Holding

The Supreme Court held that the 1963 instrument is a deed of settlement, not a gift, and that the High Court lacked jurisdiction to reverse the lower courts' concurrent factual findings under Section 100 CPC.

Summary

The dispute arose from a 1963 instrument by which two brothers transferred their share of a family property to their sister-in-law Govindammal. The lower courts held that the instrument was a valid settlement deed granting her a two‑thirds share, while the High Court reversed this, deeming it a gift deed for lack of adequate consideration and consequently halved the parties' shares. The Supreme Court examined the nature of the deed, interpreting "consideration" under the Contract Act and the definition of settlement under the Indian Stamp Act, and concluded that non‑monetary consideration such as care and charitable work sufficed for a settlement. It also reviewed the scope of Section 100 of the CPC, reaffirming that a second appeal cannot disturb concurrent factual findings of lower courts. Accordingly, the Court restored the findings of the trial and first appellate courts, held the deed to be a settlement, and set aside the High Court’s order. The appeal was allowed.

Issues considered

Whether the 1963 instrument is a gift deed or a deed of settlement.
Whether the High Court was justified in overturning the concurrent findings of fact of the lower courts under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908.
Whether the consideration stated in the deed satisfies the requirement of adequate consideration for a settlement.
Whether the documentary evidence (Ex.B16, Ex.B17) establishes an oral partition.

Legislation cited

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether the deed executed, which gave rise to the present property dispute, was a gift deed or a deed of settlement; Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the concurrent findings of fact while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Headnotes† Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 122 – Indian Stamp Act, 1899 – Section 2(24) Determination of whether an instrument is Gift Deed or Deed of Settlement – Held, the instrument in the case is Deed of Settlement – The consideration need not

Subjects

Gift DeedSettlement DeedConsiderationSection 100 CPCTransfer of Property ActIndian Stamp ActFamily Settlement

Judgment

[2024] 11 S.C.R. 2329 : 2024 INSC 868

Ramachandra Reddy (Dead) Thr. LRs. & Ors.
v.
Ramulu Ammal (Dead) Thr. LRs.
(Civil Appeal No. 3034 of 2012)
14 November 2024
[C.T Ravikumar and Sanjay Karol,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether the deed executed, which gave rise to the present
property dispute, was a gift deed or a deed of settlement; Whether
the High Court was justified in reversing the concurrent findings
of fact while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Civil
Procedure Code, 1908.

Headnotes†
Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Section 122 – Indian Stamp Act,
1899 – Section 2(24) Determination of whether an instrument
is Gift Deed or Deed of Settlement – Held, the instrument in
the case is Deed of Settlement – The consideration need not
always be in monetary terms and can be in other forms as well –
Non-monetary consideration accepted for Deed of Settlement:
Held: The High Court, while considering Second Appeal of the
Respondents, reversed the concurrent findings of the Trial Court as
well as the First Appellate Court that the deed executed in relation
to the property in favour of one Govindammal was settlement
deed – The High Court found that the deed in question was a
gift deed and not one of settlement as the element of ‘adequate
consideration’ was missing and instead, the transfer was effected
out of love and affection for Govindammal – Held, the transfer
of property in favour of Govindammal was in recognition of the
fact that she had been taking care of the transferors and would
continue to do so while also using the same to carry out charitable
work – The High Court has erred in taking a constricted view of
‘consideration’, especially taking note of the fact that the settlement
was between the members of a family – As such, Govindammal
(now her heirs) is indeed entitled to 2/3rd share in the property, in
terms of the settlement deed. [Paras 14, 15.4, 15.5, 16.4]

*Author
2330 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Section 100 – Power to interfere
in Second Appeal limited:
Held: The jurisdiction to interfere in findings where the Courts
below have been ad idem, is limited and such limitation is well
expounded – Referring to Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki (2007) 1 SCC 546
there is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground
of an erroneous finding of fact, however gross or inexcusable the
error may seem to be, and they added a note of warning that no
court in India has power to add to, or enlarge, the grounds specified
in Section 100 – Further reference made to V. Ramachandra
Ayyar v. Ramalingam Chettiar, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 155 & Nazir
Mohammed v. J. Kamala (2020) 19 SCC 57 on the limitations of
the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of
the CPC. [Paras 16, 16.1]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Section 100 – Meaning of
substantial question of law Reiterated:
Held: Referring to Suresh Lataruji Ramteke v. Sau. Sumanbai
Pandurang Petkar, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1210, Santosh
Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (2001) 3 SCC 179, it was held
that a substantial question of law, which is sine qua non for the
maintainability of a second appeal, shall be one which is not
previously settled by law of land or a binding precedent – The
said substantial question of law shall not have material bearing
on the decision of case – Further, a new point raised for the first
time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case
unless it goes to the root of the matter – Therefore, it will depend
on facts of each case. [Paras 16.3]

Case Law Cited
CIT v. Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority [2022] 15 SCR
899 : (2023) 4 SCC 561; Chidambara Iyer & Ors. v. P.S. Renga
Iyer [1966] 1 SCR 168 : 1965 SCC OnLine SC 293; Gurdev
Kaur v. Kaki [2007] Supp. 1 SCR 27 : (2007) 1 SCC 546; V.
Ramachandra Ayyar v. Ramalingam Chettiar, 1962 SCC OnLine
SC 155; Nazir Mohammed v. J. Kamala [2020] 7 SCR 763 :
(2020) 19 SCC 57; Suresh Lataruji Ramteke v. Sau. Sumanbai
Pandurang Petkar [2023] 12 SCR 488 : 2023 SCC OnLine SC
1210; Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari [2001] 1 SCR 948 :
(2001) 3 SCC 179 – referred to.
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 2331

Ramachandra Reddy (Dead) Thr. LRs. & Ors. v.
Ramulu Ammal (Dead) Thr. LRs.

List of Acts

Transfer of Property Act, 1882; Contract Act, 1872; Stamp Act, 1899.

List of Keywords

Gift Deed; Settlement Deed; Consideration.

Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3034
of 2012

From the Judgment and Order dated 22.04.2009 of the High Court
of Madras in SA No. 10 of 2005

Appearances for Parties

Raghenth Basant, S. Nagamuthu, Sr. Advs., Balaji Subramanian,
Akash Kundu, Ms. Hima Bhardwaj, A. Lakshminarayanan, G. Balaji,
Ms. Jyotika Malhotra, Advs. for the Appellants.

V. Prabhakar, R.Anand Padmanabhan, Sr. Advs., Ms. Jothy Prashar,
Ms. Ruchi, Arimardhan Sharma, Ms. Vidya Vijay Signh Pawar,
Shashi Bhushan Kumar, Advs. for the Respondent.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Sanjay Karol, J.

1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the High
Court of Judicature at Madras dated 22nd April, 2009 passed in
S.A.No.10 of 2005. The judgment impugned in turn was passed
in a first appeal preferred against judgment and decree dated
3rd December, 2003 passed by the Additional District Court-cum-
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Fast Track Court No.V, Chengalpattu
in A.S.No.35 of 2001 which confirmed the judgment and decree
dated 13th September, 2001 of the Subordinate Judge, Tiruvallur in
O.S.No.89 of 1995.
2. The brief facts, putting the controversy in context are :-
2332 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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2.1 One Balu Reddy, was survived by his three sons viz.,
Venkatarama Reddy, Venkata Reddy @ Pakki Reddy1 and
Chenga Reddy.2 They enjoyed the property in question as
coparceners to Hindu joint family property. The first of the
three siblings, Venkatarama Reddy died leaving behind his son
Markandeya Reddy as legal heir; the second, Venkata Reddy @
Pakki Reddy died leaving behind his daughter Govindammal as
legal heir; and the third brother Chenga Reddy died issueless,
with each of them having 1/3rd share in the undivided property.
Chenga Reddy transferred his share in favour of Govindammal in
the year 1963 by way of a settlement deed dated 5th May, 1963.
It is urged that thereafter, Govindammal, enjoyed uninterrupted
possession of the property to the extent of 2/3rd.
2.2 In 1986 the original settlement deed in favour of Govindammal
was given to Markandeya Reddy to bring into effect the 2/3rd
share of Govindammal in the official records since at that time
no partition by metes and bounds was effected and without
prejudice to their rights, they had been cultivating random,
separate portion(s) of the land. Such change was, allegedly
never effected and neither were the documents returned to
her. As such the suit for partition was filed on 30th March, 1995.
2.3 Plaint
In the plaint following prayers were made :-

“ ... ... ...
(9) The plaintiffs therefore pray that this Hon’ble Court
may be pleased to pass a decree.
(a) for partition and separate possession of
2/3rd share from out of the suit properties
in favour of the plaintiffs and to put the
plaintiffs in possession of the same.
(b) directing the defendant to pay cost of the
suit and

1 In certain places the record reflects alias of Venkata Reddy as Bachi Reddy Or Bakki Reddy
2 In certain places the record reflects alias of Chenga Reddy as Renga Reddy
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 2333

Ramachandra Reddy (Dead) Thr. LRs. & Ors. v.
Ramulu Ammal (Dead) Thr. LRs.

(c) such other reliefs as this Honourable court
may deem fit proper in the circumstances
of the case and render justice accordingly.”
2.4 Written Statement
In the written statement filed by the original defendants,
it has been averred that in the year 1984 the Panchayat
decided on a division between the parties giving one-half
of the property to both. Patta was not separated for 48-78
acres. His right and title extend to 25½ acres.
Survey No.201/1 was incorrectly included in the name of
the defendant, and when change thereof, was applied for
by Govindammal, the same was carried out without any
objection. Survey Nos.201/L and 201/B were incorrectly
shown against the name of Govindammal and actually
belonged to the defendant.
There is a lake on the property to which the defendant
had half right.
The plaintiff is not in joint possession of properties and is
not entitled to the relief of partition.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT
3. The Trial Court framed the following issues:
"1. Whether the marking of the suit properties are correct
or not?
2. Whether the suit properties are properties of the
plaintiff?
3. Whether the settlement deed executed in the year
1963 have been brought into force?
4. Whether the partition made in the year 1964 is
genuine?
5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for partition as prayed?
6. What are the other relief?”
Having considered the first four issues, the Court, in answer to the
fifth issue, concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to 2/3rd share
of the property. The same was awarded with costs.
2334 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE FIRST APPELLATE COURT
4. The learned First Appellate Court found for its consideration one
solitary issue which was the correctness of the judgment and decree
of the Trial Court. Having considered the evidence on record, the
conclusion arrived at is as under:-
“… Therefore, for the above said facts, I finally decided
that Ex.A1 registered settlement deed was executed
for valuable consideration and as such the deceased
Govindammal has got 2/3rd share in the suit properties
on the basis of Ex.A1 registered settlement deed and
as such her legal heirs, i.e. the respondents/plaintiff are
entitled to get 2/3rd share in the suit properties as prayed
for in the plaint. Earlier, I decided that the appellant/
second defendant has miserably failed to prove that
the suit properties were divided by states and bounds
orally in the year 1964 and mutation of revenue records
in the name of the deceased first defendants. Thiru
Markandeya Reddy would not affect the rights of the
respondent/plaintiff over the suit properties and also in
view of the registered settlement deed dated 5.5.1963
the respondent/plaintiff are entitled to get 2/3rd share in
the suit properties as prayed for in the plaint and as such
there is no reason to interfere with the findings of the
trial court and also no merit in this Civil appeal. In view
of the above said findings, I come to the conclusion that
this civil appeal is liable to be dismissed and I answered
this point accordingly.”

PROCEEDINGS IN SECOND APPEAL
5. Substantial questions of law, arising in the appeal were recorded in
para 6 of the impugned judgment. It reads as under :
"1. Whether the courts below have considered the
material evidence in the case and have properly
applied the law relating to consideration and
appreciation of family arrangement while considering
the defence put forward by the defendant in this
regard?
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 2335

Ramachandra Reddy (Dead) Thr. LRs. & Ors. v.
Ramulu Ammal (Dead) Thr. LRs.

2. Whether the courts below have properly considered
the material evidence in the case namely, Ex.A1,
which is a gift (settlement) deed gifting undivided
share in the coparcenary property?
3. Whether the Courts below properly considered the
material evidence, namely Ex.B16 and Ex.B17, which
have been brought into existence by the plaintiffs
pending the suit which contain the admission to lean
towards the family arrangement?”
6. The High Court concluded that, (a) the learned Courts below correctly
concluded that oral partition had indeed not taken place; (b) that the
Courts below committed an error in holding the settlement deed to
be valid and thereby awarding 2/3rd share in favour of the original
plaintiffs i.e., heirs of Govindammal; (c) that Ex.B16 and B17, cannot
be taken as sufficient evidence to prove oral partition. In view of
this conclusion, the judgment and decree of the Courts below were
modified to the extent that:-
“…Accordingly, the plaintiffs being the legal representatives/
legal heirs of Venkata Reddy are entitled to one half share
and the defendant being the sole widow of D1 Markandeya
Reddy s/o Venkata Rama Reddy is entitled to another half
share in all the suit properties. Accordingly, preliminary
decree shall follow…”

RIVAL CONTENTIONS
7. We have heard Mr. Ragenth Basant and Mr. S. Nagamuthu, learned
senior counsel for the appellants, and Mr. V. Prabhakar, learned
senior counsel for the respondents. We have also perused the written
submissions filed by the parties.
8. The appellants submit chiefly, as under :
8.1 The Courts have correctly and concurrently rejected the defence
of oral partition; thus, this issue has obtained finality;
8.2 What flows from the above is that the rights under the settlement
deed of 1963 have not been given up and were enforceable.
However, the High Court holding that this deed was actually
a gift deed and not a settlement deed, was a position being
2336 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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not open to the Court. This instrument and the rights flowing
therefrom have been admitted in the written statement, wherein
a specific defence has been taken stating thus :
“The right under the 1963 settlement deed were given
up before the Panchayatdars in view of the family
arrangements.”
8.3 Once such a defence of family arrangement stood rejected,
the plaintiff has to necessarily succeed. This is more so in the
view, that the High Court would not ordinarily disturb concurrent
findings of fact.
8.4 The settlement deed in favour of Govindammal was executed
since she had been looking after the food and shelter needs
of her father and uncle and, subsequently, she would perform
charitable work therewith. Such documents have been repeatedly
held to be settlement deeds and not gift deeds.
8.5 In furtherance of the submissions made the appellants have
submitted a compilation of case laws.
9. Mr. V. Prabhakar, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents, submitted as under :-
9.1 The nomenclature of the document hardly makes any difference.
It is the contents of the document, that are to be taken into
consideration. The document although, may be styled as a
settlement deed, was, in fact, a gift deed.
9.2 The intention has been manifested by both express language
and necessary implication. There is no reservation of power of
life estate or vesting rights.
9.3 The appellants have never questioned the nomenclature of
the document and that the document in question, was not a
gift deed. The term ‘settlement’ is used in terms of settlement
of a dispute.
9.4 There is no element of consideration in Ex.A1 (settlement
deed) and love and affection are not elements of ‘consideration’
under the law.
9.5 Documentary evidence such as separate pattas, kist, receipts,
adangals, drive home the point of oral partition. The exclusive
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 2337

Ramachandra Reddy (Dead) Thr. LRs. & Ors. v.
Ramulu Ammal (Dead) Thr. LRs.

enjoyment of properties under separate pattas and separate
sub- divisions cannot be ‘brushed aside.’

OUR VIEW
10. In the above backdrop, the question for us to decide is whether, in
the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court was justified
in overturning the concurrent findings of the Trial as well as the First
Appellate Court. The second question to be considered is whether
the deed executed, which gave rise to the present property dispute,
was a gift deed or a deed of settlement.
11. The settlement deed executed in favour of Govindammal, which is
said to have given her right over 2/3rd of the subject property, is
reproduced for reference:
“DOCUMENT NO.485/1963

Settlement deed for Rs. 5000/- This
settlement deed has been executed on
5th May 1963 in favor of Govindammal
wife of Thondi Krishna Chettiar resident
of Chengalpattu District, Uthukottai
sub district, Katturamanathapuram
panchayat board area by Pakki Reddi(1)
and Chenga Reddi sons of Boyee Reddi
of Ramanathapuram village that with
all of our consent and good faith and
bonafidely execute this settlement deed
that you are the only daughter of Bagi
Reddi and that we do not have any
wife or children or legal heirs and you
happened to be the daughter of our elder
brother Chenga Reddi and that since
we do not have any wife or children
and you happened to have looked after
us very well till now ad that herein after
you will look after our food and shelter
needs and in the belief that you would
do all the charitable work
2338 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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We execute this settlement deed in respect of properties
worth Rs. 5000/- in favor of you and give possession to you
today itself and therefore from today onwards you have the
exclusive, right, title and possession in those properties,
you, your heirs, successors and assigns will have the
exclusive rights, title and possession and we assure that
there is no encumbrances in those properties and any
encumbrances find in future, we would settle them at our
own expenses. The properties given to you this settlement
deed are, value of the property at Amayappanpakam village
is Rs. 500/-. Out of our inherited property of 4.32 acres of
land in dry survey number 176 in Amambakkam village,
Ammampakkam panchayat board area, Uthukottai sub
district and Chengalpattu district we have two third share
after giving one third share to Markandeyan son of our elder
brother and out 4.39 acres of dry land in survey number
221 with patta number 558 in Seethanperi Amaran village
in Amapakkam panchayat board area worth Rs. 4000/-
we have 2/3rd share leaving 1/3rd share to Markendeyan
son of our elder brother and out of 8.41 acres in survey
number 201 we have a right of 2/3rd share leaving 1/3rd
share to Markendeyan son of our elder brother. Out of
2.69 acres of land in dry survey number 201, we have
2/3rd right leaving 1/3rd to Markendeyan son of our elder
brother and out of 9.89 acres in Ramanathapuram village
in Ramanathapuram panchayat board in Uthukottai sub-
district, Chengalpattu district is Rs.500 /-. 17.74 acres
in survey number 163 which is in our possession and
enjoyment. North of the street, east of the housing plot of
Subbi Reddi and Govinda Reddy, west of the dry land of
Thondhi Krishna Reddy and others west of the pattai in
the middle, a house with measurement east to west about
250 feet, north to south about 200 feet in which we have
2.3rd right leaving 1/3rd to Markendeyan son of our elder
brother and out of 2 acre 40 cents in survey number 160
we have 2/3rd right leaving 1/3rd to Markendeyan son of our
elder brother including the standing palm trees, tamarind
trees, and neem trees and other standing palm trees, and
neem trees and other standing trees over which we have
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 2339

Ramachandra Reddy (Dead) Thr. LRs. & Ors. v.
Ramulu Ammal (Dead) Thr. LRs.

2/3rd right leaving 1/3rd to Markendeyan son of our elder
brother. This settlement deed has been executed by us
with all our consent and good faith and bonafidely. xxxLeft
hand Thumb impression of Baghi Reddy and Left hand
thumb impression of Renga Reddy. Sd.
Witnesses.”

12. Although submissions have been advanced by learned senior counsel
for the parties on a variety of issues, in our considered view, the
scope for interference of this Court is limited only to the question
as formulated in para 10.
13. The dispute, as is evident from the above, hinges on whether the
deed executed granting Govindammal 2/3rd share of the property is
a gift deed or a settlement deed. In making such a determination, it
is imperative to examine the meaning of ‘gift’ and ‘settlement’. The
Transfer of Property Act, 18823 defines ‘gift’ as: –
122. “Gift” defined.—“Gift” is the transfer of certain
existing moveable or immoveable property made voluntarily
and without consideration, by one person, called the
donor, to another, called the donee, and accepted by or
on behalf of the donee.
Acceptance when to be made.—Such acceptance must
be made during the lifetime of the donor and while he is
still capable of giving.
If the donee dies before acceptance, the gift is void.
The term ‘settlement’ does not find a place in the TPA. It is defined
under the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. Section 2 (24) reads: –
Settlement.—“Settlement” means any non-testamentary
disposition, in writing, of movable or immovable property
made—
(a) in consideration of marriage,
(b) for the purpose of distributing property of the
settlor among his family or those for whom he desires

3 Hereafter, TPA
2340 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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to provide, or for the purpose of providing for some
person dependent on him, or
(c) for any religious or charitable purpose;
‘disposition’ for reference, means a devise “intended to
comprehend a mode by which property can pass, whether
by act of parties or by an act of the law” and “includes
transfer and charge of property ”.4
14. Disagreeing with the Courts below, the High Court held that the deed
executed was, in fact, a gift deed. The reasoning in this regard is: –
“20. From a conspectus, therefore, of the definitions
contained in the dictionaries and the books regarding
a gift or an adequate consideration, the inescapable
conclusion that follows is that “consideration” means a
reasonable equivalent or other valuable benefit passed
on by the promisor to the promise or by the transferor to
the transferee. Similarly, when the word “consideration”
is qualified by the word adequate it makes consideration
stronger so as to make it sufficient and valuable having
regard to the facts, and circumstances of the case. It
has also been seen from the discussions of the various
authorities mentioned above that a gift is undoubtedly
a transfer which does not contain any element of
consideration in any shape or form. In fact, where there
is any equivalent or benefit measured in terms of money
in respect of a gift the transaction ceases to be a gift and
acquires a different colour. ... Love, affection, spiritual
benefit and many other factors may enter in the intention
of the donor to make a gift but these filial considerations
cannot be called or held to be legal considerations as
understood by law. It is manifest, therefore, that the
passing of monetary consideration is completely foreign
to the concept of a gift having regard to the nature,
character and the circumstances under which such a
transfer takes place...

4 Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, as referred to in Madras Refineries Ltd. v. Chief Controlling Revenue
Authority, Board of Revenue, Madras (1977) 2 SCC 308
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 2341

Ramachandra Reddy (Dead) Thr. LRs. & Ors. v.
Ramulu Ammal (Dead) Thr. LRs.

21....In fact, the legislature has made its intention clear
that gift is excluded by qualifying the word “consideration”
by the adjective “adequate.” Assuming that love and
affection, spiritual benefit or similar other factors may
amount to consideration for the gift, the word “adequate”
is wholly inapplicable to and inconsistent with the concept
of a gift because it is impossible to measure love and
affection, the sentiments or feelings of the donor by any
standard yardstick or barometer. The words “adequate
consideration” clearly postulate that consideration must
be capable of being measured in terms of money value
having regard to the market price of the property, the
value that it may fetch if sold, the value of similar lands
in the vicinity , so on and so forth. In the instant case,
the legislature by using the word “adequate” to qualify the
word “consideration” has completely ruled out and excluded
gift from the ambit of clause (b) of the proviso. In these
circumstances, therefore, the argument of Mr. Kacker that
by not expressly excluding gift, clause(b) of the proviso
includes gift cannot be accepted particularly in the face of
the clear and unambiguous language used by clause (b)
of the proviso in describing the nature of transaction as
one for adequate consideration.”
The primary reason, as it appears from the above extract for the High
Court holding that the deed in question was in fact a gift deed and
not one of settlement, is that it found that the element of ‘adequate
consideration’ was missing and instead, the transfer was effected
out of love and affection for Govindammal.
15. Since the point which the High Court in its wisdom found to be the
determining factor qua the nature of the deed is the element of
consideration and its adequateness, let us consider the same.
15.1 It shall be useful to refer to certain provisions of the Indian
Contract Act, 1872. The relevant part of the interpretation
clause thereof says -
“2...
(d) When, at the desire of the promisor, the promisee
or any other person has done or abstained from
2342 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

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doing, or does or abstains from doing, or promises
to do or to abstain from doing, something, such act
or abstinence or promise is called a consideration
for the promise;
(e) Every promise and every set of promises, forming
the consideration for each other, is an agreement;
(f) Promises which form the consideration or part of
the consideration for each other are called reciprocal
promises;...”
15.2 The discussion regarding the meaning of the word ‘consideration’
made in CIT v. Ahmedabad Urban Development Authority,5
is relevant for our purposes here:
“165. The term “consideration” however is broader.
The plain meaning is a monetary payment, for
something obtained, in the form of goods, or services.
In CCE v. Fiat India (P) Ltd. [CCE v. Fiat India (P)
Ltd. (2012) 9 SCC 332 : (2012) 12 SCR 975] this
Court explained the meaning of that term : (SCC pp.
360-61, paras 68-73)
“68. … Consideration means something which is of
value in the eye of the law, moving from the plaintiff,
either of benefit to the plaintiff or of detriment to the
defendant. In other words, it may consist either in
some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the
one party, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or
responsibility, given, suffered or undertaken by the
other, as observed in Currie v. Misa [Currie v. Misa,
(1875) LR 10 Exch 153] .
69. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
(unabridged) defines, “consideration” thus:
‘Something that is legally regarded as the equivalent
or return given or suffered by one for the act or
promise of another.’

5 (2023) 4 SCC 561
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 2343

Ramachandra Reddy (Dead) Thr. LRs. & Ors. v.
Ramulu Ammal (Dead) Thr. LRs.

70. In Vol. 17 of Corpus Juris Secundum (pp. 420-
21 and 425) the import of “consideration” has been
described thus:
‘Various definitions of the meaning of “consideration”
are to be found in the textbooks and judicial opinions.
A sufficient one, as stated in Corpus Juris and which
has been quoted and cited with approval is “a benefit
to the party promising or a loss or detriment to the
party to whom the promise is made….”
At common law every contract not under seal requires
a consideration to support it, that is, as shown in the
definition above, some benefit to the promisor, or
some detriment to the promisee.’
71. In Salmond on Jurisprudence, the word
“consideration” has been explained in the following
words:
‘A consideration in its widest sense is the reason,
motive or inducement, by which a man is moved to
bind himself by an agreement. It is for nothing that
he consents to impose an obligation upon himself, or
to abandon or transfer a right. It is in consideration
of such and such a fact that he agrees to bear new
burdens or to forego the benefits which the law
already allows him.’
xxx xxx xxx
73. From a conspectus of decisions and dictionary
meaning, the inescapable conclusion that follows is
that “consideration” means a reasonable equivalent
or other valuable benefit passed on by the promisor
to the promisee or by the transferor to the transferee.
Similarly, when the word “consideration” is qualified
by the word “sole”, it makes consideration stronger so
as to make it sufficient and valuable having regard to
the facts, circumstances and necessities of the case.”
(Emphasis supplied)
2344 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

15.3 Chidambara Iyer & Ors. v. P.S. Renga Iyer 6 which cites similar
authorities is also important for our consideration.
15.4 What flows from the above-cited judgments as also provisions
of law, is that ‘consideration’ need not always be in monetary
terms. It can be in other forms as well. In the present case, it
is seen that the transfer of property in favour of Govindammal
was in recognition of the fact that she had been taking care of
the transferors and would continue to do so while also using
the same to carry out charitable work. Although the deed stands
reproduced supra, for immediate recollection the relevant extract
is once again reproduced hereinbelow:
“...execute this Settlement deed that you are the only
daughter of Bagi Reddi and that we do not have any
wife or children or legal heirs and you happened to
be the daughter of our elder brother Chenga Reddi
and that since we do not have any wife or children
and you happened to have looked after us very well
till now and that herein after you will look after our
food and shelter needs and in the belief that you
would do all the charitable work.”
15.5 In that view of the matter, the High Court has erred in taking such
a constricted view of ‘consideration’, especially taking note of the
fact that this settlement was between the members of a family.
16. The above conclusion apart, it was also to be demonstrated by the
High Court that the reversal of concurrent findings by the Courts
below was justified. The jurisdiction to interfere in findings where
the Courts below have been ad idem, is limited and such limitation
is well expounded. We may only refer to a few authorities.
16.1 Dalveer Bhandari J. in Gurdev Kaur v. Kaki 7 referred to various
earlier judgments in the following manner-
“55. This Court again reminded the High Court in
Commr., HRCE v. P. Shanmugama [(2005) 9 SCC
232] that the High Court has no jurisdiction in second
appeal to interfere with the finding of facts.

6 1965 SCC OnLine SC 293
7 (2007) 1 SCC 546
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 2345

Ramachandra Reddy (Dead) Thr. LRs. & Ors. v.
Ramulu Ammal (Dead) Thr. LRs.

