RAKHAL DEBNATHversusSTATE OF WEST BENGAL

                   [2012] 7 S.C.R. 513


                   RAKHAL DEBNATH                             A
                             v.
                STATE OF WEST BENGAL
            (Criminal Appeal No. 201 of 2010)

                  SEPTEMBER 4, 2012
                                                              B
    [SWATANTER KUMAR AND FAKKIR MOHAMED
            IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, JJ.]

     Penal Code, 1860 - ss.306, 498A and 107 - Death of
married woman due to burn injuries - Conviction of appellant- C
husband ulss. 306 and 498A - Justification - Held: Justified -
In the facts and circumstances of the case, the conclusion of
High Court that deceased committed suicide cannot be
faulted - s. 113A of the Evidence Act was duly attracted to the
facts of the case - Deceased committed suicide within 35 days D
from the gate of her marriage and the a/legation of cruelty was
also fully established - Consistent statements of PWs
disclosed that deceased was not happy with the marriage and
complained about the conduct of the appellant - in demanding
money from her father apart from his illicit relationship with E
his niece - The act of appellant in pledging the jewels of the
deceased was also proved - Consequently prosecution case
that deceased was instigated by the appellant to take the
extreme decision of committing suicide by pouring kerosene
on herself and set herself on fire was fully established and F
thereby charge of abetment uls.306 and as well as s.498A
stood proved - Evidence Act, 1872 - s. 113A.

    The wife of accused-appellant died due to severe
burn injuries. The death occurred within 35 days after her
marriage. In the hospital register it was noted by the        G
doctor-P.W.19 that as per the statement of appellant, the
deceased suffered burn injuries from the burning stove
when she was preparing tea and bread in the kitchen.

                            513                               H
    514      SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2012] 7 S.C.R.

A However, according to the prosecution, shortly after
  marriage, the appellant demanded money from his father-
  in-law, PW3, for purpose of his business which was
  declined whereupon the appellant retorted that he knew
  how to collect money from him through his own
B daughter, and thereafter pledged the jewels of his wife
  with PW17 for a specified sum. The appellant's wife was
  also stated to have been nurturing a grievance against
  the appellant in view of his illicit contacts with his niece
  (the second accused) who lived in the very same house
c of appellant. It was alleged by the prosecution that all this
  ultimately resulted in the appellant's wife taking the
  extreme decision of committing suicide by pouring
  kerosene on herself and setting herself on fire.

       The appellant was proceeded against for offences
D under Sections 306 and 498A of IPC. The trial court
  acquitted the appellant-accused. In appeal, the High
  Court reversed the acquittal of appellant and held him
  guilty on both the charges. Hence the present appeal.

E         Dismissing the appeal, the Court

       HELD: 1.1. P.W.19 the doctor who examined the
  deceased (the appellant's wife) immediately after she was
  brought to the hospital reported that according to the
  appellant the deceased suffered the burn injuries from the
F burning stove when she was preparing tea and bread.
  However, in the 313 CrPC questioning the appellant made
  it clear that he did not make any such statement. If the
  said statement is to be accepted then what remains is the
  postmortem report, the evidence of the post mortem
G doctor P.W.15 and the recoveries made at the place of
  occurrence, namely, kitchen (viz) the 20 litre cane in
  which about a litre of kerosene was found, the quilt and
  pillows and a piece of cloth soaked in kerosene and the
  clothes worn by the deceased which also smelled
H
  RAKHAL DEBNATH v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL                 515


kerosene. The question of deceased having suffered              A
burn injuries from the burning stove is ruled out by the
own version of the appellant. [Para 6] [521-G-H; 522-A-B]

