RAM DAAN (D) THROUGH LRS.versusURBAN DEVELOPMENT TRUST

                        [2014]-8 S.C.R. 360


A                RAM DAAN (0) THROUGH LRS.
                                 V.
                 URBAN DEVELOPMENT TRUST
                  (Civil Appeal No.7119 of 2014)
                         AUGUST 1, 2014
B
           [J. CHELAMESWAR AND A.K. SIKRI, JJ.]

       Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Suit for permanent
  injunction by appellant against defendant-respondent -
C Sustainability - Held: On facts, since there was no clear
  pleading as to who was the real owner of the suit property and
  in absence of any assertion that respondent was the owner of
  the property, appellant entitled for injunction, subject to the
  right of the true owner of the property (whoever it is) to evict
o the appellant in accordance with law.
      The appellant filed suit seeking decree of permanent
  injunction    restraining      the   respondent     from
  dispossessing the appellant from a plot of land. The suit
E was dismissed. The order was upheld by the appellate
  Court and the High Court. Hence the present appeal.

        Allowing the appeal and decreeing the suit, the Court

       HELD:1.1. There is no assertion that the respondent
F is the real owner of the property. Assuming for the sake
  of argument that the respondent has some authority to
  evict the appellant, the eviction must be by a process
  known to law, i.e., either by filing a suit to evict the
  appellant or by resorting to some other procedure duly
G authorized by law. The respondent placed reliance on
  Section 91 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act which
  authorises the summary eviction of encroachers of the
  government property by following the procedure
  prescribed therein. However, from the written statement

H                               360
     RAM DAAN (D) THROUGH LRS. v. URBAN                  361
            DEVELOPMENT TRUST
it does not appear that the respon~ent took any steps          A
contemplated under Section 91 of the said Act. [Paras 15,
17] [367-B-D]

     1.2: .Since there is no clear pleading in the case on
hand as to who is the real owner ofthe suit schedule           B
property and in absence of any assertion that the
respondent is the owner of the property, the appellant is
entitled for an injunction, as prayed, subject to the right
of the true owner of the property (whoever it is) to evict
the appellant in accordance with law. [Para 20] [368-C, D]     C

     Perry v. C/issold, 1907 AC 73 and Nair Service Society
Ltd. v. K. C. Alexander & Others 1968 SCR 163 : AIR 1968
SC 1165 - referred to.
                    Case Law Reference                         D
    1907 AC 73              referred to          Para 13
    1968 SCR 163            referred to          Para 13,
                                                      19
    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.            E
7119 of 2014

    From the Judgment and Order dated 23.01.2012 in SBCA
No. 68 of 1993 of the High Court Of Rajasthan at Jodhpur.
                                                               F
    Shekhar Prit Jha, Sunil Puri, Vikrant Bhardwaj for the
appellants.

    Aruneshwar Gupta, Nikhil Singh for the Respondent.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                 G
    CHELAMESWAR, J. : 1. Leave granted.

    2. This appeal arises out of a judgment dated 23rd

                                                               H
    362      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    (2014) 8 S.C.R.


A   January, 2012 of the High Court of Rajasthan at Jodhpur in an
    appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
    (for short "the CPC"). By the impugned judgment, the appeal
    was dismissed.

        3. The appellant herein filed an Civil Suit No.71 of 1976
8
  on the file of the Additional Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, First
  Class, No. 1 Bikaner seeking a decree of permanent injunction
  restraining the respondent herein from dispossessing the
  appellant of a plot of land admeasuring 4914 sq. yards and
C further not to demolish the construction existing over the said
  property. The appellant pleaded uninterrupted possession of the
  suit scheduled property from the year 1942. From the averments
  of the plaint, it appears that the appellant encroached on the
  said property in the year 1942.

D         4. The respondent herein disputed the claim of
    uninterrupted possession from the year 1942 and stated in his
    written statement as follows:-

          "In the year 1965 to remove the illegal possession of the
          plaintiff in notice was issue to him and upon receiving no
E
          response, the boundary wall of the suit property was
          dismantle. However, again he illegally occupied the said
          property."

          It is further stated in the written statement:-
F
          " .... improvement trust got removed the possession of the
          plaintiff in 1965. Therefore, the plaintiff again repossessed
          the same and action is being contemplated to remove him
          from the suit property. However, issuing these period a new
G         policy was amounted by the state Govt. according to which
          a policy of regularization unauthorized possession or
          allotment of alternative plot in lieu of the illegally occupied
          land was announced. As per the said policy to plaintiff was
          offered the policy of regularization of his 1808 sq. yrd. land
          at rate Rs. 3/- per sq. yrd and the same was to be offered
H
    RAM DAAN (D) THROUGH LRS. v. URBAN                       363
  DEVELOPMENT TRUST [J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]
    in lieu of his illegal possession and constructional house       A
    over the land the plaintiff was issued a notice to this effect
    on two occasion with direction that he should deposit the
    amount. However, neither the plaintiff intended to deposit
    the amount nor he wished to remove his possession and
    he wants to enjoy the Govt. land free of cost."                  B

     5. Before we make any analysis of the above extracted
portion of the written statement, we must place on record, the
extra~t does not make very comfortable reading whether the
mistakes occurring in the said extract are typographical errors      C
or are errors in the draft is a matter for conjecture. It only
demonstrates the sorry state of affairs of the Indian legal
system.

