RAJUversusTHE STATE OF HARYANA

18                      [2019]
              SUPREME COURT    4 S.C.R. 18
                             REPORTS                       [2019] 4 S.C.R.


A                                   RAJU
                                      v.
                        THE STATE OF HARYANA
                      (Criminal Appeal No. 1175 of 2014)
B                           FEBRUARY 22, 2019
      [N. V. RAMANA, MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR AND
                   INDIRA BANERJEE, JJ.]
            Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,
     2000 – s.7A – Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)
C
     Rules, 2007 – r.12 – Trial court convicted three accused persons
     for the offence of gang-rape u/s.376(2)(g) of IPC – All the accused
     appealed to the High Court – Appellant-accused raised the defence
     that he was aged less than 18 years at the time of commission of the
     offence – High Court rejected the contention and affirmed the
D    conviction of the three accused including the appellant – In appeal,
     Supreme Court directed the Registrar (Judicial) to conduct inquiry
     in respect of the age of the appellant in terms of s.7A of the 2000
     Act – Pursuant thereto, report was submitted which determined the
     age of the Appellant as 16 years, 2 months & 2 days at the time of
     commission of the offence and concluded that he was juvenile at
E
     that time – The State raised the question that whether the plea of
     juvenility as decided by the Registry of Supreme Court should be
     given precedence over the view of the High Court – Held: High
     Court decided the issue merely upon an assessment of the material
     on record without resorting to the procedure governing inquiries
F    for determination of age as laid out in s.7A of the 2000 Act and r.12
     of the 2007 Rules – High Court did not conduct inquiry stipulated
     as per s.7A & r.12 – In instant case, inquiry was conducted by the
     Registrar (Judicial) upon direction of the Supreme Court – As the
     inquiry conducted by the Registrar (Judicial) was thereafter
     affirmed, so that amounted to an inquiry conducted by the Supreme
G
     Court – Thus, findings of such inquiry would prevail over the view
     taken by the High Court – Accordingly, conviction and sentence of
     the appellant u/s.376 of IPC set aside.


H
                                      18
               RAJU v. THE STATE OF HARYANA                              19


      Allowing the appeal, the Court                                     A
      HELD: 1. The High Court evidently did not even frame its
discussion in terms of whether the evidence brought on record
was sufficient to conduct an inquiry under the Juvenile Justice
(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 and the Juvenile
Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 let alone          B
order and conduct such an inquiry. On the contrary, it simply
recorded that the evidence did not go to show that the Appellant
was a juvenile at the time of the commission of the offence, and
proceeded to affirm the conviction of the Appellant on merits.
[Para 15][26-E-F]
                                                                         C
       2. Therefore, it is evident that the only inquiry as stipulated
under the 2000 Act and the 2007 Rules was conducted by the
Registrar (Judicial) upon the directions of this Court, after the
Court was satisfied upon going through the school certificates
adduced by the Appellant that the certificates in question prima
facie entitled him to claim the conduct of such an inquiry. In such      D
a situation, the question regarding whether precedence may be
given to the inquiry of a Registrar (Judicial) of this Court over
the opinion of the High Court regarding the age of an accused
can be restated as whether such inquiry conducted by the
Registrar (Judicial) upon the direction of this Court, if thereafter     E
affirmed by this Court, would amount to an inquiry conducted by
this Court itself. If this be the case, the findings of such inquiry
would prevail over the view taken by the High Court. [Para 16]
[26-F-H; 27-A]
      3. This Court is of the opinion that the above question must       F
be answered in the affirmative. This Court, on previous occasions
as well, has adopted the practice of directing the Registrar
(Judicial) to conduct the inquiry in terms of Rule 12 of the 2007
Rules on behalf of this Court, and accepted the findings made
therein. Seeing that the Registrar (Judicial) is a District Judge
serving on deputation at the Supreme Court, recourse to his or           G
her assistance in the form of collecting evidence and arriving at a
finding regarding the claim of juvenility of the person concerned
may be undertaken by this Court in order to save its judicial
time. However, it must be stressed that the findings in an inquiry
conducted by the Registrar (Judicial) would not per se prevail           H
20            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2019] 4 S.C.R.


