RAM CHANDRA PRASAD SINGHversusSHARAD YADAV

                          [2020] 4 S.C.R. 1061                           1061


               RAM CHANDRA PRASAD SINGH                                  A
                                  v.
                         SHARAD YADAV
                   (Civil Appeal No. 2004 of 2020)
                         MARCH 19, 2020                                  B
         [ASHOK BHUSHAN AND M. R. SHAH, JJ.]
       Constitution of India: Art.226 — Tenth schedule; Paragraph
6 – Respondent no.1 was elected as Member of Parliament (Rajya
Sabha) on JD(U) ticket – Appellant, Member of Parliament (Rajya          C
Sabha) and leader of JD(U) in Rajya Sabha filed a petition under
Art.102(2) read with Paragraph 6 of the Tenth Schedule of the
Constitution of India praying that respondent no.1 be disqualified
under the Tenth Schedule and his seat be declared vacant in Rajya
Sabha – Allegation was that respondent no.1 who was elected to
Rajya Sabha on the ticket of JD(U), by his repeated conduct,             D
public/press statements against JD(U) and its leadership and
openly aligning with rival political party (RJD), voluntarily gave
up his membership thus acquiring disqualification under the Tenth
Schedule to the Constitution – The Chairman, Rajya Sabha after
following the due procedure and after giving opportunity of hearing      E
passed an order disqualifying the respondent as a member of the
House in terms of paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule of the
Constitution – Aggrieved respondent filed writ petition before High
Court – In the said writ petition, appellant filed application praying
for seeking permission to place additional documents to
                                                                         F
demonstrate some purported post disqualification conduct of
respondent which was denied by the respondent – High Court by
impugned order dismissed application holding that the scope of writ
petition is limited to examining the legality of the order passed by
Chairperson disqualifying the respondent from being a member of
the Rajya Sabha and any event subsequent to passing of the said          G
order cannot be a consideration for High Court to test the legality
of the said order – Impugned order challenged in the instant
appeal – Held: In the instant case, the Chairman passed the order
on 04.12.2017 on the application filed on 02.09.2017 by the
appellant seeking disqualification of the respondent – The order         H
                                1061
1062            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2020] 4 S.C.R.


 A     passed by the Chairman was based on a petition dated 02.09.2017
       as well as the material and evidence, which was brought on record
       before the Chairman – On 7.7.2019, appellant filed application
       for seeking permission to place additional documents – Additional
       evidence sought to be brought on record of the writ petition was
 B     not the basis for seeking disqualification of the respondent, thus,
       there was no error in the order of the High Court rejecting the
       application – The order of the High Court is upheld, however,
       subject to observations that where subsequent event or conduct
       of member is relevant with respect to state of affairs as pertaining
       to the time when member has incurred disqualification, that
 C     subsequent events can be taken into consideration by the High
       Court in exercise of its jurisdiction u/Art.226 – Thus, the
       observations made in paragraph 4 need not to be read as laying
       down a law that in any case subsequent event cannot be considered
       for testing the legality of the order impugned or for moulding the
 D     relief in a writ petition u/Art.226.
             Dismissing the appeal, the Court
             HELD: 1. The facts and sequence of the events on the
       basis of which the Chairman came to the conclusion that a person
       has incurred disqualification under paragraph 2(1) (a) of the
 E     Tenth Schedule are all facts, which had occurred prior to
       adjudication by the Chairman. The application which was filed
       by the appellant seeking disqualification of the respondent was
       filed on 02.09.2017 in which application, the foundation of
       disqualification of respondent was already laid down. The order
 F     passed by the Chairman was based on a petition dated
       02.09.2017 as well as the material and evidence, which was
       brought on record before the Chairman. Additional evidence
       sought to be brought on record of the writ petition was not the
       basis for seeking disqualification of the respondent, hence, there
       is no error in the order of the High Court rejecting the
 G     application. [Paras 12, 14] [1071-C-D; 1072-B-D]
             Rajendra Singh Rana and Others v. Swami Prasad
             Maurya and Others (2007) 4 SCC 270 : [2007] 2 SCR
             591 ; Shrimanth Balasaheb Patil v. Hon’ble Speaker
             Karnataka Legislative Assembly and Others (2019) 15
 H           SCALE 533 – followed.
    RAM CHANDRA PRASAD SINGH v. SHARAD YADAV                            1063


      Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India and Others (1994) 2                A
      Suppl. SCC 641 : [1994] 1 SCR 754 – relied on.
       2. The observations made by the High Court in paragraph
4, i.e., “any event subsequent to the passing of the said order
cannot be a consideration for this Court to test the legality of
the said order”may be generally correct but there can be                B
exception if the above statement is treated as statement of law.
In a writ petition under Article 226 subsequent events can be
taken note of for varied purposes. The observations made in
paragraph 4 need not to be read as laying down a law that in
any case subsequent event cannot be considered for testing the
legality of the order impugned or for moulding the relief in a writ     C
petition under Article 226. The order of the High Court is upheld
subject to observations. [Paras 16-19] [1072-H; 1073-A-B-H;
1074-A]
      Mohd. Ikram Hussain v. State of Uttar Pradesh and
      Others AIR 1964 SC 1625 : [1964] SCR 86 ;                         D
      Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor & General
      Traders (1975) 1 SCC 770 : [1975] 3 SCR 958 –
      relied on.
                       Case Law Reference
[1994] 1 SCR 754                  relied on            Para 9           E

[2007] 2 SCR 591                  followed             Para 10
(2019) 15 SCALE 533               followed             Para 11
[1964] SCR 86                     relied on            Para 15
                                                                        F
[1975] 3 SCR 958                  relied on            Para 17
      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2004
of 2020.
      From the Judgment and Order dated 11.09.2018 of the High
Court of Delhi at New Delhi in WP (C) No. 11102 of 2017.                G
      Ranjit Kumar, Sr. Adv., Gopal Singh, Manish Kumar, Shivam
Singh, Jaideep Khanna, Harpreet Singh Gupta, Advs. for the Appellant.
      Kapil Sibal, Devadatt Kamat, Sr. Advs., Javedur Rahman, Aditya
Bhat, Nizam Pasha, Ali Asghar Rahim, Ms. Sneha Ravi Iyer, Gautam
Talukdar, Advs. for the Respondent.                                     H
1064            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2020] 4 S.C.R.


 A           The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
             ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.
              1. This appeal has been filed against the Interlocutory Order dated
       11.09.2018 passed by the Delhi High Court in C.M. Application No.
       27159 of 2018 filed by the appellant in Writ Petition No. 11102 of 2017.
 B
       By the said application, the appellant sought permission to submit
       additional documents and place material on record which has been
       rejected by the High Court.
             2. Brief facts of the case giving rise to this appeal are: -
 C            2.1 The respondent No.1 was elected as Member of Parliament
       (Rajya Sabha) from Bihar on a Janata Dal (United)[JD(U)] ticket for
       a term beginning from 08.07.2016 for a period of six years. The
       appellant, a Member of Parliament (Rajya Sabha) and leader of JD(U)
       in Rajya Sabha filed a petition before the Chairman, Rajya Sabha on
 D     02.09.2017 under Article 102(2) read with paragraph 6 of the Tenth
       Schedule of the Constitution of India praying that the respondent No.1,
       Member of Rajya Sabha be disqualified under the Tenth Schedule of
       the Constitution of India and his seat be declared vacant in Rajya Sabha.
       The appellant in his petition has averred that respondent No.1, who was
       elected to the Rajya Sabha on the ticket of Janata Dal (United) from
 E     the State of Bihar had by his repeated conduct, public/press statements
       against the JD(U) and its leadership and openly aligning with the rival
       political party, Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), has voluntarily given up his
       membership, thus, acquiring disqualification under the Tenth Schedule
       to the Constitution.
 F            2.2 The Chairman, Rajya Sabha got a copy of the petition filed
       by the appellant forwarded to the respondent, who was requested to
       furnish his comments thereon. The respondent after seeking extension
       of time filed his comments. The Chairman, Rajya Sabha after following
       the due procedure and after giving opportunity of oral hearing to the
 G     respondent No.1 passed an order on 04.12.2017 disqualifying the
       respondent as a member of the House in terms of paragraph 2(1)(a)
       of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution.
              2.3 Against the order dated 04.12.2017 passed by the Chairman
       of the Rajya Sabha, respondent filed a Writ Petition No. 11102 of 2017
 H     in Delhi High Court.
    RAM CHANDRA PRASAD SINGH v. SHARAD YADAV                                   1065
              [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

