2020, which has been
recorded after 25 days from the date of incident, the overt tact
B which was attributed in the FIR, is missing. Though the complainant
has stated that the applicant was present, but no role is attributed
in the subsequent statement, which was recorded on 3rd June,
2020, wherein the details with regard to chronology of events which
took place at the place of the incident on 9th May 2020 is in effect
C substituted by the complainant in the additional statement dated
3rd June 2020 by narrating altogether different details. At this
juncture, this Court is not going into the details of the incident as it
may affect the trial at the later point of time. Suffice is to say
prima facie appears that the applicant has been involved in alleged
offences due to pending proceedings of the previous offences and
D enmity with the complainant side…”
9. In addition, the Single Judge observed that:
(i) The accused was in jail since 19 May 2020;
(ii) The charge-sheet had been filed after investigation; and
E (iii) The trial was likely to take time as 110 witnesses were to be
examined.
Reliance was placed on the decision of this Court in Sanjay
Chandra v. Central Bureau of Investigation2. The orders granting bail
to A-10 and A-15 (21 December 2020); to A-16 (19 January 2021); and
F to A-17 (20 January 2021) are based on parity.
10. The main accused, Vishan (A-6) was granted bail on 21
December 2020. The reasons adduced by the Single Judge of the High
Court are contained in paragraphs 7, 8 and 9 of the order which reads
thus:
G
“7. Having heard the learned advocates for the parties and perusing
the material placed on record and taking into consideration the
facts of the case, nature of allegations, gravity of offences, role
attributed to the accused, without discussing the evidence in detail,
2
H 2012 (1) SCC 40
RAMESH BHAVAN RATHOD v. VISHANBHAI HIRABHAI MAKWANA 31
MAKWANA (KOLI) [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

this Court is of the opinion that this is a fit case to exercise the A
discretion and enlarge the applicant on regular bail.
8. Looking to the overall facts and circumstances of the present
case, I am inclined to consider the case of the applicant.
9. This Court has also taken into consideration the law laid down
by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Sanjay Chandra Vs. B
Central Bureau of Investigation, reported in [2012] 1 SCC 40.”
11. The allegations against all the accused in the present batch of
appeals arise out of the same incident. All the appeals have hence been
heard together.
12. Mr Vinay Navare, Senior Counsel and Ms Jaikriti S Jadeja, C
Counsel have appeared in support of the appeals, all of which had been
filed by the informant. Mr Nikhil Goel, Counsel appeared on behalf of
the respondent-accused. In pursuance of the notice issued on 5 February
2021, Mr Aniruddha P Mayee has entered appearance on behalf of the
State of Gujarat. Insofar as the accused are concerned, the position before
the Court as recorded in the order dated 5 April 2021 reads thus: D
“SLP (Crl) 790/2021 - sole accused represented by Mr
Nikhil Goel
SLP (Crl) 1245/2021 - sole accused – no appearance
entered despite service
E
SLP (Crl) 1246-47/2021 - two accused represented by Mr
Purvish Malkan and Mr Nikhil Goel
SLP (Crl) 1248/2021 - sole accused – no appearance entered
despite service
SLP (Crl) 1249/2021 - sole accused represented by Mr J S
Atri, instructed by Mr Haresh F
Raichura”
Since in two of the Special Leave Petitions namely Special Leave
Petition (Crl) Nos. 1245 and 1248 of 2021, no appearance had been
entered on behalf of the accused despite service of notice, this Court by
its order dated 5 April 2021 requested Mr Nikhil Goel to represent them. G
We appreciate the able assistance which has been rendered by Mr Nikhil
Goel as an officer of the Court who has acted as an amicus curiae for
the two unrepresented accused as well.
13. Mr Vinay Navare, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf
of the appellant – informant submits that the primary basis on which the H
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.

A first order granting bail was passed by the High Court in the case of
Sidhdhrajsinh Bhagubha Vaghela (A-13) on 22 October 2020 is that while
the FIR was registered on 9 May 2020, the statement of the informant
was recorded on 3 June 2020, in which there have been substantial changes
in the genesis of the incident including the nature of the weapons. While
the allegation in the FIR is that Vishan (A-6) fired several rounds from a
B
rifle together with other persons, the subsequent statement would indicate
that the injuries had been caused not as a result of the use of firearms but
by a sharp weapon. The following submissions have been urged:
(i) The cross FIR lodged by Vishan (A-6) on 13 May 2020
indicates that an incident had taken place on 9 May 2020;
C
(ii) During the course of the incident, five homicidal deaths
resulted on the side of the informant (of the FIR dated 9 May
2020);
(iii) The cross FIR lodged on 13 May 2020 contains a reference
to:
D a. The accused being armed with weapons;
b. Pre-meditation on the part of the accused to waylay
and assault the side of the informant; and
c. The assault being committed by the accused as the
deceased were attempting to flee after their vehicle had
E been cornered by two tractors belonging to the side of
the accused.
(iv) The presence of the accused and the role attracted to them
has been spelt out not only in the FIR but it is evident from
the cross FIR which was subsequently registered on 13 May
F 2020 at the behest of Vishan (A-6);
(v) The cross FIR which sets out the version of the accused
would indicate that the accused were the aggressors; and
(vi) Whether the five deaths were caused as a result of firearm
G injuries (as alleged in the FIR dated 9 May 2020) or due to
dhariyas (as alleged in the statement recorded on 3 June 2020)
is not relevant at this stage. The presence of the accused, the
pre-meditation on their part, the assault committed on persons
belonging to the side of the informant and the resultant five
homicidal deaths which form the genesis of the incident should
H be sufficient to deny bail.
RAMESH BHAVAN RATHOD v. VISHANBHAI HIRABHAI MAKWANA 33
MAKWANA (KOLI) [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