A    upon a contrary view taken by the High Court. Only after this
     Court applies its judicial mind to such report with due regard to
     the confines of the procedure stipulated in Section 7A of the 2000
     Act and Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, and only if it thereafter
     confirms the findings in such report would the same prevail upon
     a contrary view taken by the High Court which is not based upon
B
     any such inquiry. [Para 17][27-A-D]
            4. It has been conclusively established that the date of
     birth of the Appellant was 12.07.1984 and as such he was aged 16
     years, 2 months and 2 days at the time of commission of the offence
     dated 14.09.2000. In such circumstances, there is no doubt that
C    the inquiry conducted by the Registrar (Judicial) upon the direction
     of this Court in the instant matter amounts to an inquiry conducted
     by this Court itself, and is conclusive proof of the age of the
     Appellant as provided in Rule 12(3) of the 2007 Rules. As the
     Appellant satisfies the requirement of Sections 2(k) and 2(l) of
D    the 2000 Act, the said Act is applicable to him in full force in light
     of Section 7A and Section 20. Therefore, criminal appeal hereby
     stands allowed and the order of the High Court affirming the
     conviction and sentence of the Appellant under Section 376(2)(g)
     of the IPC is set aside.[Paras 24 and 25][29-G, H; 30-A, B]
E          Murari Thakur v. State of Bihar (2009) 16 SCC 256 :
           [2006] 10 Suppl. SCR 988; Dharambir v. State (NCT
           of Delhi) (2010) 5 SCC 344 : [2010] 5 SCR 137;
           Jitendra Singh @ Babboo Singh v. State of U.P. (2010)
           13 SCC 523 : [2010] 13 SCR 879; Hari Ram v. State of
           Rajasthan (2009) 13 SCC 211 : [2009] 7 SCR 623;
F          Mohan Mali v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2010) 6 SCC
           669 : [2010] SCR 373; Daya Nand v. State of Haryana
           (2011) 2 SCC 224 : [2011] 1 SCR 173; Jitendra Singh
           @ Babboo Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2013) 11
           SCC 193: Abuzar Hossain v. State of West Bengal (2012)
G          10 SCC 489 : [2012] 9 SCR 244; Abdul Razzaq v. State
           of Uttar Pradesh (2015) 15 SCC 637 – referred to.
                             Case Law Reference
           [2006] 10 Suppl. SCR 988          referred to     Para 4
           [2010] 5 SCR 137                  referred to     Para 4
H
                RAJU v. THE STATE OF HARYANA                                  21


      [2010] 13 SCR 879                    referred to      Para 4            A
      [2009] 7 SCR 623                     referred to      Para 9
      [2010] SCR 373                       referred to      Para 9
      [2011] 1 SCR 173                     referred to      Para 9
      (2013) 11 SCC 193                    referred to      Para 9            B
      (2012) 9 SCR 244                     referred to      Para 9
      (2015) 15 SCC 637                    referred to      Para 9
      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1175 of 2014.                                                                 C
      From the Judgment and Order dated 24.08.2011 of the High Court
of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No. 1830-SB
of 2003.
       Siddhartha Dave, (Amicus Curiae), Ms. Jemtiben A.O., Advs.
for the Appellant.                                                            D

     Ms. Bina Madhavan, Dr. Monika Gusain, Advs. for the
Respondent.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
       MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J. 1. This appeal is                          E
directed against the final judgment and order dated 24.08.2011 passed
by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal
Appeal No. 1830-SB of 2003, by which the High Court dismissed the
appeal filed by the Appellant herein challenging the judgment of conviction
under Section 376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) dated 08.11.2002       F
and order of sentence dated 11.11.2002 rendered by the Additional
Sessions Judge, Gurgaon, in Sessions Case No. 5/2001.
       2. The brief facts leading to the instant appeal are that an FIR
was lodged against the Appellant Raju s/o Rajendar Singh, and two other
persons, viz. Raju s/o Bhim and Raja @ Raj Kumar s/o Makhsi, alleging
                                                                              G
that the three persons had intercepted the prosecutrix when she was
passing by some fields along with her one-year-old brother and had taken
her to a field nearby, whereupon Raju s/o Bhim and Raja @ Raj Kumar
s/o Makhsi engaged in the gang-rape of the prosecutrix, while the
Appellant stood outside the field. The prosecutrix was aged fifteen years
                                                                              H
22             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2019] 4 S.C.R.


