RAJU @ BALACHANDRAN & ORS.versusSTATE OF TAMIL NADU

                   [2012) 11 S.C.R. 109

           RAJU @ BALACHANDRAN & ORS.                          A
                            v.
                 STATE OF TAMIL NADU
           (Criminal Appeal No. 1614 of 2009)
                  NOVEMBER 27, 2012
                                                               B
  [SWATANTER KUMAR AND MADAN B. LOKUR, JJ.]

     Penal Code, 1860- ss.302, 326 and 341 and s.302 rlw
s.34 - Homicidal attack on the brother and mother of PW5
leading to their death - Testimony of PW5 - Conviction of C
appellants by Courts beiow on that basis - Challenge to -
Held: PW5's description of the events was simple and
straightforward and the cross-examination did not demolish
his version of the events - Facts evident from record lead to
the clear conclusion that PW5 was present at the place of D
occurrence and was an eye witness to the incident - His
testimony supported in its essential details by testimony of
the other witnesses - Evidence of PW5 credible
notwithstanding that he was a related and interested witness
- Conclusion anived at, by the Courts below not shown to be E
perverse nor shown to be deserving reversal - Conviction of
appellants accordingly upheld.

     Witness - Evidence of related and interested witness
having enmity with the accused - Appreciation of - Held: A F
court should examine the evidence of such a witness with
greater care and caution than the evidence of a third party
disinterested and unrelated witness - Where the related and
interested witness may have some enmity with the assailant,
the bar would need to be raised and the evidence of the
witness would have to be examined by applying a standard G
of discerning scrutiny - However, this is only a rule of
                                                            /
prudence and not one of law.

    Witness - Different categories of witnesses - 1) A third
                           109                                 H
    110      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2012] 11 S.C.R.


A party disinterested and unrelated witness (such as a bystander
  or passer-by); 2) a third party interested witness (such as a
  trap witness); 3) a related and therefore an interested witness
  (such as the wife of the victim) having an interest in seeing
  that the accused is punished; and 4) a related and therefore
B an interested witness (such as the wife or brother of the victim)
  having an interest in seeing the accused punished and also
  having some enmity with the accused.

       The brother and. mother of PWS were victims of a
C homicidal attack. PW5's brother died on the spot while
  his mother was grievously injured and died
  subsequently. The trial Court and the High Court
  believing the testimony of PW-5 held that his brother and
  mother were murdered by the appellants and convicted
  them. Appellant no.1 was convicted under Sections 302,
D 341 and 326. The other two appellants were convicted
  under Section 302 r/w Section 34 IPC.

       In the instant appeal, two contentions were advanced
  by the appellants .:firstly, that since PW-5 was a related
E and interested witness, his evidence must be closely
  scrutinized, and if his testimony is put to close scrutiny,
  it will be quite clear that he ought not to be believed and
  secondly, that the prosecution case was doubtful since
  there was no evidence except the unreliable testimony of
F PW-5.
          Dismissing the appeal, the Court

       HELD: 1.1. For the time being, this Court is
  concerned with four categories of witnesses - a third .
G party disinterested and unrelated witness (such as a
  bystander or passer-by); a third party interested witness
  (such as a trap witness); a related and therefore an
  interested witness (such as the wife of the victim) having
  an interest in seeing that the accused is punished; a
H related and therefore an interested witness (such as the
 RAJU @ BALACHANDRAN & ORS. v. STATE OF               111
              TAMIL NADU
wife or brother of the victim) having an interest in seeing A
the accused punished and also having some enmity with
the accused. But, more than the categorization of a
witness, the issue really is one of appreciation of the
evidence of a witness. A court should examine the
evidence of a related and interested witness having an B
interest in seeing the accused punished and also having
some enmity with the accused with greater care and
caution than the evidence of a third party disinterested
and unrelated witness. This is all that is expected and
 required. [Para 33] [121-B-D]                              c
    1.2. In the present case, PW5 is not only a related
and interested witness, but also someone who has an
enmity with the appellants. His evidence, therefore,
needs to be scrutinized with great care and caution. [Para
34] [121-E]                                                  D

    1.3. The evidence of a related or interested witness
should be meticulously and carefully examined. In a case
where the related and interested witness may have some
enmity with the assailant, the bar would need to be raised   E
and the evidence of the witness would have to be
examined by applying a standard of discerning scrutiny.
However, this is only a rule of prudence and not one of
law. [Para 38] [124-C-D]

     1.4. On going through the evidence of PW-5 by F
applying the discerning scrutiny standard, it is difficult
to overturn the view expressed by both the Courts in
their acceptance of his evidence. His description of the
events is simple and straightforward and the cross-
examination does not demolish his version of the events. G
In fact, the cross-examination is directed more at proving
that one 'S' may have been the assailant since the
brother of PW5 had an illicit relationship with S's first
wife. This was ruled out by PW-5 who did not want to
                                                             H
    112     SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2012] 11 S.C.R.