14. On the above premises, it has been urged that the High Court A
has committed a grievous error in granting bail in the first instance on 22
October 2020 and in following the earlier order on the basis of parity.
Moreover, it has been submitted that the order granting bail to Vishan (A-
6), who is the main accused, on 21 December 2020 does not contain any
reasons whatsoever. It was urged that while granting bail, the Chief Justice
B
has merely observed that the Advocates who appeared on behalf of the
respective parties “do not press for further reasoned order”. This, it was
urged, is an anathema to criminal jurisprudence. The High Court while
exercising its jurisdiction under Section 439, is required to apply its mind
objectively and indicate reasons for the grant of bail. This duty cannot be
obviated, it was urged, by recording that the Counsel for the parties did C
not press for “a further reasoned order”.
15. The submissions urged by Mr Vinay Navare, Senior Counsel
have been supported during the course of her submissions by Ms Jaikriti
S Jadeja. Learned counsel, in addition, adverted to the following
circumstances: D

(i) The registration of three prior FIRs against Sidhdhrajsinh
Bhagubha Vaghela (A-13);
(ii) The observation of the High Court while granting bail that the
order would not be treated as precedent in any other case on E
grounds of parity; and
(iii) The grant of bail on the basis of parity alone to Vanraj Karshan
Koli (A-16), Kheta Parbat Koli (A-15), Pravin Heera Koli
(A-10) and Dinesh Karshan Akhiyani (Koli) (A-17).
F
16. Mr Aniruddha P Mayee, learned Counsel appearing on behalf
of the State of Gujarat has supported the submissions of the appellant in
the challenge to the orders granting bail on the following grounds:
(i) The grant of bail by the High court to the six accused persons
in this batch is not justified having regard to the following
G
circumstances:
a. The main accused Vishan (A-6) was a resident of Anjar
and had come to Hamirpur;
b. There was an earlier incident which had taken place
involving an altercation with the deceased Akhabhai; H
34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.

A c. A compromise was arrived at in the course of the dispute
with the intervention of the community;
d. As the cross FIR by Vishan (A-6) narrates, on 9 May
2020- the conduct of the accused was pre-meditated;
e. The incident took place at 1:00 pm when the side of the
B informant (in the FIR dated 9 May 2020) was returning
from their fields for lunch when they were waylaid and
obstructed by vehicles of the accused both at the front
and the rear;
f. The side of the accused had collected 22 persons for
C executing a pre-meditated design to assault the group of
the informant with deadly weapons;
g. Whether or not the rifles had been fired, the panchnama
notes the recovery of the weapons;
h. Both Vishan (A-6) and Sidhdhrajsinh Bhagubha Vaghela
D (A-13) have criminal antecedents, there being earlier FIRs
registered against them;
i. The Sessions Judge noted that A-6 had even attempted
to obtain bail on medical grounds on the basis of a false
identity; and
E j. The complicity of the accused, their intent, presence and
role are amply supported by the cross FIR.
17. Mr Nikhil Goel, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the
accused has on the other hand supported the orders of the High Court
granting bail on the following submissions:
F
(i) The FIR which arises out of the incident of 9 May 2020
implicates as many as 22 persons;
(ii) Accused 18-22, who are women, were granted bail, which is
not the subject matter of challenge;
G (iii) Eleven accused are still in jail of whom eight persons are
alleged to have wielded sharp-edged weapons there;
(iv) The charge sheet which has been submitted after investigation
names 110 witnesses;
(v) A charge sheet has been submitted in the cross-FIR as well;
H
RAMESH BHAVAN RATHOD v. VISHANBHAI HIRABHAI MAKWANA 35
MAKWANA (KOLI) [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

(vi) There was a free fight in the course of the incident on 9 May A
2020 resulting in injuries on the side of the accused and five
deaths on the side of the informant;
(vii) The genesis of the incident, as narrated in the FIR registered
on 9 May 2020, has been substantially altered in the course
of the statement of the informant recorded on 3 June 2020; B
(viii) The FIR made no reference to a free fight between the two
groups or to the injuries which were caused to the accused;
(ix) The post-mortem reports of 10 May 2020 would belie the
allegation that the deaths were caused as a result of gunshot
injury; C

(x) An attempt was made to improve upon the allegations in the
FIR in a subsequent statement of the informant on 3 June
2020 to ensure that the allegations in regard to the weapons
used in causing the injuries are made consistent with the post-
mortem reports which indicate the use of sharp-edged D
weapons;
(xi) The allegation in the FIR is that five persons on the side of
the informant were hit by bullets and were lying on the land
which is belied by the Post Mortem reports not indicating
gunshot injuries; and E
(xii) The nature of the incident is sought to be altered in the
statement which was recorded on 3 June 2020. The earlier
version which refers to gunshot injuries is replaced
with dhariya injuries and by the attempted use of fire arms.
F
In summation, it has been urged on behalf of the accused that
(i) The presence of the accused at the scene of offence on 9
May 2020 is established by the cross FIR;
(ii) The Post Mortem reports would demonstrate that all the
injuries were sustained by the deceased with sharp edged G
weapons and not as a result of fire arms or sticks;
(iii) There are three versions of the incident, which are
contained in the FIR, the subsequent statement and the

H
36 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.