A    at the time of the incident, which occurred on 14.09.2000. The three
     accused were convicted for the offence punishable under Section
     376(2)(g) of the IPC, and sentenced to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonment
     and a fine of Rs. 500/-, and further two months’ rigorous imprisonment
     in default of payment of fine. Aggrieved by the same, the three accused
     appealed to the High Court.
B
            3. The Appellant, inter alia, raised the defence before the High
     Court that he was aged less than 18 years at the time of commission of
     the offence, i.e. 14.09.2000, and hence was entitled to the benefit of the
     provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,
     2000 (in short, “the 2000 Act”). The High Court, however, rejected such
C    contention and affirmed the conviction of the three accused, including
     the Appellant.
            4. Aggrieved by the above judgment, the Appellant filed the instant
     appeal, inter alia raising the plea of juvenility again. The Appellant relied
     upon a transfer certificate issued in his favour by the Dayanand Middle
D    School, Sohna, Gurgaon which showed his date of birth to be 12.07.1984.
     He also relied upon a certificate issued by the Government Senior
     Secondary School (Boys), Sohna which showed his date of birth to be
     the same. It was submitted by the Appellant before this Court that the
     certificates in question prima facie entitled him to claim the conduct of
E    an inquiry in terms of Section 7A of the 2000 Act. The Appellant referred
     to the decisions of this Court in Murari Thakur v. State of Bihar, (2009)
     16 SCC 256, Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 5 SCC 344,
     and Jitendra Singh @ Babboo Singh v. State of U.P., (2010) 13 SCC
     523.

F          5. Keeping in mind such circumstances and the certificates relied
     upon, this Court vide order dated 09.08.2012 directed the Registrar
     (Judicial) of this Court to conduct an inquiry in respect of the age of the
     Appellant in terms of Section 7A of the 2000 Act read with the rules
     framed thereunder, and to submit a report to this Court within four months
     from the order.
G
           6. This Court received such report on 07.01.2013, which
     determined that the age of the Appellant was 16 years, 2 months and 2
     days at the time of commission of the offence and that he was thus a
     juvenile at that time. Thereafter, arguments were heard and judgement
     reserved. However, subsequently, the State raised the argument that the
H
                RAJU v. THE STATE OF HARYANA                                        23
               [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.]

Court had not looked into the question of whether the plea of juvenility            A
as decided by the Registry of this Court should be given precedence
over the view of the High Court. By an order dated 25.04.2014, this
Court directed that the appeal be heard further. Shri Siddhartha Dave
was subsequently appointed as amicus curiae to assist the Court.
       7. It was submitted by the learned amicus curiae that the learned            B
Registrar (Judicial) of this Court had, after duly calling for records and
appreciating the material adduced, reached the conclusion that the
Appellant was a juvenile at the time of commission of the offence, and
there was no reason to deny the Appellant the benefit of such finding.
Moreover, he submitted that seeing that it was upon the direction of this
Court that the learned Registrar had conducted the inquiry under Section            C
7A of the 2000 Act and the rules framed thereunder, and had submitted
his report to this Court after conducting such inquiry in accordance with
law, the report may be treated as having been made by this Court itself.
      8. Heard the learned amicus curiae and advocate for the State,
and perused the material on record.                                                 D

       9. It is by now well-settled, as was held in Hari Ram v. State of
Rajasthan, (2009) 13 SCC 211, that in light of Sections 2(k), 2(l), 7A
read with Section 20 of the 2000 Act as amended in 2006, a juvenile who
had not completed eighteen years on the date of commission of the
offence is entitled to the benefit of the 2000 Act (also see Mohan Mali             E
v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 6 SCC 669; Daya Nand v. State
of Haryana, (2011) 2 SCC 224; Dharambir v. State (NCT) of Delhi
(supra); Jitendra Singh @ Babboo Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh,
(2013) 11 SCC 193). It is equally well-settled that the claim of juvenility
can be raised at any stage before any Court by an accused, including                F
this Court, even after the final disposal of a case, in terms of Section 7A
of the 2000 Act (see Dharambir v. State (NCT) of Delhi, (supra),
Abuzar Hossain v. State of West Bengal, (2012) 10 SCC 489; Jitendra
Singh @ Babboo Singh v. State of UP, (supra); Abdul Razzaq v. State
of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 15 SCC 637).
                                                                                    G
       10. In light of the above legal position, it is evident that the Appellant
would be entitled to the benefit of the 2000 Act if his age is determined
to be below 18 years on the date of commission of the offence. Moreover,
it would be irrelevant that the plea of juvenility was not raised before the
Trial Court, in light of Section 7A. As per the report of the inquiry
                                                                                    H
24            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                           [2019] 4 S.C.R.


A    conducted by the Registrar (Judicial) of this Court, in this case, the
     Appellant was below 18 years of age on the date of commission of the
     offence. The only question before us that needs to be determined is
     whether such report may be given precedence over the contrary view
     taken by the High Court, so that the benefit of the 2000 Act may be
     given to the Appellant.
B
           11. Before proceeding further, it would be useful to refer to Section
     7A of the 2000 Act and Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and
     Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (in short, “the 2007 Rules”), which
     deal with the making of an inquiry by the Court in case of a claim of
     juvenility. Section 7A of the 2000 Act is as follows:
C
           “7A. Procedure to be followed when claim of juvenility is
     raised before any court—
           (1) Whenever a claim of juvenility is raised before any court or a
           court is of the opinion that an accused person was a juvenile on
D          the date of commission of the offence, the court shall make an
           inquiry, take such evidence as may be necessary (but not an
           affidavit) so as to determine the age of such person, and shall
           record a finding whether the person is a juvenile or a child or not,
           stating his age as nearly as may be:

E          Provided that a claim of juvenility may be raised before any court
           and it shall be recognised at any stage, even after final disposal of
           the case, and such claim shall be determined in terms of the
           provisions contained in this Act and the rules made thereunder,
           even if the juvenile has ceased to be so on or before the date of
           commencement of this Act.
F
           (2) If the court finds a person to be a juvenile on the date of
           commission of the offence under sub-section (1), it shall forward
           the juvenile to the Board for passing appropriate orders and the
           sentence, if any, passed by a court shall be deemed to have no
           effect.”
G
                                                          (emphasis supplied)
           12. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules states the following
     regarding the procedure to be followed for age determination:
           “In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with law,
H          the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the court or
               RAJU v. THE STATE OF HARYANA                                      25
              [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.]

       the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking                A
       evidence by obtaining –
       (a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available;
       and in the absence whereof;
       (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play
       school) first attended; and in the absence whereof;                       B

       (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal
       authority or a panchayat;
       (b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause (a)
       above, the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted         C
       Medical Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or child.
       In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or
       the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for the reasons
       to be recorded by them, may, if considered necessary, give benefit
       to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side
       within the margin of one year,                                            D
       and while passing orders in such case shall, after taking into
       consideration such evidence as may be available, or the medical
       opinion, as the case may be, record a finding in respect of his age
       and either of the evidence specified in any of the clauses (a)(i),
       (ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the            E
       conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or the juvenile in
       conflict with law.”
                                                       (emphasis supplied)
       13. It is evident from a perusal of the above that if any Court,
                                                                                 F
including this Court, is of the opinion that an accused person was a
juvenile on the date of commission of the offence, or if a claim of juvenility
is raised before it, the Court must conduct an inquiry regarding the
determination of the age of the accused. The evidence collected by way
of such inquiry, as is specified in clauses (a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of Rule
12(3), or in the absence whereof, clause (b) of the same, is treated as          G
conclusive proof of the age of the accused. In such a situation, it would
be clear that such an inquiry conducted by this Court would be given
precedence over a view of the age of the accused taken by the High
Court. It is relevant to note here itself that in this case, the High Court
decided the issue merely upon an assessment of the material on record
                                                                                 H
26             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2019] 4 S.C.R.


A    without resorting to the procedure governing inquiries for the
     determination of age as laid out in Section 7A of the 2000 Act and Rule
     12 of the 2007 Rules.
            14. At this point, it is necessary to briefly discuss the findings of
     the High Court in the impugned judgment regarding the age of the accused
B    to underscore that it has not conducted the inquiry stipulated as per
     Section 7A and Rule 12. Before the High Court, the Appellant submitted
     a report of the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Bhondsi, Gurgaon to
     the effect that his date of birth was 12.07.1984, thereby claiming the
     benefit of the 2000 Act. This plea was rejected on the grounds of failure
     to raise the plea of juvenility before the Trial court; non-production of
C    birth certificate in spite of an opportunity being granted to do so; absence
     of the Appellant’s name in the birth register dated 12.07.1984 and for
     the years 1983-84 and 1984-85; non-corroboration of the date of birth
     certificates issued by schools attended by the Appellant through other
     documentary evidence; non-matching of the name on such certificates
D    (Raj Kumar) with the name of the Appellant as brought on record (Raju);
     and non-corroboration of the address of the Appellant through such
     certificates, which simply stated that the date of birth of the student
     named Raj Kumar was 12.07.1984.
            15. The High Court evidently did not even frame its discussion in
E    terms of whether the evidence brought on record was sufficient to
     conduct an inquiry under the 2000 Act and the 2007 Rules, let alone
     order and conduct such an inquiry. On the contrary, it simply recorded
     that the evidence did not go to show that the Appellant was a juvenile at
     the time of the commission of the offence, and proceeded to affirm the
     conviction of the Appellant on merits.
F
            16. Therefore, it is evident that the only inquiry as stipulated under
     the 2000 Act and the 2007 Rules was conducted by the Registrar (Judicial)
     upon the directions of this Court, after the Court was satisfied upon
     going through the school certificates adduced by the Appellant that the
     certificates in question prima facie entitled him to claim the conduct of
G    such an inquiry. In such a situation, the question regarding whether
     precedence may be given to the inquiry of a Registrar (Judicial) of this
     Court over the opinion of the High Court regarding the age of an accused
     can be restated as whether such inquiry conducted by the Registrar
     (Judicial) upon the direction of this Court, if thereafter affirmed by this
H    Court, would amount to an inquiry conducted by this Court itself. If this
               RAJU v. THE STATE OF HARYANA                                    27
              [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.]

