RAM NIBAS GAGAR (DEAD) BY LRS.versusDEBOJYOTI DAS AND ORS.

                RAM NIBAS GAGAR (DEAD) BY LRS.                                     A
                              v.
                   DEBOJYOTI DAS AND ORS.

                           DECEMBER 4, 2002

              [R.C. LAHOTI AND BRIJESH KUMAR, JJ.]                                 B

        Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, I 972:

        S.5 (I)(c)-Subsequent event-Suit for eviction-Decreed-Appeal by
 tenant-Pending appeals before first appellate court and Supreme Court tenant      C
filing applications to bring subsequent events on record-Maintainability of-
Held, in the application before the first appellate court, the subsequent event,
 i.e., letting of shops to other tenants, is stated to have taken place during
pendency of the suit and no reason· is assigned why the fact was not brought
to notice of trial court-Besides, the said application does not seem to have       D
been pressed before appellate court or in revision before High Court-In the
application filed before Supreme Court, subsequent events i.e., inducting yet
other tenants, took place during pendency of revision before High Court, but
the attention of the High Court was not invited to such subsequent events by
promptly moving an appropriate application-There is no averment in either
of the applications that the premises re-let were so suitable as to satisfY the    E
requirements of the landlord so as to be relevant and material subsequent
events-Both the applications fail to satisfY the tests-(i) of bringing of the
subsequent events having a material bearing on the relief sought for from the
court and (ii) having been promptly brought to the notice of the Court-
Appeal dismissed-Rent and eviction-Subsequent events.
                                                                                   F
      Om Prakash Gupta v. Ranbir B. Goyal, [2002] 2 SCC, 256 and J.J. Lal
Pvt. Ltd and Ors. v. MR. Murali and Anr., [2002] 3 SCC, 98, relied on.

        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2336 of
1999.
                                                                                   G
     From the Judgment and Order dated 22.7.1998 of the Assam High
Court in C.R. No. 415 of 1993.

     Vijay Hansaria, Ms. lnklee Barooah and Sunil Kumar Jain, for the
Appellant.
                                     595                                           H
    596                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. 4 S.C.R.
A         N.R. Chaudhary and Somnath Mukherjee for the Respondents.

          The following Order of the Court was delivered :

           In the year 1981, the landlords-respondents field a suit for eviction of
    the tenant-appellant from a shop situated on the ground floor and a room
B   situated on the first floor alleging that the premises were required bonajide
    by the landlord for his own occupation mainly for commencing cloth business
    in the shop, a ground available under Section 5(1)(c) of the Assam Urban.
    Areas Rent Control Act, 1972. The ground for eviction was held to be proved
    by the Trial Court as also by the Appellate Court. A revision preferred by the
    tenant in the High Court was also dismissed. This is an appeal filed by the
C   tenant by special leave.

          So far as the finding of the Trial Court upheld by the first Appellate
    Court and by the High Court in revision based on the averments made in the
    plaint is concerned, no fault can be found therewith. What we are called upon
    to consider in this appeal is the impact of subsequent events to which the
D   tenant-appellant invited the attention of the first Appellate Court as also of
    this Court by moving applications. We will deal with the tWo applications to
    examine if any of the two applications satisfied the requirement of bringing
    such subsequent events on record of which a Court of law is bound to take
    notice and whether such subsequent events ought to have been inquired into
E   for disentitling the landlord-respondent from decree for eviction as granted
    by the Trial Court.

          The law as to subsequent events has been examined in details· and
    summed up in a recent decision of this Court in Om Prakash Gupta v. Ranbir
    B. Goyal, (2002) 2 SCC, 256, a decision to which both ofus are a party. The
F   same has law has been reiterated by a subsequent Division Bench in J.J. Lal
    Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. v. MR. Murali and Anr., [2002] 3 SCC, 98. It has been
    held:

                "The ordinary rule of civil law is that the rights of the parties
           stand crystallised on the date of the institution of the suit and, therefore,
G          the decree in a suit should accord with the rights of the parties as they
           stood at the commencement of the tis. However, the Court has power
           to take notice of subsequent events and mould the relief accordingly
           subject to the following conditions being satisfied :(i) that the relief,
           as claimed originally has, by reason of subsequent events, become
           inappropriate or cannot be granted (ii) that taking note of such
H
                    RAM NIBAS GA GAR v. O!lllOJYOTI DAS                       597
           subsequent event or changed circumstances would shorten litigation         A
           and enable complete justice being done to the parties; and (iii) that
           such subsequent event is brQught to the notice of the court promptly
           and in accordance with the rules of procedural law so that the opposite
           party is not taken by surprise.

               Such subsequent event may be one purely of law or founded on           B
           facts. In the former case, the court may take judicial notice of the
           event and before acting thereon put the parties on notice of how the
           change in law is going to affect the rights and obligations of the
           parties and modify or mould the course of litigation or the relief so
           as to bring it in conformity with the law. In the latter case, the party   C
           relying on the subsequent event, which consists of facts not beyond
           pale of controversy either as to their existence or in their impact, is
           expected to have resort to amendment of pleadings under Order 6
           Rule 17 CPC. Such subsequent event, the Court may permit being
           introduced Into the pleadings by way of amendment as it would be
           necessary to do so for the purpose of determining real questions in        D
           contrpversy between the parties."

          We will test the maintainability and entertainability of the two
    applications in the light of the tests laid down as above.