     1.2. Considering the extent of burn injuries stated by
the doctor in the postmortem report (viz.) the first degree     B
burn injuries from top of the head up to the tip of the leg
makes it clear that it could have been caused only by
pouring kerosene from the cane over the head and by
burning the person after that. The smell of kerosene oil
in the clothes and other materials recovered at the scene       c
of occurrence also fully support such a situation which
could have only been inflicted by the deceased herself
and, therefore, the conclusion of the High Court in having
held that the deceased committed suicide cannot be
found fault with. [Para 7] [522-C-E]
                                                                D
     2.1. The consistent statements of PWs 3, 9 and 11
which disclose the complaint made by the deceased
about the conduct of the appellant that he made a
demand for money from her father apart from his illicit
relationship with the second accused merits acceptance.         E
P.W.3 stated that after some days of the marriage the
appellant approached him and his son for a sum of
Rs.40,000/-, that when PW 3 expressed his inability to
make the payment the appellant left the place in a huff by
stating that he knows how to get the money from him             F
through his own daughter. P.W.3 also stated that the
deceased herself informed him about the torture meted
out to her by the appellant along with second accused
for money when P.W.3 declined to pay any money to the
appellant. P.W.3 further stated that the deceased also          G
informed him about the illicit relationship of appellant with
the second accused. The pledging of jewels of the
deceased with P.W.17 was also proved by producing
Exhibit 3 by which P.W.3 repaid a sum of Rs.11,000/- to
P.W.17 to get back the jewels which were seized by the          H
   516     SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2012] 7 S.C.R.


A police along with ornaments. P.W.17 in his evidence also
  confirmed that the appellant pledged the jewels with him.
  P.W.3 also identified the jewels which he gifted to his
  daughter at the time of the marriage which were
  recovered from P.W.17 and marked as Exhibit 1
B (collectively). The receipts Exhibit 3 and 3A disclosed that
  the said jewels were pledged by the appellant for a sum
  of Rs.11,000/-. If those jewels really did not belong to the
  deceased the same could have been established only by
  the appellant by producing proper evidence before the
c Court. Except mere denial in the 313 statement, the
  appellant failed to show that those jewels which were
  pledged by him did not belong to the deceased. [Paras
  8,11] [522-F-H; 523-A-C; 524-D-E]

       2.2. PW3 stated that though his daughter complained
D to him about the monetary demand as well as illicit
  relationship of the appellant with the second accused he
  did not inform the same to others except his close
  relatives fearing any damage that may be caused to the
  matrimonial life of his daughter which conduct of P.W.3
E as a father of the deceased was quite natural. [Para 9]
  [523-D-E]

        2.3. P.W.5 who is a relative of the deceased also
  stated that the deceased informed him once about the
F illicit intimacy of the appellant with second accused.
  P.W.10 who is stated to be the cousin of the deceased
  deposed that when she visited his house once after
  marriage she informed him that she did not like the
  environment of her matrimonial home and that the
G appellant and second accused used to talk in code
  language. P.W.11 who is the neighbour of P.W.3, in his
  evidence also deposed that when the deceased visited
  her parental home on the occasion of Dwira Gaman
  Ceremony she informed him that she did not like the
H relationship of the appellant with the second accused and
  RAKHAL DEBNATH v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL               517


that appellant was demanding money from her father.          A
P.W.11 further stated that deceased also requested him
to tell her father not to give any money to appellant.
P.W.11 also stated that according to the deceased she
was not happy with the marriage. To the same effect was
the version of P.W.12. [Para 10] [523-F-H; 524-A]            B

     2.4. As rightly held by the High Court the father of the
deceased cannot be expected to inform everyone living
around him about the unpleasant factum of the
daughter's embarrassing living condition in her
matrimonial home and, therefore, mere non-disclosure of C
those facts to others cannot be a ground to disbelieve
the version of P.W.3. No inconsistency was found in the
evidence of P.W.3 and other witnesses who had the
advantage of hearing from the mouth of the deceased
about the conduct of the appellant relating to his demand, D
as well as, his illicit intimacy with the second accused.
Nothing was suggested to any of the witnesses on behalf
of the appellant to state that they were deposing against
him with any other ulterior motive. [Para 12] [524-F-H]
                                                             E
     3. The relevant criteria for application of Section 113A
of the Evidence Act, 1872 is duly attracted to the facts of
the instant case. The deceased (appellant's wife)
committed suicide within 35 days from the date of her
marriage and the allegation of cruelty was also fully F
established. The evidence thus disclosed that the
conduct of the appellant vis-a-vis the deceased coupled
with the consequential demand of money from P.W.3 the
father of the deceased and also the pledging of the jewels
of the deceased fully established the case of the
prosecution that the deceased was instigated by the G
appellant to take the extreme decision of committing
suicide by pouring kerosene on herself and set herself
on fire and thereby the charge of abetment under Section
306 and as well as Section 498A stood proved. There is
no merit in this appeal. [Paras 14] [526-E-G]                 H
    518      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 7 S.C.R.


