RAM NIRANJAN ROYversusSTATE OF BIHAR AND ORS.

                     [2014] 4 S.C.R. 583


                    RAM NIRANJAN ROY                             A
                              v.
               STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS.
            (Criminal Appeal No. 1240 of 2004)
                      MARCH 31, 2014
                                                                 B
            [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI AND
                MADAN 8. LOKUR, JJ.]

    CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT, 1971:
                                                                 c
     s. 14 - Contempt of court - Contemner appearing-in-
person before High Court and shouting at court and making
false statement before court - High Court holding him guilty
of contempt of court and directing him to be taken into custody
and to be sent to jail for 24 hours as punishment - Held: The
                                                                  0
intemperate language used by the appellant while addressing
the Judges of the High Court is most objectionable and
contumacious - He did not show any remorse - He did not
tender any apology, but, continued his rude behaviour of
shouting at the court and baiting the court - By this behaviour E
he lowered the dignity and authority of the High Court - He
challenged the majesty of the High Court by showing utter
disrespect to it - Undoubtedly, he committed contempt of the
High Court in its presence and hearing - He is, therefore, guilty
of having committed contempt in the face of the High Court
uls 14 - High Court cannot be faulted for punishing the F
appellant for contempt of court - Constitution of India, 1950 -
Art. 215.

      s. 2(c) - Criminal contempt of court - Contemner in appeal
before Supreme Court filing copy of judgment of High Court G
by replacing words in it and filing false affidavit - Held:
Contemner is guilty of tampering with High Court's order and
filing it in Supreme Court - This would be criminal contempt
as defined bys. 2(c) - Further he has fifed false affidavit before
                             583                                 H
    584     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 4 S.C.R.


A Supreme Court - He is guilty of contempt of Supreme Court
  - He is directed to pay a fine of Rs. 25, 0001- - Constitution of
  India, 1950 - Art. 129.

          CONTEMPT OF COURT:

B      Contempt in the face of court - Held: When a contempt
  is committed in the face of the High Court or the Supreme
  Court to scandalize or humiliate the Judge, instant action may
  be necessary - There was no question of giving the appellant
  any opportunity to make his defence - Natural justice -
C Opportunity of hearing.

       In a writ petition (C.W.J.C. No.1311 of 2003), filed in
  public interest, raising several issues relating to law and
  order problem in the State of Bihar, the High Court
0 directed the Director General of Police to make a list of
  officers starting from the Station House Officers up to the
  Additional Director General of Police, of those who had
  remained in their station for more than four years. The
  appellant, a Deputy Superintendent of Police, and
E claiming himself to be the President of Bihar Police Seva
  Sangh, filed an intervention application, stating that
  transfers and postings of the officers of Bihar Police
  Service were done arbitrarily in violation of guidelines
  framed by the Home Department of the Government of
  Bihar. He referred to a writ petition filed by him (C.W.J.C.
F No.12225 of 1999) against the State of Bihar for an order
  directing the respondents to implement the said
  guidelines, which was pending in the High Court. He
  further stated that C.W.J.C. No.12225 of 1999 should be
  heard along with C.W.J.C. No.1311 of 2003, and prayed
G for his impleadment in C.W.J.C. No.1311 of 2003. On 27/
  01/2004, the appellant appeared in-person before the
  High Court. He was stated to have shouted at the Court.
  The High Court observed that the appellant baited the
  court. In view of the contumacious behaviour of the
H appellant, the High Court directed him to be taken into
  RAM NIRANJAN ROY v. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. 585


 custody by the Court Officer and the Sergeant and sent          A
 to jail as punishment for a day i.e. for twenty four hours.
 His intervention application came to be rejected.
      Disposing of the appeal, the Court         .
       HELD: 1.1 The appellant wants to ! create an              B
 impression that he is fighting for th~ caus!e of police
 officers of Bihar, but a careful. reading of hisj application
 makes it clear t~at he is espopsing his o~n cause. The
                                                 1