          The application dated 9.L\990 filed before the first Appellate Court is     E
    a vague and bald application. It was alleged that "during the pendency of the
    suit" the landlord had given on tenancy to (I) Khan jewellers; (2) Tarak
    certain premises·. No date of alleged creation of any of the two tenancies is
    given in the application so as to determine the date of subsequent event.
    There is no such averment made as to the accommodation which is alleged
    to have been let out to the two tenants during the pendency of the suit as        F
    would enable determination of nature and extent of the accommodation and
    whether such accommodation would have been sufficient to satisfy the
    requirement of the landlord in the submission of the tenant. The subsequent
    event is stated to have taken place during the pendency of the 'suit' and no
    reason is assigned why the attention of the Trial Court seized of the suit was    G
    not invited to the subsequent event and the application was being moved
    belatedly for the first time in first appeal. What is more, from a perusal of
    the judgment of the Appellate Court we do not find the application having
    been pressed by the tenant-appellant thereat before the Appellate Court. The
    impugned judgment of the High Court also does not show any grievance
'   having been raised by the tenant-petitioner thereat complaining that the          H
    598                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A application moved before the Appellate Court did not receive the consideration
    of the Appellate Court and prejudice having resulted therefrom to the tenant-
    petitioner in the High Court.

          The civil revision remained pending in the High Court from the year
    1993 to 22nd July, 1998: Special leave petition before this Court was filed
B   on 8.9.1998 accompanied by an application seeking to invite the attention of
    this Court to additional facts by way of subsequent events. The relevant part
    of the application is extracted and reproduced hereunder :

                 "That during the pendency of the pr~ceedings, the respondents-
            landlords have inducted many new tenants in the rooms adjacent to
c           the suit premises. Some tenants were inducted during the pendency
            of the first appeal for which an application was filed by the Petitioner.
            However, the Appellate Court failed to take note of the additional
            facts while disposing of the appeal. Even subsequent to disposal of
            the appeal by the Appellate Court, new tenants have been inducted by
D           the landlord/respondents. A sketch map of the suit premises alongwith
            the names of the tenants inducted and the period of tenancy is filed
            herewith and marked as ANNEXURE P-2."

          The map annexed with the application sets out the tenants having been
    inducted during the pendency of the proceedings as under:
E
                           DETAILS OF OTHER TENANTS

      Portion No.        Name of Tenants                  Period

       I.                Khan Jewellers                   1990-1993
F                        B Sarkar Jewellers               1993-1997
                         Tilupada Das                     Present

      2.                 Mis. Tarak                       1988-93
                         Choudhury Library                1993 - till now

G     3 and 4            Khan Jewellers                   Before 1990
                         Dr Bandhana Acharjee             1990-96.

      3                  Kartick Chandra Paul             1996 - till now


H     4                  Mis. Symphony                    1996 - till now
                 RAM NIBA,S GAGAR v. Pf:BOJYOTI PAS                        599

      A site plan of the bulldin~ llf which the suit premises form a part may A
also be adverted to. It appears thM the premises in occupation of the tenant-
appellant are situateq on main rgad having the opening of the shop in the
front and on the main road. Behind the shop there is a staircase and behind
the staircase shops No. 3 and 4 are situated. The map does not indicate the
direction in which the shops No. 3 and 4 have opening, i.e., as to whether B
towards the roaq, towanfa or below the staircase or in the lanes situated on
the sides. The premises demarcated as No. l and 2 are certainly situated in
the back portion of the building and presumably have some opening in the
small lane situated on the side of the premises No. l and 2.

         To the extent of the tenants having been inducted during the pendency C
  of the first appeal it is clear that the attention of the First Appellate Court or
  of the High Court was not invited to such subsequent events. While dealing
 with the application filed before the First Appellate Court we have already
  indicated that the alleged subsequent ev~nts sought to be brought to the
· notice of the First Appellate Court had taken place "during the pendency of
  the suit" and not during the pendency of the first appeal. The applicationj.D
  filed in this Court though goes on to say that even subsequent to disposal of
 the appeal by the Appellate Court new tenants have been inducted by the
  landlord-respondent but the years of subsequent events as discernible from
  the map Anne>;ed with the application show such events having taken place
  either in the year 199~ or in the year 1996 or 1997, that is, certainly when E
  the revision was pending in the High Court and the special leave petition was
  not filed. Here again, the question arises why the attention of the High Court
  was not invited to .sueh subsequent events by promptly moving an appropriate
  application. The application tlled in this Court, does not on its face, furnish
  any explanation for not bringing events to the notice of the courts as and
  when they occurred. Yet another infinnity with the application is that here F
  too the application does not make an avennent that the premises falling
  vacant and having been re-let were so suitable as to satisfy the requirements
  of the landlord so as to be relevant and material subsequent events.

       Both the applications, i.e., the application filed in the First Appellate
 Court and the application flied in this fail to satisfy the twin tests: (i) of G
 bringing of the subsequent events having a material bearing on the relief
 sought for from the Court and (ii) having been promptly brought to the notice
 of the Court. The application tiled in this Court by the appellants is a belated
 attempt to dislodge the findings of facts concurrently arrived at by the two
 courts below the J-ligh Court, 8S also by the High Court. While exercising H
    600                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. 4 S.C.R.

A   jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution, it will not be just to entertain
    such a belated and half hearted effort to introduce subsequent events by the
    tenant appellant.

          For the foregoing reasons, we do not find a case having been made out
    for interfering with the decision of the High Court or of any of the courts
B   below. The appeal is dismissed as devoid of any merit. However, in view of
    the period for which the tenant has already been in possession of the suit
    premises, the tenant appellant is allowed six months time to vacate the suit
    premises subject to his filing usual undertaking within a period of six weeks
    from today. ·
c R.P.                                                             Appeal dismissed.