RAM DASSversusISHWAR CHANDER AND OTHERS

                             RAM DASS                                       A
                                   v.
               ISHWAR CHANDER AND OTHERS

                             MAY 9, 1988

           [R.S. PATHAK, CJ., S. NATARAJAN AND                              B
                 M.N. VENKATACHALIAH, JJ.]

      Constitutioi:i of India, 1950-Article 136---Bonafide need of land·
lord of accommodation-Eviction of tenant-All conclusions drawn
from,primary facts-Not necessarily questions of law-Often are pure
questions of fact-Bonafide requirement is one such.
                                                                            c
      East Punjab Rent Restrictions Act, 1949: Section 15~ Tenant-
Eviction of-On ground of bonafide need of landlord-Righ Court-
Jurisdiction of-To interfere in revision-Court call take cautious
cognizance of subsequent events to mould relief
                                                                            D
      The appellant and the respondents were tenants or separate por-
tions of the premises which wa• later sold by the landlord to the respon-
dents, who were four brothers. The respondents filed a petition for
eviction or the appellant on the ground of bonafide requirement. They'
contended that they were in all 10 brothers, who; alongwith their
families, were living together with their father, and the accommodation     E
in their occupation was insufficient for their needs.

     The Rent Controller upheld the claim of the respondents. The
Appellate Authority (District Judge), however, allowed the appellant's
appeal. The High Court, in revision under section 15(5), reversed the
appellate judgment and restored that pf the Court of first Instance.        F

     Before this Court the appellant contended:

     (1) That the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction
was precluded from re-opening the rmdings of fact recorded by the
appellate authority; and (2) that the findings of the High Court on         G
reappraisal of evidence were wholly erroneous.

     Dismissing the appeal, it was,

     HELD: (I) It was, no doubt, true that the question whether the
requirement of the landlord was bonafide or not was essentially one or      H
                                   239
    240         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

A   fact, notwithstanding the circumstance thmt a finding of fact in that
    behalf was a secondary and inferential fact drawn from other primary
    or perceptive ones. All conclusions drawn from primary facts were not
    necessarily, questions of law. They could be, and quite often were, pure
    questions of fact. The question as to honafide requirement was one
    such. !242G-H]
B
         (2) The landlord's desire for possession, however honest it might
    otherwise be, had inevitably a subjective element in it, and that
    "desire" to become a "requirement" in law must have the objective             }
    element of a "need". [243C]                                                   ''\

          (3) Statute had been enacted to afford protection to tenants from
c   eviction. In considering the reasonable requirement of the landlord the
    court must take all relevant circumstances into consideration so that the
    protection afforded by law to the tenant was not rendered merely
    illusory or whittled down. [243A, C-D]

D         (4) Subject to the well-known limitations of all revisional jurisdic-
    tions, the scope of revisional power essentially turned on the language of
    the statute investing the revisional jurisdiction. [243E]

          (5) Section 15(5) of the Act enabled the High Court to satisfy itself
    as to the "legality and propriety" or the order under revision,
E   which was quite obviously, a much wider jurisdiction in the exercise
    of which, an appropriate case, the High Court could reappraise the
    evidence if the finding of the appellate court was found to be infirm in
    law. (243G; 244F]

         (6) Courts could take a 'cautious-cognizance' of the subsequent-
F   events in order to mould the relief. [24SF-G l                                 \1
         Mattu/a/ v. Radhe Lal, [1975) 1SCR127; Phiroze Bamanji Desai
    v. Chandrakant M. Patel, [1974) 3 SCR 267; Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Waman
    Hemraj, AIR 1938 Born. 223; Hari Shankar v. Girdhari Lal Chow-
    dhury, -(AIR 1963 SC 698); Dattonpant Gopalvarao Devakata v. Vit-
G   halrao Marutirao, AIR 1975 SC 1111 and M/s Ranalakshmi Dyeing &
    Others v. Rangaswamy, referred to.

          CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2969
    of 1984.