      2.4 In paragraphs 27 and 28, the Chairman, Rajya Sabha has               A
observed: -
      “27. After taking into account the facts of the case, the comments
      of the respondent and the petitioner, the respondent’s oral
      submission during the personal hearing on the 8th of November,
      2017 and the observations of the Committee of Privileges of the          B
      Eighth Lok Sabha and Hon’ble Supreme court’s Judgment in the
      1994 Ravi Naik Vs. Union of India case and observations in
      similar anti-defection cases, it is crystal clear that by his conduct,
      actions and speeches, the respondent, Shri Sharad Yadav, has
      voluntarily given up his membership of the political party, Janata
      Dal (United) by which he was set up as a candidate for election          C
      to the Rajya Sabha from the State of Bihar in 2016 and elected
      as such member.
      28. I, therefore, hold that the Respondent Shri Sharad Yadav has
      incurred disqualification for being a Member of the House in
      terms of paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule to the                  D
      Constitution of India. He has thus ceased to be a Member of
      the Rajya Sabha with immediate effect. I decide and declare
      accordingly.”
      2.5 The appellant, who was respondent in the writ petition filed
C.M. Application No. 27159 of 2018 dated 07.07.2018 praying for                E
seeking permission to place additional documents Annexure 1 and
Annexure 2 filed along with the application to be taken on record.
       2.6 An affidavit in reply to the above application was filed by
the petitioner. In his affidavit, the writ petitioner denied averments
made in the application. In paragraph 2 of the affidavit, following was        F
stated: -
      “2. That I have gone through the contents of the application filed
      by the respondent No.1 seeking permission to place additional
      material on record to demonstrate some purported post
      disqualification conduct of the petitioner. I wish to deny each and      G
      every averment made therein and the contents of the said
      application may be deemed to be specifically traversed and denied
      by me unless expressly admitted by me hereinafter.”
     2.7 In the affidavit, the petitioner has denied that he has formed
any new political party. He had further averred that he has been               H
1066            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2020] 4 S.C.R.