      6. It can be seen from the above extracted portion of the
written statement filed by the respondent herein in the suit that    D
the respondent admitted the possession of the plaintiff in the
year 1965 and also admitted that the appellant re-entered the
property after having had been evicted from the same in the
year 1965.
                                                                     E
      7. Be that as it may, the above extracted portion of the
written statement leaves no scope for any doubt that as on the
date of the suit, even according to the respondents herein, the
appellant/plaintiff was in possession of the suit schedule
property and also that there was a house in existence ~n the
said property.                                                       F

     8. On the basis of such pleadings, the trial court framed
various issues. Relevant for the present purpose are:-

     "( a) Whether the plaintiff is in possession of disputed        G
     property including the boundary wall and construction over
     it and land measuring 4914 yards as owner in possession
     and adverse against the defendant since 1942?

     (b) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a decree of
     permanent injunction with respect to disputed property?"        H
    364        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                              [2014] 8 S.C.R.


A        9. The trial court, on appreciation of evidence refused to
    believe the possession of the appellant prior to 1959 but
    recorded a conclusion that subsequent to 1959, the appellant
    has been in possession. 1

       10. In spite of such a finding, the suit was dismissed.
8
  Aggrieved by the same, the appellant herein carried the matter
  in appeal under Section 96 of the CPC in Appeal Decree
  No.106 of 1982 on the file of the Additional District Judge,
  Bikaner which was also dismissed by judgment and decree
C dated 19th April, 1993. The appellant herein carried the
  Second Appeal to the Rajasthan High Court unsuccessfully.
  Hence, the instant appeal.

       11. The High.Court proceeded on the basis that the entire
  case of the appellant is based solely on the ground of adverse
D possession commencing with the year 1942. In view of the fact
  that both the trial court and the first appellate court concurrently
  held that the appellant failed to prove his possession pr.ior to
  1959, the High Court opined the appellant failed to establish
  that he has been in possession of suit scheduled property for
E a period of 30 years prior to filing of the suit and, therefore, held
  that the appellant cannot successfully pray for a permanent
  injunction. The High Court also held that there is no evidence
  or material to show that -

F
    1.   .. . Undisputedly, it is proved that since 1959 the plaintiff is in possession
         of the property which is also proved vide documentary evidence which has
         been placed on record and the same has been referred and it conclusively
         proves the same, however, with respect of possession of the plaintiff over
         disputed portion prior to 1959 and from 1942 is based on oral evidence
         and it will not be proper to rely on those oral evidence, because, firstly, the
G        age of the plaintiff was very less and secondly, how he got the possession
         over the property and further there is a important differences in the
         statement of the witnesses .
         .. .The possession of the plaintiff is proved since 1959, however the ruling
         which has been referred above and after going through the same, it is
         clear that on the basis of the said possession it cannot presume that the .
H        plaintiff was in possession of the property before 1959.
     RAM DAAN (D) THROUGH LRS. v. URBAN                      365
   DEVELOPMENT TRUST [J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]
    "with knowledge of the true owners the appellant had been        A
    possessing the property as his own continuously and
    unobjectionably."

     Though, it makes no difference for the purpose of this
case, we must record that the conclusion reached by the High         B
Court that the possession of the appellanf'was without the
knowledge of the true owner (respondent?) is contrary to the
record. Two facts demolish the conclusion of the High Court.
In the year 1965, a notice was issued to the appellant seeking
to evict him under Section 91 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue          C
Act. Secondly, the fact that even according to the written
statement the appellant was offered under the policy of the
State to regularize the occupation of the appellant a part of the
suit scheduled property to the extent of 1808 sq. yards.

    12. Even otherwise such conclusion recorded by the High          D
Court, in our view, makes no difference to the prayer of the
appellant. The suit was filed with the prayer as follows:

    "Pass a decree of permanent injunction in favour of the
    plaintiff and against the defendant, whereby restrained the      E
    defendant from dispossessing the plaintiff for an area
    4914 sq. yards which has been shown in yellow colour in
    the site plan, and further the construction erectE:Jd over it
    be notdemolished and further plaintiff should not be
    dispossessed or any attempt to be taken to dispossess            F
    him from the said portion be stopped."

