RAM MURTI YADAVversusSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER

818                       [2019]
               SUPREME COURT     14 S.C.R. 818
                              REPORTS                      [2019] 14 S.C.R.


A                            RAM MURTI YADAV
                                        v.
               STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER
                         (Civil Appeal No. 8875 of 2019)
B                            DECEMBER 10, 2019
              [ASHOK BHUSHAN AND NAVIN SINHA, JJ.]
             U.P. Fundamental Rules – r.56(c) – Compulsory Retirement
      of a Judicial Officer – Appellant while posted as a Chief Judicial
C     Magistrate granted acquittal to the accused u/ss.467, 468, 471,
      474, 420, 406 and 120B of IPC – A complaint was lodged against
      the appellant with regard to the acquittal – A vigilance enquiry
      was initiated and the report was adverse to the appellant – A
      censure entry was recorded in his character roll and order of
      punishment was accepted by the appellant without any challenge
D     – Screening Committee recommended compulsory retirement of the
      appellant – Thereafter, appellant was compulsorily retired which
      was endorsed by the Full Court of the High Court – Held: The
      service records of the appellant were examined by the Screening
      Committee, the Full Court as also by the Division Bench of the High
E     Court – The scope for Judicial review of an order of compulsory
      retirement based on the subjective satisfaction of the employer is
      extremely narrow and restricted – Only if it is found to be based
      on arbitrary or capricious grounds, vitiated by malafides, overlooks
      relevant materials, could there be limited scope for interference –
F     The Full Court scrutinised the service records of the appellant and
      arrived at the conclusion that it was in public interest to compulsory
      retire the appellant – Further, punishment of censure meted out to
      the appellant was never assailed by him – Therefore, the order of
      the compulsory retirement of the appellant required no interference.

G           Service Law – Judicial Services – Held: A judge holds the
      office of a public trust – Impeccable integrity, unimpeachable
      independence with moral values embodied to the core are absolute
      imperatives which brooks no compromise – A judge is the pillar
      of the entire justice system and the public has a right to demand
      virtually irreproachable conduct from anyone performing a
H
                                       818
           RAM MURTI YADAV v. STATE OF UTTAR                          819
                PRADESH AND ANOTHER

judicial function – Judges must strive for the highest standards of   A
integrity in both their professional and personal lives.
      Dismissing the appeal, the Court
      HELD: 1. The service records of the appellant have been
examined by the Screening Committee, the Full Court as also
by the Division Bench of the High Court. The scope for judicial       B
review of an order of compulsory retirement based on the
subjective satisfaction of the employer is extremely narrow
and restricted. Only if it is found to be based on arbitrary or
capricious grounds, vitiated by malafides, overlooks relevant
materials, could there be limited scope for interference. The         C
court, in judicial review, cannot sit in judgment over the same
as an Appellate Authority. Principles of natural justice have no
application in a case of compulsory retirement. [Para 6] [824-
H; 825-A-B]
      2. The complaint against the appellant with regard to the       D
acquittal granted by him was first considered by the
Administrative Judge, who was satisfied that it is a matter for
further enquiry. The comments of the appellant were called for.
A vigilance enquiry was recommended by the Administrative
Judge, who obviously was not satisfied with the explanation
furnished. The officer holding the vigilance enquiry was also a       E
judicial officer who opined that the act of acquittal by the
appellant was not above board. The comments of the appellant
were again called for. The Screening Committee consisting
of three Hon’ble Judges, on an overall assessment of the
appellant’s service record, recommended his compulsory                F
retirement. The Full Court scrutinised the service records of
the appellant again while considering the recommendation of the
Screening Committee and arrived at the conclusion that it was
in public interest to compulsory retire the appellant. It is
undisputed that the punishment of censure meted out to the
appellant was never assailed by him. [Para 8] [825-E-G]               G
      3. A person entering the judicial service no doubt has
career aspirations including promotions. An order of compulsory
retirement undoubtedly affects the career aspirations. Having
said so, it is also cautioned that judicial service is not like any
other service. A person discharging judicial duties acts on behalf    H
820           SUPREME COURT REPORTS                     [2019] 14 S.C.R.


