Holding

An order of termination that adopts the findings and reasons of the enquiry officer is a speaking order and does not violate the principles of natural justice.

Summary

Ram Kumar, a bus conductor, was terminated after a departmental enquiry found him guilty of not issuing tickets to nine passengers despite collecting fares. The punishing authority terminated his service by adopting the enquiry officer's findings and reasons, without independently restating them, leading the appellant to claim a violation of natural justice. The trial court dismissed his suit, but the Additional District Judge allowed it, deeming the order a non‑speaking order and invalid. The High Court upheld the civil court's jurisdiction but held the order valid. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that when the punishing authority accepts the enquiry officer's findings and reasons, the termination order is a speaking order and does not breach natural justice, and therefore the appeal fails.

Issues considered

When a termination order merely adopts the findings and reasons of the enquiry officer, does it constitute a non‑speaking order violating the principles of natural justice?
Does a civil court have jurisdiction to entertain a suit challenging the validity of a departmental termination order?

Subjects

service terminationnatural justicenon‑speaking orderdepartmental enquirypunishing authoritycivil court jurisdictionprinciples of natural justicespeaking order

Judgment

RAM KUMAR A
v.
STATE OF HARYANA

AUGUST 20, 1987
+ [RANGANATH MISRA AND MURARI MOHON DUTT, JJ.] B

Civil Services: Departmental enquiry-Punishing authority
accepting finding of Enquiry Officer and reasons in support of

- finding-Order of termination by a non-speaking order-Whether
valid.

The service of the appellant, a bus conductor, was terminated
c
consequent upon the enquiry conducted into allegations of non-issue of
tickets to nine passengers, though fare was collected from each of them.
A suit filed by the appellant, contending that the order of termination
was illegal and void and was opposed to the principles of natural justice,
as no reason was given in the order, was dismissed by the trial court. It D
was also held that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain and
try the suit.

The Additional District Judge, on appeal, held that the Civil
Conrt had jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit and set aside the
\;a_ impugned order of termination as invalid as it was a non-speaking E
- order not containing any reason.

In second appeal, the High Court affirmed the finding of the
Additional District Judge as to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, but
set aside his finding that the impugned order was a non-speaking order
and held that it was quite legal and valid. F

In the appeal to this Court it was contended on behalf of the
appellant that the punishing authority had not applied his mind before
passing the impugned order, which was apparent from I.he fact that he
had not given any reason in justification thereof and this had vitiated
the impugned order of termination. G

Dismissing the appeal, this Court,

HELD: When the punishing authority agrees with the findings of
the Enquiry Officer who accepts the reasons given by him in support of
such findings, it is not necessary for the punishing authority to again H

1057
1058 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 3 S.C.R.
)
A discuss evidence and come to the same findings as that of the Enquiry
Officer and give the same reasons for the-findings. [1060E]

In the instant case, it is difficult to say that the punishing autho-
rity had not applied bis mind. The punishing authority bas placed
reliance upon the report of the Enquiry Officer, which means he has not 't'
B only agreed with the &dings of the Enquiry Officer hut also accepted
the reasons given by him for the same. When the punishing authority
has accepted the rmdings of the Enquiry Officer and the reasons given
-,.,
by him, the question of non-compliance with the principles of natural
justice does not arise. [1060E-F]

c and isItvitiated.
cannot be said that the impugned order is not a speaking order
-
[1060F] 'r
[In view of the fact that it is the first offence of the appellant, who
is said to be the father of five minor children and bas no other means of
livelihood, the respondent may consider the re-employment of the
D appellant to the post of Conductor or to any other post, to which be may ,..
be found to be suitable.] [1060G-H]

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1870
of 1982.

E From the Judgment and Order dated 2.9.1981 of the Punjab and
Haryana High Court in R.S. A. No. 1556 of 1980.

V.M. Tarkunde and Prem Malhotra for the Appellant.
_.,,

y
-
S.C. Mohanta, Mahavir Singh and C.V. Subba Rao for the
F Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DUTI', J. In this appeal by special leave the appellant, a Bus
Conductor of the Haryana Roadways, has challenged the validity of -I
G the order o( termination of his service on the ground of failure of the
punishing authority to give any reason for the impugned order in viola-
tion of the principles of natural justice.

A charge was levelled against the appellant that he did not issue
tickets to nine passengers, although he had taken the fare from each of
H them. A disciplinary proceeding was started against the appellant. The
RAM KUMAR v. STATE OF HARYANA [DUTT, J.) 1059
}-
Enquiry Officer, after considering the allegations constituting the A
charge, the plea of the appellant in defence and the evidence adduced
by the parties including the appellant, held that the charge against the
appellant was proved. The punishing authority agreed with the find-
ings of the Enquiry Officer and by the impugned order terminated the
t service of the appellant.
B

• r Aggrieved, the appellant filed a suit challenging the legality of
the order of termination. It was contended by the appellant that as no
reason was given in the impugned order, it was illegal and invalid

- '{
being opposed to the principles of natural justice. The Trial Court
overruled the said contention and also held that the Civil Court had no
jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. Accordingly, the Trial Court c
dismissed the suit.
On appeal, the learned Additional District Judge held in dis-
agreement with the Triii! Court and, in our opinion, rightly that the
Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. The learned
Additional District Judge, however, held that the impugned order was D
"('
a non-speaking order not containing any reason and, as such, it was
invalid. In that view of the matter, the learned Additional Judge
allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Trial Court and the
impugned order of termination of service of the appellant and decreed
the suit.

--
\t .. The State of Haryana took the matter to the High Court in a E
second appeal. The High Court affirmed the finding of the learned
Additional District Judge as to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, but
set aside his finding that the impugned order was a non-speaking
1 order. The High Court took the view that the impugned order was
quite legal and valid. Upon the said findings, the High Court allowed
the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the learned Addi- F
tional District Judge. Hence this appeal by special leave.

It has been urged by Mr. Tarkunde, learned Counsel appearing
on behalf of the appellant, that the punishing authority has not applied
his mind before passing the impugned order, which is apparent from
the fact that he had not given any reason in justification of the G
impugned order. Counsel submits that non-application of the mind
and failure to give any reason by the punishing authority vitiated the
impugned order of termination and, accordingly, it should be set
aside.

It has been pointed out by the High Court that the punishing H
1060 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1987] 3 S.C.R.

authority has passed a lengthy order running into seven pages men-
A
tioning therein the contents of the charge-sheet, the detailed deposi-
tion of the witnesses, as accorded by the Enquiry Officer, and the
findings of the Enquiry Officer. The explanation submitted by the
appellant has also been reproduced in the impugned order. There-

8
after, the punishing authority stated as follows:-
"I have considered the charge-sheet, the reply filed to' the
t
charge-sheet, the statements made during enquiry, the re-
port of the Enquiry Officer, the show cause notice, the
reply filed by the delinquent and other papers and that no
t.
c
reason is available to me on the basis of which reliance may
not be placed on the report of the Enquiry Officer. There-
fore, keeping these circumstances in view, I termipate his
-
service with effect from the date of issue of this order."
In view of the contents of the impugned order, it is difficult to say
that the punishing authority had not applied his mind to the case
before terminating the services of the appellant. The punishing autho-
D rity has placed reliance upon the report of the Enquiry Officer which
means that he has not only agreed with the findings of the Enquiry
Officer, but also has accepted the reasons given by him for the find-
ings. In our opinion, when the punishing authority agrees with the
findings of the Enquiry Officer and accepts the reasons given by him in
support of such findings, it is not necessary for the punishing authority
E to again discuss evidence and come to the same findings as that of the
Enquiry Officer and give the same reasons for the findings. We are
unable to accept the contention made on behalf of the appellant that
the impugned order of termination is vitiated as it is a non-speaking
order and does not contain any reason. When by the impugned order
th¢ punishing authority has accepted the findings of the Enquiry
F Officer and the reason given by him, the question of non-compliance
with the principles of natural justice does not arise. It is also incorrect
to say that the impugned order is not a speaking order.
There is, therefore, no substance in the appeal. The appeal is
dismissed. There will, however, be no order as to costs.
G In view of the fact that it is the first offence of the appellant, who
is said to be the father of five minor children and has no other means of
livelihood, the respondent may consider the re-employment of the
appellant to the post of Conductor or to any other post, to which he
may be found to be suitable.

H N.P.V. Appeal dismissed.