A cross FIR. A charge sheet has also been submitted after
the investigation of the cross FIR;
(iv) As many as twenty-two persons have been roped in;
(v) While the Sessions Judge had noticed the improvement
which was made in the subsequent statement, bail was
B denied only on the basis of the presence of the accused;
and
(vi) In the event that this Court holds that adequate reasons
have not been adduced in the order dated 21 December
2020 granting bail to A-6 an order of remand may be
C warranted.
18. The submissions of Mr Nikhil Goel have been buttressed by
Mr J S Atri, Senior Counsel by placing reliance on the decision in Sanjay
Chandra v. Central Bureau of Investigation3. Learned Senior Counsel
specifically highlighted that the subsequent statement dated 3 June 2020
D has materially altered the genesis as well as the details of the incident.
Similar submissions have been urged by Mr Purvish Jitendra Malkan,
learned Counsel appearing on behalf of some of the accused by submitting
that
(i) This is a case involving an ‘over implication’;
E
(ii) The absence of blood marks on the clothes of Kheta Parbat
Koli (A-15) and on the stick is a pointer to his innocence; and
(iii) It was the complainant’s side which had committed the initial
act of aggression.
F 19. The rival submissions now fall for analysis.
20. The first aspect of the case which stares in the face is the
singular absence in the judgment of the High Court to the nature and
gravity of the crime. The incident which took place on 9 May 2020 resulted
in five homicidal deaths. The nature of the offence is a circumstance
G which has an important bearing on the grant of bail. The orders of the
High Court are conspicuous in the absence of any awareness or elaboration
of the serious nature of the offence. The perversity lies in the failure of
the High Court to consider an important circumstance which has a bearing

H 3
2012 (1) SCC 40
RAMESH BHAVAN RATHOD v. VISHANBHAI HIRABHAI MAKWANA 37
MAKWANA (KOLI) [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

on whether bail should be granted. In the two-judge Bench decision of A
this Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudharshan Singh4 the nature
of the crime was recorded as “one of the basic considerations” which
has a bearing on the grant or denial of bail. The considerations which
govern the grant of bail were elucidated in the judgment of this Court
without attaching an exhaustive nature or character to them. This emerges
B
from the following extract:
“4. Apart from the above, certain other which may be attributed
to be relevant considerations may also be noticed at this juncture,
though however, the same are only illustrative and not exhaustive,
neither there can be any. The considerations being: C
(a) While granting bail the court has to keep in mind not
only the nature of the accusations, but the severity of the
punishment, if the accusation entails a conviction and the nature
of evidence in support of the accusations.
(b) Reasonable apprehensions of the witnesses being D
tampered with or the apprehension of there being a threat for the
complainant should also weigh with the court in the matter of grant
of bail.
(c) While it is not expected to have the entire evidence
E
establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt but
there ought always to be a prima facie satisfaction of the court in
support of the charge.
(d) Frivolity in prosecution should always be considered and
it is only the element of genuineness that shall have to be considered
F
in the matter of grant of bail, and in the event of there being some
doubt as to the genuineness of the prosecution, in the normal course
of events, the accused is entitled to an order of bail.”
This Court further laid down the standard for overturning an order
granting bail in the following terms:
G
“3. Grant of bail though being a discretionary order — but, however,
calls for exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and
not as a matter of course. Order for bail bereft of any cogent
reason cannot be sustained.”
4
(2002) 3 SCC 598 H
38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.

A 21. The principles governing the grant of bail were reiterated by a
two judge Bench in Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee5:
“9. … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an
order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the
accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to
B exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in
compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of
decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among
other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while
considering an application for bail are:
C (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to
believe that the accused had committed the offence;
(ii) nature and gravity of the accusation;
(iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction;
(iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released
D on bail;
(v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the
accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated;
E (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
influenced; and
(viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of
bail.
[internal citation omitted]”
F
Explicating the power of this Court to set aside an order granting
bail, this Court held:
“10. It is manifest that if the High Court does not advert to these
relevant considerations and mechanically grants bail, the said order
would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it
G to be illegal...”
22. We are constrained to observe that the orders passed by the
High Court granting bail fail to pass muster under the law. They are
oblivious to, and innocent of, the nature and gravity of the alleged offences
5
H (2010) 14 SCC 496
RAMESH BHAVAN RATHOD v. VISHANBHAI HIRABHAI MAKWANA 39
MAKWANA (KOLI) [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

