RAKESH MITTALversusAJAY PAL GUPTA @ SONU CHAUDHARY AND ANOTHER

                 [2026] 3 S.C.R. 220 : 2026 INSC 161

                           Rakesh Mittal
                                v.
           Ajay Pal Gupta @ Sonu Chaudhary and Another
                     (Criminal Appeal No. 957 of 2026)
                              17 February 2026
            [Sanjay Kumar* and K. Vinod Chandran, JJ.]


                           Issue for Consideration
       Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned
       order passed by the High Court granting bail to respondent No.1
       extending the parity principle ought to be set aside.

                                  Headnotes†
       Bail – Offences of pecuniary nature – Factors to be
       considered – Appellant-complainant filed FIR u/ss.406, 419,
       420, 467, 468, 471, 506, IPC, s.409 added later, alleging that he
       had supplied foodgrains to four accused persons including
       respondent No.1 (operating under different names), but he was
       paid only ₹5,02,57,000/- out of the total sum of ₹11,52,38,156/-
       and; the accused conspired with each other, prepared forged
       documents with false and fabricated addresses, including
       Aadhaar Cards, and cheated him – Respondent No.1 was
       arrested after absconding for over one and a half years –
       Bail rejected by Sessions Judge – High Court granted bail
       to Respondent No.1 on the ground of parity with co-accused
       persons – Challenge to the validity of:
       Held: Impugned order set aside – The value of life and liberty of
       members of society is not limited only to their ‘person’ but would
       also extend to the quality of their life, including their economic
       well-being – Various factors taken into consideration while dealing
       with the application for bail in the context of heinous offences
       such as likelihood of offences being repeated, danger of justice
       being thwarted by grant of bail, criminal antecedents of the
       accused, potential threat to life and liberty of victims/witnesses




* Author
[2026] 3 S.C.R.                                                              221

   Rakesh Mittal v. Ajay Pal Gupta @ Sonu Chaudhary and Another


     must necessarily be weighed while dealing with the alleged
     offenders’ pleas for grant of bail in offences of pecuniary nature
     also, where innocent people are cheated of their hard-earned
     monies by conmen, who make it their life’s pursuit to exploit and
     feast upon the gullibility of others – Respondent No.1 is a habitual
     offender – The number of diverse and unconnected aliases, fake
     IDs and the deliberate changes of identity, including his father’s
     name, clearly manifest his nefarious intention to dupe innocent
     victims and cheat them – He was granted bail earlier but chose
     to indulge in the same activities once again, resulting in the
     registration of multiple FIRs over the years – He is a career criminal
     and a menace to society – High Court did not even take his past
     antecedents into consideration – Similarly, his conduct in the
     context of the pending case was not noted – Having secured bail
     in one of the FIRs, respondent No.1 chose to abscond, resulting
     in issuance of a non-bailable warrant, which also brought to light
     the fact that his surety was not to be found – High Court ought
     not to have blindly extended the parity principle to him without
     considering the particular and distinctive features of his individual
     case. [Paras 19-22, 24]

     Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.29, 209, 323 – One of
     the grounds that weighed with the High Court was that the
     offences against respondent No.1 were triable by a Magistrate:
     Held: High Court overlooked the fact that the offences now
     alleged against respondent No.1 include offences u/s.409 IPC
     and s.467 IPC also – Punishment for offences under these
     provisions can extend to imprisonment for life or imprisonment
     for a term up to ten years – Similarly, some of the other offences
     entail a possible sentence of imprisonment over three years – A
     Metropolitan Magistrate has the same powers as a Magistrate of
     First Class while a Chief Metropolitan Magistrate is equivalent to
     a Chief Judicial Magistrate – Thus, it would always be open to a
     Magistrate, if he is of the opinion that any of the offences in the
     case are exclusively triable by a Court of Sessions, to commit
     the case to a Court of Sessions u/s.209 or s.323 – Under s.323,
     such power can be exercised by the Magistrate even during the
     course of the trial – Therefore, the assumption of the High Court
     that the case on hand is triable by a Magistrate is premature.
     [Paras 13, 14]
222                                                               [2026] 3 S.C.R.

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                                 Case Law Cited
       Neeru Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another [2014] 12
       SCR 453 : (2014) 16 SCC 508; Neeru Yadav v. State of UP and
       Another [2015] 10 SCR 802 : (2016) 15 SCC 422; Sudha Singh v.
       State of Uttar Pradesh and Another [2021] 4 SCR 95 : (2021) 4
       SCC 781 – relied on.
       Dolat Ram and Others v. State of Haryana [1994] Supp. 6 SCR
       69 : (1995) 1 SCC 349 – referred to.

