Holding

Concurrent findings of fact of the trial court and the first appellate court cannot be interfered with by a second appellate court under Section 100 of the CPC.

Issues considered

Whether a High Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code may interfere with concurrent findings of fact of the trial court and the first appellate court.
Whether the question of the genuineness and validity of the sale deed dated 5 May 1967 is a question of fact or law for a second appeal.
Whether the High Court erred in treating the sufficiency of evidence as a matter of law in a second appeal.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. 100

Subjects

Section 100 CPCsecond appealfindings of factconcurrent findingssale deedtitle to propertycivil procedurejurisdictionevidenceperverse judgment

Judgment

RAMANUJA NAIDU A
v.
V. KANNIAH NAIDU AND ANR.

MARCH 12, 1996
B
(M.M. PUNCHHI AND KS. PARIPOORNAN, JJ.]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908-Section JOO-Second Appeal-Scope
of-Concurrent findings of fact of trial court and first appellant court-cannot
be inteifmed with by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction u/s 100 C
CPC.

The respondent plaintiff filed the suit for declaration of his title to
the suit property and for recovery of possession of the same alleging that
the suit property belonged to the second defendant and he subsequently
sold the suit property to him by sale deed Ext.A·l dated 5.6.1967 with D
direction to redeem Ext.B-1, mortgage; that the second defendant executed
~· a sale deed in favour of the 1st defendant dating it as one excuted on
., 5.5.1967, that the sale deed executed in his favour is anterior to that
executed in favour of 1st defendant and so the first defendant had no title
to the suit property. The suit was dismissed. In appeal, the judgment and
deceree of the trial court were affirmed. The Subordinate Judge held that E
the sale deed in favour of the 1st defendant was executed earlier in point
of time to the sale deed executed in favour of the plaintiff and that on the
date of the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff, the second defendant had
no subsisting title to the suit property and the plaintiff did not acquire
• ,.. valid title to the suit property and therefore the sale deed in his favour F
was held to be invalid in law. In second appeal, Single Judge of the High
Court, characterising the judgments and decrees of the courts below as
perverse, reversed the concurrent judgments and on reappreciating the
entire evidence held, that the sale deed executed by the second defendant
In favour of the plaintiff was a document executed earlier, there being no
collusion between the plaintiff and the second defendant, it was 'not G
'\ ._
__
probable' that the first defendant obtained the sale deed on 5.5.1967. The
first defendant in the suit bas filed this appeal against the judgment of the
Single Judge.

Allowing the appeal, this Court H
239
240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] 3 S.C.R.

A HELD : 1.1. Concurent findings of fact of trial court and first
appellate court cannot be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of
its jurisdiction u/s 100 of Civil Procedure Code. In the instant case, in
' .
interfering with the concurrent findings of facts of the lower court, the
Single Judge of the High Court acted in excess of the jurisdiction vested
B in him u/s 100 of the Code. The Single Judge totally erred in his approach
to the entire question, and in reappraising and reappreciating the entire
evidence, and in considering the probabilities of the case, to hold that the
judgements of the courts below ware 'perverse' and that the plaintiff was
entitled to the declaration of title to suit property and recovery of posses-
sion. The courts below found, on the basis of oral and documentary
C evidence, that the sale deed obtained by the lst defendant on 5.5.1967 was
genuine and valid and that first defendant discharged the mortgage, took
possession of the suit property and thereafter cultivated the came; that
there was collusion between the plaintiff and the second defendant and so,
the sale deed pruported to have been executed by the second defendant in
D favour of the plaintiff was not valid in law. These concurrent findings of
facts of the courts below, were based on oral and documentary evidence.
The Single Judge on reappreciating the evidence took the view that 'it was
not probable ' that the document in favour of the lst defendant 'would
have' been executed on 5.6.1967. In second appeal, the Single Judge of the
E High Court totally erred in making such an approach. Besides, the Single
Judge totally ignored the concurrent findings of the courts below that the
lst defendant discharged the mortgage on 10.5.1967, took possession of the
property and cultivated the same and the said finding was based on the
oral evidence of mortgage and independent witnesses. There was no
F evidence contra. The concurrant findings of the courts below that sale deed
in favour of the 1st defendant was earlier in point of time and was genuine
and valid was a finding of fact. Such a finding was not open to challenge
in Second Appeal. The Single Judge of the High Court totally misconceived
his jurisdiction in deciding the second appeal under Section 100 of the
Code of Civil Procedure in the way he did. No question of law arose for
G consideration before the Single Judge. The sole question that arose for
consideration was, whether the sale deed, in favour of the first defendant
dated 5.5.1967, which was admittedly earlier in point of time to that dated ... ,,
5.6.1967, in favour of the plaintiff was genuine and valid. Both the trial
court as the appellate Court rightly started with the normal and
H
RAMANUJA NAIDU v. V. KANNIAH NAIDU [PARIPOORNAN, J.] 241

reasonable presumption that the sale deed dated 5.S.1967 was made on A
that day which was earlier to that dated 5.6.1967, and that there was no
~
'r evidence to off set or rebut the said presumption, to hold that the sale deed
was not executed on 5.S.1967 as pleaded by the plaintiff. On the other hand,
according to the courts below, the evidence available in the case reinforced
the aforesaid presumption and positively pointed out that the sale deed in
B
favour of the first defendant in fact was executed long before that executed
on 5.6.1967. The High Court ignored such crucial aspects and surmised
that it was "not probable" that the document dated 5.5.1967 would have been
executed on that day in view of "the delay" in registration. The approach so
-, made and the resultant conclusion, were totally unjustified and unsus-
~
tainable in law. (247-H; 248-A-H; 249-A-D]
c
Madamanchi Ramappa & Anr. v. Muthalur Bojjappa, [1964] 2 S.C.R.
673; Dudh Nath Pandey (Dead) By L.R's v. Suresh Chandra Bhattasa/i
(Dead) by L.R's, [1986] 3 S.C.C. 360; Smt. Kamala Devi Budhia & Ors. v.
Hem Prabha Ganguli & Ors., (1989] 3 S.C.C. 145; Smt. Jahejo Devi & Ors. D
v. Moharam Ali, (1988] 1 S.C.C. 372 and P. Velayudhan & Ors. v. Kurungot
).
Imbichia Moidu's son Ayammad and Ors., [1990] Supp. S.C.C. 9, relied on.
_..
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 190 of
1978.
E
From the Judgment and Order dated 27.8.76 of the Madras High
Court in S.A. No. 93 of 1974.

A.T.M. Sampath for the Appellants.

1'
K Ram Kumar for the Respondents. F
,,,
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

PARIPOORNAN, J. The first defendant in O.S. 329 of 1%7, Munsiff
Court, Thirukoilur, has filed this appeal against the judgment of a learned
single judge of the Madras High Court rendered in S.A. No. 93 of 1974
G
dated 27.8.1976, after having obtained special leave in Special Leave Peti-
\ ·>- lion No. 4469 of 1977 by order dated 25.1.1978. The plaintiff and the 2nd
defendant in the suit are the respondents herein.

2. The plaintiff filed the suit for declaration of his title to the suit H
242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996) 3 S.C.R.

A property and for recovery of possession of the same. The suit property is
the northern 33 cent.~ of dry land out of 65 cents in survey No. 217/4 in
Payyur village. It belonged to the second defendant and his minor sons. '
~

The second defendant executed Ext. B-1 registered usufructuary mortgage
dated 12.9.1966 to one Chellian, DW-3, for a sum of Rs. 600. The case put
forward by the plaintiff was that the suit property belonged to the second
B defendant, and he subsequently sold the suit property to him by sale deed
Ext. A-1 dated 5.6.1967 for Rs. 1,100, with direction to redeem Ext. B-1,
mortgage. The sale deed was registered on 7.6.1967. He further alleged that
the second defendant executed a sale deed in favour of the 1st defendant
on 5.5.1967, (Ex.B-2); that the first defendant and his (ather-in-law, who
c had a long standing enmity with the plaintiff, got the same executed by the
second defendant the sale deed as one executed on 5.5.1967 and the same
was registered on 8.6.1967 (Ex. B-2). The plaintiff objected to registration,
but it was futile. The plaintiff alleged that the sale deed executed in his
favour is anterior to Ex.B-2, and so the first defendant has no title to the
suit property. It was in these circumstances that the plaintiff laid the suit
D
for declaration of his title and recovery of possession, impleading his
vendor, the second defendant. i.
~

3. The first defendant contended that he purchased the property
from the second defendant vide Ex.B-2, sale deed dated 5.5.1%7 with a
E direction to redeem Ex.B-1, mortgage, that he redeemed Ex.B-1, Mortgage
and discharged the liability of mortgagee, Chellian (DW-3) on 10.5.1%7,
took possession of property and cultivated the same. It is thereafter with
the knowledge of the above facts, the plaintiff took the sale deed due to
enmity, on 5.6.1967. The document in his favour dated 5.5.1967 is genuine
"t
F and earlier in point of time and conveyed valid title to the suit property. "'\
Plaintiff has no valid or proper title as per Ex.A-1 and, so, the plaintifPs
suit for title and possession is unsustainable. The second defendant con-
tended that he executed the sale deed to the plaintiff as stated, and the
subsequent execution of the document in favour of the first defendant is
sham and ineffective. The learned munsiff, by judgment dated 3.3.1%9
G found that the sale deed executed by the second defendant in favour of the
first defendant (Ex.B-2) is earlier in point of time, to the sale deed
executed by the second defendant in favour of the plaintiff, that Ex. B-2 is
. ~

true and valid and, dismissed, the suit. In the appeal filed by the plaintiff,
the learned Sub-ordinate judge, Cuddalore, by judgment dated 26.3.1973,
H held on an analysis of the facts and circumstances, that the sale deed -
! RAMANUJANAIDUv. V. KANNIAH NAIDU[PARIPOORNAN,J.] 243

Ex.B-2, was executed by the second defendent in favour of the first defen- A
dant on 5.5.1967, which is earlier in point of time to the sale deed executed
by the second defendant in favour of the plaintiff on 5.5.1967, and that
...... Ex.B-2 is valid and genuine. It was further held that on the date of the sale
deed, Ex. A-1, in favour of the plaintiff, the second defendant had no
subsisting title to the suit property and the plaintiff did not acquire valid
title to the suit property. Ex. A-1 was held to be invalid in law. The
B
judgment and decree of the trial court were affirmed.

4. The plaintiff filed a second appeal before the Madras High Court
as S.A. No. 93 of 1974. A learned single judge of the Madras High Court,
·cit on reappreciating the entire evidence held, that the sale deed executed by c
the second defendant in favour of the plaintiff (Ex.A-1) is a document
executed earlier, there is no collusion between the plaintiff and the second
defendant and it is "not probable" that the first defendant obtained the sale
deed on 5.5.1967. Characterising the judgments and decrees of the courts
below as perverse, the learned Single Judge reversed the concurrent judg- D
ments of the courts below, allowed the appeal filed by the plaintiff and
,. ordered that there will be a decree for declaration of the plaintiffs title to
suit property and for recovery of possession. The plaintiff was directed to
+ deposit a sum of Rs. 600 for payment to the first defendant. It is thereafter,
the first defendant in the suit having obtained special leave, has filed this
E
appeal.

5. We heard counsel for the appellant, Mr. AT.M. Sampath and
counsel for the first respondent, Mr. K. Ram Kumar. The second respon-
¥
dent (second defendant), though served, was not represented before us. F
.... The plaintiffs definite case is that the sale deed executed in his favour by
the second defendant Ex. A-1, dated 5.6.1967 is earlier in point of time and
that Ex. B-2 dated 5.5.1967 was not obtained on that date by the first
defendant from the second defendant. Jn these circumstances, first defen-
dant has no title. First defendant obtained Ex. B-2 document in collusion
with the second defendant. The trial court and the first appellate court G
scanned the entire documentary and oral evidence including the different
.... dates on which the stamp papers were purchased by the parties, and
entered the following findings. According to the plaintiff, two stamp papers
were purchased on 3.6.1967 and that the third paper was obtained on
27.5.1967 and that the document Ex.A-1, Sale Deed was executed on H
244 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] 3 S.C.R.

A 5.6.1967 by the second defendant. PW-2 is the scribe of Ex. A-1. There arc
three attestors to the said document. None of them were examined. There
arc patent contradictions in the evidence of the plaintiff as PW-1 and PW-2
scribe regarding payment of consideration for Ex.A-1. A reference to the
suit notice sent by the plaintiff - Ex.A-4, and other circumstances show
collusion between the plaintiff and the second defendant. On the other
B
hand, the evidence of 1st defendants as DW-6, the mortgagee under Ex.
B-1, DW-3 and DW-4 one Naidu and DW-5 (scribe) independent wit-
nesses, positively point out that liability as per Ex.B-1, usufructuary
mortgage was discharged on 10.5.1967. the first defendant took possession
of the property and thereafter cultivated the same. The specific plea of the
C plaintiff that the discharge of the mortgage, Ex.B-1, was after the sale deed,
Ex.B-2, was registered on 8.6.1967, •vas held to be unfounded. The trial
court as well as the lower appellate court believed the evidence of the
defendant and his witnesses DW-3 to DW-6 and held that the Ex.B-1,
mortagage was discharged on 10.5.1967 and the facts and circumstances
D pointed out that Ex.B-2, sale deed was genuine and was executed by the
second defendant in favour of the first defendant on 5.5.1967 which is
earlier in point of Lime. So, the sale deed executed by the second defendant
in favour of the plaintiff later, on 5.6.1967 is invalid and that Ex.B-2 is valid
and legal. On the above findings, it was concluded that on the date of
Ex.A-1, the vendor (second defendant) had no subsisting title to suit
E property and the plaintiff did not acquire any good or valid title.

6. In second appeal on reappreciating the entire evidence in the case,
the learned single judge of the High Court faulted the judgments of the
courts below to the following effect. The sale deed Ex.B-2, is dated 5.5.1%7
F but was registered later, only on 8.6.1967. In view of the above delay, it is '
"probable" that the document was not executed on 5.5.1967. Rcapprcciating "
the circumstance leading to the purchase of stamp papers and other
evidence, it was held that it is not "probable" that on 10.5.1967, Ex.B-1,
usufructuary mortgage would have been discharged and the first defendant
would not have got possession of the property, the reason being that there
G was standing groundnut crop in the property on that dale and DW-3 may
not have parted with possession. Holding that the judgments of the courts
below are perverse, the learned single judge, on appreciation of the facts, -' "'
held that the plaintiffs document Ex.A-1 was earlier, that he obtained title
to the suit property and so entitled to a decree of declaration of title and
H possession of the property.
I
/
RAMANUJANAIDUv. V. KANNIAH NAIDU [PARIPOORNAN,J.] 245

7. The scope of Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code even before the A
y
.. amendment of the Section in 1976 has been neatly summarised in Mulla's
Code of Civil Procedure (15th Edn. vol. I) at page 703. It is stated therein
as follows :

"The section even as it stood before its recent amendment allowed
a second appeal only on the grounds setout in clauses (a), (b) or B
(c). Therefore, whereas a Court of first appeal is competent to
enter into questions of fact and decide for itself whether the

.... findings of fact by the lower Court are or are not erroneous, a
Court of Second appeal was not and is not competent to entertain
the question as to the soundness of a finding of fact by the Court c
below. A second appeal, accordingly, could lie only on one of the
other grounds specified in the section................... "

"As held in Durga Chowdhrani V. Jawahar Singh by the Privy
Council, there is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on
the ground of erroneous finding of facts, however gross in error D
~
they may seem to be. The same view has been expressed also by
-1- the Supreme Court. No doubt, a second appeal lay where there
was a substantial error or defect in procedure under clause (c),
but an erroneous finding of fact is distinct from an error of defect
in procedure. Accordingly, where there was no error or defect in
E
procedure, the finding of the first appellate Court upon a question
of fact had to be regarded as final, if that Court had before it
evidence proper for its consideration in support of the finding,
...................... The mere fact that the High Court would have upon
y
documents and evidence placed before the Court of first appeal
~
come to a different conclusion is no ground for a second appeal." F

In Madamanchi Ramappa & Anr. v. Muthalur Bojjappa, (1964) 2
S.C.R. p. 673, speaking for a three-Member Bench, Gajendragadkar, J.
summarised the law thus :

"The question about the limits of the powers conferred on the High G
' .._ Court in dealing with second appeals has been considered by High
Courts in India and by the Privy Council on several occasions. One
of the earliest pronouncements of the Privy Council on this point
is to be found in the case of Mst. Durga Choudhrain. In the case
of Deity Pattabhiramaswami V.S. Hanyrnayya, this Court had oc- H
246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] 3 S.C.R.

A casion to refer to the said decision of the Privy Council and it was
constrained to observe that "notwithstanding such clear and ·• v

authoritative pronoucements on the scope of the provisions of s.
100, C.P.C., some learned Judges of the High Courts are disposing
of second appeals as if they were first appeals. This introduces,
apart from the fact that the High Court assumes and exercises a
B jurisdiction which it does not possess, a gambling element in
litigation and confusion in the mind of the litigant public.' On this
ground, this Court set aside the second appellate decision which
had been brought before it by the appellants.

c In R. Ramachandra A)Yar v. Rama/ingam Chettiar, this Court had
occasion to revert to the same subject once again. The true legal
position in regard to the powers of the second appellate Court
under s. 100 was once more examined and it was pointed out that
the learned Judges of the High Courts should bear in mind the
caution and warning pronounced by the Privy Council in the case
D
of Mst. Durga Chowdhrain and should not interfere with findings
of fact.
,.. •
It appears that the decision of this Court in Deity Pettabhiramas-
wamy, was in fact cited before the learned single Judge, but he
E was inclined to take the view that some aspects of the provisions
contained in s. 100 of the Code had not been duly considered by
this Court and so, he thought that it was open to him to interfere
with the conclusions of the courts below in the present appeal.
According to the learned Judge, it is open to the second appellate {

F Court to interfere with the conclusions of fact recorded by the
District Judge not only where the said conclusions are based on
"
no evidence, but also where the said conclusions are based on
evidence which the High Court considers insufficient to support
them. In other words, the learned Judge seems to think that the
adequacy or sufficiency of evidence to sustain a conclusion of fact
G is a matter of law which can be effectively raised in a second
appeal. In our opinion, this is clearly a misconception of the true ... ..,
legal position. The admissibility of evidence is no doubt a point of
law, but once it is shown that the evidence on which courts of fact
have acted was admissible and relevant, it is not open to a party
H feeling aggrieved by the findings recorded by the courts of fact to
I
RAMANUJANAIDUv. V. KANNIAH NAIDU [PARIPOORNAN, J.] 247

contend before the High Court in second appeal that the said A
evidence is not sufficient to justify the findings of fact in question.
It has been always recognised that the sufficiency or adequacy of
evidence to support a finding of fact ;s a matter for decision of the
court of facts and cannot be agitated in a second appeal. Some-
times, this position is expressed by saying that like all questions of B
fact, sufficiency or adequacy of evidence in support of a case is
also left to the jury for its verdict. This position has always been
accepted without dissent and it can be stated without any doubt
that it enunciates what can be properly characterised as an elemen-
tary proposition. Therefore, whenever this Court is satisfied that
in dealing with a second appeal, the High Court has, either unwit- C
tingly and in a casual manner, or deliberately as in this case,
contravened the limits prescribed by s. 100, it becomes the duty of
this Court to intervene and give effect to the said provisions. It
may be that in some cases, the High Court dealing with the second
appeal is inclined to take the view that what it regards to be justice D
or equity of the case has not been served by the findings of fact
). recorded by courts of fact; but on such occasions it is necessary
to remember that what is administered in courts is justice accord-
ing to law and considerations of fair play and equity however
im~ortant they may be, must yield to clear and express provisions
of the law. If in reaching its decisions in second appeals, the High E
Court contravenes the express provisions of section 100, it would
inevitably introduce in such decisions an element of disconcerting
unpredictability which is usually assciated, with gambling; and that
is a reproach which judicial process must constantly and
scrupulously endeavour to avoid." F

(pages 683-685)

In Dudh Nath Pandey (Dead) By L. R's. v. Suresh Chardra Bhattasali
(Dead) by L.R's., (1986] 3 S.C.C. 360, a Bench of this Court held that "High
Court cannot set aside findillgs of fact of first appellate court and come to G
a different conclusion on reappraisal of evidence."

There are innumerable subsequent decisions of this Court which
_have held that concurrent findings of fact of trial court and first appellate
court cannot be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its H
248 SUPREMECOURTREPORTS [1996] 3 S.C.R.

A jurisdiction under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code. (See : Smt. Kam/a
Devi Budhia & Ors. v. Hem Prabha Ganguli & Ors., [1989J 3 S.C.C. 145;
Smt. Jahejo Devi & Ors. v. Moharam Ali, (1988] 1 S.C.C. 372; P. Ve/ayudhan
& Ors. v. Kurnngot lmbichia Moidu's son Ayammad and Ors., [1990] Supp.
S.C.C. 9, etc.

B
8. We are of the view, that in interfering with the concurrent findings
of facts of the lower courts, the learned single Judge of the High Court
acted in excess of the jurisdiction vested in him under Section 100 of Civil
Procedure Code. The learned Judge totally erred in his approach to the
entire question, and in reappraising and reappreciating the entire evidence,
c and in considering the probabilities of the case, to hold that the judgments
of the courts below are "perverse" and that the plaintiff is entitled to the
declaration of title to suit property and recovery of possession. It is evident
that the courts below found, on the basis of oral and documentary evidence,
that Ex.B-2 sale deed obtained by the first defendant on 5.5. 1967 is genuine
D and valid, and that first defendant discharged the mortgage, Ex. B-1, on
10.5.1967, took possession of the suit property and thereafter cultivated the
same. The courts below were of opinion that Ex.A-I cannot be accepted
in view of the contradictions in the evidence of PW-1 and PW-2 regarding
the payment of consideration, and none of the attestors to Ex. A-1 were
examined. Laying stress on Ex.A-4, suit notice, sent by the plaintiff to the
E first defendant and other circumstances, the courts also found that there
is collusion between the plaintiff and the second defendant and so, Ex.A-1
purported to have been executed by the second defendant in favour of the
plaintiff is not valid in law. These concurrent findings of facts of the courts
below, were based on oral and documentary evidence. The learned Single
F Judge on reappreciating the evidence took the view that it was "not prob-
able" that the document Ex. B-1 "would have" been executed on 5.6.1967
in view of the delay in the registration of the document. In second ap;>eal,
the learned single Judge of the High Court totally erred in making such an
approach. Besides, the learned single Judge totally ignored the concurrent
findings of the courts below that the first defendant discharged the
G mortgage, Ex.B-1 on 10.5.1967, took possession of the property and cul-
tivated the same and the said finding was based on the oral evidence of ;, Y
DW-3, the mortgagee and independent witnesses, DW-4 and DW-5 scribe,
besides the defendant, DW-6. There was no evidence contra. The concur-
rent findings of the court courts below that Ex.B-2, sale deed in favour of
I H the first defendant is earlier in point of time and was genuine and valid is
I RAMANUJA NAIDU v. V. KANNIAH NAIDU [PARIPOORNAN, J.] 249

a finding of fact. Such a finding was not open to any challenge in Second A
Appeal. The learned single Judge of the High Court totally misconceived
.,
• his jurisdiction in deciding the second appeal under Section _100 of the
Code of Civil Procedure in the way he did. No question of law arose for
consideration before the learned single Judge. The sole question that arose
for consideration was, whether Ex.B-2, sale deed, in favour of the first
defendant dated 5.5.1967, which is admittedly earlier in point of time to
B
Ex.A-1 dated 5.6.1967, in favour of the plaintiff is genuine and valid. Both
the trial court as well as the appellate Court, rightly, in our opinion, started
with the normal and reasonable presumption that Ex. B-2 dated 5.5.1967,
'>iiq was made on that day which is earlier to Ex.A-1 dated 5.6.1967, and that
there was no evidence to off set or rebut the said presumption, to hold that c
Ex.B-2 was not executed on 5.5.1967 as pleaded by the plaintiff. On the
other hand, according to the courts below, the evidence available in the
case reinforced the aforesaid presumption and positively pointed out that
Ext.B-2 was, in fact, executed, long before' Ext.A-1. The High Court
ignored such crucial aspects and surmised that it was "not probable" that
D
Ex.B-2 dated 5.5.1967 would have been executed on that day in view of "the
..).
delay" in registration. The appoarch so made and the resultant conclusion,
are totally unjustified and unsustainable in law.
+
9. We, therefore, set aside the judgment of the High Court and allow
this appeal. The judgments and decrees passed by the learned Munsiff in E
OS No. 329 of 1967 dated 3.2.1969 as affirmed by the learned Sub-ordinate
judge of South Arcot in A.S. No. 109 of 1969 dated 26.3.1973 will stand
restored. The appellant shall be entitled to the costs in this appeal from
the respondents, inclusive of Advocates' fee which is quantified at Rs.
y 5,000. The appeal is allowed with costs ·
)<
F
R.A Appeal allowed.