A   shield the real assailant and put the blame for the
    occurrence on someone else. [Para 39] [124-F-H]

       1.5. Both the Trial Court and the High Court have
  concurrently held that PW-5 was an eye witness to the
B murder of his brother and mother. The conclusion arrived
  at by both the Courts has not been shown to be perverse
  in any manner whatsoever nor has it been shown
  deserving of reversal. [Para 40] [125-A-B]

        1.6. The presence of PW-5 at the place of occurrence
C cannot be doubted in view of the FIR lodged by PW-1 and
  his testimony. Even though PW-1 may have turned
  hostile, the fact remains that a report was made to the
  police about the homicidal attack on the brother and
  mother of PWS. That there was a homicidal attack on
D them is not in dispute. This is confirmed even by the
  witnesses who turned hostile. It is also not in dispute that
  the brother of PW5 died on the spot and that PW5's
  mother was grievously injured. This too is confirmed by
  the witnesses who turned hostile. That PW-5 took his
E mother to the hospital immediately after she was attacked
  is confirmed by PW-1. On the basis of these facts, which
  are evident from the record, there is no option but to
  accept the conclusion of both the Courts that PW-5 was
  present at the place of occurrence and was an eye
F witnl!SS to the incident. His testimony is not unreliable
  and is supported in its essential details by the testimony
  of the other witnesses. [Para 41] [125-C-F]
      1.7. The evidence of PW-5 is found to be credible
  notwithstanding that he was a related and interested
G witness. Accordingly, the conviction and sentence
  awarded to the appellants by the Tria~ Court and
  confirmed by the High Court is upheld. [Para 42] [124-G]

     State of Rajasthan v. Kalki (1981) 2 SCC 752: 1981 (3)
H SCR 504 - doubted.
  RAJU @ BALACHANDRAN & ORS. v. STATE OF               113
               TAMIL NADU

    Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab 1954 SCR 145 and          A
Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab (1976) 4 SCC 369 - relied
on.

     State of Bihar v. Basawan Singh AIR 1958 SC 500: 1959
SCR 195; Darya Singh v. State of Punjab (1964) 3 SCR 397;    B
Waman v. State of Maharashtra (2011) 7 SCC 295: 2011 (6)
SCR 1072; Ba/raje v. State of Maharashtra (2010) 6 SCC
673: 2010 (6) SCR 764; Prah/ad Patel v. State of Madhya
Pradesh (2011) 4 SCC 262: 2011 (3) SCR 471; lsrar v. State
of Uttar Pradesh (2005) 9 SCC 616: 2004 (6) Suppl. SCR
695; S. Sudershan Reddy v. State of Andhra Prades~ (2006)
                                                             c
10 SCC 163: 2006 (3) Suppl. SCR 743; State of Uttar
Pradesh v. Naresh (2011) 4 SCC 324: 2011 (4) SCR 1176;
Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab (2009) 9 SCC 719: 2009
(13) SCR 774 and Vishnu v. State of Rajasthan (2009) 10
sec 477 - referred to.                                       D

                     Case Law Reference:
  1981 (3) SCR 504           doubted         Para 30
  1959 SCR 195               referred to     Para 31         E
  1954 SCR 145               relied on       Paras 35, 38
  (1964) 3 SCR 397           referred to     Para 36
  2011 (6) SCR 1072          referred to     Para 37
                                                             F
  (1976) 4 sec 369           relied on       Para 38
  2010 (6) SCR 764           referred to     Para 37

  2011 (3) SCR 471           referred to     Para 37
                                                             G
  2004 (6) Suppl. SCR 695 referred to        Para 37

  2006 (3) Suppl. SCR 743 referred to        Para 37

  2011 (4) SCR 1176          referred to     Para 37
                                                             H
    114       SUPREME COURT REPORTS              (2012] 11 S.C.R.


A     2009 (13) SCR 774            referred to      Para 37
      (2009) 10 sec 477            referred to      Para 37
        CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
    No. 1614 of 2009.
B
        From the Judgment & Order dated 02.8.2006 of the High
    Court of Judicature of Madras at Madurai in Criminal Appeal
    No. 4 of 2005.

          R.V. Kameshwaran for the Appellants.
c
          M. Yogesh Kanna for the Respondent.

          The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

       MADAN B. LOKUR, J. 1. The issue before us is whether
D the Trial Court and the High Court were both right in believing
  the testimony of PW-5 Srinivasan, a related and interested
  witness, that his brother Veerappan and his mother Marudayi
  were murdered by the appellants. Whether such an issue is of
  such public importance that it requires a decision from this
E Court is moot. But, be that as it may, we find no reason to
  disbelieve the witness and agree with both the Courts that his
  evidence should be accepted.

         2. Accordingly, we uphold the conviction and sentence of
F   the appellants for having committed the murder of Veerappan
    and Marudayi.

    The facts:
      3. Appellant No. 1 (Raju @ Balachandran) is the father of
G appellant No. 2 (Rajkumar) and of appellant No. 3 (Sekar).
          4. The case of the prosecution was that there was some
    enmity between the appellants and Veerappan relating to a
    ritual called "Mandu Vettal" performed before worshipping God
H
  RAJU @ BALACHANDRAN & ORS. v. STATE OF                    115
       TAMIL NADU [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]
in their village. The enmity dated back to about 4 or 5 years       A
prior to the incident that we are concerned with.