H         From the Judgment and Order dated 29.5.1984 of the Punjab
           RAM DASS v. ISHWAR CHANDER [VENKATACHALIAH, J.J              241

    and Haryana High Court in Civil Revision No. 1934 of 1982.
                                                                               A
          Harbans Lal and Balmokand Goyal for the Appellant.

          V.C. Mahajan and K.R. Nagaraja for the Respondents.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by:                                B

         VENKATACHALIAH, J. This appeal, by special Leave, by the
    tenant arises out of the proceedings for eviction instituted against him
    under the East Punjab Rent Restriction Act 1949 and is preferred
    against the judgment, dated, 29.5.1984 in Civil Revision No. 1934 of
    1982 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, reversing the judgment, C
    dated, 30.4.1982 made by the Appellate Authority, Kapurthala, in
    Rent Appeal No. 130 and restoring that of the Rent Controller, dated,
    17.12.1978 in rent case no. 47 of 1977, granting possession to the
    Respondent--landlords.
                                                                               D
          2. Appellant was a tenant of the premises concerned in the pro-
    ceedings on a monthly rent of Rs.3 having been inducted into posses-
    sion oh 9.12.1965 by the then owner Smt. Manohar Kaur. The pre-
'   mises in the occupation of the appellant consist of a portion of the
    ground-floor of the building. On 15.12.1976, the said Manohar Kaur
    sold the entire property in favour of respondents. The respondents are     E
    four brothers. Prior to the purchase, they were occupying, as tenants,
    other portions of the same building both in the first floor and the
    second floor. They were in occupation of three rooms in the first floor
    and .one in the second.

                                                                               F
          On 27.9.1977, respondents filed a petition for eviction oLthe
    appellant on the ground of their own bonafide .requirement_ of the
    premises. They alleged that the portion in their occupation was insuffi-
    cient for their needs and that they required additional accommoda-
    tion. They said that they were in all 10 brothers who, alongwith their
    families, were living together with their father.
                                                                               G

          3. Appellant contested, the claim, urging that the first-respon-
    dent one of the brothers, was in occupation of other rented-premises
    in the saine town at a place called Mohalla Malka-na; that the respon-
    dents' father was himself in occupation of a separate rented premises;
    that the accommodation already available to the respondents was            H
    242         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

A more than sufficient for their requirements and that, accordingly, their
  projected need was fictitious and malafide. Appellant also said that
  the proceedings were brought in collusion with the previous owner.
                                                                                 '
        4. On an appreciation of the evidence, the Rent Controller
  upheld the claim of the landlords and made an order granting posses-
B sion. The Appellate Authority (District Judge) however, allowed
  appellants' appeal and set-aside the order of eviction. The High Court
  in revision under Section 15(5) of the Act reversed the appellate judg-
  ment and restored that of the court of first instance. The aggrieved
  tenant has come-up by special leave.

        5. In support of the appeal, Shri Harbans Lal, learned senior
C advocate, urged that the order of the High Court suffers from, and
  stands vitiated, by, two serious errors: The first, according to the
  learned counsel, is that the High Court, in exercise of its revisional
  jurisdiction, was precluded from reopening findings of facts recorded
  by the Appellate-Authority and substituting fresh findings of its owtt
D on a reappraisal of the evidence even if the fresh findings so recorded
  could be said to be. amongst those possible on the evidence. Learned
  Counsel placed reliance on Mattu/al v. Radhe Lal, [1975) 1 SCR 127
  and Phiroze Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel & Ors., [1974) 3
  SCR267.

E          The second is that the findings as to the bonafides, or the lack of
    it, of the alleged need for the additional-accommodation recorded by
    the Appellate Authority were sound, proper and supportable on the
    evidence on record and the High Court in exercise of its revisional
    jurisdiction could not have reappraised the evidence afresh and that
    the findings so substituted by the High Court are wholly erroneous.
F
         Sh. V.C. Mahajan, learned senior advocate for the respondent-
    landlords, however, sought to support the order of the High Court.

