RAKESH & ORS.versusBOARD OF REVENUE U.P. & ORS. ETC.

                          [2019] 4 S.C.R. 677                            677


                         RAKESH & ORS.                                   A
                                  v.
            BOARD OF REVENUE U.P. & ORS. ETC.
                  (Civil Appeal No. 5040 of 2008)
                         MARCH 08, 2019                                  B
        [ASHOK BHUSHAN AND K.M. JOSEPH, JJ.]
       Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act,
1950 – ss.130, 131 and 134 – Application filed by Sirdar (tenant)
for grant of Bhumidar Rights in respect of three plots along with
                                                                         C
deposit of 20 times of land revenue – Sale deed executed by the
Sirdar next day in respect of these plots – Application for grant of
Bhumidar rights rejected in respect of two plots – Revision
application filed by Sirdar challenging the same – Bhumidar Sanad
granted to Sirdar in respect of one plot only but after his death – By
Ordinance of 1977, Bhumidar with transferable rights were granted        D
to every Sirdar referred to in ss.130 and 131 of the 1950 Act –
Ordinance was substituted by 1977 Act – Suits filed by the purchaser
of the three plots on the basis of sale deed executed by the Sirdar –
Trial court dismissed the suits – Appellate Authority allowed the
appeal only with regard to the plot to which Sanad was granted
                                                                         E
which order was upheld by Board of Revenue – Both the parties
filed writ petitions – High Court allowed the writ petition of
purchaser, decreed the suit in respect of other two plots also – On
appeal, held: Under s.134 r/w s.137, a Sirdar after depositing 20
times of land revenue and making an application could obtain
Bhumidhari Sanad – ss.130 and 131 of the 1950 Act were substituted       F
by U.P. Ordinance No.1 of 1977 which was subsequently enacted
as an Act namely, the U.P. Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1977 –
s.134 was omitted by the U.P. Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1977 –
The effect of the provision was that by statute, Bhumidhari right
was conferred on Sirdar, w.e.f., 28.01.1977, the date of issue of
                                                                         G
U.P. Ordinance No.1 of 1977 – s.73 of U.P. Land Laws (Amendment)
Act, 1977 dealt with transitory provisions – s.73(1) provided that
all proceedings for acquisition of bhumidhari rights under ss.134
and 135 of the 1950 Act as they stood immediately before 28.01.1977
and all proceedings arising therefrom, pending on such date before
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                                  677
678            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2019] 4 S.C.R.


A     any court or authority shall abate – Thus revision which was pending
      against the rejection of grant of Bhumidhari Sanad, stood abated
      by virtue of Ordinance No.1 of 1977 – s.73(2) provided that where
      any proceeding has abated under sub-section (1) the amount
      deposited for the acquisition of such rights shall be refunded to the
      person depositing the same or to his legal representatives as the
B
      case may be – Thus, the claim of Sirdar to get Bhumidari rights on
      the basis of his application with regard to two plot against which
      revision was filed stood terminated by virtue of provisions of s.73 –
      Hence, on the basis of the pendency of revision, no benefit could
      be taken by Sirdar – The benefit of a statutory provision shall be
C     applicable to those Sirdars, who were Sirdars on the date when
      Ordinance was enforced, which subsequently became an Act – In
      the instant case, on 28.01.1977, Sirdar was already dead and his
      legal heirs were mutated in his place, thus, benefit of Ordinance
      No.1 of 1977 and the U.P. Act No. 8 of 1977 cannot be availed by
      Sirdar, so as to validate his sale deed with regard to two Plots –
D
      High Court committed error in allowing the writ petition filed by the
      contesting respondent and decreeing the suit – U.P. Zamindari
      Abolition and Land Reforms (Amendment) Ordinance, 1977 – U.P.
      Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1977 – s.73 – Land Laws.
            Partly allowing the appeal, the Court
E
            HELD: 1.1 Under Section 134 read with Section 137, a
      Sirdar after depositing 20 times of land revenue and making an
      application could obtain Bhumidhari Sanad. Sections 130 and
      131 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 were
      substituted by U.P. Ordinance No.1 of 1977 - U.P. Zamindari
F     Abolition and Land Reforms (Amendment) Ordinance, 1977,
      which was subsequently enacted as an Act namely, the Uttar
      Pradesh Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1977. Section 134 was
      omitted by the Uttar Pradesh Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1977.
      The effect of the provision was that by statute, Bhumidhari right
G     was conferred on Sirdar, w.e.f., 28.01.1977, the date of issue of
      U.P. Ordinance No.1 of 1977, which was subsequently enacted
      as an Act, namely, U.P. Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1977, which
      was deemed to have come into effect on 28.01.1977, the date of
      issuance of Ordinance. The most important provision, which