     Though the appellant made assertions in the plaint that he
became the owner of the suit property by adverse possession,
he never sought a .decree for a declaration of his title either by   G
virtue of adverse possession or otherwise. As can be seen
frqm the above extract, the prayer was simply for a permanent
injunction.


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    366      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2014] 8 S.C.R.


A       13. It is settled position of law laid down by the Privy
    Council in Perry v. Clissold, 1907 AC 73,-

         "It cannot be disputed that a person in possession of land
         in the assumed character of owner and exercising
B        peaceably the ordinary rights of ownership has a perfectly
         good title against all the world but the rightful owner. And
         if the rightful owner does not come forward and assert his
         title by the process of law within the period prescribed by
         the provisions of the statute of Limitation applicable to the
        ·case, his right is forever extinguished and the possessory
c        owner acquires an absolute title."

       The above statement was quoted with the approval by this
  Cou'rt in Nair Service Society Ltd. v. K. C. Alexander & Others,
  AIR 1968 SC 1165. Their Lordships at para 22 emphatically
D stated:-

          "The cases of the Judicial Committee are not binding on
          us but we approve of the dictum in 1907 AC 73."

E         14. The question, therefore, is that in view of the concurrent
    finding recorded by all the three courts below that the appellant
    has been in possession of the property (at least from the year
    1959) whether the injunction as prayed for by the appellant can
    be denied? As can be seen from the judgment of the Privy
F   Council referred to supra, a person such as the appellant in
    possession of land has a perfectly good title against the entire
    world except the rightful owner. However, the rightful owner must
    assert his title by the process of law within the period prescribed
    by the statutes of limitation applicable to the case.
G        15. We have carefully scanned through the written
    statement. There is no assertion that the respondent is the real
    owner of the property though it is very boldly submitted before
    us that the State of Rajasthan is the owner of the property.

H         16. However, the respondent is not the State of Rajasthan.
       RAM DAAN (D) THROUGH LRS. v. URBAN                                367
     DEVELOPMENT TRUST [J. CHELAMESWAR, J.]
What exactly is the legal character of the respondent is not                      A
known? Assuming that the State of Rajasthan is the real owner
of the property in question, whether the respondent is legally
authorized by the State of Rajasthan to recover possession of
the suit scheduled property is not clear from the record.
                                                                                  B
      17. Assuming for the sake of argument that the respondent
has some authority to evict the appellant, the eviction must be
by a process known to law, i.e., either by filing a suit to evict
the appellant or by resorting to some other procedure duly
authorized by law. In this regard, learned counsel for the                        C
respondent placed reliance on Section 91 of the Rajasthan
Land Revenue Act which, no doubt, authorises the summary
eviction of encroachers of the government property by following
the procedure prescribed therein. However, from the written
statement it does not appear that the respondent2 took any
steps contemplated under Section 91 of the said Act. It                           0
appears that the respondent is under the belief that once
Section 91 was invoked (in 1965), such an invocation for
evicting the appellant summarily can eternally be relied upon
by anybody for evicting the appellant.
                                                                                  E
      18. Law, in our opinion, does not sanction such process.
Even according to the respondent, subsequent to the alleged
eviction in 1965, the appellant re-entered possession of the suit
scheduled property. In which case if the respondent desires to
evict the appellant again, the same must be done in accordance                    F
with law by initiating appropriate proceedings. Until such
process of eviction in accordance with law is initiated, the
appellant's possession of the suit scheduled property is
required to be protected.

     19. In the context of the right of the recovery of possession                G
of immoveable property by a person who was dispossessed
from such property, this Court, in Nair Service Society Ltd.
2.   We must not be understood to be declaring that Section 91 of the Rajasthan
     Land Revenue Act authorizes the respondent to summarily evict the
     encroachers.                                                                 H
    368       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2014] 8 S.C.R.


A   (supra), while dealing with Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act,
    1877 (corresponding to Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act,
    1963) opined:

          " ... The uniform view of this Court is that if Section 9 of
          the Specific Relief Act is utilised, the plaintiff need not
8
          prove title and the title bf the defendant does not avail him .
          ... " (para 14)

         20. In the light of the above principle of law laid down by
  this Court and in view of the fact that there is no clear pleading
C in the case on hand as to who is the real owner of the suit
  schedule(Property an.d absence of any assertion that the
  respondenfis the owl'ler of the property, we are of the opinion
  that the appellant is.entitled for an injunction, as prayed, subject1
  of course, to the right of the true owner of the property (whoever
D it is) to evict the appellant in accordance with law.

         21. In the result, the appeal is allowed and suit is decreed
    as indicated above with costs throughout.

    Bibhuti Bhushan Bose                    Appeal allowed & Suit decreed.