A     of the State in discharge of its sovereign functions. Dispensation
      of justice is not only an onerous duty but has been considered
      as akin to discharge of a pious duty, and therefore, is a very
      serious matter. The standards of probity, conduct, integrity that
      may be relevant for discharge of duties by a careerist in another
      job cannot be the same for a judicial officer. A judge holds the
B
      office of a public trust. Impeccable integrity, unimpeachable
      independence with moral values embodied to the core are
      absolute imperatives which brooks no compromise. A judge is
      the pillar of the entire justice system and the public has a right
      to demand virtually irreproachable conduct from anyone
C     performing a judicial function. Judges must strive for the highest
      standards of integrity in both their professional and personal
      lives. [Para 13] [828-A-D]
             4. It has to be kept in mind that a person seeking justice,
      has the first exposure to the justice delivery system at the level
D     of subordinate judiciary, and thus a sense of injustice can have
      serious repercussions not only on that individual but can have
      its fall out in the society as well. It is therefore absolutely
      necessary that the ordinary litigant must have complete faith at
      this level and no impression can be afforded to be given to a
E     litigant which may even create a perception to the contrary as
      the consequences can be very damaging. The standard or
      yardstick for judging the conduct of the judicial officer therefore
      has necessarily to be strict. Having said so, it is also observed
      that not every inadvertent flaw or error that will make a judicial
      officer culpable. The State Judicial Academies undoubtedly has
F     a stellar role to perform in this regard. A bona fide error may
      need correction and counselling. But a conduct which creates a
      perception beyond the ordinary cannot be countenanced. For a
      trained legal mind, a judicial order speaks for itself. [Para 14]
      [828-E-G]
G           Union of India & Ors. v. K.K. Dhawan, (1993) 2 SCC
            56 : [1993] 1 SCR 296 ; Union of India & Ors. v. Duli
            Chand, (2006) 5 SCC 680 [2003] 3 Suppl. Pyare
            Mohan Lal v. State of Jharkhand and Ors., (2010) 10
            SCC 693 : [2010] 11 SCR 216 ; Syed T.A. Naqshbandi
H           & Ors. v. State of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors., (2003) 9
          RAM MURTI YADAV v. STATE OF UTTAR                   821
               PRADESH AND ANOTHER

     SCC 592 : [2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 114 ; Rajendra Singh       A
     Verma (D) thr. Lrs. v. Lt. Governor (NCT of Delhi),
     (2011) 10 SCC 1 : [2011] 12 SCR 496 ; High Court
     of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil & Anr.,
     (2000) 1 SCC 416 : [1999] 4 Suppl. SCR 205 – relied
     on.
                                                              B
     Ram Ekbal Sharma v. State of Bihar and Anr., (1990)
     3 SCC 504 : [1990] 2 SCR 679 ; P.C. Joshi v. State of
     U.P. and Ors., (2001) 6 SCC 491 : [2001] 1 Suppl.
     SCR 369 ; Ramesh Chander Singh v. High Court
     of Allahabad and Anr., (2007) 4 SCC 247 : [2007]
     3 SCR 198 – distinguished.                               C

     Baikuntha Nath Das and Anr. v. Chief District Medical
     Officer, Baripada and Anr., (1992) 2 SCC 299 : [1992]
     1 SCR 836 ; Nawal Singh v. State of U.P. and Another,
     (2003) 8 SCC 117 : [2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 1046 ; R.C.
     Chandel v. High Court of M.P. and Anr., (2012) 8 SCC     D
     58 : [2012] 7 SCR 205 ; Punjab State Power Corpn.
     Ltd. and Ors. v. Hari Kishan Verma, (2015) 13 SCC
     156 : [2015] 3 SCR 555 ; Registrar General, Patna
     High Court v. Pandey Gajendra Prasad and Ors.,
     (2012) 6 SCC 357 : [2012] 5 SCR 994 – referred to.       E
                     Case Law Reference
[1992] 1 SCR 836                referred to         Para 3
[2007] 3 SCR 198                distinguished       Para 3
[1990] 2 SCR 679                distinguished       Para 12   F
[2001] 1 Suppl. SCR 369        distinguished        Para 12
[2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 1046       referred to          Para 4
[2012] 7 SCR 205                referred to         Para 4
[2015] 3 SCR 555                referred to         Para 4    G
[2012] 5 SCR 994                referred to         Para 7
[1993] 1 SCR 296                relied on           Para 9
(2006) 5 SCC 680                relied on           Para 9
[2010] 11 SCR 216               relied on           Para 9    H
822             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 14 S.C.R.