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    RAKESH & ORS. v. BOARD OF REVENUE U.P. & ORS.                      679


needs to be noticed in the Uttar Pradesh Land Laws (Amendment)         A
Act, 1977 is Section 73, which dealt with transitory provisions.
[Paras 14, 15, 16] [690-E-G; 691-G-H; 692-A]
       1.2 Section 73(1) provides that all proceedings for
acquisition of bhumidhari rights under sections 134 and 135 of
the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act,            B
1950, as they stood immediately before 28.01.1977 and all
proceedings arising therefrom, pending on such date before any
court or authority shall abate. The revision against the order dated
23.05.1975 was pending against the rejection of grant of
Bhumidhari Sanad, which stood abated by virtue of Ordinance
No.1 of 1977. Section 73(2) provides that where any proceeding         C
has abated under sub-section (1) the amount deposited for the
acquisition of such rights shall be refunded to the person
depositing the same or to his legal representatives as the case
may be. Thus, sub-section (2) of Section 73 of U.P. Act No.8 of
1977 contemplated that all proceedings pertaining to grant of          D
Bhumidhari Sanad shall be abated and amount deposited shall be
refunded to the person applying or the legal representative. The
consequence of the said provision is that the revision, which was
filed by Sirdar stood abated and the amount so deposited was to
be refunded to his legal representative. The claim of sirdar to
get Bhumidari rights on the basis of his application dated             E
25.11.1974 with regard to Plot Nos. 243 and 503, thus, stood
terminated by virtue of provisions of Section 73. In view of
provisions of Section 73, the claim of Sirdar to get Bhumidhari
rights on the basis of his application dated 25.11.1974 stood
negated. Hence, on the basis of the pendency of revision, no           F
benefit can be taken by Sirdar and High Court erred in law in
holding that by Ordinance No.1 of 1977, Sirdar had also got
benefited retrospectively. [Paras 17-19] [692-D-H; 693-A-B]
       2. By statutory provision, i.e. Section 73, all pending
applications and proceedings were abated and grant of Bhumidhari       G
rights was contemplated under Sections 130 and 131, which was
sought to be inserted by U.P. Ordinance No.1 of 1977. The benefit
of a statutory provision shall be applicable to those Sirdars, who
were Sirdars on the date when Ordinance was enforced, which

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680            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 4 S.C.R.


A     subsequently became an Act. On 28.01.1977, Sirdar was already
      dead and his legal heirs were mutated in his place, thus, benefit
      of Ordinance No.1 of 1977 and the U.P. Act No. 8 of 1977 cannot
      be availed by Sirdar, so as to validate his sale deed dated
      26.11.1974 with regard to Plot Nos. 243 and 503. High Court,
      thus, committed error in allowing the writ petition filed by the
B
      contesting respondent and decreeing the Suit No. 30 of 1978.
      [Para 20] [693-B-D]
            Deo Nandan and Another v. Ram Saran and Others
            (2000) 3 SCC 440 : [2000] 2 SCR 209 – relied on.
C           Ram Sabodh and Another v. Deputy Director of
            Consolidation,U.P., Faizabad and Others 1982 All. L.J.
            1252 – held inapplicable
            Ram Pyare v. Ram Narain and Others (1985) 2 SCC
            162 : [1985] 2 SCR 918 – referred to
D
                                 Case Law Reference
              1982 All. L.J. 1252      held inapplicable        Para 3
              [1985] 2 SCR 918         referred to              Para 9
E             [2000] 2 SCR 209         relied on                Para 10


            CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5040
      of 2008.
F           From the Judgment and Order dated 03.03.2006 of the High
      Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 3020 of
      1984.
            Pramod Swarup, Sr. Adv., Ms. Pareena Swarup, Ms. Sushma
      Verma, Atul Kumar Pandey, Ravinder Kumar, Prashant Chaudhary,
G     Advs. for the Appellants.
             Abhishek Chaudhary, Tanmaya Agarwal, Rohit Kaliyar, Advs.
      for the Respondents.