          6. Upon a consideration of the matter, we are of the view that
    both the contentions urged in support of the appeal are in-substantial.
G
           It is, no doubt, true thatthe question whether the requirement of
    the landlords is bonafide or not is essentially one of fact, notwithstand-
    ing the circumstance that a finding of fact is a secondary and inferen-
    tiaf fact drawn from other primary or perceptive ones. All concfusions
    drawn from primary-facts are not necessarily, questions of law. They
H   can be, and quite often are, pure questions of fact. The question as to
    bonafide requirement is one such.
               RAM DASS v. JSHWAR CHANDER IVENKATACHALIAH, J.(                243

               Statutes enacted to afford protection to tenants from eviction on     A
        the basis of contractual rights of the parties make the resumption of
    ,   possession by the land-lord subject to the satisfaction of certain statu-
        tory conditions. One of them is the bonafide requirement of the land-
        lord, variously described in the statutes as "bona-fide requirement",
        "reasonable requirement", "bona-fide and reasonable requirement"             B
        or, as in the case of the present statute, merely referred to as "landlord
        requires for, his own use". But the essential idea basic to all such cases
        is that the need of the landlord should be genuine and honest, con-
 •      ceived in good faith; and that, further, the court must also consider it
        reasonable to gratify that need. Landlord's desire for possession how-
        ever honest it might otherwise be, has inevitably a subjective element
        in it and that, that desire, to become a "requirement" in Jaw must have      c
                                   a
        the objective element of "need". It must also be such that the court
        considers it reasonable and, therefore, eligible to be gratified. In doing
        so, that court must take all relevant circumstances into consideration
        so that the protection afforded by law to the tenant is not rendered
        merely illusory or whittled down.                                            D
              7. On the first contention that the revisional powers do not ex-
        tend to interference with and upsetting of findings of fact, it needs to
        be observed that, subject to the well-known limitations inherent in all
t(;
        revisional jurisdictions, the matter essentially turns on the language of
        the statute investing the jurisdiction. The decisions relied upon by Shri
                                                                                     E
        Harbans Lal, deal, in the first case, with the limitations on the scope of
        interference with findings of fact in second-appeals and in the second,
        with the limitation on the revisional powers where the words in the
        statute limit it to the examination whether or not the order under
        revision is "according to law." The scope of the revisional powers of
        the High Court, where the High Court is required to be satisfied that
                                                                                     F
        the decision is "according to law" is considered by Beaument C.J. in
        Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj, AIR 1938 Bombay 223 a case
        referred to with approval by this Court in Hari Shankarv. Girdhari Lal
        Chowdhury, AIR 1963 SC 698.
 c
              But here, Section 15(5) of the Act enables 'the High Court to
                                                                                     G
        satisfy itself as to the "legality and propriety" of the order under
        revision, which is, quite obviously, a much wider jurisdiction. That
        jurisdiction enables the court of revision, in appropriate cases, to
        examine the correctness of the findings of facts also, though the revi-
'       sional court is n~t "a second court of first appeal" (See Dattonpant
        Gopalvarao Devakate v. Vithalrao Marutirao).                                 H
    244         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [1988) Supp. 1 S.C.R.

A          Referring to the nature and scope of the revisional jurisdiction
    and the limitations inherent in the concept of a 'Revision' this Court in
    Mis. Ranalakshmi Dyeing Works & Ors. v. Rangaswamy Chettier,
    [ 1980),2 RCJ 165 (at 167) observed:

