RAM AVTAR SHUKLAversusARVIND SHUKLA

                       RAM AVTAR SHUKLA                                 A
                                  v.
                         ARVIND SHUKLA

                        NOVEMBER 23, 1994

            [KULDIP SINGH AND K. RAMASWAMY, JJ.]                        B

     Constitution of India-Article 129 I Contempt of Court Act, 1971
Section 2 (c)-Contempt of Court-Act of interfering with judicial process
by fabricating court's proceedings, impersonating himself to be petitioner
and producing forged document to gain unfair advantage-Gratie and
contumacious act and conduct-Mere statement of conditional apology or C
even unconditional apology-Not to be accepted-Sentence of 3 months RI
-Imposed.

     One Educational s~ciety constituted under the Soci~ties
Registration Act, had been obtaining renewal from time to time. There D
was a dispute as to who represented the society. The petitioner claimed
that he was duly elected as a Manager of the Committee and he was
entitled to make an application for renewal while the case of the
respondent was that he was entitled to represent the society as a
Manager. The respondent obtained order from the Assistant Registrar
for his functioning as a Manager. The District Inspector of Schools E
recognised the petitioner as a Manager of the Committee. The Assistant
Registrar issued show cause notice to the respondent, on an application
made by the petitioner, that the respondent had fraudulently fabricated
the records and obtained the order. Subsequently an order was passed
cancelling the certificate recognising the respondent as a Manger. On
appeal, the order was confirmed. The writ petition filed against tfte F
order was allowed by the High Court and the orders were quashed.

    The petitioner filed ~LP against the judgment of the High Court,
and the operation of the judgment of the High Court was stayed.
Subsequently, it was brought to the notice of this Court that the G
petitioner was not allowed to function due to an order passed during
summer vacation, cancelling the order of stay. This Court prima facie
found that the cancelling order was a forged document for the reason
that neither of the two Judges who were parties to the original order of
stay, were the vacation judges. Therefore, the cancellation order of the
stay by the same judges on June 9, 1992 did not arise. On enquiry, the H
                                 707
    708'                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS         [1994] SUPP. 5 S.C.R

A   Registrar confirmed that the order of cancellation was a forged order
    and there was a conflict as to who had committed the forgery.

        It was finally established that the alleged interim order of this
    Court was forged and it was produced before the District Inspector of
    Schools by the respondent and that by producing the said order, the
B   respondent wanted to gain an advantage. In ·the facts and
    circumstances of this case, this Court initiated suo motu contempt
    proceedings against the respondent.

        ln1 the affidavit filed by the respondent he stated that the petitioner
    had fabricated the oder and had produced it before the Dist. Inspector
C   of Schools.

           Disposing of the matter, this Court

         HELD 1.1 The circumstances clearly point to the unerring
    conclusion that the respondent with the connivance of one of the staff in
D   the Registry, obtained the blank printed format and forged the order
    dated June 9. 1992. Later, he impersonated as petitioner and produced
    it in the office of the District Inspector of Schools. The petitioner
    having obtained the stay of the operation of the order of the High
    Court on May 11, 1992, cannot be expected to produce an order dated ·
    June 9, 1992, cancelling the order dated May 11, 1992. In fact, the
E   language of the order shows that it is not the Court language. The
    respondent initially obtained an order from the Asstt. Registrar
    recognising him to be the Manager which was later cancelled on the
    finding that it was obtained by playing fraud and misrepresentation.
    The inevitable conclusion would be that it is the respondent that stands
    to gain and not the petitioner. This Court accordingly confirms its
F   prima facie conclusion that the respondent obviously forged the order of
    this court and produced it iu the office of the Dist. Inspector of Schools,
    impersonating to be the petitioner to have him reinstated as a Manager
    of the School. (713 E to G, 714 A)
         2.1 The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 deals with any acts or
G   conduct of the parties to the litigation or witness 'in any manner'. The
    acts or conduct may take different forms. The tendency on the part of
    the contemner.in his action or conduct to prevent the course of justice
    is the relevant fact. To do an act with the intention of preventing the
    course of justice is not itself enough, but the acts must have also that
    tendency and the acts must have been done with an intent to 'prevent
H   the course of justice. (715 D, E)
                   R. A. SHUKLA v. ARVIND SHUKLA                     709