and to the severity of the punishment in the event of conviction. In Neeru A
Yadav v. State of U.P.6, this Court has held that while applying the principle
of parity, the High Court cannot exercise its powers in a capricious manner
and has to consider the totality of circumstances before granting bail.
This Court observed:
“17. Coming to the case at hand, it is found that when a stand was B
taken that the 2nd Respondent was a history sheeter, it was
imperative on the part of the High Court to scrutinize every aspect
and not capriciously record that the 2nd Respondent is entitled to
be admitted to bail on the ground of parity. It can be stated with
absolute certitude that it was not a case of parity and, therefore,
the impugned order clearly exposes the non-application of mind. C
That apart, as a matter of fact it has been brought on record that
the 2nd Respondent has been charge sheeted in respect of number
of other heinous offences. The High Court has failed to take note
of the same. Therefore, the order has to pave the path of extinction,
for its approval by this Court would tantamount to travesty of D
justice, and accordingly we set it aside.”
23. Another aspect of the case which needs emphasis is the manner
in which the High Court has applied the principle of parity. By its two
orders both dated 21 December 2020, the High Court granted bail to
Pravin Koli (A-10) and Kheta Parbat Koli (A-15). Parity was sought with E
Sidhdhrajsinh Bhagubha Vaghela (A-13) to whom bail was granted on 22
October 2020 on the ground (as the High Court recorded) that he was
“assigned similar role of armed with stick (sic)”. Again, bail was granted
to Vanraj Koli (A-16) on the ground that he was armed with a wooden
stick and on the ground that Pravin (A-10), Kheta (A-15) and Sidhdhrajsinh
(A-13) who were armed with sticks had been granted bail. The High F
Court has evidently misunderstood the central aspect of what is meant by
parity. Parity while granting bail must focus upon role of the accused.
Merely observing that another accused who was granted bail was armed
with a similar weapon is not sufficient to determine whether a case for the
grant of bail on the basis of parity has been established. In deciding the G
aspect of parity, the role attached to the accused, their position in relation
to the incident and to the victims is of utmost importance. The High
Court has proceeded on the basis of parity on a simplistic assessment as
noted above, which again cannot pass muster under the law.
6
(2014) 16 SCC 508 H
40 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.

A 24. The narration of facts in the earlier part of this judgement
would indicate that on 22 October 2020, a Single Judge of the High Court
granted bail to Sidhdhrajsinh (A-13), The Single Judge noted that the
name of A-13 is shown in the FIR for the incident which took place on 9
May 2020. The circumstance which weighed with the Single Judge was
that the informant in the subsequent statement which was recorded
B
twenty-five days after the FIR on 3 June 2020, does not advert to overt
act which was attributed in the FIR; though the presence of A-13 is
shown, no specific role is attributed to him in the subsequent statement.
Observing that the details in regard to the chronology of events which
took place on 9 May 2020 “is in effect substituted” in the subsequent
C statement dated 3 June 2020, the High Court held that it appears that A-
13 was roped in due to the pendency of previous proceedings and enmity
with the side of the informant. Holding that this was sufficient to grant
bail, the learned Judge observed:
“15. Learned Advocates appearing on behalf of the
D respective parties do not press for further reasoned order.”
(emphasis supplied)
25. The order which was passed on 22 October 2020 in the case
of A-13 was relied upon, on grounds of parity, in the case of Pravin (A-
10) and Kheta (A-15), by orders of a Single Judge of the High Court,
dated 21 December 2020. In the case of Vishan (A-6), bail was granted
E on 21 December 2020 by the Single Judge who had passed orders dated
22 October 2020 in the case of A-10 and A-15. The only reasons which
have been indicated in the order of the Single Judge is that bail was being
granted taking into consideration the facts of the case, the nature of the
allegations, gravity of offences and role attributed to the accused.
F Thereafter, by an order dated 19 January 2021 bail was granted to Vanraj
(A-16) purely on the basis of parity. On 20 January 2021, the order granting
bail to Vanraj (A-16) was followed in the case of Dinesh (A-17) on the
ground of parity.
26. From the above conspectus of facts, it is evident that essentially
G the only order which contains a semblance of reasoning is the order dated
22 October 2020 granting bail to A-13. As a matter of fact, the submissions
which have been made on behalf of the accused substantially dwell on
the same line of logic in justifying the grant of bail on the ground that in
the subsequent statement dated 3 June 2020 of the informant, the genesis
and details of the incident which took place on 9 May 2020 as elaborated
H in the FIR have undergone a substantial change.
RAMESH BHAVAN RATHOD v. VISHANBHAI HIRABHAI MAKWANA 41
MAKWANA (KOLI) [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

27. In granting bail to the six accused, the High Court has committed A
a serious mistake by failing to recognize material aspects of the case,
rendering the orders of the High Court vulnerable to assail on the ground
of perversity. The first circumstance which should have weighed with the
High Court but which has been glossed over is the seriousness and gravity
of the offences. The FIR which has been lodged on 9 May 2020 adverts
B
to the murder of five persons on the side of the informant in the course of
the incident as a result of which offences punishable under Sections 302,
143, 144, 147, 148, 149, 341, 384, 120B, 506(2) read with Section 34 of
the Indian Penal Code were alleged. This is apart from the invocation of
the provisions of Sections 25(1-b) A, 27 and 29 of the Arms Act and
Section 135 of the Gujarat Police Act. The FIR which was lodged on 9 C
May 2020 notes that the incident took place at 1:00 pm. A group of
persons from the side of the informant, including the deceased, were
returning home at about 1:00 pm. The genesis of the incident is that the
path of their vehicle was blocked both from the front and the rear by
tractors of the accused. The FIR specifically refers to the presence of the
D
accused Vishan (A-6), Sidhdhrajsinh Bhagubha Vaghela (A-13), Vanraj
Karshan Koli (A-16), Kheta Parbat Koli (A-15), Pravin Heera Koli (A-
10) and Dinesh Karshan Akhiyani (Koli) (A-17). It states that the accused
had all come to the scene of offence with pistols, dhariyas and knives and
that initially Vishan (A-6) and two others had fired from their rifles as a
result of which five persons fell to the ground. Some of these accused – E
Vishan (A-6), Sidhdhrajsinh (A-13), Vanraj (A-16), Kheta (A-15), Pravin
(A-10) and Dinesh (A-17) are alleged to have assaulted with dhariyas and
lathis over the head and body of Akhabhai, Pethabhai, Amara, Lalji and
Vela. All of them were rushed to the Government Hospital where they
were pronounced dead.
F
28. Four days after the FIR was lodged by the informant on 9
May 2020, a cross FIR was lodged by Vishan (A-6). This FIR contains
a narration of the pre-existing dispute over land and to an incident which
had taken place on 7 May 2020 which was resolved with the intervention
of the community. The cross FIR dated 13 May 2020 stated that Vishan
(A-6) sent his nephew together with Akhabhai to the police station to G
retrieve his motorcycle. The cross FIR specifically states that the side of
the accused had decided to kill Akhabhai and in pursuance of this design
he proceeded in his vehicle together with his brother and some of the
other accused and tried to kill Akhabhai by dashing his car against him.
The translation of the actual intent in the cross FIR is questioned by Mr H
42 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.