A     [2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 114               relied on               Para 10
      [2011] 12 SCR 496                     relied on               Para 11
      [1999] 4 Suppl. SCR 205               relied on               Para 11
            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 8875
B     of 2019.
             From the Judgment and Order dated 23.05.2018 of the High
      Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, Lucknow in Writ
      Petition (SB) No. 16040 of 2016.
             R. Basant, Sr. Adv., Lokesh Kumar, Arun, Kuldip Singh,
C     Advs. for the Appellant.
            Sunny Choudhary, Adarsh Upadhyay, Advs. for the Respondents.
            The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
            NAVIN SINHA, J.
D
            1. The appellant, a judicial officer of the rank of Additional District
      and Sessions Judge, assails his order of compulsory retirement dated
      03.05.2016 at 56 years of age under Rule 56 (C) of the U. P.
      Fundamental Rules (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’).
             2. The appellant while posted as a Chief Judicial Magistrate
E
      granted acquittal to the accused on 17.09.2007 in Criminal Case
      No.4670 of 2005 “State vs. Mohd. Ayub” under Sections 467, 468, 471,
      474, 420, 406 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. A complaint was
      lodged against the appellant with regard to the acquittal. After calling
      for comments from the appellant, and perusing the judgement and the
F     order of reversal in appeal, the Administrative Judge on 24.02.2009
      recommended an enquiry. A vigilance enquiry, V.B. Enquiry No.26/2009,
      was held by the OSD, Enquiry, High Court of Allahabad. The enquiry
      report dated 10.05.2012 was adverse to the appellant. His comments
      were called for on 28.06.2012. On 20.12.2012, the appellant was
      informed that on basis of the enquiry, a censure entry had been recorded
G
      in his character roll. The order of punishment was accepted by the
      appellant without any challenge. On 01.04.2016, a committee of three
      Hon’ble Judges constituted for screening of judicial officers for
      compulsorily retirement under the Rules recommended the compulsory
      retirement of the appellant which was endorsed by the Full Court on
H     14.04.2016 leading to the impugned order of compulsory retirement. The
            RAM MURTI YADAV v. STATE OF UTTAR                                     823
          PRADESH AND ANOTHER [NAVIN SINHA, J.]