    R. v. Machin, (1980) 3 All ER 151 and R. v. Murray, (1982) 2 All ER A
225, referred to.

     2.2 Any interference in the course of justice, any obstruction
caused in the path of those seeking justice are an affront to the majesty
of law and, therefore, the conduct is punishable as contempt of Court.
Law of contempt is only one of many ways in which the due process of B
law are prevented to be perverted, hindered or thwarted to further the
cause of justice. Due course of justice means not only any particular
proceeding but broad stream of administration of justice. Therefore,
due course of justice used in Section 2 (c) or Section 13 of the Act are of
wide import and are not limited to any particular judicial proceeding.
Due process of law is blinkered by acts or conduct of the parties to the C
litigation or witnesses or generate tendency to impede or undermine the
free flow of the unsullied stream of justice by blatantly resorting, with
impunity, to fabricate court proceedings to thwart fair adjudication of·
dispute and its resultant end. If the act complained of substantially
interferes with or tends to interfere with the broad stream of
administration of justice, it would be punishable under the Act. If the D
act complained of undermines the prestige of the court or causes
hindrance in the discharge of due course of justice or tends to obstruct
the course of justice or interfere with due course of justice, it is
sufficient that the conduct complained of, constitutes contempt of court
and liable to be dealt with in accordance with the Act.
                                                       (716 F-H, 717 A, B) E

    2.3 It has become increasingly a tendency on the part of the parties
either to produce fabricated evidence as part of the pleadings or record
or to fabricate the court record itself for retarding or obstructing the
course of justice or judicial proceeding to gain unfair advantage in the
judicial process. This tendency to obstruct the due course of justice or    F
tendency to undermine the dignity of the court needs to be severely
dealt with to deter the persons having similar proclivity to resort to
such acts or conduct, In an appropriate case, the mens rea may not be
clear or may be obscure but if the act or conduct tends to undermine
the dignity of the court of prejudice the party or impedes or hinders the
due course of, judicial proceedings or administration of justice, it        G
would amount to contempt of the court. (719 C, D)

    2.4 In the instant case, the acts of the respondent in fabricating the
court proceeding purported to be dated June 9, 1992, impersonating
himself to be the petitioner and producing the fabricated copy of the
court proceedings in the office of the Dist. Inspector of Schools thus H
    710                      SUPREME COURT REPORTS         [1994) SUPP. 5 S.C.R

A   constitute contempt of the court. It tended to interfere with the course
    of justice in legal proceedings to gain unfair advantage over the
    petitioner and is not as innocent as pretended to be by the petitioner.
                                                                   (717 D, E)

        3. Public interest demands that when a person had interfered with
B   judicial process and fabricated and court's proceedings, impersonated
    himself to be the petitioner and produced in the office of the competent
    authority so as to enable him to continue as a Manager of the School,
    the judicial decision should not be pre-empted or circumvented by
    mere statement of conditional apology or as a fact even unconditional
    apology. The unconditional apology should be contrite for the acts
c   committed by him. Therefore, the conditional apology would not be
    premium to avoid conviction. Though it is open to the court in an
    appropriate case to accept an unconditional apology based on factual
    scenario accepting the apology and dropping the proceeding of
    contumacious acts deliberately done to over-reach the due process of
    the law without compunction should amount to a premium to· fabricate
D   the court order with impunity. (717 G, H, 718 A)

        4. In the instant case, it is a grave and contumacious act and
    conduct on the part of the respondent which cannot be lightly brushed
    aside. Therefore, it is a fit case that the respondent should be convicted
    and is accordingly convicted under Art.129 of the Constitution and
E   sentenced to undergo rigourous imprisonment for a period of three
    months. (718 D)

       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Suo Motu Contempt Case No.
    248of1994.
F                                            IN

          Special Leave f'etition (C) No .17524Of1991. _

       From the Judgment and Order dated 22. l 0.91 of the Allahabad High
    Court in C.Misc.W.P. No.27911of1991.
G
          T.N. Singh, B.M .. Sharma, for the Petitioner.