A Nikhil Goel by submitting that correctly translated from Gujarati, the intent
would be to assault and not to kill. Be that as it may, the cross FIR
indicates the presence of all these accused and of their being armed with
weapons to assault the deceased. A-6, in fact, states that in the course of
the incident which took place, he was assaulted on his hand with a dhariya.
The cross FIR contains a narration of how Akhabhai and the others tried
B
to run away from the scene but were way-laid and assaulted. The cross
FIR also then states that several women from the side of the accused
came to the scene of occurrence.
29. A reading of the cross FIR which was lodged by Vishanbhai (A-
6) on 13 May 2020 indicates:
C
(i) An intent on the part of the accused to launch an assault on
the deceased;
(ii) The manner in which their pre-meditated design was sought
to be achieved by assaulting Akhabhai and the other deceased
persons;
D (iii) An effort was made by Akhabhai and the other deceased to
run away but this was prevented in the course of the assault;
and
(iv) The accused had come armed with weapons to execute their
intent.
E 30. In other words with the contents of the cross FIR as they
stand, it was impossible for any judicial mind, while adjudicating upon the
applications for the grant of bail, to gloss over:
(i) The presence of the accused at the scene of occurrence on
9 May 2020;
F (ii) The accused being armed with weapons to accost Akhabhai
and the other persons accompanying him;
(iii) The intent to assault them; and
(iv) The actual incident in the course of which Akhabhai and four
other persons of his group were waylaid and assaulted,
G resulting in five homicidal deaths.
31. The Post Mortem reports which have been produced on the
record indicate the extensive nature of the bodily injuries which were
sustained by each of the five deceased persons. It is true that in the FIR
dated 9 May 2020, it was alleged that the deceased were fired upon as a
H result of which they fell to the ground whereas, in the statement dated 3
RAMESH BHAVAN RATHOD v. VISHANBHAI HIRABHAI MAKWANA 43
MAKWANA (KOLI) [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

June 2020, it has been stated that the injuries were sustained as a result A
of dhariyas and sticks. Whether the deaths occurred as a result of bullet
wounds or otherwise can make no difference on whether a case for the
grant of bail was made out once a plain reading of the cross FIR indicates
both the presence of the accused and the execution of their plan to assault
the side of the informant with the weapons which were in the possession
B
of the accused. The High Court in its first order dated 22 October 2020
was persuaded to grant bail on the specious ground that the details of the
incident as they appeared in the subsequent statement of the informant
dated 3 June 2020 are at variance with the FIR dated 9 May 2020. These
are matters of trial. The High Court has, however, clearly overlooked the
cross FIR dated 13 May 2020 lodged by A-6 and the implications of the C
content of the FIR on the basic issue as to whether bail should be granted.
As a matter of fact, it is also important to note that the presence of
women on the side of the accused is a fact which is noted in the cross FIR
itself. Bail having been granted to A-18 to A-22 has not been the subject
matter of the challenge in these proceedings. Hence, it is not necessary to
D
dwell on that aspect any further. It is important for the purpose of
evaluating this batch of cases at the present stage to also note the invocation
of the provisions of the Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code.
32. Our analysis above would therefore lead to the conclusion that
there has been a manifest failure of the High Court to advert to material E
circumstances, especially the narration of the incident as it appears in the
cross FIR which was lodged on 13 May 2020. Above all, the High Court
has completely ignored the gravity and seriousness of the offence which
resulted in five homicidal deaths. This is clearly a case where the orders
passed by the High Court suffered from a clear perversity.
F
33. There is another aspect of this batch of cases which it is
necessary to note. In the order of the High Court dated 22 October 2020
granting bail to Sidhdhrajsinh (A-13), there was a reference to the
submission of the Public Prosecutor to the criminal antecedents of A-13
bearing on previous FIRs registered against him in 2017 and 2019. This
aspect bearing on the criminal antecedents of A-13 has not been considered G
in the reasons which have been adduced by the Single Judge. In Ash
Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh7, this Court has held that criminal
antecedents of the accused must be weighed for the purpose of granting
bail. That apart, it is important to note that the ground on which A-13 was
7
(2012) 9 SCC 446 H
44 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.