 A     wrongly disqualified. It was pleaded that High Court is not concerned
       with the subsequent event which do not form subject matter of the writ
       petition. The application filed by the appellant was opposed by the writ
       petitioner. The High Court vide its impugned judgment dated11.09.2018
       dismissed the application. After noticing the averments made in the
       application of the appellant and the reply given by the writ petitioner,
 B
       High Court gave its reason for rejecting the application in paragraph 4,
       which is to the following effect:-
             “4. The scope of the present petition is limited to examining the
             legality and the validity of the order dated 04.12.2017 passed by
             the Chairperson, Rajya Sabha, disqualifying the petitioner from
 C
             being a member of the Rajya Sabha. Any event subsequent to
             the passing of the said order, cannot be a consideration for this
             Court to test the legality of the said order.”
             2.8 The appellant aggrieved by the above order rejecting the
 D     application has come up in this appeal.
             3. We have heard Shri Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel and
       Shri Gopal Singh, learned counsel for the appellant. Shri Kapil Sibal,
       learned senior counsel has appeared for the respondent.
              4. Shri Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel submits that the
 E     subsequent conduct and actions of the respondent re-affirms the findings
       of the Chairman that the respondent has voluntarily given up his
       membership of JD(U) from which political party he was elected to Rajya
       Sabha. It is submitted that on the basis of subsequent conducts and
       actions of the respondent, the appellant cannot go to Chairman, Rajya
 F     Sabha seeking disqualification of the respondent, hence, subsequent
       conducts and actions can be looked into in the writ petition and the High
       Court erred in rejecting application of the appellant bringing subsequent/
       additional evidence on record. It is submitted that respondent himself
       has relied on subsequent events in his pleadings. It is submitted that
       the respondent has subsequently contested the Lok Sabha Election from
 G
       the political party Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), which clearly proves
       that he had voluntarily given up membership of JD(U) and had joined
       RJD. Seeking disqualification of respondent is a continuous cause of
       action. Shri Ranjit Kumar has also relied on Section 8 of the Evidence
       Act and submits that both previous and subsequent conducts are
 H     relevant.
    RAM CHANDRA PRASAD SINGH v. SHARAD YADAV                                1067
              [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

       5. Shri Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel appearing for the        A
respondent refuting the submissions of the learned counsel for the
appellant contends that High Court has rightly rejected the application
praying for taking on record additional evidence regarding subsequent
events. He submits that under Tenth Schedule, disqualification is
incurred on the day when member has voluntarily given up his
                                                                            B
membership of political party from which he was elected. The
respondent having been disqualified; he is not a member of JD(U) as
on date. The disqualification incurred by member under paragraph
2(1)(a) of Tenth Schedule even though determined by the Speaker or
Chairman subsequently, the said adjudication relates to previous date
when member voluntarily gives up his membership. Shri Sibal submits         C
that subsequent conducts and events, which has taken place after the
order of the Chairman are neither germane nor relevant for
disqualification, which has been pronounced by Hon’ble Chairman. He
submits that it is the appellant, who has obtained adjournment of the
hearing of the writ petition.
                                                                            D
       6. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel
for the parties and have perused the record. The points which arise
for consideration in this appeal lie in a very narrow compass.
       7. Whether C.M.P. No. 27159 of 2018 filed by the appellant has
been erroneously rejected by the High Court is the question to be           E
answered. The writ petition filed by the respondent, which is pending
in the High Court is the writ petition challenging the order of Hon’ble
Chairman (Rajya Sabha) dated 04.12.2019 holding that respondent has
incurred disqualification for being member of House in terms of
paragraph 2(1)(a) of the Tenth Schedule of the Constitution. The
grounds on which petition was filed by the appellant on 02.09.2017 for      F
disqualifying the respondent have been noticed in the order of the
Hon’ble Chairman (Rajya Sabha) to the following effect: -
      “In his petition, the petitioner averred that the respondent, Shri
      Sharad Yadav, who was elected to the Rajya Sabha on the ticket
      of Janata Dal (United) from the State of Bihar on the 8 th of July,   G
      2016, had by his repeated conduct, public/press statements
      against the JD(U) and its leadership and openly aligning with a
      rival political party, namely, the Rashtriya Janata Dal(RJD),
      proved that he has voluntarily given up the membership of the
      party, thus becoming subject to disqualification under the Tenth      H
1068            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2020] 4 S.C.R.