                                   List of Acts
       Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

                                List of Keywords
       Bail; Parity principle; Heinous offences; Ground of parity; Offences
       of pecuniary nature; Likelihood of offences being repeated; Danger
       of justice being thwarted by grant of bail; Criminal antecedents of
       the accused; Potential threat to life and liberty of victims/witnesses;
       Offences of pecuniary nature; Cheating; Habitual offender; Aliases;
       Fake IDs; Change of identity; Intention to dupe innocent victims;
       Challenge to the validity of order granting bail; Foodgrains supplied;
       Section 29, 209, 323, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Criminal
       breach of trust.

                               Case Arising From
       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
       957 of 2026
       From the Judgment and Order dated 12.11.2025 of the High Court
       of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench in CRMBA No. 9871
       of 2025

                            Appearances for Parties
       Advs. for the Appellant(s):
       Manish Goswami, Sr. Adv., Rongon Choudhary, Gaurav Shukla,
       Deshmukh Adith Satish.
       Advs. for the Respondent(s):
       Siddhartha Dave, Sr. Adv., Ankit Dhawan, Rupraj Banerjee, Mohit
       Miglani, Namit Saxena.
[2026] 3 S.C.R.                                                         223

     Rakesh Mittal v. Ajay Pal Gupta @ Sonu Chaudhary and Another


                        Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

                                     Judgment

       Sanjay Kumar, J.

1.     Leave granted.
2.     The appellant is the complainant in FIR No. 0568 dated 29.12.2023,
       registered under Sections 406, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 506
       of the Indian Penal Code, 18601, on the file of P.S. Risiya, District
       Bahraich, Uttar Pradesh. He is aggrieved by the grant of bail to an
       accused therein., viz., Ajay Pal Gupta @ Sonu Chaudhary, respondent
       No.1, vide order dated 12.11.2025 passed in Criminal Misc. Bail
       Application No. 9871 of 2025 by a learned Judge of the Allahabad
       High Court, Lucknow Bench.
3.     The case of the complainant was that he had supplied foodgrains to
       the four named accused in the FIR, including respondent No.1, but
       he was paid only ₹5,02,57,000/- out of the total sum due and payable
       to him, i.e., ₹11,52,38,156/-. He claimed that cheques were issued
       but when those cheques were presented, they were dishonoured for
       want of funds. He further claimed that his inquiries had revealed that
       the accused conspired with each other, prepared forged documents
       with false and fabricated addresses, including Aadhaar Cards, and
       had cheated him. Documents were filed in proof of respondent No.1
       showing his own name and his father’s name differently on separate
       occasions.
4.     When notice was ordered in this matter on 24.11.2025, this Court
       was informed that respondent No. 1 had not yet been released from
       prison pursuant to the impugned bail order. Noting the same, this
       Court directed that, if that be so, the impugned order should not
       be given effect to. In consequence, respondent No.1 still remains
       incarcerated.
5.     We may note that respondent No.1, being accused No.1 in the FIR,
       was arrested only on 08.08.2025 after absconding for over one and
       a half years. The learned Sessions Judge, Bahraich, rejected his



1    For short, ‘IPC’
224                                                          [2026] 3 S.C.R.

                           Supreme Court Reports


       plea for grant of bail, vide order dated 29.08.2025 in Bail Application
       No. 2512 of 2025. Therein, the learned Sessions Judge, apart
       from noting various other aspects, found that respondent No.1 had
       deliberately made a false statement before the Court by suppressing
       the fact that there were three other FIRs registered against him in
       Uttar Pradesh and Delhi.
6.     Respondent No.1 then approached the High Court by way of the
       subject application on 03.09.2025. By the impugned order, the learned
       Judge noted his plea that he was entitled to parity, as his co-accused,
       viz., Devender Pal Singh was granted bail on 07.11.2025 and another
       co-accused, Uma Shankar Mishra, had been granted anticipatory
       bail even earlier on 18.08.2025. The learned Judge held that, in the
       light of the co-accused’s bail orders; the period that respondent No.1
       had remained in prison; the fact that the chargesheet had been filed;
       and as the offence was triable by a Magistrate, respondent No.1
       was entitled to grant of bail, subject to conditions. This order is the
       cause for grievance presently.
7.     Notably, Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 644 of 2024 filed by
       respondent No.1 before the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench,
       seeking quashing of the subject FIR No. 0568 of 2023 was dismissed
       as withdrawn on 30.01.2024.
8.     The State of Uttar Pradesh, respondent No.2 herein, filed a counter
       affidavit. Therein, it stated that after the registration of the FIR on
       29.12.2023, after investigation and upon discovery of the ingredients
       of criminal breach of trust, Section 409 IPC was also added. Notices
       were stated to have been issued to all the four accused but respondent
       No.1 and his co-accused, Vijay Pal Gupta, could not be found as the
       furnished addresses were incorrect and fictitious. The investigation
       was then transferred to the Crime Branch, Bahraich, from P.S. Risiya,
       pursuant to the order dated 31.07.2024 of the Senior Superintendent
       of Police, as the offence involved cross jurisdictional operations
       resulting in loss of ₹6.5 crores to the complainant. According to the
       State, respondent No.1 used the following names/aliases – Ajay Pal
       Gupta, Sonu Chaudhary, Gautam Agrawal, Shubham Gupta, Shivam
       Agarwal, Kamla Kant Tiwari, Shaurya Dudulani and Sonu Seth. He
       was finally arrested on 08.08.2025 and three Aadhaar cards, two
       showing his name as Sonu Chaudhary s/o Sobharam, with different
       addresses in Delhi, and one showing his name as Gautam Agarwal
[2026] 3 S.C.R.                                                         225