be the case, the findings of such inquiry would prevail over the view          A
taken by the High Court, as is evident from the preceding discussion.
        17. We are of the opinion that the above question must be answered
in the affirmative. This Court, on previous occasions as well, has adopted
the practice of directing the Registrar (Judicial) to conduct the inquiry in
terms of Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules on behalf of this Court, and accepted       B
the findings made therein (see Dharambir v. State (NCT) of Delhi,
(supra). Seeing that the Registrar (Judicial) is a District Judge serving
on deputation at the Supreme Court, recourse to his or her assistance in
the form of collecting evidence and arriving at a finding regarding the
claim of juvenility of the person concerned may be undertaken by this
Court in order to save its judicial time. However, it must be stressed that    C
the findings in an inquiry conducted by the Registrar (Judicial) would not
per se prevail upon a contrary view taken by the High Court. Only after
this Court applies its judicial mind to such report with due regard to the
confines of the procedure stipulated in Section 7A of the 2000 Act and
Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, and only if it thereafter confirms the findings     D
in such report would the same prevail upon a contrary view taken by the
High Court which is not based upon any such inquiry.
       18. We may now undertake to consider the findings in the report
submitted by the Registrar (Judicial). As already noted, as per the report,
the age of the Appellant was 16 years, 2 months and 2 days at the time         E
of commission of the offence and he was thus a juvenile at that time. In
the said report, the learned Registrar referred to the original Transfer
Certificate in Hindi issued by the Headmaster, Dayanand Arya Middle
School, Sohna dated 24.03.2012 and the Transfer Certificate issued by
the Principal, Government Senior Secondary School (Boys), Sohna dated
12.12.2000. These certificates contain the official seal of the respective     F
schools and the signatures of the respective authorities, and state the
name of the student as Raj Kumar, son of Rajendar Singh, and record
his date of birth as 12.07.1984. A certificate dated 07.12.2010 was also
issued by the Principal of the Government Senior Secondary School
(Boys), Sohna, verifying that the student named Raj Kumar, son of              G
Rajendar Singh, used to study at the school, and that the school records
reflected his date of birth as 12.07.1984 and the name of his mother as
Smt. Sarla Devi.
       19. The learned Registrar also duly corroborated the contents of
these certificates by referring to other school records and also examined      H
28             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2019] 4 S.C.R.


A    witnesses. With respect to the Dayanand Arya Middle School, Sohna,
     the learned Registrar examined Mr. Suresh Chand, Teacher, appearing
     under the directions of the School Headmaster, who confirmed that the
     Transfer Certificate dated 24.03.2012 was bona fide and issued under
     the signature of the then Principal. The Registrar also verified the
     certificate by comparing it with the office copy of the same in the School
B
     Leaving Certificate Register produced before him. The original Admission
     and Withdrawal Register of the school was also examined, which also
     recorded the Appellant’s date of birth as 12.07.1984, and stated that he
     was admitted in the school on 23.07.1992 and withdrew on 310.3.1996
     after passing Class V.
C           20. With respect to the Government Senior Secondary School
     (Boys), Sohna, the learned Registrar also called for the school records,
     which were produced through Mrs. Nirmal Kalra, Teacher, under the
     instructions of the Principal of the school. She too affirmed that the
     Transfer Certificate dated 12.12.2000 was bona fide, and issued under
D    the signature of the then Principal. She affirmed having compared the
     entries in the certificate with the corresponding entries in the relevant
     register of the school, copies of which had been submitted to the learned
     Registrar. The following details with respect to the Appellant’s period of
     study in the school were also affirmed by Mrs. Kalra on affidavit:
E        S.    Admission    Date         of Date          of Reasons      for
         No.   No.          Admission       Striking Off     Striking Off the
                                                             Name
         1.    14163        7.5.1996    (in 19.4.1997 (in Non-payment of
                            Class VI)       Class VII)       School Funds
         2.    14678        17.5.1997 (in March 1999 (in Failed in Class
F                           Class VII)      Class VIII)      VIII      Board
                                                             Examination
         3.    15546        7.7.1999    (in 7.8.1999     (in Continued
                            Class VIII)     Class VIII)      absence
             21. The learned Registrar concluded that the school transfer
G    certificates dated 24.03.2012 and 12.12.2000, read along with the relevant
     entries of school registers of the respective schools, were admissible as
     evidence under Rule 12(3)(a)(ii) of the 2007 Rules, i.e., they were found
     to be in the nature of the “date of birth certificate from the school
     (other than a play school) first attended” as specified in the said
     clause, and thus accepted the Appellant’s claim of juvenility. It was also
H
               RAJU v. THE STATE OF HARYANA                                     29
              [MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.]