                " ..... 2.. "Appeal" and "revision" are expressions of
B               common usage in Indian statutes and the distinction bet-
                ween "appellate jurisdiction" and "revisional jurisdiction"
                is well known though not well defined. Ordinarily, appel-
                late jurisdiction involves a rehearing, as it were, on law as     ~-

                well as fact and is invoked by an aggrieved person. Such
                jurisdiction may, however, be limited in some way as, for
                instance has been done in the case of second appeals under
c               the Code of Civil Procedure and under some Rent Acts in
                some States. Ordinarily, again, revisional jurisdiction is
                analogous to a power of superintendence and may some-
              . times be exercised even without its being invoked by a
                party. The extent of revision al jurisdiction is defined by the
D               statute conferring such jurisdiction .................· ... .
                Revisional jurisdiction as ordinarily understood with
                reference to our statutes is always included in appellate
                jurisdiction but not vice-versa. These are general observa-
                tions. The question of the extent of appellate or revisional
                jurisdiction has to be considered in each case with refer-
E               ence to the language employed by the statute ..... "

          The criticism of Sri Harbans Lal that it was impermissible for the
    High Court in its revisional jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of
    fact recorded by the appellate authority, however erroneous they be,
    is not, having regard to the language in which the revisional power is
F   couched, .tenable. In an appropriate case, the High Court can reap-
    praise the evidence if the findings of the appellate court are found to
    be infirm in law.

          8. Now to the second contention. The High Court was of the
    view that certain findings recorded by the Appellate Authority on the
G   question of the bonafides Of the requirement of the landlords were
    based on material which was not quite relevant. Secondly, the High
    Court took into account certain subsequent events brought on record.
    In regard to the first aspect, the High Court observed:

                " ..... According to the learned Appellate Authority there
H               was no evidence on record to prove that the fandlords were
          RAM DASS v. ISHWAR CHANDER [VENKATACHALIAH, J.]              245

               ten brothers since their father had not come in the witness-
                                                                              A
               box to depose in this regard. This approach of the learned
               Appellate Authority is without wrong and illegal. There
               was nothing to disbelieve Ishwar Chander when he says
               that they are ten brothers. No question was put to him in
               the cross-examination to challenge the said statement of
               h~ ..... "                         .                           B

    The High Court noticed that so far as the premises which were said to
    be in the occupation of the Ishwar Chander (Respondent No. 1) were
    concerned, the owner of those premises was seeking resumpiion of
    possession.Further, in respect of the accommodation in the hands of
    the farther, there were already proceedings for eviction against him
    binding decision in therligh Court.                                       c
          In regard to the subsequent events which the High Court took
    notice of it said:

               " ..... Thus, what has to be seen is whether the accommo-      D
               dation in their occupation is sufficient for their require-
               ments or not. Of course, out of the four landlords, one is
               married and the others were unmarried when the ejectment
               application was. filed in the year 1977. However, about
               seven years have passed since then. Mean-while, Surinder
               Kumar landlord has also been married and he has got one        E
               son aged 2 years, whereas Subhash Chand has also been
               recently married in March, 1984, as per the affidavit of
               Hukam Chand, father of the landlords, dated 27th May,
               1984. Thus, there was nothing on the record to show that
               the present accommodation in occupation of the landlords
               was sufficient to meet their requirements ..... "              F

    Courts can take a 'cautious-cognizance of the subsequent-events in
    order to mould the relief. The High Court did that.' No fault could be
    found with that.

          9. CMP No. 33347 is filed by the appellant, seeking to bring        G
    certain subsequent events on record. The alleged subsequent event is
    that pursuant to an agreement for purchase of another residential
    building entered into by the first respondent and his wife, a sale deed
:   had subsequently come to be executed in favour of first respondent's-
    wife. The contention is that having regard to this subsequent-acquisi-
    tion, the present claim for additional accommodation does not survive.    H
    246         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [1988] Supp. 1 S.C.R.

A   We are afraid this circumstance, even if true, will not tilt the balance in
    favour of the appellant. Even if the need of the other three brothers
    who are co-owners is taken into account, the order of eviction is
    supportable on the basis of ther need. CMP is, therefore, of no practi-
    cal assistance to the appellant.
B
          10. In the result, we find no merit in this appeal which is accord-
    ingly dismissed, but without an order as to costs.

    R.S.S.                                                 Appeal dismissed.