          Nikku Ram Mahajan. for H.M.Singh for the Respondent No.3.

          R.C. Verma for R.B. Misra for the Respondent Nos. l and 2.

H         The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
        R. A. SHUKLA v. ARVIND SHUKLA [K. RAMASWAMY, J.]             711

     K. RAMASWAMY, J. M.L.S. Uchchattar Madhyamik Vidyalaya. A
Reewan (Sandalpur) Dist. Kanpur Dehat was established by a Committee
duly constituted under the Societies Registration Act, 1960. The Society has
been obtaining renewal from the Assistant Registrar from time to time. Ram
Autar Shukla while working as a Manager of the institution, the term of the
office of the Committee was to be renewed for 5 years from October 5,
1990. There was a dispute as to who represent the society. The petitioner B
Ram Autar claimed that he was duly elected as a Manager of the Committee
and he was entitled to make an applic.ation for renewal, while the case of
the respondent was that he was entitled to represent the society as a
Manager. Admittedly, the respondent made an application and had obtained
orders from the Asstt. Registrar for.his functioning as a Manager. The Dist.
Inspector of Schools on May 6, 1991 recognised the petitioner as a C
Manager of the Committee and approved the list of office bearers. The
Asstt. Registrar issued show cause notice to the respondent, on an
application made by the petitioner, that the respondent had fraudulently
fabricated the records and obtained the oder. After service of the show
cause notice on February 19, 1991, though the respondent sought time to
file the counter, even after the date was given for filing an affidavit, it D
would appear that he did not do the same nor has given an explanation.
Therefore, the Asstt. Registrar passed an oder of February 23, 1991
cancelling the certificate dated October 12, 1990 recognising the
respondent as a Manager. He recorded the finding that the renewal was
obtained by playing fraud and misrepresentation of facts. On appeal filed E
by respondent, it was ultimately confirmed by the Commissioner by his,
Proceedings dated September 16 1991. The writ petition No. 21 l l of 1991
filed by the respondent was allowed by the High Court of Allahabad and
quashed the orders. The petitioner filed the above SLP impleading the
officials and the respondents as No.3 in the SLP. After issuing notice on
December 2, 199 l and hearing both the counsel, by order dated May 11, F
1992, stayed the operation of the judgment of the High Court. On
November 24, 1992 when it was brought to the notice of this Court that the .
petitioner was not allowed to function pursuant to the orders passed by this
court on May 11, 1992, due to an oder dated June 6, 1992 cancelling the
order of stay dated May I I, 1992, a bench of 3 judges consisting of us and
Brother Justice V. Ramaswami primafacie found that the order dated June G
9, 1992 was a forged document for the reason that neither Justice
T.K.Thommen nor Justice K.J. Reddy who were parties to the original
order of stay, were the vacation Judges. Therefore, the cancellation order of
the stay by the same learned Judges on June 9, 1992 would not arise.
Accordingly while confirming the order of stay made by this Court dated
May 11, 1992, we directed the functionaries to permit the petitioner to H
    712                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [1994] SUPP:· 1s.C.R

A   continue as a Manager and directed the Registrar General to hold an .
    enquiry as to who had committed the forgery of the order dated June 9,
    1992. The Registrar confirmed in his proceeding dated January 19, 1993
    that the order dated June 9, 1992 was a forged order and there is a conflict
    as to who had committed the forgery. Therefore, he reported and sought for
    directions that "in view of the directions of the Hon'ble Court dated
B   November 24, 1992 for such action as the Court may deem fit in the
    circumstances of the case". Thereafter we called for the records and notice
    was issued to the respondents. We directed the Dist. Inspector of Schools,
    Kanpur Dehat to be present pursuant to which she was present and
    produced the records and she was also directed to file an affidavit.