found that the certificates contained the name of the Appellant as Raj          A
Kumar, son of Rajendar Singh, born on 12.07.1984. This name was found
to be the full name of the Appellant and the name Raju appearing on the
SLP record taken to be an alias, as affirmed by both his parents by way
of separate affidavits.
        22. In our opinion, the learned Registrar has duly affirmed the         B
veracity and bona fide nature of the certificates adduced by the schools
attended by the Appellant. At the same time, since Rule 12(3)(a)(ii)
specifically mentions that the certificate showing the date of birth of the
person shall be from the school first attended (other than a play school),
we find that the certificate issued and school records maintained by the
Dayanand Arya Middle School, Sohna, where the Appellant studied for             C
four years till class V, as duly affirmed through the examination of a
witness from such school, is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of clause
(a)(ii) of Rule 12(3). Of course, it goes without saying that the certificate
issued by the Government Senior Secondary School (Boys), Sohna and
the accompanying school records serve to corroborate the veracity of            D
the records furnished by the former school. It would not be out of place
to highlight here that the findings in the inquiry report have also not been
controverted by the State.
       23. We are also conscious of the limitation envisaged under Section
7A of the 2000 Act that the evidence adduced with respect to the age of         E
the accused cannot be in the form of mere affidavits. Due to this reason,
the reliance of the learned Registrar upon affidavits to conclude that the
name used in the certificates placed on record (i.e. Raj Kumar) is the
full name of the Appellant and the name Raju is merely an alias is not
tenable in our view. However, we find that there is sufficient evidence
on record in the form of the appearance of the name of the father of the        F
Appellant on the certificate dated 24.03.2012 issued by the Dayanand
Arya Middle School, Sohna, to indicate that the name Raj Kumar
appearing on such certificate was the full name of the Appellant.
       24. In light of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that it
has been conclusively established that the date of birth of the Appellant       G
was 12.07.1984 and as such he was aged 16 years, 2 months and 2 days
at the time of commission of the offence dated 14.09.2000. In such
circumstances, we do not have any doubt that the inquiry conducted by
the Registrar (Judicial) upon the direction of this Court in the instant
matter amounts to an inquiry conducted by this Court itself, and is             H
30                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                       [2019] 4 S.C.R.


A    conclusive proof of the age of the Appellant as provided in Rule 12(3) of
     the 2007 Rules. As the Appellant satisfies the requirement of Sections
     2(k) and 2(l) of the 2000 Act, the said Act is applicable to him in full
     force in light of Section 7A and Section 20.
            25. Criminal Appeal hereby stands allowed and the order of the
B    High Court affirming the conviction and sentence of the Appellant under
     Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC is set aside. Seeing that the Appellant has
     already spent 6 years in imprisonment, whereas the maximum period for
     which a juvenile may be sent to a special home is only 3 years as per
     Section 15(1)(g) of the 2000 Act, and since the Appellant has already
     been enlarged on bail by virtue of the order of the Court dated 09.05.2014,
C    he need not be taken into custody. His bail bonds stand discharged and
     all proceedings against him, so far as they relate to the present case,
     stand terminated.
           26. Before we part with this matter, we would like to place on
     record our appreciation for the valuable assistance rendered to this Court
D    by Shri Siddhartha Dave, the learned amicus curiae in this matter.


     Ankit Gyan                                                   Appeal allowed.



E




F




G




H