 High Court whil~ dealing wit~ the, quest(on iof law and
 order situation i in Bihar, wa~ !ooki~g int~ the State          c
 Government's policy of posti~gs and! tra~sf+r of police
 officers, obviously because th~t has a direct! bearing on
 efficiency and rectitud~ of the. police pffiter$. The High
 Court had directed the\ res/pondents to submit a list of
 officers who were not removed
                          '   ~
                                  'from
                                  '
                                        their
                                          ;
                                              Statibn
                                               I   '
                                                      for more   D
 than four years. Admit1edly, the appE!llant is posted at
 Patna for several years. The appellant was unhappy and
 disturbed about the task undertaken by the High Court.
 It is this that made him intervene in C.W.J.c.1 No.1311 of
                                               ' '
 2003. [para 4-5) [590-F-G, H; 5~1-A, B-pJ . :                   E
        1.2 The contents of the irripugAed( order ,of the High
   Court reflect the appellant's rude behaviour. He shouted
   at the Judges. The intemperate lang~age used by the
   appellant while addressing the Judges, of the High Court
   is most objectionable and contumacious. He told the F
   court that his application should be heard along with
   Public Interest Litigation as it related to postings and
   transfers of police officers. On scrutiny, it was found that
   it mainly related to his transfer. Thus, he made a wrong
  statement before the court. He, then, stated that he was
  a protected staff member and had immunity from transfer G
· and he could not be touched. He tried to overawe the
  court by producing a Cabinet Minis;ter's leitte~ addressed
  to the Chief Minister recommendin~ his c~se~ The Court
                                          1

  .deprecates this conduct. [para 9 and 18] (593-F-G; 594-
  B~; 601-~                                                     H
    586   SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 4 S.C.R.

A        1.3 The appellant did not show any remorse. He did
    not tender any apology, but, continued his rude
    behaviour of shouting at the court and baiting the court.
    By this behaviour he lowered the dignity and authority
    of the High Court. He challenged the majesty of the High
B   Court by showing utter disrespect to it. Undoubtedly, he
    committed contempt of the High Court in its presence
    and hearing. He is, therefore, guilty of having committed
    contempt in the face of the High Court. His case is
    squarely covered bys. 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act,
c   1971. [para 9) [594-D-E]

        Ranveer Yadav v. State of Bihar 2010 (6) SCR 1073 =
    (2010) 11 SCC 493 ; Pritam Pal v. High Court of Madhya
    Pradesh, Jabalpur, through Registrar 1993 Supp (1) SCC
    529 and Prakash Singh and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.
D   2006 (6) Suppl. SCR 473 = (2006) 8 sec 1 - relied on

        Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra 1995 (2) SCR 638 = (1995)
    2 sec 584 - referred to.

E      1.3 When a contempt is committed in the face of the
  High Court or the Supreme Court to scandalize or
  humiliate the Judge, instant action may be necessary. If
  the courts do not deal with such contempt with strong
  hand, that may result in scandalizing the institution
F thereby lowering its dignity in the eyes of the public. To
  prevent erosion of that faith, contempts committed in the
  face of the court need a strict treatment. Therefore, since
  the contempt was gross and it was committed in the face
  of the High Court, the Judges had to take immediate
  action to maintain honour and dignity of the High Court.
G There was no question of giving the appellant any
  opportunity to make his defence. [para 14) [597-D-G]

         Leila David(6) v. State of Maharashtra and Others 2009
                  =
    (15) SCR 317 (2009) 10 sec 337 - relied on.
H
 RAM NIRANJAN ROY v. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. 587


     2.1 In this Court also the appellant's behaviour is far    A
from satisfactory. He stated before this Court that he had
filed an application for bail in the High Court, but the High
Court did not consider it. There is no bail application in
the record of the High Court. Still worse is the tampering
of the impugned order. In the copy of the impugned order        s
filed in this Court, by replacing the word 'shouted' by the
words 'didn't shout', the appellant has changed the entire
meaning of the sentence to suit his case that he did not
shout in the court. Thus, he is guilty of tampering with
the High Court's order and filing it in this Court. This        c
would be criminal contempt as defined by s. 2(c) of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Further, in this Court the
appellant has filed a false affidavit. This amounts to
contempt of this Court. Even in this Court he has not
tendered apology. [para 14, 15 and 17] [597-G, 598-B, E-
                                                                0
G; 600-G]