c        In the affidavit filed by the respondent he stated ''that the answering
    respondent has no knowledge of the order dated June 9, 1992 allegedly
    passed by this Hon'ble Court. He has neither filed the said order oofore the
    Dist. Inspector of Schools nor he fabricated the signature of the petitioner in
    accompanying application" etc. Smt. Ramsia Avasti, the Dist. Inspector of
    Schools, Kanpur Dehat, on the basis of the affidavits of Rameshwar and
D   Puttanlal, had stated thus: "the stay order dated 9.6.92 in SLP No,17524/91
    was filed by one Sri Arvind Shukla who told his name as Ram Autar
    Shukla. Later on he came to know that the name of that person was Arvind
    Shukla and not Ram Autar Shukla. He further stated that he (Arvind
    Shukla) used to tell his name as Ram Autar Shukla". To the same effect
    Rameshwar who was working as Daftry as on the relevant date and
E   Puttanlal who was working as class IV employees as on that date have
    stated that the respondent delivered that order in their office impersonating
    as Ram Autar Shukla but later they came to know that he is Arvind Shukla.
    The respondent filed his reply denying those allegations~ On August 9,
    1994 we passed the following order "that it is established from the record
    that the alleged interim order of this Court dated 9.6.92 is forged. It is also
F   established that the said order was produced before the Dist. Inspector of
    Schools by Arvind Shukla. By producing the said order, Mr. Shukla wanted
    to gain an advantage. Mr. Shukla is, therefore, guilty of forging the drder
    and producing before the Dist. Inspector of Schools. There are two courses
    open to us i.e. either to file a complaint under s. 197, Criminal Procedure
    Code or to initiate contempt proceedings against Mr. Shukla. We are of the
G
    view that in the facts and circumstances of this case, we should initiate
    contempt proceedings against him. We issue show cause notice to Mr.
    Shukla as to why he be not held guilty of contempt of court and be suitably
    punished. He may file his reply within six weeks to be listed on 4.10.94".
    Pursuant to that notice, he filed the affidavit. Therein, while reiterating that
H   he did not commit forgery nor did he produce the forged order of this court,
                                                           J

        R. A. SHUKLA v. ARVIND SHUKLA [K. RAMASWAMY, J.]               713

he stated that he tenders unconditional apology. He is the bread winner of A
the family. The conviction of him for contempt would render his aged
parents, two minor sons and his house wife destitutes.

      From the record, it is clear that this Court passed the oder on May 11,
1992 after hearing both parties suspending the operation of the order of the
High Court. On June 9, 1992 during summer vacation, an order was B
purported to have been passed by the same learned judges cancelling the
order dated May 11, 1992. In the affidavit initially filed by the respondent
he stated that the petitioner had fabricated the oder and he was not to gain
anything by fabricating the document or producing the forged document for
the reason that subsequently this Court passed an order directing the
authorities to permit the petitioner to continue to function as a Manager. He C
also alleged prevarication ·by the subordinates, Rameshwar and Puttanlal,
class IV employees. It would be clear that they are playing the game
according to the exigencies. Initially they stated in the affidavits filed in .
support of the respondent that the Ram Autar Shukla produced the order
dated June 9, 1992 and later they categorically stated in the sworn
statements before this Court that it was the respondent Arvind Shukla that D
produced the order dated June 9,1992 before them and impersonated to be
the petitioner. Yet in third affidavits they stated that the above statement
was not correct.. Be that as it may, the circumstances clearly point to the
unerring conclusion that the respondent with the connivance of one of the
staff in the Registry, obtained the blank printed format and forged the order
dated June 9, 1992 impersonated as petitioner and produced it in the office E
of the District Inspector of Schools. The petitioner having obtained the stay
of the operation of the order of the High Court on May 11, 1992, cannot be
expected to produce an order purported to be dated June 9, 1992 cancelling
the order dated May 11, 1992. In fact, the language of the order shows that
it is not the court language. The respondent initially obtained an order from F
the Asstt. Registrar recognising him to be the Manager which was later
cancelled on the findings that it was obtained by playing fraud and
misrepresentation: When he challenged that order !1S confirmed ultimately
by the Commission, at his instance, he had it quashed by the High Court
which was suspended by this Court. Who would stand to gain by vacating
the order dated May 11, 1992. The inevitable conclusion would be that is G
the respondent that stands to gain and not the petitioner. Therefore, the
stand taken by the respondent that it was the petitioner that had fabricated
the order dated June 9, 1992 and had produced it before the Dist. Inspector
of Schools is an obvious absurdity and too credulous to believe. Therefore,
the affidavits of Rameshwar and Puttanlal that it was the respondent who
produced the order dated June 9, 1992 before them impersonating to be the H
    714                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS            (1994] SUPP. 5 S.C.R

