RAM KHILONA AND ORS.versusSARDAR AND ORS.

                       RAM KHILONA AND ORS.                                     A
                                      v.
                           SARDAR AND ORS.

                              JULY 16, 2002

         [D.P. MOHAPATRA AND K.G. BALAKRJSHNAN, JJ.]                            B


       Code ofCivil Procedure, 1908-Section /00-Second appeal-Agreement
 of sale of land by covenantors-Alteration made in the agreement deed by
introducing two independent marginal witnesses subsequently-Suit for specific   C
performance of contract of sale on basis of agreement deed decreed and suit
for declaration of rights of vendees dismissed-Upholding of decrees of lower
court, High Court holding alterations in the agreement deed as material
alterations-Correctness of-Held, order of High Court not sustainable since
alterations made subsequently did not bring about any change in validity and
enforceability of agreement of sale-Deeds-Material alterations.                 D
      Covenantors entered into an agreement of sale of land. However,
they did not execute the sale deed in favour of the appellants-covenantees.
Subsequently alterations were made in the agreement deed by introducing
two independent marginal witnesses. Appellants-covenantees then filed suit
for specific performance of contract of sale on the basis of the agreement E
and it was decreed. Respondent Nos. I and 2 filed suit for declaration of
rights of the vendees over the land against the appellants and respondent
Nos.3 and 4, which was dismissed. Appeals were also dismissed. Aggrieved,
respondents filed second appeals. High Court held that the interpolation
for introducing the two independent marginal witnesses in the agreement F
of sale was made so as to give authenticity to the said agreement of sale.
It held that the alteration made in the agreement deed by the covenantors
is material alteration which had the result of avoiding the agreement, and
rendering it void ab initio having no binding effect on the vendor and thus
the agreement cannot be enforced. Hence the present appeals.
                                                                                G
      Allowing the appeals, the Court

     HELD: I. I. The approach of the High Court in the second appeal
was clearly against the law and spirit of Section 100 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Further, the view taken by the High Court that the
                                    187
                                                                                H
    188                        SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A interpolation said to have been made by the covenantees in the agreement
    of sale does not stand scrutiny under law. Also such alteration, assuming
    that it was made subsequently, did not bring about any change in the
    validity and enforceability of the agreement of sale. The finding recorded
    by the High Court appears to be based on surmise. Therefore, the
B   judgment is clearly unsustainable. (197-F-H]

        1.2. High Court observed that the covenantees-appellants might have
  had an apprehension that as the marginal witnesses in the original
  document were persons closely related to them, the court may not readily
  accept the case of the appellants regarding the agreement of sale and,
C therefore, they subsequently introduced two independent persons as
  marginal witnesses in the document after its execution, which amounted
  to interpolating with the documents. This was considered by the courts
  and was not believed. The observations of the first appellate court were
  mere observations, which was not taken as a substantial matter against
  the credibility and acceptability of the case of the appellants in the suit
D for specific performance. Trial Court and the First Appellate Court had
  concurrently accepted the case of the appellants in the suit for specific
  performance and had rejected the case of the respondents in suit for
  declaration of rights. Courts in exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction
  vested in them had decreed the suit for specific performance of the
E agreement of sale. The High Court in its impugned judgment did not
  discuss any legality by the courts below in taking the decision. (197-B-E]

        MS. Anirudhan v. Thomco's Bank Ltd., AIR (1963) SC 746 and Kaliana
    Gounder v. Palani Gounder and Anr., AIR (1970] SC 1942, referred to.

            Halsbury 's Laws ofEngland, 4th Edition at page 552 para 1378, referred
F
    to.

            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 238-39 of
    1997.

G        From the Judgment and Order dated 24.9.1996 of the High Court of
    Allahabad in S.A. 1974/78 and 1975/78.