     Rakesh Mittal v. Ajay Pal Gupta @ Sonu Chaudhary and Another


      s/o Bhagwan Das Agarwal, with an address in Ghaziabad, Uttar
      Pradesh, along with a PAN card in the name of Gautam Agarwal
      s/o Bhagwan Das Agarwal, were recovered from his possession
      apart from other incriminating documents. All the fake IDs had his
      picture and even his father’s name was changed from Sobharam
      to Bhagwan Das Agarwal. The chargesheet was filed against him
      on 23.10.2025.
9.    The State pointed out that respondent No.1 had remained a fugitive
      for more than 20 months since registration of the FIR and despite
      a picture publication and raids conducted across Delhi and Uttar
      Pradesh, he remained untraceable until 08.08.2025. It was stated
      that respondent No.1 was apprehended only after declaration and
      payment of a reward of ₹51,000/- to facilitate his capture. The State
      referred to the three known criminal antecedents of respondent No.1
      in Uttar Pradesh and Delhi. It stated that, insofar as FIR No. 229
      of 2017 registered in Delhi was concerned, respondent No.1 had
      secured bail and did not co-operate thereafter during the trial. Even
      the address of the surety furnished by him was found to be fictitious.
      His co-accused, Vijay Pal Gupta @ Jivan Saini, whose real name
      was found to be Jivan Kaushik, was also arrested on 12.11.2025.
      According to the State, respondent No.1 had been operating under
      different names, as he had as many as 8 to 10 aliases with forged
      Aadhaar cards and PAN card, making it difficult to track and verify his
      criminal antecedents comprehensively against multiple jurisdictions.
      The investigation conclusively established that respondent No.1 was
      the principal offender and the master-mind behind the offence. The
      State asserted that the High Court had failed to take a holistic view
      of the matter while directing his release on bail. It was pointed out
      that even the surety furnished by him in this case was not found at
      the given address.
10. In the affidavit filed in support of his application to vacate the stay
    granted on 24.11.2025, respondent No.1 stated that his name was
    correctly recorded as Sonu Chaudhary in FIR No.229 of 2017. He
    further stated that his father’s name was correctly mentioned in his
    Aadhaar card, PAN card, Passport and Vehicle Registration Certificate
    as Sh. Shobha Ram. In a separate counter affidavit filed on his behalf,
    it was stated that there were only 2 FIRs registered against respondent
    No.1, i.e., FIR No.229 of 2020 [sic 2017] registered under Sections
    420, 467, 468, 471, 506, 120B and 34 IPC on the file of P.S. Geeta
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       Colony, District Shahdara, Delhi, and the subject FIR No. 0568 of
       2023 under Sections 406, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 501 IPC on
       the file of P.S. Risiya, District Bahraich, Uttar Pradesh. According
       to the deponent, when the subject FIR was registered, the details
       of the accused were provided by the complainant or were procured
       by the Investigating Officer and respondent No.1, therefore, had
       no control on how his father’s name was shown. Respondent No.1
       was stated to have been arrested on 26.05.2017 in connection with
       FIR No.229 of 2017. He was granted bail on 10.08.2017, but as he
       failed to appear before the Trial Court, a non-bailable warrant was
       stated to have been issued against him on 26.04.2025.
11. Though the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No.1 spoke
    of only 2 FIRs being registered against him, including the subject FIR,
    the order dated 29.08.2025 passed by the learned Sessions Judge,
    rejecting the bail application of respondent No.1, indicates that, apart
    from FIR No. 229 of 2017 and the subject FIR No. 0568 of 2023,
    FIR No.254 of 2022 and FIR No.31 of 2020 were also registered
    against respondent No.1. FIR No. 31 of 2020 was registered on the
    file of P.S. Secunderabad, District Bulandshahr, under Sections 420
    and 406 IPC, while FIR No.254 of 2022 was registered on the file of
    P.S. Commissionerate, Gautam Budh Nagar, Uttar Pradesh, under
    Sections 406, 420 and 120B IPC. We may also note that FIR No.
    229 of 2017 is still dragging on and it appears that charges have
    not even been framed in that case till date.
12. At this stage, we may note that one of the grounds that weighed
    with the High Court was that the offences against respondent No.1
    were triable by a Magistrate. However, the High Court overlooked
    the fact that the offences now alleged against respondent No.1
    include offences under Section 409 IPC and Section 467 IPC also.
    Significantly, the punishment for offences under these provisions can
    extend to imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term up to ten
    years. Similarly, some of the other offences for which respondent No.1
    has been hauled up for entail a possible sentence of imprisonment
    over three years.
13. Under Section 29 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19732, a
    Magistrate of First Class can pass a sentence of imprisonment for a