A   petitioner is consistent with the circumstances and would be acceptable to
    us. We accordingly confirm our prima facie conclusion in. our show cause
    notice and hold that the respondent obviously forged the order of this court
    and produced it in the office of the Dist. Inspector of Schools, Kanpur
    Dehat impersonating to be the petitioner to have him reinducted as a
    Manager of the School.
B
          The question then is whether the respondent has committed the
    contempt of this Court ? Section 2 (c) of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971,
    (for short 'the Act') defines criminal contempt as "the publication (whether
    by words, spoken or written or by signs or visible representation or
    otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever ( 1)
c   scandalise or tend to scandalise or lower or tend to lower the authority of
    any court ; (2) prejudic.e or interferes or tends to interfere with the due
    course ofjudicial proceedings or (3) interferes or tends to interferes with,
    or obstructs or tends to obstructs the administration. ofjustice in any other
    manner. Oswald's classic book of Contempt of Court, state that "to speak
    generally contempt of court may be said to be constituted by any conduct
D   that tends to bring the authority or administration of law into disrespect or
    disregard or to interfere with or prejudice litigant or the witness during the
    litigation". C,J. Miller, in his Contempt of Court, 2nd reprint Ed 1993, has
    stated at p.3.that English law has long recognised that a criminal contempt
    may be committed by publishing ma~er or "indulging in conduct which
    creates a serious risk or prejudice to the fair trial of particular criminal or
E   civil proceedings, whether through an effect upon the parties, the witness,
     or the tribunal itself." The Law of Contempt by Anthony Arlidge David
     Eady, 1982-Ed., commenting on 1981 Contempt of Court Act at p.151
     stated that "any conduct calculated to interfere with the administration of
    justice was a contempt". Calculated means no more than tending to. In
F
     comparable common law jurisdiction, in Att. Gen.       v.  Times Newspaper,
    (1974) A.C., 273, the House of Lords held that any act which raised a real
    albeit small likelihood of interference with the administration of justice
    amounts to contempt of court. A recent judgment of this Court dated
    November 14, 1994, in Chandra Sjzastri v. Anil Kumar Verma, a bench               ...
    comprising of one of us, Kuldip ·Singh, J. was a Member, Learned Brother
    Hans~ia, J. speaking for the bench had held that "the stream of
G
    administration of justice h3ll to remain unpolluted so that purity of court's
    atmosphere may give vitality to all the organs of the State. Polluters of
    judicial firmament are, therefore, required to be well taken care of to
    maintain the sublimity of court's environment; so also to enable it to
    adniinister justiee fairly and to the satisfaction of all concerned. Anyone
     who takes recourse to fraud deflects the course of judicial proceedings; or if
H
         R. A. SHUKLA v. ARVIND SHUKLA [K. RAMASWAMY, J.)                715

anything is done with oblique motive, the same interferes with the A
administration of justice. Such persons are required to be properly dealt
with, not only to punish them for the wrong done, but also to deter others
from indulging in similar acts which shake the faith of people in the system
of administration of justice". The facts therein were that the respondent
produced false and fabricated certificate to defeat the claim of the
respondent for transfer of the case. This Court held that "if a forged and B
fabricated document is filed the same may amount to interfere with the
administration of justice". It was further held that "obstruction of justice is
to interpose obstacles or impediments, or to hinder, impede or in any
manner interrupt or prevent the administration of justice". The fabrication
and production of false document was, therefore, held to be interference
with the due course of justice and by distortion thereof the respondent C
committed contempt of this court.