A granted bail is that in the subsequent statement dated 3 June 2020, the
overt act which was attributed in the FIR was found to be missing. Having
said this, the learned Judge observed that the order shall not be treated
as a precedent to claim bail on the basis of parity in any other case.
34. We are left unimpressed with and disapprove of the above
B observation of the Single Judge. Whether parity can be claimed by any
other accused on the basis of the order granting bail to A-13 ought not to
have been pre-judged by the Single Judge who was dealing only with the
application for the grant of bail to A-13. The observation that the grant of
bail to A-13 shall not be considered as a precedent for any other person
who is accused in the FIR on grounds of parity does not constitute judicially
C appropriate reasoning. Whether an order granting a bail is a precedent on
grounds of parity is a matter for future adjudication if and when an
application for bail is moved on the grounds of parity on behalf of another
accused. In the event that parity is claimed in such a case thereafter, it is
for that court before whom parity is claimed to determine whether a case
D for the grant of bail on reasons of parity is made out. In other words, the
observations of the Single Judge which have been noticed above are
inappropriate and erroneous. Moreover, as observed above in para 23,
even while considering the ground of parity not only the weapon, but
individual role attributed to each accused must be considered. We have
dwelt on this aspect of the matter in order to ensure that the position in
E law is corrected in terms as explained above. As we have noted earlier,
bail was thereafter granted to Pravin (A-10) and Kheta (A-15) by orders
dated 21 December 2020 on the ground of parity as claimed with the
order dated 22 October 2020. The Single Judge observed that the Additional
Public Prosecutor had not made any point of distinction. Subsequently,
F parity was the basis on which bail was sought in the case of Vanraj (A-16)
who was granted bail on 19 January 2021. While granting bail, the Single
Judge observed that:
“the learned advocates appearing on behalf of the respective parties
do not press for further reasoned orders”
G A similar observation is contained in the order dated 20 January
2021 of the Single Judge granting bail to Dinesh (A-17). Finally on this
aspect we would also advert to the order of the High Court dated 21
December 2020 granting bail to Vishan (A-6) which again contains a
statement that the “advocates appearing on behalf of the respective parties
H do not press for a further reasoned order”.
RAMESH BHAVAN RATHOD v. VISHANBHAI HIRABHAI MAKWANA 45
MAKWANA (KOLI) [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

35. We disapprove of the observations of the High Court in a A
succession of orders in the present case recording that the Counsel for the
parties “do not press for a further reasoned order”. The grant of bail is a
matter which implicates the liberty of the accused, the interest of the
State and the victims of crime in the proper administration of criminal
justice. It is a well-settled principle that in determining as to whether bail
B
should be granted, the High Court, or for that matter, the Sessions Court
deciding an application under Section 439 of the CrPC would not launch
upon a detailed evaluation of the facts on merits since a criminal trial is
still to take place. These observations while adjudicating upon bail would
also not be binding on the outcome of the trial. But the Court granting bail
cannot obviate its duty to apply a judicial mind and to record reasons, C
brief as they may be, for the purpose of deciding whether or not to grant
bail. The consent of parties cannot obviate the duty of the High Court to
indicate its reasons why it has either granted or refused bail. This is for
the reason that the outcome of the application has a significant bearing on
the liberty of the accused on one hand as well as the public interest in the
D
due enforcement of criminal justice on the other. The rights of the victims
and their families are at stake as well. These are not matters involving the
private rights of two individual parties, as in a civil proceeding. The proper
enforcement of criminal law is a matter of public interest. We must,
therefore, disapprove of the manner in which a succession of orders in
the present batch of cases has recorded that counsel for the “respective E
parties do not press for further reasoned order”. If this is a euphemism
for not recording adequate reasons, this kind of a formula cannot shield
the order from judicial scrutiny.
36. Grant of bail under Section 439 of the CrPC is a matter involving
the exercise of judicial discretion. Judicial discretion in granting or refusing F
bail – as in the case of any other discretion which is vested in a court as
a judicial institution – is not unstructured. The duty to record reasons is a
significant safeguard which ensures that the discretion which is entrusted
to the court is exercised in a judicious manner. The recording of reasons
in a judicial order ensures that the thought process underlying the order is
subject to scrutiny and that it meets objective standards of reason and G
justice. This Court in Chaman Lal v. State of U.P.8 in a similar vein has
held that an order of a High Court which does not contain reasons for
prima facie concluding that a bail should be granted is liable to be set
aside for non-application of mind. This Court observed:
8
(2004) 7 SCC 525 H
46 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.