A       Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2001) 9 SCC
    618: 2001 (4) Suppl. SCR 247 and Thanu Ram v. State of
    Madhya Pradesh (Now Chhattisgarh) (2010) 10 SCC 353:
    2010 (12) SCR 710 - relied on.

       K. Prema S. Rao and Anr. v. Yadla Srinivasa Rao and
B Ors. (2003) 1 SCC 217: 2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 339 and Devi
  Lal v. State of Rajasthan (2007) 14 SCC 176: 2007 (11) SCR
    219 - cited.

                         Case Law Reference:
c         2001 (4) Suppl. SCR 247     relied on        Para 4, 13

          2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 339     cited            Para 4

          2007 (11) SCR 219           cited            Para 4

D         2010 (12) SCR 710           relied on      Para 15

        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
    No. 201 of 2010.

        From the Judgment & Order dated 24.12.2008 of the High
E   Court Court at Calcutta in G.A. No. 27/1990.

          Ravi Kumar Tomar, Amitava Acharjee, H.B. Tiwari, Smriti
    for the Appellant.

F       Chanchal Kumar Ganguly, Avijit Bhattacharjee for the
    Respondent.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

        FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J. 1. The
G first accused is the appellant. The appellant was proceeded
  against for offences under Sections 306 and 498A of IPC. The
  Trial Court acquitted the appellant and by the impugned order,
  the High Court while reversing the judgment of the Trial Court
  found the appellant guilty on both the charges and imposed the
H sentence of imprisonment of 10 years and also a fine of
  RAKHAL DEBNATH v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL                        519
    [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
Rs.10,000/-, in default to suffer further one year rigorous             A
imprisonment for the offence under Section 306 of IPC. He was
also sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for three years
apart from fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default to suffer further rigorous
imprisonment for one year for the offence under Section 498A
of IPC. Both the sentences were directed to run consecutively.          B
The High Court thus partly allowed the appeal of the State. The
acquittal of the second accused, however, was confirmed by
the High Court.

     2. The case of the prosecution was that the appellant got          C
married to the deceased Krishna as per Hindu rites and
customs on 22.04.1987. The unfortunate incident of the death
of the deceased Krishna occurred on 26.05.1987 when she
was admitted to SSKM Hospital with severe burn injuries at
08.35 a.m. and she was declared dead at 08.37 a.m. In the
hospital register it was noted by the doctor-P.W.19 that as per         D
the statement of the appellant at 07.35 a.m. in the morning while
the deceased was preparing tea and bread in the kitchen of
the house she got burnt of the burning stove. However,
according to the prosecution shortly after the marriage the
appellant demanded a sum of Rs.40,000/- from the father of              E
the deceased Krishna for the purpose of his business which
was declined, that upset by the declining of his demand by the
father of the deceased the appellant stated to have retorted then
that he knew how to collect the money from his father-in-law
through his wife, and that thereafter on 22.05.1987, the                F
appellant pledged the jewels of deceased Krishna for a sum
of Rs.11,000/-. The deceased Krishna was also stated to have.
been nurturing a grievance against the appellant about his illicit
contacts with the second accused Anima who was none other
than the niece of the appellant. The prosecution filed its final        G
report before the Trial Court and, thereafter, the charges under
Sections 306 and 498A of IPC were leveled against the
appellant.

     3. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant while               H
    520     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 7 S.C.R.


A assailing the judgment of the High Court submitted that the
  postmortem doctor-P.W.15 stated that he was not able to come
  to any definite opinion as to whether the death was homicidal,
  suicidal or accidental. Therefore, the main ingredient for the
  alleged offences against the appellant was not established by
B the prosecution. Learned counsel then contended that the
  whole case was based on circumstantial evidence and that
  there was no circumstance to link the appellant with the death
  of the deceased. Elaborating his submission learned counsel
  contended that none of the ingredients for the offences under
c Section 306 as well as 498A of IPC was demonstrably placed
  before the court below by the prosecution and, therefore, the
  conviction and sentence cannot be sustained. He further
  contended that FIR was based on the complaint of P.W.3 which
  was not written by him, that the version of P.W.3, who was the
  father of the deceased, did not in any way disclose any factor
0
  or even remotely suggest that there was any abetment on the
  part of the appellant for the deceased to commit suicide. The
  learned counsel therefore contended that the acquittal made by
  the Trial Court was a well considered judgment and the
E interference with the same by the High Court was not justified.
  The submission of learned counsel for the appellant was that
  there was no evidence for abetment nor was there any evidence
  to show that the appellant caused any cruelty to the deceased
  in order to convict the appellant for the offences falling under
  Sections 306 and 498A of IPC.
F
        4. As against above submissions the learned counsel
  appearing for the State contended that the death of the
  deceased occurred hardly within 35 days after her marriage
  with the appellant, that the ocular evidences of P.Ws.3, 9 and
G 11 amply disclosed that within few days after the marriage the
  appellant made a demand for a sum of Rs.40,000/-, that the
  non-payment of the said money to the appellant and the
  subsequent pledging of the jewels of the deceased which was
  established by Exhibit 7 as well as evidence of P.W.17 showed
H that the demand of dowry was amply established. The learned
  RAKHAL DEBNATH v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL                       521
    [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]