challenge laid out by the appellant to his order of retirement before the         A
High Court was unsuccessful and thus the present appeal.
       3. Learned senior counsel Shri R. Basant, appearing on behalf
of the appellant, submitted that since joining the service in 1996-97 as
a Civil Judge (Jr. Division) his Annual Confidential Reports (ACRs) till
2014-15 certify his integrity. The quota of cases allocated to the                B
appellant being inadequate, his percentage of work was considered
adequate. The adverse remark in 1996-97 for below performance had
been expunged. An error of judgment in deciding a criminal case, while
discharging judicial functions, cannot ipso facto lead to an inference
of dishonesty. There was in fact no material to infer dishonesty or lack
of integrity on part of the appellant in granting acquittal in the criminal       C
case. Merely because a different view was possible does not justify
the extreme step of compulsory retirement. The order of compulsory
retirement being stigmatic in nature, the failure to hold departmental
enquiry vitiates the same. The appellant was promoted to the post of
Additional District and Sessions Judge on the basis of merit-cum-                 D
seniority and was confirmed in 2013. He had also crossed the
efficiency bar. The punishment of censure therefore stands obliterated
and was irrelevant for the purpose of compulsory retirement. The
conclusion that the appellant had lost his utility and efficiency as a judicial
officer to be declared deadwood was unsustainable without adequate
consideration of his ACRs in the recent past years before retirement,             E
at least from 2012 to 2015. Reliance in support of the submissions was
placed on Ram Ekbal Sharma vs. State of Bihar and Anr., (1990) 3
SCC 504; Baikuntha Nath Das and Anr. vs. Chief District Medical
Officer, Baripada and Anr., (1992) 2 SCC 299; P.C. Joshi vs. State
of U.P. and Ors., (2001) 6 SCC 491, and Ramesh Chander Singh                      F
vs. High Court of Allahabad and Anr., (2007) 4 SCC 247.
       4. Learned counsel for the respondent contended that the adverse
remarks against the appellant for the year 1996-97 was never expunged
as the explanation furnished was not found satisfactory by the District
Judge which was informed to the appellant on 12.10.1998. His disposal             G
was also found to be inadequate in subsequent years. The complaint
against the appellant for granting acquittal was examined at several
levels before the impugned action followed. The appellant never
questioned the punishment of censure in connection with the very same
order of acquittal. The entire service record of the appellant was
considered by the Screening Committee and again by the Full Court.                H
824            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 14 S.C.R.


A     The fact that the appellant may have been promoted subsequently is
      irrelevant for the purpose of consideration of compulsory retirement.
      Reliance in support of the submissions was placed on Baikuntha Nath
      Das (supra); Union of India & Ors. vs. K.K. Dhawan, (1993) 2 SCC
      56; Union of India & Ors. vs. Duli Chand, (2006) 5 SCC 680; Nawal
      Singh vs. State of U.P. and Another, (2003) 8 SCC 117; Pyare Mohan
B
      Lal vs. State of Jharkhand and Ors., (2010) 10 SCC 693; R.C.
      Chandel vs. High Court of M.P. and Anr., (2012) 8 SCC 58, and
      Punjab State Power Corpn. Ltd. and Ors. vs. Hari Kishan Verma,
      (2015) 13 SCC 156.
            5. We have considered the submissions on behalf of the parties
C     and also the precedents sought to be relied upon by them respectively.
      The High Court also noticed that another vigilance enquiry VB No.06
      of 2009 had also been initiated but was dropped. The enquiry which
      followed on the complaint against acquittal manifests that the appellant
      was provided proper opportunity of his defence at every stage. Quite
D     apart from the scrutiny of his service records by the Screening
      Committee and again by the Full Court, the Division Bench again
      perused his ACRs and opined as follows:
            “We have perused the expunged portion of the annual remarks
            of the petitioner and found that rating of the petitioner as fair
            officer has not been expunged. Likewise, in the year 2008-09,
E
            2009-10, 2010-11, the petitioner was posted as Additional District
            & Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No.8, Pratapgarh and his
            disposal of work prescribed as Additional District Judge, Fast
            Track Court was found inadequate. Censure entry, recorded
            against the petitioner and considered by the Screening Committee
F           and Full Court, still has not been expunged. The petitioner has
            never challenged the said censure entry, therefore, there is no
            substance in the arguments of the learned counsel for the
            petitioner that single censure entry relating to integrity could not
            be considered by the Screening Committee and Full Court. The
            expositions of law relied upon by the learned counsel for petitioner
G           are of no help for the petitioner. The expositions of law relied
            upon by the learned counsel for the respondent is squarely
            applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case.”
            6. The service records of the appellant have been examined by
      the Screening Committee, the Full Court as also by the Division Bench
H     of the High Court. The scope for judicial review of an order of
           RAM MURTI YADAV v. STATE OF UTTAR                                   825
         PRADESH AND ANOTHER [NAVIN SINHA, J.]