     The Act deals with any acts or conduct of the parties to the litigation or
witnesses "in any manner". The acts or conduct may take different forms
including the conduct or acts which may amount in itself to a criminal
offence or interferes or tends to interfere with course of justice, obstructs or D
tends to obstruct the course of justice or administration of justice in any
other manner. These acts or conduct may be to put an obstacle or tends to
obstruction or tends to prejudice the right of the opposite party to the
litigation in its result or the effective or efficacious prosecution of the
proceedings. The tendency on the part of the contemner in his action or E
conduct to prevent the course of justice is the relevant fact. To do an act
with the intention of preventing the course of justice is not itself enough but
the acts must have also that tendency and the acts must have been done with
an intent to prevent the course of justice. In R. v. Machin, (1980] 3. All
England Reports 151, the facts were that:-
                                                                                F
               "The appellant made a written statement at a police station
               admitting certain motoring offences. He then went outside
               the station and, at his request, a friend punched him in the
               eye causing it to swell. The friend then agreed to give
               evidence that the police in the station had caused the injury.
               The appellant told other persons that the police had hit him     G
               and his wife lodged a formal complaint to that effect at
               another police station. The appellant then had a professional
               photograph taken of his eye injury but did not collect it. He
               was charged with attempting to pervert the course of public
               justice."
                                                                                H
    716                     SUPREME COURT REPORTS             (1994) SUPP. S S.C.R

A       Considering the question whether it amounts to contempt, Eveleigh
    Lord Justice of Court of Appeal held on page 153-54 thus:-

                     "The particular acts or conduct in question may take many
                     different forms including conduct that amounts in itself to
                     some other criminal offence or attempt threat in the strict
B                    sense of an inchoate. offence. The gist of the offence is
                     conduct which may lead and is intend~ to lead to a
                                            1

                     miscarriage of justice whether·or ·not a miscarriage actually
                     occurs. We therefore respectfully agree that the use of the
                     word "attempt" in the present context is misleading as was
                     said in R v. Rowell. The word is convenient for use in the
c                  . case where it cannot be proved that the course of justice
                     was actually perverted but it does no more than describe a
                     substantive offence which consists of conduct which has the
                     tendency and is intended to pervert the course of justice. To
                     do an act with the intention of perverting the course of
                     justice is not of itself enough. The act must also have that
D                    tendency."

         In R v. Murray, [1982] 2 All ER 225, the appellant had tampered with
    the report of the blood test analysed by the competent authority who found
    him containing 157 mg alcohol in 100 ml of blood. Whether it amounts to a
    contempt to prevent the course of justice, Lord Lane, CJ., speaking for the
E   Court of Appeal, held that "in order to prove the offence of attempting to
    pervert the course of justice it had to be shown not only that the accused
    intended to pervert the course of justice but also that what he had done,
    without more, had a tendency to produce that result; and to establish that, it
    was not necessary to show that the tendency had in fact materialised it was
    sufficient if there was evidence that thefaccused had done enough for there
F   to be a risk, without further action by him, that injustice would result."

          Any interference in the course of justice, any obstruction caused. in the
    path of those seeking justice are an affront to the majesty of law and,
    therefore, the conduct is punishable as contempt of court. Law of contempt
     is only one of many ways in which the due process of law is prevented from
G    being perverted, hindered or thwarted to further the cause of justice. Due
    course of justice means not only any particular proceeding but broad stream
    of administration of justice. Therefore, due course of justice used in s.2 (c)
    or s.13 of the Act are of wide import and are not limited to any particular
    judicial proceeding. Much more wider when this Court exercises suo motu
    power under Art., 129 of the Constitution. Due process of law is blinkered
H   by acts or conduct of the parties to the litigation or witnesses which
         R. A. SHUKLA v. ARVIND SHUKLA [K. RAMASWAMY, J.]                 717

generate tendency to impede or undermine the free flow of the unsullied          A
stream of justice by blatantly resorting, with impunity, to fabricate court
proceedings to thwart fair adjudication of dispute and its resultant end. If
the act complained of substantially interferes with or tends to interfere with
the broad stream of administration of justice, it would be punishable under
the Act. If the act complained of undermines the prestige of the court or
causes hindrance in the discharge of due course of justice or tends to           B
obstruct the course of justice or interfere with due course of justice, it is
sufficient that the conduct complained of, constitutes contempt of court and
liable to be dealt with in accordance with the Act. It has become
increasingly a tendency on the part of the parties either to produce
fabricated evidence as a part of the pleadings or record or to fabricate the
court record itself for retarding or obstructing the course of justice or        C
judicial proceedings to gain unfair advantage in the judicial process. This
tendency to obstruct the due course of justice or tendency to undermine the
dignity of the court needs to be severely dealt with to deter the persons
having similar proclivity to resort to such acts or conduct. In an
approximate case, the mens rea may not be clear or may be obscure but if
the act or conduct tends to undermine the dignity of the court or prejudice      D
the parts of impedes or hinders the due course of, judicial proceedings or
administration of justice, it would amount to contempt of the court. The
acts of the respondent in fabricating the court proceedings purported to be
dated June 9, 1992 impersonating himself to be the petitioner and
producing the fabricated copy of the court proceedings in the office of the
Dist. Inspector of Schools thus constitute contempt of the court. It tended to   E
interfere with the course of justice in legal proceedings to gain unfair
advantage over the petitioner and is not as innocent as pretended to be by
the petitioner. Further as we have already held that he alone stands to gain
by fabricating the court proceeding and producing it before the authorities
 for his continuance as a Manager of the School, he had the necessary            F
animous or mens rea to fabricate the court's proceedings impersonated
 himself to be the petitioner and produced it in the office of the Dist.
 Inspector of School. Thereby, he committed contempt of court.

     The question then is whether his apology would be acceptable or is
liable to be punished . It is seen that his apology in the counter to the show   G
cause notice is only conditional and not an unconditional one. Public
interest therefore, demands that when a person had interfered with judicial
process and fabricated the court's proceedings, impersonated himself to be
the petitioner and produced in the office of the competent authority so as to
enable him to continue as a Manager of the School, the judicial decision,
should not be pre-empted or circumvented by mere statement of conditional        H
    718                    SUPREME COURT REPORTS            (1994] SUPP. 5 S.C.R

A   apology or as a fact even unconditional apology. The unconditional
     apology should be contrite for the acts committed by him. Therefore, the
     conditional apology would not be a premium to avoid conviction. Though it
     is open to the court in. an appropriate case to accept an unconditional
     apology based on factual scenario but accepting the apology and dropping
    the proceeding of contumacious acts deliberately done to over-reach the
B   due process of the law without compunction would amount to a premium to
     fabricate the court order with impunity. In Asharam M Jain v. A.T. Gupta
    and Ors., [1983] 4 SCC 125 at 127-28, the petitioner made scandalous
    allegations against the Chief Justice of the High Court and without
    withdrawing those allegations offered an unconditional apology. This Court
     did not ·accept the unconditional apology and convicted the contemner for
c    contempt and sentenced him two month's imprisonment to atone him for
     his contumacious conduct. Therefore, we have no hesitation to reject the
     respondent's conditionai apology. In view of the facts set out hereinbefore
     and the finding recorded, it is a grave and contumacious act and conduct on
    the part of the respondent which cannot be lightly brushed aside. Therefore,
D    we are of the opinion that it is a fit case that the respondent should be
     convicted and a~ordingly convicted under Art. 129 of the Constitution and
     sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ~ period of three months.
    ·The suo motu contempt petition is accordingly ordered.

    A.G.                                                       Petition disposed.
E       The Superintendent of Police, Kanpur Dehat is. directed to arrest the
    respondent and consign him to the Central Jail, Kanpur to undergo the
    sentence of three months plirsuant to the conviction ordered in this petition

    ·A.G.                                                   Petition disposed of.