counsel submitted that the evidence of P.Ws.3, 9 and 11                A
disclosed that the deceased duly conveyed to both the
witnesses the conduct of the appellant in having raised a
demand for money apart from his illicit behaviour with his niece
which ultimately resulted in the deceased taking the extreme
decision of pouring kerosene and setting fire to herself. The          B
learned counsel pointed out that the recoveries made at the
place of occurrence such as kerosene cane, piece of cloth
soaked in kerosene, the quilt and pillows and the wearing
apparels of the deceased which had the smell of kerosene and
the burn injuries suffered by the deceased amply proved that           c
the deceased committed suicide and that such an extreme
decision to commit suicide was pursuant to the constant
instigation of the appellant to get money from the parental home
of the deceased and also his illicit relationship with second
accused. The learned counsel relied upon the decisions of this
                                                                       0
Court reported as Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh -
(2001) 9 SCC 618, K. Prema S. Rao and another v. Yadla
Srinivasa Rao and others - (2003) 1 SCC 217 and Devi Lal
v. State of Rajasthan - (2007) 14 SCC 176.

     5. Having heard learned counsel for the appellant as well         E
as the learned counsel for the State and having perused the
judgment impugned in this appeal and other related papers, at
the very outset, it will have to be stated that there is no merit in
this appeal.
                                                                       F
      6. The deceased died due to extensive burn injuries on her
body which was fully established by the postmortem report as
well as by the evidence of doctor P.W.15 who conducted the
postmortem. The same is also not disputed by the appellant.
In fact, P.W.19 the doctor who examined the deceased                   G
immediately after she was brought to the hospital reported that
according to the appellant the deceased suffered the burn
injuries from the burning stove when she was preparing tea and
bread. However, in the 313 questioning the appellant made it
clear that he did not make any such statement. If the said
                                                                       H
    522      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2012] 7 S.C.R.

A statement is to be accepted then what remains is the
  postmortem report, the evidence of P.W.15 and the recoveries
  made at the place of occurrence, namely, kitchen (viz) the 20
  litre cane in which about a litre of kerosene was found, the quilt
  and pillows and a piece of cloth soaked in kerosene and the
B clothes worn by the deceased which also smelled kerosene.
  The question of deceased having suffered burn injuries from
  the burning stove is ruled out by the own version of the
  appellant.

        7. Considering the extent of burn injuries stated by the
C doctor in the postmortem report (viz) the first degree burn
  injuries from top of the head up to the tip of the leg makes it
  clear that it could have been caused only by pouring kerosene
  from the cane over the head and by burning the person after
  that. The smell of kerosene oil in the clothes and other materials
D recovered at the scene of occurrence also fully support such a
  situation which could have only been inflicted by the deceased
  herself and, therefore, the conclusion of the High Court in having
  held that the deceased committed suicide cannot be found fault
  with.
E
        8. If once the said conclusion is irresistible, what remains
  to be examined is what was the reason for the deceased to
  take that extreme decision to burn herself. For that purpose,
  when we examine the ocular evidence placed before the court
F below, we find the consistent statements of P.Ws.3, 9 and 11
  which disclose that the complaint made by the deceased about
  the conduct of the appellant that he made a demand for money
  from her father apart from his illicit relationship with the second
  accused merits acceptance. P.W.3 stated that after some days
G of the marriage the appellant approached him and his son for
  a sum of Rs.40,000/-, that when P.W.3 expressed his inability
  to make the payment the appellant left the place in a huff by
  stating that he knows how to get the money from him through
  his own daughter. P.W.3 also stated that the deceased herself
  informed him about the torture meted out to her by the appellant
H
 RAKHAL DEBNATH v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL                      523
   [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]