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    RAKESH & ORS. v. BOARD OF REVENUE U.P. & ORS.                              681


      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by                               A
       ASHOK BHUSHAN, J. This appeal has been filed against the
judgment of Allahabad High Court dated 03.03.2006 deciding the two
writ petitions being Writ Petition No. 16105 of 1983 filed by predecessors-
in-interest of the appellant and Writ Petition No. 3020 of 1984 filed by
respondent No.4.                                                               B
      2. Brief facts of the case necessary for deciding this appeal are:-
      2.1 One Pursottam was the Sirdar (a category of tenancy) of
          agricultural plots Nos. 243, 503 and 1/3rd share in Plot No.
          521 situated in Village Pilkhana, District Shahjahanpur. On
          25.11.1974, Pursottam deposited 20 times of the land revenue         C
          and made an application for grant of Bhumidhar rights in
          accordance with U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms
          Act, 1950. On 26.11.1974, Pursottam executed a sale deed
          of the aforesaid three plots in favour of Ajudhi @ Ayodhya.
          On 23.05.1975, application of Pursottam for grant of                 D
          Bhumidhari Sanad for plot Nos. 243 and 503 was rejected. A
          revision application was filed by Pursottam challenging the
          order dated 23.05.1975. With regard to Plot No. 521,
          Bhumidhari Sanad was granted in the name of Pursottam by
          order of Assistant collector on 05.01.1976, before which on
          04.12.1975, Pursottam has died.                                      E

      2.2 By Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms
          (Amendment) Ordinance, 1977 (U.P. Ordinance No.1 of 1977),
          promulgated on 28.01.1977, Bhumidhar with transferable rights
          were granted to every Sirdar referred to in Sections 130 and
          131 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The            F
          ordinance No.1 of 1977 was substituted by U.P.Act No.8 of
          1977 enforced with effect from 28.01.1977.
      2.3 Ajudhi @ Ayodhya filed two suits – Suit No. 30 of 1978 praying
           for declaration of Bhumidhari Rights in Plot Nos. 243 and 503
           and Suit No. 31 of 1978 claiming declaration of Bhumidhari          G
           Rights in Plot No. 521 on the basis of sale deed dated 26.11.1974
           executed by Pursottam.
      2.4 The trial court dismissed both the suits by judgment dated
          23.03.1979. Two appeals were filed by respondents against
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682            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2019] 4 S.C.R.


A               the judgment of trial court. Additional Commissioner allowed
                Appeal No. 436/6 of 1979 decreeing the suit No. 31 of 1978
                with regard to Plot No. 521, with regard to which Sanad was
                granted,but the Additional Commissioner dismissed the appeal
                No. 435/5 of 1979 arising out of Suit No. 30 of 1978. Both
                appellant and respondent filed second appeal before the Board
B
                of Revenue against the judgment of the Additional
                Commissioner. Board of Revenue vide its judgment dated
                18.11.1983 dismissed both the second appeals.
           2.5 Parties filed writ petitions against the order of Board of Revenue.
               Ram Bilas died during the pendency of the writ petition, whose
C              heirs were brought on record. Writ Petition No. 16105 of 1983
               was filed by predecessor-in-interest of the appellant whereas
               Writ Petition No. 3020 of 1984 was filed by respondents. High
               Court vide its impugned judgment dated 03.03.2006 allowed
               the Writ Petition filed by respondent and dismissed the writ
D              petition filed by the appellant. By judgment of the High Court,
               Suit No.30 of 1978 also stood decreed. Appellant, aggrieved
               by the said judgment has come up in this appeal.
             3. Shri Pramod Swarup, senior Advocate, learned counsel for the
      appellant submits that both the suits filed by respondent deserves to be
E     dismissed in view of the fact that Pursottam had no right to executed
      sale deed of Sirdari rights on 26.11.1974. Although, he had submitted an
      application for Bhumidhari Sanad but he having died on 05.12.1976 before
      grant of Sanad, Bhumidhari rights shall accrue to his legal heirs and the
      plaintiffs have no right to be declared as Bhumidhari. He further submits
      that in any view of the matter, with regard to Plot Nos. 243 and 503,
F     application for Bhumidhari Sanad was rejected on 23.05.1975, hence
      with regard to aforesaid two plots, Suit No. 30 of 1978 deserves to be
      dismissed. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on judgment
      of Allahabad High Court in Ram Sabodh and Another Vs. Deputy
      Director of Consolidation, U.P., Faizabad and Others, 1982 All.
G     L.J. 1252.
             4. Shri Abhishek Chaudhary, learned counsel for the respondent
      refuting the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant contends
      that both the suits filed by the respondent deserves to be decreed, since
      Pursottam (deceased) having deposited the 20 times of the land revenue
H     and made an application on 25.11.1974 for grant of Bhumidhari
    RAKESH & ORS. v. BOARD OF REVENUE U.P. & ORS.                                 683
               [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

rights,bhumidhari rights shall be treated to have been granted, w.e.f., the       A
date of making of application, i.e., 25.11.1974, in view of the provision of
Section 137 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act,
1950. With regard to Plot Nos. 243 and 503, with regard to which
application for grant of Sanad was rejected on 23.05.1975 a revision
was filed by Pursottam, which was pending at the time when U.P.
                                                                                  B
Ordinance No. 1 of 1977 was enforced granting Bhumidhari rights to
Sirdars, by which the revision stood abated.
      5. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have
perused the records.
       6. The High Court in its impugned judgment has taken the view              C
that insofar as Suit No. 31 of 1978 filed by respondent was concerned,
Bhumidhari Sanad was granted in favour of Pursottam (deceased),
although, after his death but the said Sanad will have retrospective effect
making Pursottam Bhumidhar w.e.f. 25.11.1974, hence no error was
committed by decreeing Suit No.31 of 1978. Coming to Suit No. 30 of
1978, filed by the respondent, High Court took the view that in view of           D
the fact that Pursottam had challenged the rejection of the application,
which was subjudice when the proceedings were abated on account of
Ordinance No.1 of 1977,the legal heirs of Pursottam cannot contend
contrary to the interest of Pursottam. The High Court also relied on
Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act in upholding the claim of the          E
respondent.
       7. Before we consider the submissions of the learned counsel for
the parties, it is necessary to refer to provisions of U.P. Zamindari Abolition
and Land Reforms Act, 1950. Section 134 of the Act provides for
acquisition of Bhumidhari rights by a Sirdar. Section 134(1) (existing at         F
the relevant time) is as follows:-
       “134. Acquisition of bhumidhari rights by a sirdar.— (1) If a
       sirdar, not being a sirdar, referred to in clause (b) of Section 131
       deposits to the credit of the State Government an amount equal to
       twenty times the land revenue payable or deemed to be payable              G
       on the date of application for the land of which he is the sirdar, he
       shall, upon an application duly made in that behalf to an Assistant
       Collector, be entitled, with effect from the date on which the amount
       has been so deposited, to a declaration that he has acquired the
       rights mentioned in Section 137 in respect of such land:
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684            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 4 S.C.R.


A           Explanation I. – For the purposes of this sub-section, the expression
            ‘land’ includes share in land.
            Explanation II. – For the purpose of this section the land revenue
            payable shall—
               (a) in respect of land referred to in the proviso to clause (a) of
B              sub-section (1) of Section 246, be an amount arrived at after
               all the increases have been given effect to; and
               (b) in respect of land to which the proviso to Section 247 applies,
               be an amount determined at hereditary rates under that
               section.”
C
            8. Section 137 provides for Grant of certificate. Section 137 as it
      existed at the relevant time is quoted as below:-
            “137. Grant of certificate.— (1) If the application has been
            duly made and the Assistant Collector is satisfied that the applicant
D           is entitled to the declaration mentioned in Section 134 he shall
            grant a certificate to that effect.
            (2) Upon the grant of the certificate under sub-section (1) the
            sirdar shall from the date on which the amount referred to in sub-
            section (1) of Section 134 has been deposited:
E              (a) become and the be deemed to be a bhumidhar of the holing
               or the share in respect of which the certificate has been
               granted, and
               (b) Be liable for payment of such reduced amount on account
               of land revenue for the holding or his share therein, as the case
F              may be as shall one-half of the amount of Land revenue payable
               or deemed to be payable by him therefor on the date of
               application.
            Provided further that in the cases referred to in Explanation II of
            section 134 sirdar shall, during the period a reduced amount is
G           payable in accordance with Section 246 or 247, be liable for
            payment of one-half of the amount payable from time to time.
            Explanation.—For purpose of clause (b) the land revenue payable
            by a sirdar on the date aforesaid shall, where it exceeds an amount
            double that computed at the hereditary rates applicable, be deemed
H           to be equal to such amount.
    RAKESH & ORS. v. BOARD OF REVENUE U.P. & ORS.                               685
               [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

      (2-A) Where the amount referred to in sub-section (1) of Section          A
      134 is deposited on a date other than the first day of the agricultural
      year, the land revenue payable by the bhumidhar under clause (b)
      of sub-section (2) for the remainder of the agricultural year in
      which the amount is deposited shall be determined in such manner
      as may be prescribed.”
                                                                                B
       9. We may first take up the case of the Suit No.31 of 1978 filed
by the respondent with regard to which declaration was sought for Plot
No. 521. With regard to Plot No.521 Bhumidhari Sanad was issued on
05.01.1976 in the name of Pursottam. Additional Commissioner, Board
of Revenue and the High Court taken the view that Bhumidhari certificate
shall relate back to the date of application by Pursottam and sale deed         C
executed by him for Plot No.521 was valid. This Court had occasion to
consider Sections 134 and 137 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land
Reforms Act, 1950 as well as Section 43 of the Transfer of Property
Act in Ram Pyare Vs. Ram Narain and Others, (1985) 2 SCC 162.
In the above case, the Sirdar tenant deposited land revenue and made            D
an application for grant of Bhumidhari Sanad on 28.10.1961 and on the
same day, he sold the land to appellant. Certificate was issued on
30.10.1961. The suit was filed by the sons of Sirdarpraying for cancellation
of sale deed. High Court decreed the suit against which the appeal was
filed. This Court held that Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act
was applicable and the tenure holder acquired the Bhumidhari rights and         E
the suit filed by the sons of Matbar Mal was liable to be dismissed.
After referring to provisions of Section 134 and 137 of the U.P. Zamindari
Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, this Court laid down following in
Paragraph No.4:-
      “4. The decision in Dhani Ram v. Jokhu was approved by another            F
      Division Bench of the same court consisting of S.D. Khare and
      R.B. Misra, JJ., in Ram Swarup v. Deputy Director, Consolidation,
      ILR (1971) 1 All. 698. In the latter case the learned Judges
      expressed the further opinion that in a situation like the one before
      them, there was no reason why recourse should not be had to               G
      Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act to feed the title as it
      were, if the necessary conditions were fulfilled. We agree with
      the reasoning of the learned Judges in Ram Swarup v. Deputy
      Director, Consolidation. In that case, the matter was remanded to
      the Deputy Director of Consolidation to consider the question of
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686      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2019] 4 S.C.R.


A     the applicability of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act and
      proceed to dispose of the matter in accordance with law. In the
      present case, the facts speak for themselves and we do not think
      that it is necessary to remand the case to the lower courts for a
      decision on the question of the applicability of Section 43 of the
      Transfer of Property Act. The amount of deposit under Section
B
      134 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition Act was made on October
      28, 1961 and it was on the same day that the sale deed was
      executed by Matbar Mal. It is clear that Matbar Mal erroneously
      represented to the vendee that he was authorised to transfer the
      property and professed to transfer such property for consideration.
C     The very execution of the sale deed on the same day as the deposit
      of the requisite amount under Section 134 is significant enough to
      establish that the sale deed was the result of an erroneous
      representation by Matbar Mal. It is also clear that the present
      plaintiffs who are the sons of the vendor, Matbar Mal cannot
      possibly claim to be transferees in good faith which indeed they
D
      do not claim to be. Section 43 clearly applies to the situation. The
      learned counsel for the respondents however attempted to disclaim
      the applicability of Section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act by
      referring to Jumma Masjid v. Kodimaniandra Deviah, AIR 1962
      SC 847. He invited our attention to the following observations of
E     the learned Judges:
         “Now the compelling reason urged by the appellant for reading
         a further exception in Section 43 is that if it is construed as
         applicable to transfers by persons who have only spes
         successionis at the date of transfer, it would have the effect of
F        nullifying Section 6(a). But Section 6(a) and Section 43 relate
         to two different subjects, and there is no necessary conflict
         between them; Section 6(a) deals with certain kinds of interests
         in property mentioned therein, and prohibits a transfer simpliciter
         of those interests. Section 43 deals with representations as to
         title made by a transferor who had no title at the time of transfer,
G        and provides that the transfer shall fasten itself on the title
         which the transferor subsequently acquires. Section 6(a) enacts
         a rule of substantive law, while Section 43 enacts a rule of
         estoppel which is one of evidence. The two provisions operate

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RAKESH & ORS. v. BOARD OF REVENUE U.P. & ORS.                                687
           [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

    on different fields, and under different conditions, and we see          A
    no ground for reading a conflict between them or for cutting
    down the ambit of the one by reference to the other. In our
    opinion, both of them can be given full effect on their own
    terms, in their respective spheres. To hold that transfers by
    persons who have only a spes successionis at the date of transfer
                                                                             B
    are not within the protection afforded by Section 43 would
    destroy its utility to a large extent.”
 We are unable to see in what manner these observations can
 possibly assist the respondents. In the same decision, it has been
 observed later, referring to the decision of the Madras High Court
 in Official Assignee, Madras v. Sampath Naidu, AIR 1933 Mad.                C
 795:
    “This reasoning is open to the criticism that it ignores the principle
    underlying Section 43. That section embodies, as already stated,
    a rule of estoppel and enacts that a person who makes a
    representation shall not be heard to allege the contrary as              D
    against a person who acts on that representation. It is immaterial
    whether the transferor acts bona fide or fraudulently in making
    the representation. It is only material to find out whether in
    fact the transferee has been misled. It is to be noted that when
    the decision under consideration was given, the relevant words           E
    of Section 43 were, ‘where a person erroneously represents’,
    and now, as amended by Act 20 of 1929, they are ‘where a
    person fraudulently or erroneously represents’, and that
    emphasises that for the purpose of the section it matters not
    whether the transferor acted fraudulently or innocently in
    making the representation, and that what is material is that he          F
    did make a representation and the transferee has acted on it.
    Where the transferee knew as a fact that the transferor did
    not possess the title which he represents he has, then he cannot
    be said to have acted on it when taking a transfer. Section 43
    would then have no application and the transfer will fail under          G
    Section 6(a). But where the transferee does act on the
    representation, there is no reason why he should not have the
    benefit of the equitable doctrine embodied in Section 43,
    however fraudulent the act of the transferor might have been.”

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688             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2019] 4 S.C.R.


A            10. Another judgment, which is relevant for the present case is
      Deo Nandan and Another Vs. Ram Saran and Others, (2000) 3
      SCC 440. In the said case, one Bechan was the Sirdar of agricultural
      land. He filed an application on 25.08.1964 for grant of Bhumidhari
      Sanad and on 25.08.1964, he executed a sale deed of the land to the
      plaintiff-appellant. Before any order could be passed granting the
B
      Bhumidhari Sanad in favour of Bechan, he died on 15.09.1964. The
      widow of Bechan on 05.01.1965 sold the land. Sanad was issued on
      09.02.1965 in favour of Bechan w.e.f. 25.08.1964, the date on which
      the application was made. Plaintiff-appellant filed a suit challenging the
      sale deed executed by wife of tenure holder. High Court held that on
C     25.08.1964, Bechan had not acquired any right, title or interest, hence he
      cannot transfer any right by executing a sale deed in favour of the plaintiff-
      appellant. This Court referred to provisions of Section 134 and 137 and
      held that the declaration must necessarily take effect from the date when
      the amount is deposited. In paragraph No.7, following has been laid
      down:-
D
             “7. Section 134, from its plain language, indicates and shows that
             on the application being made and 10 times the land revenue being
             paid, the sirdar becomes entitled “with effect from the date on
             which the amount had been deposited” to a declaration that he
             has acquired the rights mentioned in Section 137 of the Act. The
E            section clearly specifies the date with effect from which the rights
             would stand acquired: the date is the one on which the amount
             contemplated by Section 134 is deposited. This clearly obviates
             the uncertainty of the point of time when the title is transferred by
             fixing the date as being the one when the amount is deposited. It
F            would be immaterial as to when the declaration under Section
             137 is made because that declaration must necessarily take effect
             from the date when the amount is deposited.”
            11. The submission that before grant of Sanad, the applicant had
      died was also considered by this Court in paragraph No.9 and it was
G     held that the certificate will have a retrospective effect. The view of
      the High Court was disapproved and suit was held to be entitled to be
      decreed. In paragraph Nos.9 and 10, following has been laid down:-
             “9. It is no doubt true that in the Full Bench decision in Banshidhar
             v. Dhirajadhari, AIR 1971 ALL. 526 (FB), in the Single Judge
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    RAKESH & ORS. v. BOARD OF REVENUE U.P. & ORS.                             689
               [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

      decision in Mobin Khan v. Chunnu Khan, 1981 All. LJ 402,                A
      and in the decision in Raghunandan Singh v. Vashwant Singh,
      1978 RD 183, a different view has been expressed by the
      Allahabad High Court. In the Full Bench decision, the view taken
      is that it is from the date when the order is passed under Section
      137 that the sirdar becomes a bhumidhar. In the latter two cases,
                                                                              B
      it has been held that if after filing of the application and making
      payment of the land revenue the applicant dies, then certificate in
      his name cannot be granted. In our opinion, the said decisions run
      counter to the plain language and meaning of Sections 134 and
      137 as they stood at the relevant point of time. When a certificate
      is issued under Section 137, it in fact recognises the position as on   C
      the date when the application was made and the payment
      contemplated under Section 134(1) was deposited. The certificate,
      in other words, will have a retrospective effect and would relate
      back to the date of the application. There was nothing to prevent
      the Revenue Authorities from allowing the application filed under
                                                                              D
      Section 134(1) on the day when it was presented. The underlying
      intention of the legislature, therefore, clearly is that as and when
      the said application is accepted and order is passed under Section
      137, it must relate back to the date when the application was
      filed. Such a situation is not unknown to law. Mr Prem Prasad
      Juneja, learned counsel for the appellants, as an analogy, has drawn    E
      our attention to Order 22 Rule 6 CPC which provides that if any
      of the parties to a suit dies after the hearing has been completed
      and before the judgment is pronounced, the suit would not abate.
      The doctrine of relation back has been incorporated in Sections
      134 and 137 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms
                                                                              F
      Act.
      10. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the lower appellate court
      had rightly interpreted Sections 134 and 137 and the High Court
      was in error in overruling the said decision.”
       12. In view of law as laid down above, the judgment of Allahabad       G
High Court in Ram Sabodh(Supra) cannot help the appellant. The
judgment of this Court in Deo Nandan and Another (supra) fully covers
the claim of the plaintiff-respondent with regard to Suit No. 31 of 1978
relating to Plot No.521, with regard to which Sanad was granted after

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690            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2019] 4 S.C.R.


A     death of Pursottam. We are of the view that Additional Commissioner,
      Board of Revenue and High Court committed no error in decreeing Suit
      No.31 of 1978.
             13. Now, we come to the claim of the plaintiff-respondent with
      regard to Plot Nos. 243 and 503 in Suit No.30 of 1978. The facts reveal
B     that with regard to aforesaid plots, although application was made on
      25.11.1974 by depositing the 20 times amount of the land revenue, but
      the application was rejected on 23.05.1975 by the Assistant Collector. A
      revision was filed by Pursottam challenging the said order, which was
      pending at the time when U.P. Ordinance No.1 of 1977 was issued
      abating the proceedings. High Court has noted that the claim of Pursottam
C     to grant of Bhumidhari Sanad was subjudice in revision,when the
      proceedings were abated. It was further observed that legal heirs, who
      were brought on the record on the revision, due to death of Pursottam,
      were competent to represent the estate of deceased and cannot setup
      any claim adverse to the interest of the deceased. High Court observed
D     that had Pursottam not died, he would have acquired the status of
      Bhumidhar under Ordinance No.1 of 1977 and since he had already
      executed the sale deed after depositing 20 times land revenue, it would
      have related back to the date when he made the application and deposited
      the amount.
E            14. We may first notice the provisions of U.P. Ordinance No.1 of
      1977, which has been referred to by the High Court and which are
      relevant in the facts of the present case. We have noticed above that
      under Section 134 read with Section 137, a Sirdar after depositing 20
      times of land revenue and making an application could obtain Bhumidhari
      Sanad. Sections 130 and 131 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land
F     Reforms Act, 1950 were substituted by U.P. Ordinance No.1 of 1977 -
      U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms (Amendment) Ordinance,
      1977, which was subsequently enacted as an Act namely, the Uttar
      Pradesh Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1977, which areto the following
      effect:-
G           “Section 3: Substitution of sections 130 and 131—For
            sections 130 and 131 of the principal Act, the following sections
            shall be substituted, namely:—
               “130. Bhumidhar with transferable rights.—Every person
               belonging to any of the following classes, not being a person
H
    RAKESH & ORS. v. BOARD OF REVENUE U.P. & ORS.                            691
               [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

         referred to in section 131, shall be called a bhumidhar with        A
         transferable rights, and shall have all the rights and be subject
         to all the liabilities conferred or imposed upon such bhumidhars
         by or under this Act, namely—
        (a) every person who was a bhumidhar immediately before the
            date of commencement of the Uttar Pradesh Land Laws              B
            (Amendment) Act, 1977;
        (b) every person who, immediately before the said date, was a
            sirdar referred to in clause (a) or clause (c) of section 131,
            as it stood immediately before the said date;
        (c) every person who in any other manner acquires on or after        C
            the said date the rights of such a bhumidhar under or in
            accordance with the provisions of this Act.
         131. Bhumidhar with non-transferable rights.—Every person
         belonging to any of the following classes shall be called a
         bhumidhar with non-transferable rights, and shall have all the      D
         rights and be subject to all the liabilities conferred or imposed
         upon such bhumidhars by or under this Act, namely—
        (a) every person admitted as a sirdar of any land under section
            195 before the date of commencement of the Uttar Pradesh
            Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1977, or as a bhumidhar with          E
            non-transferable rights under the said section on or after
            the said date;
        (b) every person who in any other manner acquires on or after
            the said date, the rights of such a bhumidhar under or in
            accordance with the provisions of this Act;                      F
        (c) every person who is, or has been allotted any land under the
            provisions of the Uttar Pradesh Bhoodan Yagna Act, 1952.”
       15. Section 134 was omitted by the Uttar Pradesh Land Laws
(Amendment) Act, 1977. The effect of the provision was that by statute,
Bhumidhari right was conferred on Sirdar, w.e.f., 28.01.1977, the date       G
of issue of U.P. Ordinance No.1 of 1977, which was subsequently enacted
as an Act, namely, U.P. Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1977, which
was deemed to have come into effect on 28.01.1977, the date of issuance
of Ordinance.
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692            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 4 S.C.R.


A           16. The most important provision, which needs to be noticed in
      the Uttar Pradesh Land Laws (Amendment) Act, 1977 is Section 73,
      which dealt with transitory provisions, which is as follows:-
            “Section 73: Transitory provisions
            (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the
B           time being in force all proceedings for acquisition of bhumidhari
            rights under sections 134 and 135 of the Uttar Pradesh Zamindari
            Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, as they stood immediately
            before January 28, 1977 and all proceedings arising therefrom,
            pending on such date before any court or authority shall abate.
C           (2) Where any proceeding has abated under sub-section (1) the
            amount deposited for the acquisition of such rights shall be refunded
            to the person depositing the same or to his legal representatives
            as the case may be.”
            17. Section 73(1) provides thatall proceedings for acquisition of
D     bhumidhari rights under sections 134 and 135 of the Uttar Pradesh
      Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950, as they stood
      immediately before 28.01.1977 and all proceedings arising therefrom,
      pending on such date before any court or authority shall abate.
             18. The revision against the order dated 23.05.1975 was pending
E     against the rejection of grant of Bhumidhari Sanad, which stood abated
      by virtue of Ordinance No.1 of 1977, as has been noted by the High
      Court in its judgment. The most important provision is Section 73(2),
      which provides that where any proceeding has abated under sub-section
      (1) the amount deposited for the acquisition of such rights shall be
F     refunded to the person depositing the same or to his legal representatives
      as the case may be.
             19. Thus, sub-section(2) of Section 73 of U.P.Act No.8 of 1977
      contemplated that all proceedings pertaining to grant of Bhumidhari Sanad
      shall be abated and amount deposited shall be refunded to the person
      applying or the legal representative. The consequence of the said
G
      provision is that the revision, which was filed by Pursottam stood abated
      and the amount so deposited was to be refunded to his legal
      representative. The claim of Pursottam to get Bhumidari rights on the
      basis of his application dated 25.11.1974 with regard to Plot Nos. 243
      and 503, thus, stood terminated by virtue of provisions of Section 73 as
H
    RAKESH & ORS. v. BOARD OF REVENUE U.P. & ORS.                                 693
               [ASHOK BHUSHAN, J.]

extracted above. In view of provisions of Section 73 as extracted above,          A
the claim of Pursottam to get Bhumidhari rights on the basis of his
application dated 25.11.1974 stood negated. Hence, on the basis of the
pendency of revision, no benefit can be taken by Pursottam and High
Court erred in law in holding that by Ordinance No.1 of 1977, Pursottam
had also got benefited retrospectively.
                                                                                  B
       20. By statutory provision, i.e. Section 73, all pending applications
and proceedings were abated and grant of Bhumidhari rights was
contemplated under Sections 130 and 131, which was sought to be
inserted by U.P. Ordinance No.1 of 1977. The benefit of a statutory
provision shall be applicable to those Sirdars, who were Sirdars on the
date when Ordinance was enforced, which subsequently became an                    C
Act. On 28.01.1977, Pursottam was already dead and his legal heirs
were mutated in his place, thus, benefit of Ordinance No.1 of 1977 and
the U.P. Act No. 8 of 1977 cannot be availed by Pursottam, so as to
validate his sale deed dated 26.11.1974 with regard to Plot Nos. 243 and
503. High Court, thus, committed error in allowing the writ petition filed        D
by the contesting respondent and decreeing the Suit No. 30 of 1978.
       21. The writ petition filed by respondent No.3 questioning the
decision of Courts below with regard to Suit No.30 of 1978 was not
liable to be allowed by the High Court. All the Courts below including
the Board of Revenue had taken correct view with regard to Suit No.30             E
of 1978 filed by the respondent.
       22. In result, the appeal is partly allowed. The judgment of the
High Court insofar as it allows the Writ Petition No.3020 of 1984 filed
by Ajudhi @ Ayodhya is set aside. The judgment of the High Court
insofar as it dismissed the Writ Petition No. 16105 of 1983 is affirmed.          F
In consequences, the judgment of the Courts below decreeing the Suit
No. 31 of 1978 of respondent Ajudhi @ Ayodhya is maintained, whereas
judgment of High Court decreeing the Suit No. 30 of 1978 is set aside.
Suit No.30 of 1978 of Ajudhi @ Ayodhya stands dismissed. The appeal
is decided accordingly. Parties shall bear their own costs.
                                                                                  G

Devika Gujral                                            Appeal partly allowed.




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