A “8. Even on a cursory perusal the High Court’s order shows
complete non-application of mind. Though detailed examination of
the evidence and elaborate documentation of the merits of the case
is to be avoided by the Court while passing orders on bail
applications. Yet a court dealing with the bail application should be
satisfied, as to whether there is a prima facie case, but exhaustive
B
exploration of the merits of the case is not necessary. The court
dealing with the application for bail is required to exercise its
discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course.
9. There is a need to indicate in the order, reasons for prima facie
concluding why bail was being granted particularly where an accused
C was charged of having committed a serious offence…”
37. We are also constrained to record our disapproval of the manner
in which the application for bail of Vishan (A-6) was disposed of. The
High Court sought to support its decision to grant bail by stating that it
had perused the material on record and was granting bail “without
D discussing the evidence in detail” taking into consideration:
(1) The facts of the case;
(2) The nature of allegations;
(3) Gravity of offences; and
E (4) Role attributed to the accused.
As a matter of fact there is no discussion or analysis of
circumstances at all. This lone sentence in the order of the Single Judge
leaves a Court before which the order granting bail is challenged,
completely without guidance on the considerations which weighed with
F the High Court in granting bail. We appreciate that in deciding whether
or not to grant bail the High Court is not at a stage where it adjudicates
upon guilt. This is to be analyzed during the course of criminal trial where
evidence has been recorded. But surely, the order of the High Court
must indicate some reasons why the Court has either granted or denied
G bail. The Sessions Judges in the present case have indicated their reasons
for the ultimate conclusion. This unfortunately has not been observed in
the order of the High Court dated 21 December 2020. Dealing with a
similar formulation as in the present case, this Court has held recently
held as follows in Sonu v. Sonu Yadav9:
9
H Criminal Appeal No. 377 of 2021, decided on 5 April 2021
RAMESH BHAVAN RATHOD v. VISHANBHAI HIRABHAI MAKWANA 47
MAKWANA (KOLI) [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

“11. In the earlier part of this judgment, we have extracted the A
lone sentence in the order of the High Court which is intended to
display some semblance of reasoning for justifying the grant of
bail. The sentence which we have extracted earlier contains an
omnibus amalgam of (i) “the entire facts and circumstances of the
case”; (ii) “submissions of learned Counsel for the parties”; (iii)
B
“the nature of offence”; (iv) “evidence”; and (v) “complicity of
accused”. This is followed by an observation that the “applicant
has made out a case for bail”, “without expressing any opinion on
the merits of the case”. This does not constitute the kind of reasoning
which is expected of a judicial order. The High Court cannot be
oblivious, in a case such as the present, of the seriousness of the C
alleged offence, where a woman has met an unnatural end within
a year of marriage. The seriousness of the alleged offence has to
be evaluated in the backdrop of the allegation that she was being
harassed for dowry; and that a telephone call was received from
the accused in close-proximity to the time of death, making a
D
demand. There are specific allegations of harassment against the
accused on the ground of dowry. An order without reasons is
fundamentally contrary to the norms which guide the judicial
process. The administration of criminal justice by the High Court
cannot be reduced to a mantra containing a recitation of general
observations. That there has been a judicious application of mind E
by the judge who is deciding an application under Section 439 of
the CrPC must emerge from the quality of the reasoning which is
embodied in the order granting bail. While the reasons may be
brief, it is the quality of the reasons which matters the most. That
is because the reasons in a judicial order unravel the thought
F
process of a trained judicial mind. We are constrained to make
these observations because the reasons indicated in the judgment
of the High Court in this case are becoming increasingly familiar
in matters which come to this Court. It is time that such a practice
is discontinued and that the reasons in support of orders granting
bail comport with a judicial process which brings credibility to the G
administration of criminal justice.”
38. What has been observed in the above extract equally applies
to the facts of the present case. There is no question now of ordering a
remand to the High Court in the case of Vishan (A-6) since the question
of bail has been argued fully before this Court. Moreover, the case of H
48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.

A Vishan (A-6) has been considered together with the entire batch of cases
in which bail has been granted- initially on 22 October 2020 in the case of
Sidhdharajsinh (A-13), which has been followed on the grounds of parity
in the case of the other accused.
39. The High Court has relied upon the decision of this Court in
B Sanjay Chandra v. Central Bureau of Investigation 10. While
considering the grant of bail in certain cases arising out of the 2G Spectrum
Scam, this Court observed as follows:
“21. In bail applications, generally, it has been laid down from the
earliest times that the object of bail is to secure the appearance of
C the accused person at his trial by reasonable amount of bail. The
object of bail is neither punitive nor preventative. Deprivation of
liberty must be considered a punishment, unless it is required to
ensure that an accused person will stand his trial when called upon.
The courts owe more than verbal respect to the principle that
punishment begins after conviction, and that every man is deemed
D to be innocent until duly tried and duly found guilty.”
Elaborating further, the Court held
“22. From the earliest times, it was appreciated that detention in
custody pending completion of trial could be a cause of great
E hardship. From time to time, necessity demands that some
unconvicted persons should be held in custody pending trial to
secure their attendance at the trial but in such cases, “necessity”
is the operative test. In this country, it would be quite contrary to
the concept of personal liberty enshrined in the Constitution that
any person should be punished in respect of any matter, upon which,
F he has not been convicted or that in any circumstances, he should
be deprived of his liberty upon only the belief that he will tamper
with the witnesses if left at liberty, save in the most extraordinary
circumstances.”
At the same time, the Court recognized in paragraph 24 of its
G decision that:
“24. In the instant case, we have already noticed that the “pointing
finger of accusation” against the appellants is “the seriousness of
the charge”. The offences alleged are economic offences which
10
2012 (1) SCC 40
H
RAMESH BHAVAN RATHOD v. VISHANBHAI HIRABHAI MAKWANA 49
MAKWANA (KOLI) [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