along with second accused for money when P.W.3 declined to           A
pay any money to the appellant. P.W.3 further stated that the
deceased also informed him about the illicit relationship of
appellant with the second accused. The pledging of jewels of
the deceased with P.W.17 was also proved by producing
Exhibit 3 by which P.W.3 repaid a sum of Rs.11,000/- to              B
P. W.17 to get back the jewels which were seized by the police
along with ornaments. P.W.17 in his evidence also confirmed
that the appellant pledged the jewels with him. P.W.3 also
indentified the jewels which he gifted to his daughter at the time
of the marriage which were recovered from P.W.17 and                 c
marked as Exhibit 1 (collectively).

      9. The factum of the living of second accused in the very
same house of the appellant was not in dispute and the same
was also deposed by P.W.3. He further stated that though his
daughter complained to him about the monitory demand as well         D
as illicit relationship of the appellant with the second accused
he did not inform the same to others except his close relatives
fearing any damage that may be caused to the matrimonial life
of his daughter which conduct of P.W.3 as a father of the
deceased was quite natural.                                          E

      10. P.W.5 who is a relative of the deceased also stated
that the deceased informed him once about the illicit intimacy
of the appellant with second accused. P. W .10 who is stated to
be the cousin of the deceased deposed that when she visited          F
his house once after marriage she informed him that she did
not like the environment of her matrimonial home and that the
appellant and second accused used to talk in code language.
P.W.11 who is the neighbour of P.W.3, in his evidence also
deposed that when the deceased visited her parental home on          G
the occasion of Dwira Gaman Ceremony she informed him that
she did not like the relationship of the appellant with the second
accused and that appellant was demanding money from her
father. P.W.11 further stated that deceased also requested him
to tell her father not to give any money to appellant. P.W.11 also
                                                                     H
    524      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 7 S.C.R.


A   stated that according to the deceased she was not happy with
    the marriage. To the same effect was the version of P.W.12.

        11. The High Court while examining the charge of abetment
  of the suicide committed by the deceased as well as cruelty
8 meted out to her falling under Sections 306 and 498A of IPC
  made a detailed analysis of the above evidence and held that
  the charges were proved. Though the learned counsel for the
  appellant attempted to point out that there was no proof to show
  that the appellant pledged the jewels of the deceased, we are
C not in a position to appreciate the said contention for more than
  one reason. In the first place P.W.3 the father of the deceased
  identified the jewels which were recovered from P.W.17.
  P.W.17 himself confirmed that those jewels were pledged by
  the appellant with him. The receipts Exhibit 3 and 3A disclosed
  that the said jewels were pledged by the appellant for a sum
D of Rs.11,000/-. If those jewels really did not belong to the
  deceased the same could have been established only by the
  appellant by producing proper evidence before the Court.
  Except the mere denial in the 313 statement, the appellant failed
  to show that those jewels which were pledged by him did not
E belong to the deceased.

        12. As rightly held by the High Court the father of the
  deceased cannot be expected to inform everyone living around
  him about the unpleasant factum of the daughter's embarrassing
F living condition in her matrimonial home and, therefore, mere
  non-disclosure of those facts to others cannot be a ground to
  disbelieve the version of P.W.3. We also do not find any
  inconsistency in the evidence of P.W.3 and other witnesses who
  had the advantage of hearing from the mouth of the deceased
G about the conduct of the appellant relating to his demand, as
  well as, his illicit intimacy with the second accused. Nothing was
  suggested to any of the witnesses on behalf of the appellant to
  state that they were deposing against him with any other ulterior
  motive. The fact remains that the deceased committed suicide
H within 35 days from the date of marriage, coupled with the
  RAKHAL DEBNATH v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL                      525
    [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.]
untrammeled evidence before the court below about the cruelty         A
meted out to the deceased, fully established the guilt of the
appellant of abetment to the deceased to commit suicide as
well as the cruelty under Section 498A of IPC.