            E.C. Agrawala and M.P. Shorewala for the Appellants. -

         D.B. Vohra, Roopendra Singh, K.K. Gupta and Sanjeev Anand for
H   the Respondent.
             RAM KHILONA v. SARDAR [D.P. MOHAPA IRA, J.]                 189
     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                                 A
      D.P. MOHAPATRA, J, The judg!nent dated 24.9.1996 passed by the
High Court of Allahabad in Second Appeal Nos. 1974/78 and 1975/78, is
under challenge in these appeals filed by Ram Khilona, Charni, Snit. Kishni
W/o Ratni, Hari Ram @ Harbans s/o Ratni, Smt. Mukhtary w/o Buddhi, Sher
Singh s/o Buddhi, Shyam Lal s/o Buddhi and Praye Lal s/o Het Ram, against       B
Sardar and Sher Singh, sons of Kanha Jaat, Nehal Singh s/o Todar and Ram
Khilari s/o Todar (deceased) by his Legal Representatives Veerpal and Khemo.

      In the impugned judgment the High Court allowed the appeals and set
aside the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below. The operative         C
portion of the judgment reads :

        "Jn the result, both the appeals succeed and are accordingly allowed.
       The judgment and decree passed by the courts below in both the suits
       are accordingly set aside. Suit No. 58 of 69 which was filed by
       covenators for specific performance of the agreement deed (Ext.12)       D
       is dismissed with costs throughout whereas suit No.58 of 71 which
       had been filed for declaration of the rights of the vendees over the
       land in suit is decreed with costs throughout. The vendees are
       accordingly declared owners of the land in suit by virtue of the sale
       deed which was executed by the vendors transferring the land in suit
       in their favour on 7.5.69."                                              E
     The factual back drop of the case leading to the present proceeding
may be stated thus :

      The appellants herein filed suit no. 58/1969 in the Court of the Civil
Judge, Mathura against the respondents herein seeking the following main        F
relief:

       "(A) That the suit of the plaintiffs for specific performance of the
       contract for sale on the basis of agreement for sale dated 19.4.1969
       be declared in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, and
       it be directed in the decree that all the defendants shall execute the G
       sale deed in favour of the petitioners after taking Rs. 2,000 (balance),
       in respect of the land details whereof have been given at the foot of
       this plaint, and in case, they do not execute the sale deed within the
       time given by the Court, the court may execut the sale deed, in favour
       of the plaintiffs.                                                       H
    190                        SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002) SUPP. I S.C.R.

A           (8) That the defendants be ordered by means of injunction that they
            shall not interfere' in the possession of the plaintiffs over the land
            details whereq~re given at the foot of this plaint and shall not take
            the land in .t,heir own possession after dispossessing the plaintiffs."

           The case pleaded by the plaintiffs was that defendants 1 & 2 entered
B    into an agreement for sale of the suit land measuring 23.83 acres situated in
     village Khitaw.ata, Tehsil Chhata, District Mathura, U.P. on 19.4.1969 for a
     consideration of Rs. 14,000. The plaintiffs paid Rs. 12,000 to the defendants
     1 and 2 at the time of the execution of the agreement for sale. In pursuance
     of the said agreement the defendants 1 and 2 put the plaintiffs in possession
C   of the suit property and they continued with the possession by carrying on
     agricultural activities on the land. Despite several reminders defendants l and
    2 did not execute "the sale deed in favour of the plaintiffs. Subsequently, the
    ,plaintiffs came to know that defendants 3 and 4 had got a sale deed executed
     in their favour from defendants 1 and 2 in respect of the same property in a
     clandestine manner on 7.5.1969 without the knowledge of the plaintiffs. The
D   plaintiffs asserted in para 7 of the plaint that they had been and were ready
     and willing to get the sale deed executed from the defendants 1 and 2 after
    paying the balance amount of sale consideration.

           Since the defendants 1 and 2 failed to keep their promise for sale of the
E   suit land to the plaintiffs the later had to file the suit seeking reliefs noted
    above. The defendants 1 and 2 filed their written statement refuting averments
    made by the plaintiffs in the plaint. It was their case that they had sold the
    suit land to defendants 3 and 4 on 7.5 .1969 for Rs. 15,000. It was their
    further case that on that date they were in possession of the land and delivered
    possession of the same to defendants 3 and 4 in pursuance of the sale deed.
F   Thereafter the defendants 3 and 4 possessed the land and made certain
    improvements thereon. In para 7 of the written statement it was averred, inter
    alia, that defendants l and 2 did not execute any sale deed in favour of the
    plaintiffs nor did they take any amount as advance money. It was the further
    case of the said defendants that they had executed the sale deed in favour of
    defendants 3 and 4 openly and to the knowledge of the plaintiffs; that the so
G   called agreement was forged and fictitious and the thumb impressions therein
    were obtained by fraud and defendants 1 and 2 did not receive any amount
    towards consideration.

         Defendants 3 and 4 filed separate written statements countering the
H   averments made in the plaint. They also took the stand that the so called
              RAM KHILONA v. SARDAR [D.P. MOHAPATRA, J.J                     191

agreement for sale said to have been executed by the defendants l and 2 was         A
a forged and fictitious document and it was doubtful that they bore the
signature and thumb impressions of defendants I and 2. It was also averred
in the written statement that the plaintiff by exerting influence on defendants
l and 2 and by playing fraud on them got the thumb impression on blank
stamp paper after the sale deed was executed in their (defendants 3 and 4)          B
favour. Defendants 3 and 4 asserted in para 9 of the statement that one of the
witnesses of the so called agreement i.e. Harchandi happens to be fat'1er in
law in distant relationship and they are very intimate to each other, the other
witness hails from the plaintiffs party and bears malice for the defendants.
All the defendants prayed for dismissal of the suit. Respondents l and 2
herein filed original suit no. 58 of 197 l against the appellants and respondents   C
3 and 4 herein and against one Dharam Lal in the Court of Civil Judge,
Mathura seeking the following main reliefs:

        "That it may be declared that the land in suit described at the foot of
        this plaint has been in possession of the plaintiffs and is held in
        custodia legis by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate Chhata in the D
        proceedings u/s l 45 of the Criminal Procedure Code Ram Khilona
        Versus Sardar and others for the benefit of the plaintiff and is liable
        to be released in their favour and is not liable to be released in favour
        of the defendants no. l to 5 as observed by the learned Muns if Mathura
        in Criminal Reference No.41 of 1970 under section 146 Cr.P.C. on E
        12.5.1971."

       Subsequently, the plaint was amended to include the prayer for recovery
of possession of the suit land in favour of the plaintiffs. The gist of the case
pleaded by the plaintiffs in that suit is that on 7.5.1969 defendants 6 and 7
executed a sale deed of the suit land, having an area of 23.83 acres under p
Chhak No.92 of village Khitawata, Pargana Chhata, District Mathura in favour
of the plaintiffs for a sum of Rs. 15000 and delivered possession of the land
to them. Immediately after getting the possession of the land on 7.5.1969 the
plaintiffs irrigated a portion of said chak from tubewell situated in chak no.99
belonging to one Lekhi s/o Hiralal and his brothers Dharam Lal and Ramlal,
and sowed the sugarcane crop in the said portion. The plaintiffs applied for G
mutation of their names in the revenue records which was duly made on 13th
June, 1969. The plaintiff asserted that defendants 1 to 5 were personally
aware of the execution of sale deed; of the possession of the plaintiffs over
the said chak and also of the mutation proceedings. The further case of the
plaintiffs was that in order to deprive them of the property the defendants 1 H
    192                        SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A   to 5 made some manipulations and got a document manufactured which is
    alleged to be an agreement of sale in their favour. In para I 2 of the plaint the
    plaintiffs averred that on 10.7.69 the defendants 1 to 5 filed civil suit no.58
    of 1969 in the Court of Civil Judge, Mathura for specific performance of the
    alleged agreement of sale and obtained an ad-interim injunction. The injunction
    order was vacated by the civil Judge on 29.7.1969. In appeal the District
B   Judge by the order dated 2.8. I 969 issued direction for maintenance of status
    quo. In paragraphs 18 to 24 the plaintiffs made avennents regarding injunction
    against the proceeding under section 145 Cr. P.C. on the basis of the police
    report dated 23. I 2.1969 of the apprehended breach of peace; the preliminary
    order passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Chhata on 30.12.1969 and the
C   order dated 21.3.1970 attaching the land, and the order passed by the learned
    Magistrate on 9 .11.1970 referring the dispute to the Civil Court under Section
    I 46 of the Criminal Procedure Code. In para 23 of the plaint it is stated that
    on 12.5. I 971 learned Munsif, Mathura gave his finding holding that defendants
    1to5 were in possession of the land in dispute:on 13.12.1969 and within two
    months before the said date. The plaintiff apprehending that on the basis of
D   the finding of the Munsif the Sub-Divisional Magistrate is likely to deliver
    the possession of the land in dispute to defendants I to 5 by 3 .6. I 97 I, filed
    a suit for declaration and injunction.

          In the written statement filed by the appellants herein the avennents
E   and the allegations made in the plaint were denied. The case pleaded by the
    said defendants in the plaint or original suit No.58/1969 was reiterated in the
    written statement filed by them. The learned Additional Civil Judge, Mathura
    in the judgment dated 21.12.1974 decreed suit no.58 of 1969 and dismissed
    suit no.58/1971. The operative portion of the judgment reads as follows:

F           "The suit no.58/1971 is dismissed with costs payable to the
            covenantees who are defendants no. 1 to 5. The other defendants
            would get no costs. The suit no. 58 of I 969 is decreed with costs
            payable by all the defendants of that suit. The 5 covenantees Ram
            Khilona and others who are plaintiffs of suit no.58/1969 will deposit
            Rs. 2000 in 45 days from the date of this order. In default their suit
G           is to stand dismissed with costs to the defendants of that suit. Upon
            the deposit of the amount within the time allowed the original owners
            and vendees who are the defendants of suit no.58/1969 would execute
            the sale deed in favour of the covenantees on a date notified by the
            latter by registered mail. If the original owners and vendees do not
H           comply with the covenantees notice appointing the date for the
             RAM KHILONA v. SARDAR [D.P. MOHAPATRA, J.]                  193

       execution of the sale deed the deed would be executed by the court       A
       at the instance of the covenantees and at the expenses of the owners
       and the vendees.

       Let a copy of this judgment be placed upon the record of the original
       suit no.58 of 1971."
                                                                                B
      The respondents 1 and 2 herein filed civil appeal Nos. 3 and 4 of 1975
challenging the judgment of the learned Additional Civil Judge. The appeals
were dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Mathura by the
judgment rendered on 6.5.1978 and decrees of the trial court in both the suits
were confinned. Being dissatisfied with the decision of the Courts below C
respondents 1 and 2 herein filed second appeal Nos. 1974/78 and 1975178 in
the High Court which were decided by the Judgment dated 24.9.1996 of the
single Judge allowing both the appeals, as noted earlier. The said judgment
is assailed by the appellants in the present appeals.

      At the time of admission of the appeal, the High Court formulated the     D
question of law for examination in following terms :

       "Whether the transfer in favour of the defendant-appellants (vendee
       for this judgment) was protected by Section 41 of Transfer of Property
       Act and/or Section 19 of the Specific Relief Act"?                       E
In the impugned judgment the learned Judge has observed that : "Shri
Murlidhar, learned Senior Advocate who appeared for appellants (vendees)
in both the appeals has not given emphasis to challenge the finding of fact ..
which have been recorded by the courts below for decreeing the suit No.58
of 69 and for dismissing Suit No.58 of 71 against which review can be F
legally sought by the appellants in substantial question of law having been
either wrongly decided or left undecided though it was required to be decided
for having arisen in the case."lt has been further observed in the judgment
that "Shri Murlidhar also did not press the appeal on the question of law on
which the appeal was admitted for hearing by this court at the stage of Order G
41 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure." After discussing the merit of the
question of applicability of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, the
High Court observed "On the findings of fact finally settled by the courts
below, concedes Mr. Murlidhar also, vendees cannot invoke the provisions
of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act. Protection of the said provision
for saving the transfer of the land in suit in their favour therefore cannot be H
    194                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A availed of by the vendees on the facts finally settled by the courts below
    Section 41 is not attracted."

         Regarding Section 19 of the Speci.fic Relief Act, the High Court observed
  that the said section has no application to the case at all. The resultant position
  after discussion of the substantial question of law framed was: "the result of
B the above discussion therefore is that this appeal cannot succeed on the
  points raised in its support in the memo of appeal". Thereafter the High Court
  proceeded to consider the contention raised by Shri Murlidhar, learned counsel
  for the appellant, that in view of the observations made by the lower appellate
  Court which has been quoted in the impugned judgment the position was
C clear that previously the witnesses in the document were Harchandi and Tuhi
  Ram but subsequently by making some over-writings the names of Mool
  Chand and Ram Swarup were made witnesses in the document. The relevant
  observation stated to have been made by the lower appellate Court to this
  effect reads :

D           "A mere look to this stamp reveals that previously the witnesses were
            somebody else and by doing overwriting Mool Chand and Ram Swarup
            were made witnesses. If really Mool Chand and Ram Swarup were
            the attesting witnesses of the deed, their thumb impression and
            signatures respectively should also have been on the first stamp paper.
            It appears that originally Harchandi and Tahi Ram were the witnesses
E
            even on the second stamp paper, but subsequently the names of Mool
            Chand and Ram Swarup were introduced by doing overwriting. This
            raises a strong suspicion against the genuineness of the fact that Mool
            Chand and Ram Swarup were really the attesting witnesses originally
            and in their presence the deed was executed. Keeping this fact in
F           view, the evidence of Mool Chand and Ram Swarup will be judged."

     From the observations of the lower appellate Court the High Court inferred
    that the case of the appellants that alterations had been made by the covenantors
    in the agreement of sale (Ext.12) for introducing Ram Swarup and Moo!
G   Chand, two independent persons, as marginal witnesses of the said agreement.
    The High Court took the view that the interpolation for introducing the two
    independent marginal witnesses in the agreement of sale was made so as to
    give authenticity to the said agreement of sale. Then the High Court considered
    the question whether the interpolation made in the document was a material
    alteration or not? The High Court took note of the decisions of this Court in
H   the case of M.S. Anirudhan v. Thomco's Bank Ltd., AIR (1963) SC 746
             RAM KHILONA v. SARDAR [D.P. MOHAPATRA. l.)                        195

which was cited by the learned counsel for appellants before the Court and· A
the case of Kaliana Gounder v. Palani Gounder and Anr., AIR (1970) SC
1942 which was cited by the learned counsel for the respondent. The High
Court also took note of the rule laid by the Supreme Court to the effect :

       "The Supreme Court, however, proceeded to lay down the law on the
       subject presuming that the change complained of by the defendant              B
       was made subsequently by an unilateral act bf the plaintiff or on his
       behalf. The Supreme Court he Id that since the additions made in the
       instrument were inconsequential as it merely expresses that which
       was implied by law in the deed as originally written, or which carries
       out the intention of the parties to the agreement already apparent on         C
       the face of the deed and that the alteration does not otherwise prejudice
       the party who is liable under the agreement deed. The alteration was
       not a material alteration."

Testing the case on hand in the light of the principles noted by him, the D
learned Judge observed : "In this background if we test the alteration in
question there should be no iota of doubt left to conclude that by the said
alteration the covenantors tried to add sanctity to the instrument (Ext.12)
which in their opinion, with the signatures of their relatives and ene1nies of
vendees who were originally projected as witnesses of the execution of that
instrument, was not likely to pass the test of genuineness with the tough E
scrutiny of the law courts therefore, they thought it necessary to introduce
new names of other two mafginal witnesses in place of the original one s to1



rule out any doubt about its genuineness." The learned Judge further observed
in the judgment : "the alteration made by the covenantors in the agreement
deed was thus a material alteration as it was to the prejudice of the vendors F
who, in view of the testimony of those two witnesses, whose names were
subsequently introduced in it, were faeed with a difficult situation of failing
in their endeavour to prove that the said agreement deed was fraudulently
manufactured by covenantors on a document and their signatures were obtained
on the pretext of transfer of some other property". The learned Judge summed
up his findings in the following words :                                        G

       "On the facts, circumstances and the legal position already discussed
       in detail herein above I am of the view that the alteration which was
       made in the agreement deed by the covenantors must be held to be
       a material alteration which had the result of avoiding the agreement. H
    196                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] SUPP. I S.C.R.

A          at the option of the vendors and was rendered void ab initio having
           no binding effect on the vendors. The agreement, therefore, cannot
           be enforced against the vendors for the reason of its having been
           altered without their knowledge and consent."

B          From the discussions in the impugned judgment the sole question that
    arises for consideration in these appeals is whether the High Court was right
    in setting aside the concurrent decision of the courts below on recording a
    finding that the alterations found to have been made in the agreement of sale
    by introducing two more marginal witnesses was a material alteration of the
    document?
c
          In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition at page 552 para 1378 it
    is observed :

           "A material alteration is one which varies the rights, liabilities, or
D          legal position of the parties as ascertained by the deed in its original
           state, or otherwise varies the legal effect of the instrument as originally
           expressed, or reduces to certainty some provision which was originally
           unascertained and as such void, or which may otherwise prejudice
           the party bound by the deed as originally executed.

E               The effect of making such an alteration without the consent of the
            party bound is exactly the same as that of cancelling the deed."

           In paragraph 1383 at page 555 it is observed :

F          "An alteration made in a deed, after its execution, in some particular
           which is not material does not in any way affect the validity of the
           deed; and this is equally the case whether the alteration was made by
           a stranger or by a party to the deed. Thus the date of a deed may well
           be filled in after execution; for a deed takes effect from the date of
           execution, and is quite good though it is undated. So, also, the names
G
           of the occupiers of land conveyed may be inserted in a deed after its
           execution, where the property assured was sufficiently ascertained
           without them. It appears that an alteration is not material which does
           not vary the legal effect of the deed in its original state, but merely
           expresses that which was implied by law in the deed as originally
H          written, or which carries out the intention of the parties already
             RAM KHILONA v. SARDAR [D.P. MOHAPATRA, J.]                   197

       apparent on the face of the deed, provided that the alteration does not   A
       otherwise prejudice the party liable under it."

It has not been held by the High Court and indeed it was also not contended
before us that the agreement of sale, as it stood originally, was invalid for
any reason. Indeed the position is accepted that the document did not require
any marginal witnesses for validity in law. All that has been observed by the B
High Court is that the covenantees, appellants herein, might have had an
apprehension that as the marginal witnesses in the original document were
persons closely related to them the Court may not readily accept the case of
the plaintiffs regarding the agreement of sale; therefore, they subsequently
introduced two independent persons as marginal witnesses in the document C
which amounted to interpolating with the documents. We find from the
discussions in the judgment of the trial Court and the first appellate Court
that the question of addition of marginal witnesses in the document after its
execution was considered by the Courts and was not believed. The observations
of the first appellate Court quoted by the High Court in the impugned judgment
were mere observations which, as the judgment shows, was not taken as a D
substantial matter against the credibility and acceptability of the case of the
plaintiffs in Civil Suit No.58 of 69. As noted earlier, the trial Court and the
first appellate Court had concurrently accepted the case of the plaintiffs in
C.S.No.58 of 69 and had rejected the case of the plaintiffs in C.S.No.58 of
71. The Courts in exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in them E
under Section 20 of the Specific Relief Act had decreed the suit for specific
performance of the agreement of sale. The High Court in the impugned
judgment has not discussed any legality by the courts below in taking the
decision. It appears that the High Court has decided the second appeal on a
question neither taken in the memorandum of appeal nor taken in that form
before the courts below and has upset the concurrent decisions of the courts F
on a finding recorded by it. The approach of the High Court in the second
appeal was clearly against the law and spirit of Section 100 of the Code of
Civil Procedure. Further, as discussed earlier, the view taken by the High
Court that the interpolation said to have been made by the covenantees in the
agreement of sale does not stand scrutiny under law. As observed earlier such G
alteration, assuming that it was made subsequently, did not bring about any
change in the validity and enforceability of the agreement of sale. We are
constrained to observe that the finding recorded by the High Court appears
to be based on surmise. Therefore, the judgment is clearly unsustainable.

     Accordingly, the appeals are allowed with costs. The common judgment        H
    198                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002) SUPP. 1 S.C.R.

A   and decree passed by the High Court on 24th September, 1996 in Second
    Appeal Nos.1974 of 1978 and 1975 of 1978 is set aside and the judgment
    and decree passed by the First Additional District Judge, Mathura in Appeal
    Nos.3-4 of 1975 confirming the judgment and decree in Suit Nos.58 of 1969
    and 58 of 1971 is restored. The appellants shall be entitled to a sum of Rs.
B   20,000 as hearing fee from the respondents.

    N.J.                                                      Appeals allowed.