have resulted in loss to the State exchequer. Though, they contend A
that there is a possibility of the appellants tampering with the
witnesses, they have not placed any material in support of the
allegation. In our view, seriousness of the charge is, no doubt, one
of the relevant considerations while considering bail applications
but that is not the only test or the factor: the other factor that also
B
requires to be taken note of is the punishment that could be imposed
after trial and conviction, both under the Penal Code and the
Prevention of Corruption Act. Otherwise, if the former is the only
test, we would not be balancing the constitutional rights but rather
“recalibrating the scales of justice”.”
In Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar Alias Polia11 this Court observed C
as follows:
“16. The considerations that guide the power of an appellate court
in assessing the correctness of an order granting bail stand on a
different footing from an assessment of an application for the
cancellation of bail. The correctness of an order granting bail is D
tested on the anvil of whether there was an improper or arbitrary
exercise of the discretion in the grant of bail. The test is whether
the order granting bail is perverse, illegal or unjustified. On the
other hand, an application for cancellation of bail is generally
examined on the anvil of the existence of supervening circumstances E
or violations of the conditions of bail by a person to whom bail has
been granted. In Neeru Yadav v. State ofU.P. [Neeru
Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri)
527] , the accused was granted bail by the High Court [Mitthan
Yadav v. State of U.P., 2014 SCC OnLine All 16031] . In an appeal
against the order [Mitthan Yadav v. State of U.P., 2014 SCC F
OnLine All 16031] of the High Court, a two-Judge Bench of this
Court surveyed the precedent on the principles that guide the grant
of bail. Dipak Misra, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was)
held: (Neeru Yadav case [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014)
16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527] , SCC p. 513, para 12) G
“12. … It is well settled in law that cancellation of bail after it
is granted because the accused has misconducted himself or
of some supervening circumstances warranting such
cancellation have occurred is in a different compartment
11
(2020) 2 SCC 118 H
50 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2021] 7 S.C.R.

A altogether than an order granting bail which is unjustified, illegal
and perverse. If in a case, the relevant factors which should
have been taken into consideration while dealing with the
application for bail have not been taken note of, or bail is founded
on irrelevant considerations, indisputably the superior court can
set aside the order of such a grant of bail. Such a case belongs
B
to a different category and is in a separate realm. While dealing
with a case of second nature, the Court does not dwell upon
the violation of conditions by the accused or the supervening
circumstances that have happened subsequently. It, on the
contrary, delves into the justifiability and the soundness of the
C order passed by the Court.”
In Mahipal (supra), this Court outlined the standards governing
the setting aside of bail by this Court in the following terms:
“17. Where a court considering an application for bail fails to
consider relevant factors, an appellate court may justifiably set
D aside the order granting bail. An appellate court is thus required to
consider whether the order granting bail suffers from a non-
application of mind or is not borne out from a prima facie view of
the evidence on record.”
These two standards were reiterated in a recent decision of this
E Court in Prabhakar Tewari v. State of U.P.12.
40. The considerations which must weigh with the Court in granting
bail have been formulated in the decisions of this Court in Ram
Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh13 and Prasanta Kumar
Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee14(noted earlier). These decisions as
well as the decision in Sanjay Chandra (supra) were adverted
F to in a recent decision of a two judge Bench of this Court dated 19
March 2021 in The State of Kerala v. Mahesh15 where the
Court observed:
“22…All the relevant factors have to be weighed by the Court
considering an application for bail, including the gravity of the
G offence, the evidence and material which prima facie show the
involvement of applicant for bail in the offence alleged, the extent
12
(2020) 11 SCC 648
13
(2002) 3 SCC 598
14
(2010) 14 SCC 496
15
H Criminal Appeal No 343 of 2021
RAMESH BHAVAN RATHOD v. VISHANBHAI HIRABHAI MAKWANA 51
MAKWANA (KOLI) [DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.]

of involvement of the applicant for bail, in the offence alleged, A
possibility of the applicant accused absconding or otherwise
defeating or delaying the course of justice, reasonable apprehension
of witnesses being threatened or influenced or of evidence being
tempered with, and danger to the safety of the victim (if alive), the
complainant, their relatives, friends or other witnesses….”
B
Similarly, the Court held that the grant of bail by the High Court
can be set aside, consistent with the precedents we have discussed above,
when such grant is based on non-application of mind or is innocent of the
relevant factors for such grant.
41. For the reasons which we have indicated above, we have come C
to the conclusion that the orders granting bail to the respondent-accused
Vishan Heera Koli (A-6), Pravin Heera Koli (A-10), Sidhdhrajsinh
Bhagubha Vaghela (A-13), Kheta Parbat Koli (A-15), Vanraj Karshan
Koli (A-16) and Dinesh Karshan Akhiyani (Koli) (A-17) suffer from a
clear perversity. We accordingly allow these appeals and set aside the D
following orders of the High Court:
Sl No. Name of the Accused Date of order by the SLP No.
accused No. High Court

1 Vishan Heera Koli 6 21 December 2020 790 of 2021
2 Pravin Heera Koli 10 21 December 2020 1246-47 of 2021 E
3 Sidhdhrajsinh 13 22 October 2020 1249 of 2021
Bhagubha Vaghela
4 Kheta Parbat Koli 15 21 December 2020 1246-47 of 2021
5 Vanraj Karshan 16 19 January 2021 1248 of 2021
Koli
6 Dinesh Karshan 17 20 January 2021 1245 of 2021 F
Akhiyani (Koli)

42. All the above accused are directed to surrender forthwith.
The copy of the order shall be forwarded to the Sessions Judge to secure
compliance forthwith.
G
43. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

Nidhi Jain Appeals allowed

H