     13. In this context the reliance placed upon the decision        B
of this Court by the counsel for the State in Ramesh Kumar
(supra) can be usefully applied. In paragraph 12 of the said
decision this Court, while explaining the application of Sections
107, 113A in regard to an offence falling under Section 306
IPC has held as under:
                                                                      c
     "12. This provision was introduced by the Criminal Law
     (Second) Amendment Act, 1983 with effect from 26-12-
     1983 to meet a social demand to resolve difficulty of proof
     where helpless married women were eliminated by being
     forced to commit suicide by the husband or in-laws and           D
     incriminating evidence was usually available within the four
     corners of the matrimonial home and hence was not
     available to anyone outside the occupants of the house.
     However, still it cannot be lost sight of that the presumption
     is intended to operate against the accused in the field of       E
     criminal law. Before the presumption may be raised, the
     foundation thereof must exist. A bare reading of Section
     113-A shows that to attract applicability of Section 113-
     A, it must be ~hown that (i) the woman has committed
     suicide, (ii) such suicide has been committed within a           F
     period of seven years from the date of her marriage, (iii)
     the husband or his relatives, who are charged had
     subjected her to cruelty. On existence and availability of
     the abovesaid circumstances, the court may presume that
     such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such          G
     relatives of her husband. Parliament has chosen to sound
     a note of caution. Firstly, the presumption is not mandatory;
     it is only permissive as the employment of expression "may
     presume" suggests. Secondly, the existence and
     availability of the abovesaid three circumstances shall not,
                                                                      H
    526       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2012] 7 S.C.R.


A          like a formula, enable the presumption being drawn; before
          the presumption may be drawn the court shall have to have
          regard to "all the other circumstances of the case". A
          consideration of all the other circumstances of the case
          may strengthen the presumption or may dictate the
B         conscience of the court to abstain from drawing the
          presumption. The expression - "the other circumstances
          of the case" used in Section 113-A suggests the need to
          reach a cause-and-effect relationship between the cruelty
          and the suicide for the purpose of raising a presumption.
c         Last but not the least, the presumption is not an irrebuttable
          one. In spite of a presumption having been raised the
          evidence adduced in defence or the facts and
          circumstances otherwise available on record may destroy
          the presumption. The phrase "may presume" used in
          Section 113-A is defined in Section 4 of the Evidence Act,
D
          which says - 'Whenever it is provided by thiS' Act that the
          court may presume a fact, it may either regard such fact
          as proved, unless and until it is disproved, or may call for
          proof of it."

E      14. When we apply the said principle to the facts of the
  case, we find that the relevant criteria for application of Section
  113A is duly attracted to the facts of this case. The deceased
  committed suicide within 35 days from the date of her marriage
  and the allegation of cruelty was also fully established. The
F evidence thus disclosed that the conduct of the appellant vis-
  a-vis the deceased coupled with the consequential demand of
  money from P.W.3 the father of the deceased and also the
  pledging of the jewels of the deceased fully established the
  case of the prosecution that the deceased was instigated by
G the appellant to take the extreme decision of committing suicide
  by pouring kerosene on herself and set herself on fire and
  thereby the charge of abetment under Section 306 and as well
  as Section 498A stood proved.

          15. In this respect the subsequent decision reported as
H
 RAKHAL DEBNATH v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL                     527
   [FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J.)

Thanu Ram v. State of Madhya Pradesh (Now Chhattisgarh)             A
- (2010) 1o sec 353 can also be usefully referred to. In
paragraphs 26 and 27 this Court has explained the legal
position as under:

    "26. In the Explanation to Section 113-A it has also been       8
    indicated that for the purpose of the said section, the
    expression "cruelty" would have the same meaning as in
    Section 498-A IPC. Accordingly, if the degree of cruelty
    is such as to warrant a conviction under Section 498-A
    IPC, the same may be sufficient for a presumption to be         C
    drawn under Section 113-A of the Evidence Act in harmony
    with the provisions of Section 107 IPC

    27. All the decisions on the point cited by Dr. Pandey, deal
    with the differences in relation to the provisions of Section
    498-A and Section 306 IPC, except in Sushil Kumar               D
    Sharma case, where the provisions of Section 498-A IPC
    had been considered in the context of Section 304-B IPC.
    In that context, it was sought to be explained that the big
    difference between Sections 306 and 498-A IPC is that
    of intention. The provisions of Section 113-A of the            E
    Evidence Act or its impact on an offence under Section
    498-A IPC or Section 306 IPC vis-a-vis Section 107 IPC
    was not considered in any of these decisions."

     16. In the light of the above conclusion of ours, we do not
                                                                    F
find any merit in this appeal and the same is dismissed.

B.B.B.                                     Appeal dismissed.