 A           Schedule to the Constitution. The main contention of the
             petitioner is that the respondent instead of adhering to the
             unanimous decision taken on the 26th of July, 2017 by the JD(U)
             and its President, Shri Nitish Kumar to withdraw from the
             Mahagathbandhan and the coalition Government formed in Bihar
             in 2015, started anti-party activities by publicly denouncing the
 B
             party’s decision. He campaigned with RJD leaders and workers
             between the 10th and the 12th of August, 2017 in different districts
             of Bihar and attended the public rally called by the rival political
             party, i.e., RJD, in Patna on the 27th of August, 2017 despite
             written directive from Shri K.C. Tyagi, Secretary-General of the
 C           party advising him not to attend the rally and also conveying to
             him that his participation in the rally would be construed not only
             against the principles of high morality but also as voluntarily giving
             up the membership of the JD(U). The petitioner had annexed
             newspaper clippings, media reports and videos as proof of the
             allegations.”
 D
              8. Paragraph 2(1) of the Tenth Schedule is to the following
       effect: -
             “2. Disqualification on ground of defection. — (1) Subject
             to the provisions of paragraphs 4 and 5, a member of a House
 E           belonging to any political party shall be disqualified for being a
             member of the House—
             (a) if he has voluntarily given up his membership of such political
             party; or
             Explanation. —For the purposes of this sub-paragraph, —
 F
             (a) an elected member of a House shall be deemed to belong to
             the political party, if any, by which he was set up as a candidate
             for election as such member;”
              9. The disqualification is incurred by member of the House as
       soon as he has voluntarily given up his membership of such political
 G     party. This Court in Ravi S. Naik Vs. Union of India and Others,
       1994 Supp (2) SCC 641 had occasion to consider the expression
       “voluntarily given up his membership”. Referring to paragraph 2(1)(a),
       this Court laid down following: -
             “11…………………………………………. The said paragraph
 H           provides for disqualification of a member of a House belonging
    RAM CHANDRA PRASAD SINGH v. SHARAD YADAV                                1069
              [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

      to a political party “if he has voluntarily given up his membership   A
      of such political party”. The words “voluntarily given up his
      membership” are not synonymous with “resignation” and have
      a wider connotation. A person may voluntarily give up his
      membership of a political party even though he has not tendered
      his resignation from the membership of that party. Even in the
                                                                            B
      absence of a formal resignation from membership an inference
      can be drawn from the conduct of a member that he has
      voluntarily given up his membership of the political party to which
      he belongs.”
       10. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Rajendra Singh Rana
and Others Vs. Swami Prasad Maurya and Others, (2007) 4 SCC                 C
270 had occasion to consider paragraph (2) of Tenth Schedule of the
Constitution. In the above case, the Constitution Bench held that
decision by the Speaker taken at a subsequent point of time cannot and
does not postpone his incurring of disqualification by the act of the
legislature. In paragraph 34, this court held: -                            D
      “34. As we see it, the act of disqualification occurs on a member
      voluntarily giving up his membership of a political party or at the
      point of defiance of the whip issued to him. Therefore, the act
      that constitutes disqualification in terms of para 2 of the Tenth
      Schedule is the act of giving up or defiance of the whip. The         E
      fact that a decision in that regard may be taken in the case of
      voluntary giving up, by the Speaker at a subsequent point of time
      cannot and does not postpone the incurring of disqualification by
      the act of the legislator…………………………………………
      ………………………………...................................…
      The fact that in terms of para 6 a decision on the question has       F
      to be taken by the Speaker or the Chairman, cannot lead to a
      conclusion that the question has to be determined only with
      reference to the date of the decision of the Speaker. An
      interpretation of that nature would leave the disqualification to
      an indeterminate point of time and to the whims of the decision-      G
      making authority. The same would defeat the very object of
      enacting the law. Such an interpretation should be avoided to the
      extent possible. We are, therefore, of the view that the contention
      that (sic it is) only on a decision of the Speaker that
      the disqualification is incurred, cannot be accepted. This would
      mean that what the learned Chief Justice has called the               H
1070            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 4 S.C.R.