56. Again, this Court in State of Kerala v. Mohd. Kunhi
[(2005) 10 SCC 139] has reiterated the same principle
that the High Court is not justified in interfering with
the concurrent findings of fact. This Court observed
that, in doing so, the High Court has gone beyond the
scope of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
...
73. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as
early as in 1890 stated that there is no jurisdiction
to entertain a second appeal on the ground of an
erroneous finding of fact, however gross or inexcusable
the error may seem to be, and they added a note of
warning that no court in India has power to add to, or
enlarge, the grounds specified in Section 100.
...
81. Despite repeated declarations of law by the
judgments of this Court and the Privy Council for
over a century, still the scope of Section 100 has
not been correctly appreciated and applied by the
High Courts in a large number of cases. In the
facts and circumstances of this case the High Court
interfered with the pure findings of fact even after the
amendment of Section 100 CPC in 1976. The High
Court would not have been justified in interfering with
the concurrent findings of fact in this case even prior
to the amendment of Section 100 CPC. The judgment
of the High Court is clearly against the provisions of
Section 100 and in no uncertain terms clearly violates
the legislative intention.”
(Emphasis supplied)

16.2 A Bench of three learned Judges in V. Ramachandra
Ayyar v. Ramalingam Chettiar,8 as recently followed in Nazir
Mohammed v. J. Kamala,9 observed :-

8 1962 SCC OnLine SC 155
9 (2020) 19 SCC 57
2346 [2024] 11 S.C.R.

Supreme Court Reports

“11. It is well known that as early as 1890, the Privy
Council had occasion to consider this aspect of the
matter in Mussummai Durga Choudhrain v. Jawahir
Singh Choudhri [17 IA 122] . In that case, it was urged
before the Privy Council, relying upon the decision of
the Calcutta and Allahabad High Courts in Futtehma
Begum v. Mohamed Ausur [ILR 9 Cal 309] and Nivath
Singh v. Bhikki Singh [ILR 7 All 649] respectively,
that the High Court would be within its jurisdiction
in holding that where the lower appellate court has
clearly misapprehended what the evidence before it
was, and has been led to discard or not give sufficient
weight to other evidence to which it is not entitled,
the High Court can interfere under Section 100. This
contention was rejected by the Privy Council and it
was observed that an erroneous finding of fact is a
different thing from an error or defect in procedure,
and that there is no jurisdiction to entertain a second
appeal on the ground of an erroneous finding of fact,
however gross or inexcusable the error may seem to
be. Their Lordships added that nothing can be clearer
than the declaration in the Code of Civil Procedure
that no second appeal will lie except on the grounds
specified in Section 584 (corresponding to Section
100 of the present Code), and they uttered a word
of warning that no court in India or elsewhere has
power to add to or enlarge those grounds. Since
1890, this decision has been treated as a leading
decision on the question about the jurisdiction of
the High Court in dealing with questions of facts in
second appeals.”
16.3 The principles regarding the exercise of jurisdiction under Section
100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 have been recently
summarised by this Court in Suresh Lataruji Ramteke v. Sau.
Sumanbai Pandurang Petkar.10 Referring to Santosh Hazari v.
Purushottam Tiwari11 it was held that a substantial question of

10 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1210
11 (2001) 3 SCC 179
[2024] 11 S.C.R. 2347

Ramachandra Reddy (Dead) Thr. LRs. & Ors. v.
Ramulu Ammal (Dead) Thr. LRs.

law, which is sine qua non for the maintainability of a second
appeal, shall be so, if:-
"a) Not previously settled by law of land or a binding
precedent.
b) Material bearing on the decision of case; and
(c) New point raised for the first time before the
High Court is not a question involved in the
case unless it goes to the root of the matter.
Therefore, it will depend on facts of each case.”
16.4 In our considered view, none of the aspects referred to above
appear to be met in this case, justifying the High Court’s
overturning of concurrent findings. Govindammal (now her heirs)
is indeed entitled to 2/3rd share in the property.
17. In light of the above discussion, the appeal succeeds and is,
accordingly, allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court is
set aside and the findings of the Court below, are restored.
Pending applications if any, shall stand disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Mukund P Unny, Hony. Associate Editor
(Verified by: Liz Mathew, Sr. Adv.)