2   For short ‘CrPC’
[2026] 3 S.C.R.                                                         227

    Rakesh Mittal v. Ajay Pal Gupta @ Sonu Chaudhary and Another


     term not exceeding three years, while a Chief Judicial Magistrate may
     pass a sentence of imprisonment, excepting imprisonment for a term
     exceeding seven years or a sentence of death or imprisonment for
     life. A Metropolitan Magistrate has the same powers as a Magistrate
     of First Class while a Chief Metropolitan Magistrate is equivalent to
     a Chief Judicial Magistrate.
14. In that view of the matter, it would always be open to a Magistrate, if
    he is of the opinion that any of the offences in the case are exclusively
    triable by a Court of Sessions, to commit the case to a Court of
    Sessions under Section 209 CrPC or Section 323 CrPC. It may be
    noted that under Section 323 CrPC, such power can be exercised
    by the Magistrate even during the course of the trial. Therefore, the
    assumption of the High Court that the case on hand is triable by a
    Magistrate is premature.
15. We are also conscious of the fact that this is not a case of cancellation
    of bail but a challenge to the validity of an order granting bail. Even
    in cases of cancellation of bail, the power to do so is not just limited
    to occurrence of supervening circumstances as the Court has the
    inherent power and discretion to cancel the bail of an accused even
    in the absence of supervening circumstances (See Dolat Ram and
    others vs. State of Haryana3). One of the grounds enumerated
    therein, as relevant for exercise of such power, is where the past
    criminal record and the conduct of the accused are completely
    ignored while granting bail.
16. Neeru Yadav vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another4 was a case
    where bail had been granted to a history-sheeter, charge-sheeted
    for a number of heinous offences, on the ground of parity. Observing
    that liberty is a priceless treasure for a human being and is a cardinal
    value on which civilization rests, this Court cautioned that liberty
    of an individual would however not be absolute as society, by its
    collective wisdom and through the process of law, can withdraw
    liberty that has been sanctioned to an individual when such an
    individual becomes a danger to the collective and to the societal
    order. It was further observed that the High Court must exercise its
    discretion cautiously and when there is likelihood of offences being


3   (1995) 1 SCC 349
4   (2014) 16 SCC 508
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       repeated or there is a danger of justice being thwarted by grant
       of bail, these are factors which should be taken into consideration
       while dealing with an application for bail. It was further observed that
       cancellation of bail if the accused misconducted himself or due to some
       intervening circumstances is in a different compartment altogether
       from examination of an order granting bail which was unjustified,
       illegal or perverse. It was held that, if in a case, the relevant factors
       which should have been taken into consideration while dealing with
       the application for bail have not been taken note of or it is founded
       on irrelevant considerations; indisputably, the superior court can set
       aside such a bail order. Per this Court, such a case would belong
       to a different category and in a separate realm, as it delves into the
       justifiability and soundness of the order passed by the Court.
17. Again, in Neeru Yadav vs. State of UP and another5, this Court
    observed that a crime, though committed against an individual, may
    not retain an individual character as the victim may be an individual
    but, in the ultimate eventuate, it is the society which is the victim.
    Further, observing that a crime, as is understood, creates a dent in
    the law-and-order situation and disturbs orderliness, this Court held
    that an individual can enjoy his liberty which is definitely of paramount
    value but he cannot be a law unto himself and he cannot cause
    harm to others. It was held that an individual cannot be a nuisance
    to the collective or a terror to the society. Reference was made to
    the observations of E. Barrett Prettyman, Chief Judge of the US
    Court of Appeals (Retired), which read thus: -
            “In an ordered society of mankind there is no such thing
            as unrestricted liberty, either of nations or of individuals.
            Liberty itself is the product of restraints; it is inherently
            a composite of restraints; it dies when restraints are
            withdrawn. Freedom, I say, is not an absence of restraints;
            it is a composite of restraints. There is no liberty without
            order. There is no order without systematised restraint.
            Restraints are the substance without which liberty does
            not exist. They are the essence of liberty. The great
            problem of the democratic process is not to strip men of
            restraints merely because they are restraints. The great