 A           snowballing effect, will also have to be ignored and the question
             will have to be decided with reference to the date on which the
             membership of the legislature party is alleged to have been
             voluntarily given up.”
             11. A recent Three Judge Bench judgment of this Court in
 B     Shrimanth Balasaheb Patil Vs. Hon’ble Speaker Karnataka
       Legislative Assembly and Others, (2019) 15 Scale 533 had
       occasion to consider paragraph 2 of the Tenth Schedule of the
       Constitution of India. In the above case, this Court noticed the objects
       and reasons of the Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act, 1985.
       This Court categorically held that decision of the Speaker that a member
 C
       is disqualified relates back to the date of the disqualifying action
       complained of. In paragraphs 54 and 55, this court laid down following:-
             “54. In addition to the above, the decision of the Speaker that a
             member is disqualified, relates back to the date of the disqualifying
             action complained of. The power of the Speaker to decide upon
 D
             a disqualification petition was dealt by a Constitution Bench of
             this Court in Rajendra Singh Rana v. Swami Prasad Maurya,
             (2007) 4 SCC 270. This Court, reading the provisions of
             paragraphs 2 and 6 of the Tenth Schedule, has clearly held that
             the Speaker has to decide the question of disqualification with
 E           reference to the date it was incurred. The Court held that:
             34. As we see it, the act of disqualification occurs on a member
             voluntarily giving up his membership of a political party or at the
             point of defiance of the whip issued to him. Therefore, the act
             that constitutes disqualification in terms of para 2 of the Tenth
 F           Schedule is the act of giving up or defiance of the whip. The
             fact that a decision in that regard may be taken in the case of
             voluntary giving up, by the Speaker at a subsequent point of time
             cannot and does not postpone the incurring of disqualification by
             the act of the legislator. Similarly, the fact that the party could
             condone the defiance of a whip within 15 days or that the
 G
             Speaker takes the decision only thereafter in those cases, cannot
             also pitch the time of disqualification as anything other than the
             point at which the whip is defied. Therefore in the background
             of the object sought to be achieved by the Fifty-second
             Amendment of the Constitution and on a true understanding of
 H           para 2 of the Tenth Schedule, with reference to the other
    RAM CHANDRA PRASAD SINGH v. SHARAD YADAV                                 1071
              [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

      paragraphs of the Tenth Schedule, the position that emerges is         A
      that the Speaker has to decide the question of disqualification
      with reference to the date on which the member voluntarily gives
      up his membership or defies the whip. It is really a decision ex
      post facto...”
                                                     (emphasis supplied)     B
      55. As such, there is no doubt that the disqualification relates to
      the date when such act of defection takes place……………”
       12. The decision taken by the Speaker, thus, has to be on the
basis of conduct or actions taken by member, which may amount to
                                                                             C
voluntarily giving up his membership. The facts and sequence of the
events on the basis of which Hon’ble Chairman came to the conclusion
that a person has incurred disqualification under paragraph 2(1)(a) of
the Tenth Schedule are all facts, which had occurred prior to adjudication
by the Hon’ble Chairman. In the facts of the present case, the
Chairman of Rajya Sabha has passed the order on 04.12.2019 on the            D
claim of the appellant praying for disqualification as noticed above. The
foundation of order of the Chairman are the facts and events, which
took place after 26.07.2017. The petition having been filed by the
appellant on 02.09.2017, petition has to be treated to be founded on
facts and events, which took place on or before 02.09.2017.                  E
       13. Now, reverting to the C.M. Application No. 27159 of 2018,
we need to note as to what was the additional evidence, which was
sought to be brought on record of the writ petition. Paragraph 4 and 5
of the application contains the details of Annexure 1 and Annexure 2,
which is sought to be brought on record, which is as follows: -              F
      “4. That it is respectfully submitted that during the pendency of
      the above matter, the petitioner has formed/launched a new
      political party called the “Loktantrik Janata Dal” on 18.05.2018
      at the Talkatora Stadium. Photographs, video clippings, posters
      and banners are proof of this formation and his active role therein.   G
      Photocopies of the pictures of the petitioner are annexed hereto
      as Annexure 1 collectively. Video recording of the speeches by
      the petitioner in the said event as also some more photographs
      have been extracted in a CD which is annexed hereto as
      Annexure-2.                                                            H
1072            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2020] 4 S.C.R.