compulsory retirement based on the subjective satisfaction of the              A
employer is extremely narrow and restricted. Only if it is found to be
based on arbitrary or capricious grounds, vitiated by malafides, overlooks
relevant materials, could there be limited scope for interference. The
court, in judicial review, cannot sit in judgment over the same as an
Appellate Authority. Principles of natural justice have no application in
                                                                               B
a case of compulsory retirement.
       7. The performance chart, as furnished by the appellant,
demonstrates that his assessment from 1996-97 till 2014-15 rates him
as a “fair” or “good officer” only, except for one entry of “very good”
in the year 2011-12. The submission that his integrity was certified on
each occasion leaves us unimpressed. There can hardly be any direct            C
evidence with regard to integrity as far as a judicial officer is concerned.
It is more a matter of inference and perceptions based on the conduct
of the officer. The inadequacy of the present system of writing ACRs
of judicial officers has deficiencies in several ways, was noticed in
Registrar General, Patna High Court vs. Pandey Gajendra Prasad                 D
and Ors., (2012) 6 SCC 357.
       8. The complaint against the appellant with regard to the acquittal
granted by him was first considered by the Administrative Judge, who
was satisfied that it is a matter for further enquiry. The comments of
the appellant were called for. A vigilance enquiry was recommended             E
by the Administrative Judge, who obviously was not satisfied with the
explanation furnished. The officer holding the vigilance enquiry was also
a judicial officer who opined that the act of acquittal by the appellant
was not above board. The comments of the appellant were again called
for. The Screening Committee consisting of three Hon’ble Judges, on
an overall assessment of the appellant’s service record, recommended           F
his compulsory retirement. The Full Court scrutinised the service records
of the appellant again while considering the recommendation of the
Screening Committee and arrived at the conclusion that it was in public
interest to compulsory retire the appellant. It is undisputed that the
punishment of censure meted out to the appellant was never assailed            G
by him.
      9. The submission of Shri Basant that compulsory retirement
could not have been ordered for mere error of judgment in decision
making merits no consideration in view of K.K. Dhawan (supra) and
Duli Chand (supra). Likewise, what has been euphemistically described          H
826            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 14 S.C.R.


A     as “washed-off theory” by reason of any subsequent promotion after
      adverse entry being relevant for further promotion but not for
      compulsory retirement has to be rejected in view of Pyare Mohan Lal
      (supra). A single adverse entry could suffice for an order of compulsory
      retirement as held in Pyare Mohan Lal (supra) as follows :
B           “29. The law requires the authority to consider the “entire service
            record” of the employee while assessing whether he can be given
            compulsory retirement irrespective of the fact that the adverse
            entries had not been communicated to him and the officer had
            been promoted earlier in spite of those adverse entries. More
C           so, a single adverse entry regarding the integrity of an officer
            even in remote past is sufficient to award compulsory retirement.
            The case of a judicial officer is required to be examined, treating
            him to be different from other wings of the society, as he is
            serving the State in a different capacity. The case of a judicial
            officer is considered by a committee of Judges of the High Court
D           duly constituted by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice and then the
            report of the Committee is placed before the Full Court. A decision
            is taken by the Full Court after due deliberation on the matter.
            Therefore, there is hardly any chance to make the allegations of
            non-application of mind or mala fides.”
E
             10. This Court in Syed T.A. Naqshbandi & Ors. vs State of
      Jammu & Kashmir & Ors., (2003) 9 SCC 592, considering the scope
      of judicial review of an assessment of the conduct of a judicial officer
      approved by a Full Court, observed as follows:

F            “7. … As has often been reiterated by this Court, judicial review
            is permissible only to the extent of finding whether the process
            in reaching the decision has been observed correctly and not the
            decision itself, as such. Critical or independent analysis or
            appraisal of the materials by the courts exercising powers of
            judicial review unlike the case of an appellate court, would neither
G           be permissible nor conducive to the interests of either the officers
            concerned or the system and institutions of administration of
            justice with which we are concerned in this case, by going into
            the correctness as such of ACRs or the assessment made by
            the Committee and approval accorded by the Full Court of the
H           High Court.”
           RAM MURTI YADAV v. STATE OF UTTAR                                   827
         PRADESH AND ANOTHER [NAVIN SINHA, J.]