    Chandra Shashi v. Ani/ Kumar Verma 1994 (5) Suppl.
          =
SCR 465 (1995) 1 SCC 421; In Re: Bineet Kumar Singh
                   =
2001 (3) SCR 424 (2001) 5 sec 501 - relied on.
                                                            E
     2.2 It cannot be said that since the respondents have
not filed affidavit, the appellant's case is unrebutted. A
contempt matter is essentially between the contemnor
and the court. On the basis of the record and the
attendant circumstances, the court has to decide whether F
there is any contempt or not. The facts of the case are
gross. The contempt is in the face of the High Court. The ,
fact that the respondents have not filed affidavit in reply
does not dilute the contempt committed by the appellant.
[para 19] [601-C-E]
                                                            G
     2.3 Therefore, this Court is of the view that the High
Court cannot be faulted for punishing the appellant for
contempt of court. No interference is necessary with the
impugned order. As regards the contempt of this Court
committed by the appellant, he is directed to pay a fine H
    588      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 4 S.C.R.


A   of Rs.25,000/-, failing which he shall suffer simple
    imprisonment for seven days. [para 20] [601-F-G]

                          Case Law Reference:
          2009 (15) SCR 317             relied on      para 8
B         1995 (2) SCR 638              referred to    para 10
          2010 (6) SCR 1073             relied on      para 11
          1993 Supp (1) sec 529         relied on      para 12
          1994 (5) Suppl. SCR 465       relied on      para 15
c
          2001 (3) SCR 424              relied on      para 16
          2006 (6) Suppl. SCR 473       relied on      para 18
      CRIMINAL APP ELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
D No. 1240 of 2004.
         From the Judgment and Order dated 27.01.2004 of the
    Division Bench of High Court of Judicature at Patna in CWJC
    No.1311 of2003.

E         Appellant-in-person.

        Siddharth Luthra, ASG (A.C.), Anandana Handa, Aditya
    Singla, Supriya Juneja, Prerna Singh, Gopal Sin9:h for the
    Respondents.
F         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

        (SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J. 1. A petition
    was filed in public interest in the Patna High Court being
    C.W.J.C. No. 1311 of 2003 by Bihar Vyavsayik Sangharsh
G Morcha and another raising several issues relating to law and
    order problem in the State of Bihar. The State of Bihar, the
    Director General of Police of Bihar and others were made party
  . respondents. The issues raised inter alia were whether the
    respondents were duty bound to provide safe and healthy
H atmosphere for the proper development of the State or not and
RAM NIRANJAN ROY v. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. 589
        (RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
whether the inaction of the respondents was violative of            A
fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 19 and 20 of the
Constitution of India. The petitioner inter alia sought direction
to the respondents to take measures to stop exploitation of
shopkeepers, dealers, artisans, labourers and industrial units
by officers and police personnel.                                   8
      2. The High Court issued notices to the respondents
pursuant to which they filed affidavits. On 14/08/2003 the High
Court directed the Director General of Police to make a list of
officers from the Station House Officers upto the Additional
Director General of Police, of those who have remained in their     C
station for more than four years. Relevant paragraphs from the
High Court's order could be quoted:

    'The court suggests the following measures as an ad
    interim exercise:                       ·                       o
    a) Let the Director General Police make out a list of
    officers from the Station House Officer upto the Additional
    Director General of Police, of those who have remained
    in their station for more than four years. This dossier is
    to be supported with information from setvice record as         E
    to which officer throughout their career has remained at
    which station and for how long. Officers who have
    remained at one station for over four years must see a
    posting out within six weeks from today. These would be
    c.Fficers below the rank of Inspector General of Police.        F
    Staff below the SHOs who have remained at a particular
    station beyond three years will be identified by the District
    heads of police concerned and their movement will be
    undertaken by the Director General of Police.
                                                                    G
          It must be mentioned that the period of four years
    is set because in the normal course of government
    setvice, transfers and postings are made for officers if
    they have been at a particular station for more than three
    years. This order obviously does not preclude the
                                                                    H
    590      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2014] 4 S.C.R.


A         Director General of Police from making any transfers
          should an officer have been at a posting for a lesser
          period, which is within normal administrative powers. "

        3. In December, 2003, the appellant. who was holding the
  post of Deputy Superintendent of Police, Crime Investigation
8 Department (CID), Bihar, filed an intervention application being
  l.A.No.5588 of 2003. The appellant claimed in the application
  that he was the President of Bihar Police Seva Sangh, a
  service association of members of Bihar Police Service. He
  stated in the application that the transfers and postings of the
C officers of Bihar Police Service were done arbitrarily in violation
  of guiding principles framed by the Home Department of
  Government of Bihar. The appellant referred to a Writ
  Application filed by him being C.W.J.C. No.12225 of 1999
  against the State of Bihar for an order directing the respondents
D to implement the said guiding principles. He stated that the said
  writ application has been pending in the High Court for last four
  years during which the government has tried to victimize him
  mala fide. He further stated that his application should be heard
  along with the C.W.J.C. No.1311 of 2003. He, therefore, prayed
E that he may be impleaded in C.W.J.C. No.1311of2003.

        4. Admittedly, the appellant is posted at Patna for several
  years. It is clear from several orders that the High Court has
  passed in this matter that while dealing with the question of law
  and order situation in Bihar, the High Court was looking into
F the State Government's policy of postings and transfer of police
  officers, obviously because that has a direct bearing on
  efficiency and rectitude of the police officers. The High Court
  even recorded the statement of the Advocate General that
  certain transfers of police officers are being effected. The
G appellant was unhappy and disturbed about the task undertaken
  by the High Court. This is evident from the first paragraph of
  his intervention application where he has referred to the order
  passed by the High Court directing the respondents to submit
  a list of officers who have not been removed from their station
H
RAM NIRANJAN ROY v. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. 591
        [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
for more than four years. It is this that made him intervene in       A
C.W.J.C. No.1311 of 2003.

     5. The appellant wanted his writ application pending in the
 Patna High Court to be heard with C.W.J.C. No. 1311 of 2003.
We have, therefore, carefully gone through that petition. The
                                                                      8
appellant wants to create an impression that he is fighting for
the cause of police officers of Bihar, but a careful reading of
his application makes it clear that he is espousing his own
cause. He has stated that he is continuously posted for seven
years in Cabinet Vigilance Department. He has stated that his
posting in Criminal Investigation Department is wrong and he          C
should be posted as Sub Divisional Police Officer anywhere
in Patna or in any other proper office such as traffic or transport
department in Patna, so that he may do government duties and
take over the responsibility as the President of Bihar Police
Seva Sangh. We shall advert to this Seva Sangh a little later,        D
but, suffice it to say at this stage that the appellant's pending
writ application concentrates on his posting and he figures in
the prayer clause also.

      6. From the impugned order it appears that on 27/01/ E
2004, the appellant appeared in-person before the High Court.
He shouted and told the court that he was intervener and that
the High Court has nqt focused its attention on the wrong
policies of transfers within the police department. He raised his
voice with impertinence and declared that the High Court is not F
taking up his case wherein he has challenged his transfer and
posting made in the police department. Learned Judges, then,
asked him whether he had been granted leave by the Director
General of Police to.present his case. He again shouted at the
court and stated that he had applied for leave but whether leave
is granted to him or not is not the concern of the court. The High G
Court has obseiVed that he could not show to the court that
leave had been granted to him by the Police Headquarters to
argue his case in-person and challenge transfer policy of the
police department. The High Court has further observed that
                                                                      H
    592      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 4 S.C.R.


A   the appellant baited the court. He wanted his writ application
    to be considered out-of-turn on the ground that it was
  . concerning transfers and postings of police officers. The High
    Court, therefore, called for the record, perused the appellant's
    application and found out that it mainly related to his own
B transfer. The appellant, then, claimed to be an office bearer of
    Bihar Police Seva Sangh and stated that the Police Manual has
    declared him a member of the protected staff and he has
    immunity from transfers and hei cannot be touched. He
    produced a letter addressed by a Cabinet Minister to the Chief
c Minister of Bihar questioning why he was transferred from one
    establishment to another, though, within the city. The said letter
    is quoted in the impugned order. It appears from the impugned
    order that the appellant did not show the slightest remorse nor
    regret and instead continued to bait the court and repeat that
0 even the Minister had given him protection and had granted
    stay of his transfer. In view of this contumacious behaviour, the
    High Court directed that the appellant may be taken into custody
    by the Court Officer and the Sergeant and sent to jail as
    punishment for a day i.e. for twenty four hours. His intervention
E application came to be rejected. Aggrieved by this order, the
    appellant has approached this Court.

       7. The appellant appeared in-person. Looking to the
  importance of the matter, we requested Mr. Siddharth Luthra,
  learned Additional Solicitor General, to assist us. As usual, Mr.
F Luthra has rendered remarkable assistance to this Court. We
  heard the appellant at some length. He submitted that he is not
  guilty of contempt of court. He submitted that he has highest
  regard for the court and he never shouted in the court as stated
  in the impugned order. He submitted that he is the President
G of the Bihar Police Seva Sangh and is espousing the cause of
  police officers in general. On a query made by this Court,
  whether the Bihar Police Seva Sangh is a registered society
  or whether it has got any recognition, he submitted that the
  application in that behalf is pending. The Bihar Police Seva
H Sangh, however, has not received any recognition so far. He
 RAM NIRANJAN ROY v. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. 593
         [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
submitted that the respondents have not refuted any of his            A
contentions by filing any affidavit in reply. He drew our attention
to Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and
submitted that no opportunity, as contemplated therein, was
given to him to make his defence. He submitted that he had
filed an application for bail. However, no order was passed           B
thereon. He further" submitted that the High Court has
unnecessarily cast aspersions on him. He urged that the
impugned order may be set aside.

      8. Mr. Luthra, learned Additional Solicitor General, on the
other hand, submitted that the appellant is guilty of contempt        C
committed in the face of the High Court and his case is covered
by the judgment of this Court in Leila David(6) v. State of
Maharashtra and Others1 where this Court has observed that
when a contemnor disrupts the court proceedings by using
offensive language, it is permissible to adopt summary                D
proceedings to punish him. Mr. Luthra further submitted that the
appellant tried to get his personal application tagged to the
Public Interest Litigation petition for his personal gain and he
utilized a letter of a Cabinet Minister to overawe the court.
Besides, he produced incorrect copy of the impugned order in          E
this Court. He claimed that he had filed bail application when
no such application is found in the record. He has committed
breach of undertaking given in the affidavit filed in this Court.
Mr. Luthra submitted that no leniency should be shown to such
a person and the appeal may, therefore, be dismissed.                 F

     9. We have extensively referred to the contents of the
impugned order of the High Court with a purpose. It reflects the
appellant's rude behaviour. The intemperate language used by
the appellant while addressing learned Judges of the High Court       G
is most objectionable and contumacious. The appellant is
Deputy Superintendent of Police. He claims to be the President
of Bihar Police Seva Sangh. A responsible police officer is not
expected to behave in such undignified and unruly manner in
1.   (2009) 10 sec 337.                                               H
    594       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 4 S.C.R.

A   the Court. He shouted at the. Judges. When they asked him
    Whether the police headquarters had granted him any
    permission to argue his case in-person and challenge transfer
    policy of the police department, he rudely stated that that was
    not the concern of the court. He was, however, unable to
B   produce any permission. Thereafter, he told the court that his
    application should be heard along with Public Interest Litigation
    as it related to postings and transfers of police officers. On
    ~crutiny, it was found that it mainly related to his transfer. Thus,
    he made a wrong statement before the Court. He, then, stated
C   that he is a protected staff member and has immunity from
    transfer and he cannot be touched. He tried to overawe the
    court by producing a Cabinet Minister's letter addressed to the
    Chief Minister recommending his case. He did not show any
    remorse. He did not tender any apology, but, continued his rude
    behaviour of shouting at the court and baiting the court. By this
0
    behaviour he lowered the dignity and authority of the High Court.
    He challenged the majesty of the High Court by showing utter
    disrespect to it. Undoubtedly he committed contempt of the
    High Court in its presence and hearing. He is, therefore, guilty
    of having committed contempt in the face of the High Court.
E   His case is squarely covered by Section 14 of the Contempt
    of Courts Act, 1971.

          10. In Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra 2, on a question put to
    him by a Judge of the Allahabad High Court, the contemnor,
F   who was an advocate, started shouting at the Judge and told
    him that the question could not have been put to him and he
    would get the Judge transferred or see that impeachment
    motion is brought against him in Parliament. He made more
    such derogatory comments. Learned Judge addressed a letter
G   to the Acting Chief Justice narrating the incident. The Acting
    Chief Justice forwarded the letter to the then Chief Justice of
    India. This Court, then, issued a notice to the advocate taking
    a view that there .was a prima facie case of the criminal
    contempt of the court. This Court treated the said contempt as
H   2.   (1195) 2 sec 584.
RAM NIRANJAN ROY v. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. 595
        [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
criminal contempt committed in the face of the High Court and        A
sentenced the advocate. Commenting on the contemnor's
conduct, this Court observed as under:

      "To resent the questions asked by a Judge, to be
      disrespectful to him, to question his authority to ask the
                                                                    8
      questions, to shout at him, .to threaten him with transfer
      and impeachment, to use insulting language and abuse
      him, to dictate the order that he should pass, to create
      scenes in the court, to address him by losing temper are
      all acts calculated to interfere with and obstruct the course
      of justice. Such acts tend to overawe the court and to C
     prevent it from performing its duty to administer justice.
      Such conduct brings the authority of the court and the
     administration of justice into disrespect and disrepute
      and undermines and erodes the very foundation of the
     judiciary by shaking the confidence of the people in the D
     ability of the court to deliver free and fair justice."

     The above observations of this Court have a bearing on
the present case.
                                                                     E
    11. In Ranveer Yadav v. State of Bihafl the appellant and
the other contemnors disrupted the court proceedings by
aggressively exchanging heated words and created unpleasant
scenes in the Court. The decorum and dignity of the court was
so much threatened that the Judge was forced to rise. This
Court held that the offending acts of the appellant constitute       F
contempt in the face of the court. The relevant paragraph could
be quoted.

     "The offending acts of the appellant constitute contempt in
     the face of court. When contempt takes place in the face        G
     of the court, peoples' faith in the administration of justice
     receives a severe jolt and precious judicial time is wasted.
     Therefore, the offending acts of the appellant certainly
     come within the ambit of interference with the due course
3.   (2010) 11 sec 493.                                              H
    596       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 4 S.C.R.


A         of judicial proceeding and are a clear case of criminal
          contempt in the face of the court."

          12. The appellant's contention that no opportunity was
    given to him to make his defence must be rejected. In Pritam
    Pal v. High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur, through
8
    Registrar4, while dealing with the nature and scope of power
    conferred upon this Court and the High Court, being courts of
    record under Articles 129 and 215 of the Constitution of India
    respectively, this Court observed that the said p_ower is an
    inherent power under which the Supreme Court and the High
C   Court can deal with contempt of itself. The jurisdiction vested
    is a special one not derived from any other statute but derived
    only from Articles 129 and 215. This Court further clarified that
    the constitutionally vested right cannot be either abridged,
    abrogated or cut down by legislation including the Contempt
D   of Courts Act.

           13. In Leila David(6) this Court has discussed what is
    contempt in the face of the Court. In this case, the petitioners
    made contumacious allegations in the writ petition and
E   supporting affidavits. Notices were issued to them as to why
    contempt proceedings should not be issued against them. The
    hearing commenced. The writ petitioners disrupted the
    proceedings by using very offensive, intemperate and abusive
    language at a high pitch. One of the petitioners stated that the
F   Judges should be jailed by initiating proceedings against them
    and threw footwear at the Judges. The petitioners stood by what
    they had said and done in the Court. One of the learned Judges
    felt that there was no need to issue notice to the petitioners and
    held them guilty of criminal contempt of the court. The other
    learned Judge observed that the mandate of Section 14 of the
G   Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 must be followed before sending
    the contemnors to jail. The question was, therefore, whether the
    petitioners were entitled to any opportunity of hearing. The
    matter was thereafter placed before a three Judge Bench. The
H   4.   1993 Supp (1) sec 529.
   RAM NIRANJAN ROY v. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. 597
           [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]

  three Judge Bench resolved the difference of opinion and               A
  observed as under:

       "Section 14 of the Contempt of Courts Act no doubt
       contemplates issuance of notice and an opportunity to the
       contemnors to answer the charges in the notice to satisfy
                                                                         8
       the principles of natural justice. However, where an incident
       of the instant nature takes place within the presence and
       sight of the learned Judges, the same amounts to contempt
       in the face of the Court and is required to be dealt with at
       the time of the incident itself. This is necessary for the
       dignity and majesty of the courts to be maintained. When          C
       an object, such as a footwear, is thrown at the Presiding
       Officer in a court proceeding, the object is not to merely
       scandalise or humiliate the Judge, but to scandalise the
       institution itself and thereby lower its dignity in the eyes of
       the public."                                                      D

        14. Thus, when a contempt is committed in the face of the
  High Court or the Supreme Court to scandalize or humiliate the
  Judge, instant action may be necessary. If the courts do not deal
  with such contempt with strong hand, that may result in                E
  scandalizing the institution thereby lowering its dignity in the
  eyes of the public. The courts exist for the people. The courts
  cherish the faith reposed in them by people. To prevent erosion
  of that faith, contempts committed in the face of the court need
  a strict treatment. The appellant, as observed by the High Court       F
  was not remorseful. He did not file any affidavit te_ndering
  apology nor did he orally tell the High Court that he was
  remorseful and he wanted to tender apology. Even in this Court
· he has not tendered apology. Therefore, since the contempt
  was gross and it was committed in the face of the High Court,
  learned Judges had to take immediate action to maintain                G
  honour and dignity of the High Court. There was no question
  of giving tlie appellant any opportunity to make his defence.
  This submission of the appellant must, therefore, be rejected.

       15. In this Court also the appellant's behaviour is far from      H
    598       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 4 S.C.R.


A   satisfactory. He told us that he had filed an application for bail
    in the High Court, but the High Court did not consider it. The
    bail application attached at Annexure-A/6 to the petition is
    unsigned, supported by unsigned affidavit bearing no name of
    the lawyer. We have gone through the entire record of the High
B   Court and we find that there is no bail application in the record.
    Still worse is the tampering of the impugned order. The
    appellant has not filed the true copy of the impugned order. The
    first sentence of paragraph 4 of the copy of the impugned order
    filed in this Court reads as under:
c         "The intervenor who presents himself in person otherwise
          a police officer didn't shout at the Court that he is an
          intervenor in this case .... "

          However, in the original impugned order the said sentence
o does riot have the words 'didn't shout.' It reads as under:
          "the intervenor who presents himself in person otherwise
          a police officer shouted at the Court that he is an
          intervenor in this case ....... "

E       Thus, the words 'didn't shout' have replaced the word
   'shouted.' When we asked for an explanation, the appellant
  stated that there is no tampering, but it is merely a typing error.
  We refuse to accept this explanation. In this case, by replacing
  the word 'shouted' by the words 'didn't shout' the appellant has
F changed the entire meaning of the sentence to suit his case
  that he did not shout in the court. Thus, he is guilty of tampering
  with the High Court's order and filing it in this Court. This would,
  in our opinion, be criminal contempt as defined by Section 2(c)
  of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971. There is abundance of
G judgments of this Court on this issue. This Court has taken a
  strict view of such conduct. We may usefully refer to Chandra
  Shashi v. Anil Kumar Verina 5 where in a transfer petition the
  contemnor had filed a forged experience certificate purportedly
  issued by the Principal of a college from Nagpur. The Principal
H 5. (1995)1SCC421.
 RAM NIRANJAN ROY v. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. 599
         [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]

filed affidavit stating that the said certificate is forged. This   A
Court observed that an act which interferes or tends to interfere
or obstructs or tends to obstruct the administration of justice
would be criminal contempt as defined in Section 2(c) of the
Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. This Court further observed that
if recourse to falsehood is taken with oblique motive, the same     B
would definitely hinder, hamper or impede even flow of justice
and would prevent the courts from performing their legal duties
as they are supposed to do. The contemnor was, therefore,
suitably sentenced.
     16. In Re: Bineet Kumar Singh 6 a forged/fabricated order      C
of this court was used for the purpose of conferring some
benefits on a group of persons. This Court took a strict view of
the matter and observed as under:
       "The law of contempt of court is essentially meant for
      keeping the administration of justice pure and undefiled. D
      It is difficult to rigidly define contempt. While on the one
      hand, the dignity of the court has to be maintained at all
      costs, it must also be borne in mind that the contempt
     jurisdiction is of a special nature and should be sparingly
      used. The Supreme Court Js the highest court of record E
      and it is charged with the duties and responsibilities of
      protecting the dignity of the court. To discharge its
      obligation as the custodian of the administration of
     justice in the country and as the highest court imbued
      with supervisory and appellate jurisdiction over all the
                                                                   F
      lower courts and tribunals, it is inherently deemed to have
     been entrusted with the power to see that the stream of
     justice in the country remains pure, that its course is not
     hindered or obstructed in any manner, that justice is
     delivered without fear or favour. To discharge this
     obligation, the Supreme Court has to take cognizance of G
     the deviation from the path of justice. The sole object of
     the court wielding its power to punish for contempt is
     always for the course of administration of justice. Nothing
     is more incumbent upon the courts of justice than to
s.   c2001) s sec so1.                                              H
    600       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 (2014] 4 S.C.R.


A         preserve their proceedings from being misrepresented,
          nor is there anything more pernicious when the order of
          the court is forged and produced to gain undue
          advantage. Criminal contempt has been defined in
          Section 2(c) to mean interference with the administration
          of justice in any manner. A false or misleading or a wrong
B
          statement deliberately and wilfully made by a party to the
          proceedings to obtain a favourable order would
          undoubtedly tantamount to interference with the due
          course of judicial proceedings. When a person is found
          to have utilised an order of a court which he or she knows
c         to be incorrect for conferring benefit on persons who are
          not entitled to the same, the very utilisation of the
          fabricated order by the person concerned would be
          sufficient to hold him/her guilty of contempt, irrespective
          of the fact whether he or she himself or herself is the
          author of fabrication."
D
          We respectfully concur with these observations.
        17. We shall now turn to the affidavit filed by the appellant
  in this Court. He has sworn an affidavit stating that the
  annexures of the criminal appeal are the true copies of the
E originals and the facts stated in the criminal appeal are true to
  his knowledge. As already noted by us, the appellant has
  tampered with the original impugned order. He stated that he
  had filed a bail application in the High Court. The copy of the
  said bail application filed in this Court is unsigned and
F supported by unsigned affidavit bearing no name of the lawyer.
  The appellant has not made the Registrar of the Patna High
  Court party to the appeal. The Registrar could have clarified
  whether any bail application was, in fact, filed by the appellant.
  In any case, we have perused the record and we find that there
G is no such bail application in the record. Thus, in this Court the
  appellant has filed a false affidavit. This amounts to contempt
  of this Court.
      18. Another very disturbing feature of this case is the
  manner in which the appellant flourished in the High Court a
H Cabinet Minister's letter addressed to the Chief Minister
RAM NIRANJAN ROY v. STATE OF BIHAR AND ORS. 601
        [RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.]
recommending his case. We do not want to comment on the              A
propriety of the Cabinet Minister in addressing such a letter to
the Chief Minister in this case, though this Court has in Prakash
Singh and ors. v. Union of India and Ors. 7 sought to insulate
the police from political interference. In any case, the appellant
should not have tried to overawe the High Court by producing
the said letter. We deprecate this conduct. We were also taken       B
aback when we were informed that the appellant is the
President of the Bihar Police Seva Sangh. We are, however,
informed that membership of such association is permitted in
the State of Bihar even to the police officers. However, the fact
remains that the said association is not registered.                 c
      19. The appellant's contention that since the respondents
have not filed affidavit, his case is unrebutted is without any
merit. A contempt matter is essentially between the contemnor
and the court. On the basis of the record and the attendant
circumstances the court has to decide whether there is any           D
contempt or not. No doubt, the respondents could have filed an
affidavit, but merely because there is no affidavit, the contemnor
cannot escape his liability. The facts of the case are gross. The
contempt is in the face of the High Court. The fact that the
respondents have not filed affidavit in reply does not dilute the    E
contempt committed by the appellant.
     20. In the ultimate analysis we are of the view that the High
Court cannot be faulted for punishing the appellant for contempt
of court. No interference is necessary with the impugned order.
We are also concerned with the contempt of this Court                F
committed by the appellant. We direct the appellant to pay a
fine of Rs.25,000/-. The fine shall be deposited with the
Supreme Court Legal Services Committee within four weeks
from today, failing which the appellant shall suffer simple
imprisonment for seven days. The amount deposited by the
appellant may be utilized for issues concerning juvenile justice.    G
       21. The appeal is disposed of in the afore-stated terms.
R.P.                                       Appeal disposed of.

7.   (2006) a sec 1.                                                 H