5   (2016) 15 SCC 422
[2026] 3 S.C.R.                                                         229

    Rakesh Mittal v. Ajay Pal Gupta @ Sonu Chaudhary and Another


            problem is to design a system of restraints which will
            nurture the maximum development of man’s capabilities,
            not in a massive globe of faceless animations but as a
            perfect realisation, of each separate human mind, soul and
            body; not in mute, motionless meditation but in flashing,
            thrashing activity.”
     Noting that the High Court, in that case, had totally ignored the
     criminal antecedents of the accused and what had weighed with the
     High Court was only the doctrine of parity, this Court set aside the
     bail granted to the accused therein.
18. In Sudha Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and another6, a
    3-Judge Bench of this Court was dealing with the validity of a bail
    order passed in favour of an alleged contract killer. This Court found
    that the High Court had simply ignored the criminal antecedents of
    that accused. It was observed that though liberty is important, even
    that of a person charged with crime, it is equally important for the
    Courts to recognize the potential threat to life and liberty of victims/
    witnesses, if such an accused is released on bail.
19. Though the observations made in some of the above cases were in
    the context of heinous offences, which is not the case presently, we
    may note that the value of life and liberty of members of society is
    not limited only to their ‘person’ but would also extend to the quality
    of their life, including their economic well-being. In offences of a
    pecuniary nature, where innocent people are cheated of their hard-
    earned monies by conmen, who make it their life’s pursuit to exploit
    and feast upon the gullibility of others, the aforestated factors must
    necessarily be weighed while dealing with the alleged offenders’
    pleas for grant of bail.
20. In the case on hand, the investigation against respondent No.1,
    as is borne out by the counter affidavit filed by the State, clearly
    demonstrates that he is a habitual offender. The number of diverse
    and unconnected aliases, fake IDs and the deliberate changes of
    identity, including his father’s name, clearly manifest his nefarious
    intention to dupe innocent victims and cheat them.
21. Further, the fact that respondent No.1 was granted bail earlier but
    chose to indulge in the same activities once again, resulting in


6   (2021) 4 SCC 781
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       the registration of multiple FIRs over the years, demonstrates that
       he is a career criminal and a menace to society. The impugned
       order reflects that his past antecedents were not even taken into
       consideration. Similarly, his conduct in the context of the pending
       case was not noted. Having secured bail in relation to FIR No. 229
       of 2017, respondent No.1 chose to abscond, resulting in issuance
       of a non-bailable warrant, which also brought to light the fact that
       his surety was not to be found.
22. In such circumstances, the High Court ought not to have blindly
    extended the parity principle to him without considering the particular
    and distinctive features of his individual case. Given the fact that
    respondent No.1 has not turned over a new leaf, despite the
    indulgence shown by grant of bail in relation to FIR No. 229 of 2017,
    as evidenced by the FIRs registered against him over the years, we
    are of the opinion that letting him loose on society would only pose
    a risk and hazard to others.
23. The case law cited on behalf of respondent No.1, in the context
    of the value of liberty and the principles applicable to interference
    with bail orders, would have to be applied on the strength of the
    individual facts of each particular case and insofar as the present
    case is concerned, we find that the same have no application, given
    his antecedents and his past and present conduct.
24. The impugned order dated 12.11.2025 passed by the Allahabad High
    Court, Lucknow Bench, granting bail to respondent No.1, therefore,
    cannot be sustained either on facts or in law. The said order is
    accordingly set aside. The State shall, however, ensure that the trial
    in the case is expedited by taking all necessary measures.
       The appeal is allowed in the aforestated terms.
       Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

       Result of the case: Appeal allowed.




       †
           Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey