RAM DOSSversusK. THANGAVELU

                                     RAM DOSS                                          A
                                           v.
                                 K. THANGAVELU

                               NOVEMBER 24, 1999

                     [V. N. KHARE AND S.N. PHUKAN, JJ.]                                B


           Rent Control and Eviction-Tamil Nadu Buildings (lease and Rent
    Control) Act, 1960-Section 25-Tenant refused to recognise new owner as
     landlord-Defaulted in rent payments-Rent Court ordered eviction on the
    finding that there was landlord tenant relationship-Held: High Court cannot        C
    treat Revision application as on appeal and reassess evidence-In revision,
    Court can look into records only to satisfy itself of the legality/correctness
     of the proceedings and the propriety of the judgment/order.

          The appellant, having purchased the property from the original owner,        D
    became the owner of the premises which was already rented out to the
    respondent. However the respondent refused to recognise him as the landlord
    and failed to pay the rent. On an application by the appellant for eviction, the
    Rent Controller, held that there was a landlord-tenant relationship and in view
    of defaulted rent payment, ordered eviction. An appeal there from was
    dismissed. On Revision, High Court set aside the order of the Rent Controller      E
    holding that landlord tenant relationship was not established, against which
    this appeal is filed. In the appeal, it was contended that High Court erred in
    exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the T. N. Buildings
    (Lease and Rent Control) Act as appellate power and reassessing the evidence
    before the lower courts.
                                                                                       F
          Allowing the appeal, the Court

           HELD : The revisional power of the High Court under Section 25 of the
    Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control), Act not being appellate power,
    it is impermissible for the High Court to reassess the evidence in a revision
    petition. In this appeal the High Court proceeded to decide the revision as if G
    it was deciding an appeal. In the present case the Rent Control Authority and
    the Appellate Court on assessment of evidence concurrently recorded a
    finding of fact that there existed relationship of landlord-tenant between the
    parties. Both the Rent Control Authority and the Appellate Authority plac~
    reliance on account books produced by the appellant to show that the H
(
                                           1
    2                        SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999] SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

A respondent tenant had been paying rent in respect of the said premises. The
    Rent Control Authority also took note of the fact that the respondent tenan'
    admitted in his evidence that the disputed premises do not belong to him and
    had been constructed on the land covered by survey No. S92~593. Mere non-
    filling of lease deed, which could not be traced, would not necessarily lead to
    the conclusion that there existed no landlord-tenant relationship between the
B   parties at least when there were numerous documents on record to show that
    the appellant purchased this premises from R. The High Court was not
    justified in interfering with the finding of fact recorded by the two courts
    below. (3-H; 4-A.C; G-H)

C         Dr. Sankarnarayanan v. Punjab National Bank, (1995) Supp. 4 SCC
    675, referred to.

          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4865 of 1998.

          From the Judgment and Order dated 19 .11.1996 of High Court of Madras
    in C. R.P. No. 1644/91.
D
          TLV Iyer, Ms. N. Annapoorani, V. Krishnamurthy, S. Aravindh and T.
    Harish Kumar for the appearing parties.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

E         V. N. KHARE, J. The appellant herein alleged himself to be the landlord
    of Door Nos. 24A and is situated in Ward No. II, Block No. III, Thanjavur
    Road, in the city of Tiruvarur. Originally the said premises was owned by
     Ramanathan Chettiar. Subsequently the aforesaid premises was purchased by
    the appellant on 7th March, 1980. The respondent is the tenant in the said
     premises from the time of predecessor-in-interest of the appellant. It appears
F   that the respondent did not recognise the appellant as the owner of the
     premises and rent was also not paid for the said premises. Under s~ch
    circumstances, the _appellant filed a petition before the Rent Control Authority
    for eviction of the respondent on the grounds of denial of title and also for
    willful default of payment of rent. Before the Rent Controller, the appellant
    filed various documents including the sale deed executed in his favour for
G   establishing that he is the owner of the said premises and the respondent is
    the tenant. Similarly evidence was also led by the respondent in support of
    his case. The Rent Controller, after assessing the evidence, came to the
    conclusiOn that there existed relationship of landlord-tenant betwedn the
    appellant and the respondent and the tenant having .denied the title and also
H   having committed default in payment of rent was liable to be ejected.
                  RAMDOSS v. K. THANGAVELU (V.N. KHARE, J.]                        3
      Consequently, the order of eviction was passed by the Rent Controller. The        A
 ~    appeal preferred by the respondent-tenant was dismissed. However, the
      revision filed by the respondent-tenant was allowed by the High Court on the
      ground that the landlord had failed to establish the relationship of landlord
      and tenant between the parties. In view of that matter, the revision was
      allowed and the orders of the courts below were set aside. It is against the
      said order the landlord is in appeal before us.
                                                                                        B

             Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has urged, that in the
      present case it was not open to the High Court in exercise of its revisional
      power to reassess the evidence and record finding contrary to the finding
"!'
      recorded by the courts below and, therefore, the impugned judgment deserves       c
      to be set aside. However, this was disputed by the learned counsel for the
      respondent. He submitted that the High Court in exercise of its revisional
      jurisdiction can interfere with the incorrect finding of fact recorded by the
      courts below and therefore, the judgmei1t of the High Court has to be
      maintained. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent referred to a decision
      of this Court in the case of Asram Motors v. Bina Kumari, (1995] Supp. 4 S:CC     D
      679 wherein this Court held that the High Court, in exercise of its revisional
      power under Section 25 of the Act, can examine the correctness of the
      findings of fact. There is no quarrel as regards this proposition, but the
      question that arises for consideration is whether, while examining the
      correctness of the findings of fact, is it open to the revisional court to        E
      reassess the evidence? It is not disputed before us that Section 25 of the
      Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, [1960] (hereinafter referred
      to as 'the Act') confers the revisional jurisdiction upon the High Court which
      is not an appellate power. The High Court, under Section 25 of the Act, can
      call for and examine the record of the appellate authority in order to satisfy
      itself as to regularity of such proceedings or the correctness, legality or       F
      propriety of any decision or orders passed therein. In Dr. D. Sankara-
      narayanan v. Punjab National Bank, [1995] Supp. 4 SCC 675, it was held as
      thus:

             "We are of the view that learned counsel for the appellant is right
                                                                                        G
             when he contends that the revision petition was treated by the High
             Court as if it were a second appeal and, upon a reassessment of the
             evidence, the findings of facts of the first appellate court were
             reversed."

      Thus, in our view, the revisional power of High Court under Section 25 of the     H
•
       4                        SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1999) SUPP. 5 S.C.R.

  A Act not being an appellate power, it is impermissible for the High Court to
       reassess the evidence in a revision petition filed under Section 25 of the Act.
       In this appeal what we find is that, the High Court in the revision petition filed
       by the tenant proceeded to decide the revision as if it was deciding an appeal.
       In the present case the Rent Control Authority and the appellate Court on
       assessment of evidence concurrently recorded a finding of fact that there
  B    existed relationship of landlord-tenant between the parties. The Rent Control
       Authority and .the Appellate Authority both for purposes of determining the
       relationship of landlord-tenant placed reliance on accounts books produced
       by the appellant to show that the respondent tenant had been paying rent
       in respect of the said premises. The Rent Control Authority also took note
  C   of the fact that the respondent tenant admitted in his evidence that the
      disputed premises i.e Door Nos. 24A and 25 do not belong to him and Door
      Nos. 24A and 25 had been constructed on the land covered by survey No.
      592-593. Curiously, the High Court in its revisionaljurisdiction acting as an
      Appellate Court re-assessed the evidence of the parties and held that since
      the appellant ~andlord having undertook to file the lease deed for showing
  D   that the respondent was a tenant of erstwhile landlord failed to file the same,
      the relationship of landlord and tenant therefore is not established between
      the parties. This view of the High Court is legally and factually not correct.
      The relevant paragraph of the petition filed by the appellant landlord thus
      runs as under:-
  E
              "The petitioner learns that Kuppuswamy Chettiar has executed a lease
              deed in favour of Ramanathan Chettiar at the time of talcing the
              building on lease. The lease deed is missing and will be filed after it
              is traced."

  F A perusal of the said paragraph would show that the lease deed executed
    between Kuppuswamy Chettiar and Ramanathan Chettiar was neither in the
    personal knowledge of the appellant nor was in his possession which could
    have been filed. The only allegation that was made in the petition was that
    the appellant has learnt that a lease deed has been executed which is missing
   and the same would be filed after it is traced. Mere non-filing of lease deed,
.G
   which could not be traced, would not necessarily lead to the conclusion that
   there existed no landlord-tenant relationship between the parties atleast when
   there were numerous documents on record to show that the appellant
   purchased this premises from Ramanathan Chettiar. We are, therefore, of the
   view that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the finding of
 H fact recorded by the two courts below.
                RAMDOSS v. K. THANGAVELU [V.N. KHARE, J.)                      5
          The second reasoning given by the High Court for upsetting the            A
    judgment of the two courts below was that the sale deed tiled by the landlord
    does not mention Door Nos. 24A and 25. This finding of the High Court is
    contrary to the evidence on record. A copy of the sale deed has been filed

-
-
     before us and the said sale deed shows that it was also in respect of Door
    Nos. 24A and 25.

          For the aforesaid reasons, the judgment of the High Court is not
                                                                                    B

    sustainable in law. We, accordingly set aside the judgment and order under
    appeal. The appeal is allowed with costs.

    I. M.A.                                                     Appeal allowed.     C