 A           5. That the annexures are the true copies of their respective
             originals.”
              14. Paragraph 4 and the Annexures 1 and 2 referred therein
       clearly indicate that what was sought to be taken on record was an
       event which took place on 18.05.2018 in which event a new political
 B     party called the Loktantrik Janata Dal was formed/launched. The
       application which was filed by the appellant seeking disqualification of
       the respondent was filed on 02.09.2017 in which application, the
       foundation of disqualification of respondent was already laid down. The
       order passed by the Chairman is based on a petition dated 02.09.2017
 C     as well as the material and evidence, which was brought on record
       before the Chairman. Additional evidence, which is sought to be brought
       on record of the writ petition was not the basis for seeking
       disqualification of the respondent, hence, we do not find any error in
       the order of the High Court rejecting the C.M. Application No. 27159
 D     of 2018. While upholding the order of the High court rejecting the C.M.
       Application No. 27159 of 2018, we, however, make few observations.
              15. An event or a conduct of a person even though subsequent
       to passing of an order of Speaker or Chairman ordinarily may not be
       relevant for determining the validity of the order of the Speaker or
 E     Chairman but in a case where subsequent event or conduct of member
       is relevant with respect to state of affairs as pertaining to the time when
       member has incurred disqualification, that subsequent events can be
       taken into consideration by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction
       under Article 226. Justice Hidayatullah, (as he then was) speaking for
       this Court in Mohd. Ikram Hussain Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and
 F
       Others, AIR 1964 SC 1625 has made a very pertinent observation
       with regard to acceptance of evidence. It observed that if the Court
       requires an evidence that can always be received. In paragraph 19,
       following was laid down: -

 G           “(19)………………………All procedure is always open to a
             Court which is not expressly prohibited and no rule of this Court
             has laid down that evidence shall not be received, if the Court
             requires it…………………………….”
               16. The observations made by the High Court in paragraph 4,
 H     i.e., “any event subsequent to the passing of the said order cannot be
    RAM CHANDRA PRASAD SINGH v. SHARAD YADAV                                     1073
              [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

a consideration for this Court to test the legality of the said order” may       A
be generally correct but there can be exception if the above statement
is treated as statement of law.
      17. In a writ petition under Article 226 subsequent events can
be taken note of for varied purposes. We are reminded of the weighty
observation of Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu             B
Vs. The Motor & General Traders, (1975) 1 SCC 770, where
following was observed: -
      “4.………………………………………………. It is basic to
      our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged
                                                                                 C
      to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding.
      Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and
      not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after
      the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the
      right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently
      to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to        D
      events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity
      justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific
      provision or fairplay is violated, with a view to promote substantial
      justice — subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling
      factors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any                  E
      limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine
      it to the trial court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent
      other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law
      or justice. Rulings on this point are legion, even as situations for
      applications of this equitable rule are myriad. We affirm the              F
      proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the
      party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord
      with the current realities, the Court can, and in many cases must,
      take cautious cognisance of events and developments subsequent
      to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness        G
      to both sides are scrupulously obeyed………………………….”
       18. The observations made in paragraph 4 as quoted above need
not to be read as laying down a law that in any case subsequent event
cannot be considered for testing the legality of the order impugned or
for moulding the relief in a writ petition under Article 226.                    H
1074              SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2020] 4 S.C.R.


 A            19. In view of the foregoing conclusions, we uphold the order
       of the High Court subject to observations as made above. The writ
       petition before the High Court being held up due to pendency of this
       appeal, we request the High Court to dispose of the writ petition at an
       early date.
 B           20. The appeal is dismissed subject to the observation as made
       above.


       Devika Gujral                                           Appeal dismissed.

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