       11. The question was again considered in Rajendra Singh                 A
Verma (D) thr. Lrs. vs. Lt. Governor (NCT of Delhi), (2011) 10 SCC
1, reiterating the principle laid down in High Court of Judicature at
Bombay vs. Shashikant S. Patil & Anr., (2000) 1 SCC 416, this Court
observed as follows:
      “191. … in case where the Full Court of the High Court                   B
      recommends compulsory retirement of an officer, the High Court
      on the judicial side has to exercise great caution and
      circumspection in setting aside that order because it is a
      complement of all the Judges of the High Court who go into the
      question and it is possible that in all cases evidence would not         C
      be forthcoming about integrity doubtful of a judicial officer….”
      It was further observed that:
      “192. … If that authority bona fide forms an opinion that the
      integrity of a particular officer is doubtful, the correctness of that
      opinion cannot be challenged before courts. When such a                  D
      constitutional function is exercised on the administrative side of
      the High Court, any judicial review thereon should be made only
      with great care and circumspection and it must be confined strictly
      to the parameters set by this Court in several reported decisions.
      When the appropriate authority forms bona fide opinion that              E
      compulsory retirement of a judicial officer is in public interest,
      the writ court under Article 226 or this Court under Article 32
      would not interfere with the order.”
       12. P.C. Joshi (supra) was a case relating to an order of
punishment in a departmental proceeding held to be vitiated for want           F
of any legally acceptable or relevant evidence in support of the charges
of misconduct. Ramesh Chander Singh (supra) related to an order
of bail dealing with exercise of discretionary powers specially when a
co-accused had been granted bail by the High Court. An order of
compulsory retirement not been a punishment, much less stigmatic in
the facts and circumstances of the present case. Ram Ekbal Sharma              G
(supra) was dealing with the issue that the form of the order was not
conclusive and the veil could be lifted to determine if it was ordered as
punishment more so in view of the stand taken in the counter affidavit
with regard to grave financial irregularities, again has no relevance to
the present controversy.                                                       H
828                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2019] 14 S.C.R.


A            13. A person entering the judicial service no doubt has career
      aspirations including promotions. An order of compulsory retirement
      undoubtedly affects the career aspirations. Having said so, we must
      also sound a caution that judicial service is not like any other service.
      A person discharging judicial duties acts on behalf of the State in
      discharge of its sovereign functions. Dispensation of justice is not only
B
      an onerous duty but has been considered as akin to discharge of a pious
      duty, and therefore, is a very serious matter. The standards of probity,
      conduct, integrity that may be relevant for discharge of duties by a
      careerist in another job cannot be the same for a judicial officer. A judge
      holds the office of a public trust. Impeccable integrity, unimpeachable
C     independence with moral values embodied to the core are absolute
      imperatives which brooks no compromise. A judge is the pillar of the
      entire justice system and the public has a right to demand virtually
      irreproachable conduct from anyone performing a judicial function.
      Judges must strive for the highest standards of integrity in both their
      professional and personal lives.
D
             14. It has to be kept in mind that a person seeking justice, has
      the first exposure to the justice delivery system at the level of
      subordinate judiciary, and thus a sense of injustice can have serious
      repercussions not only on that individual but can have its fall out in the
      society as well. It is therefore absolutely necessary that the ordinary
E     litigant must have complete faith at this level and no impression can be
      afforded to be given to a litigant which may even create a perception
      to the contrary as the consequences can be very damaging. The
      standard or yardstick for judging the conduct of the judicial officer
      therefore has necessarily to be strict. Having said so, we must also
F     observe that it is not every inadvertent flaw or error that will make a
      judicial officer culpable. The State Judicial Academies undoubtedly has
      a stellar role to perform in this regard. A bona fide error may need
      correction and counselling. But a conduct which creates a perception
      beyond the ordinary cannot be countenanced. For a trained legal mind,
      a judicial order speaks for itself.
G
            15. In conclusion, we are of the considered opinion that the order
      of compulsory retirement of the appellant calls for no interference. The
      Appeal is dismissed.


H     Ankit Gyan                                                  Appeal dismissed.