    5. On 4th May 2003 at about 5.30 a.m. Veerappan had
gone to the tea shop of PW-7 Kamaraj and was returning along
with PW-1 Thangavel and PW-5 Srinivasan (brother of
                                                                    8
Veerappan) who were following him. As Veerappan
approached his house, the appellants stopped him in the
middle of the road and attacked him. Raju dealt a sickle blow
on his right leg below the knee. This was followed by sickle
blows inflicted on his shoulder, neck and head by Raj Kumar
and Sekar. Veerappan died instantaneously, his head having          C
almost been severed from the body.

      6. On hearing some shouting, Veerappan's mother
Marudayi came out of her house. When she saw what was
happening, she came to rescue Veerappan and confront the            D
appellants. At that time, Raju dealt her blows with his sickle on
her neck, shoulder and head. Marudayi succumbed to her
injuries a short while later en route to the hospital, where she
was being taken by PW-5 Srinivasan.
                                                                    E
     7. A First Information Report (FIR) of the incident was
lodged by PW-1 Thangavel and thereafter investigations were
started by the police.

     8. According to the prosecution PW-1 Thangavel and PW-
5 Srinivasan were eye witnesses to the incident. Also, when         F
the attack on Veerappan and Marud3yi took place, PW-2 Smt.
Thangammal (wife of Srinivasan), PW-3 Rajagopal and PW-4
Smt. T. Vasugi came out of their house and witnessed the
incident.
                                                                    G
      9. The appellants fled 'away after attacking Veerappan and
Marudayi. Later on they surrendered in the local Court. When
the investigating officer came to know of this, he sought their
custody by moving an application in the Court. He was granted
c::ustody of the appellants on 14th May 2003. According to the      H
    116      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               (2012) 11 S.C.R.

A prosecution, their confessional statement led to the recovery of
  the sickles used in the attack on the deceased. The clothes
  worn by the appellants were also recovered.

       10. On the conclusion of investigations, a challan was filed
  alleging that the appellants had murdered Veerappan and
8
  Marudayi. In Sessions Case No.76/2004 before the Additional
  District & Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court), Tiruchirapally, the
  appellants pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. The prosecution
  examined seventeen witnesses while the defence examined two
  witnesses.
c
    Decision of the Trial Court:

        11. During the trial, PW-1 Thangavel, the author of the FIR,
  PW-3 Rajagopal and PW-4 Smt. Vasugi turned hostile. The
D Trial Judge was of the view that PW-2 Smt. Thangammal and
  PW-5 Srinivasan were eye witnesses and believed the
  testimony of PW-2 Smt. Thangammal (in part) and that of PW-
  5 Srinivasan (in full).

        12. The Trial Judge held that PW-2 Smt. Thangammal
E generally stated that all the appellants caused injuries to the
  deceased without being specific. Consequently, her testimony
  relating to the sickle blows was not accepted.

        13. As regards PW-5 Srinivasan, it was held that he was
F specific in saying that Raju injured Veerappan with a sickle on
  the right leg below the knee, while the other two appellants
  injured him on his shoulder and neck. The nature of injuries was
  confirmed by the doctor PW-8 Dr. Sumathi Paul Raj. The
  evidence on record showed that Veerappan's head was almost
G severed from his body and his death was instantaneous. The
  Trial Judge also accepted the evidence of PW-5 Srinivasan that
  Marudayi was grievously injured by Raju on the head, neck and
  shoulder. Again, the nature of injuries was confirmed by the
  doctor PW-8 Dr. Sumathi Paul Raj who stated that Marudayi
H died as a result of the injuries.
  RAJU @ BALACHANDRAN & ORS. v. STATE OF                    117
       TAMIL NADU [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]
     14. The Trial Judge rejected the contention that since PW-    A
5 Srinivasan was the elder brother of Veerappan and son of
Marudayi, his evidence was that of an interested witness and
therefore should not be accepted. He also rejected the
contention that since the evidence of PW-5 Srinivasan was not
corroborated, his evidence should not be accepted.                 B
     15. PW-6 Marudai, father of Veerappan and husband of
Marudayi testified to the enmity between the parties as a result
of the ritual "Mandu Vettal".

      16. PW-7 Kamaraj the owner of the tea shop visited by        C
Veerappan also turned hostile. He denied that Veerappan was
followed by PW-1 Thangavel and PW-5 Srinivasan, but he did
not deny that Veerappan had visited his tea shop on the fateful
morning.
                                                                   D
     17. The other witnesses examined by the prosecution were
the doctors who conducted the post mortem, the officers who
investigated the occurrence and some others whose testimony
is not of much significance.
     18. The Trial Judge rejected the testimony of the two         E
defence witnesses as not credible. DW-1 Murugesan stated
that the appellants had come to his house on 3rd May 2003
and had stayed with DW-2 Smt. S. Vasantha. However, this
witness was not aware about when the appellants had come
to his house and after they left for the house of DW-2 Smt. S.     F
Vasantha when did they return.

      19. DW-2 Smt. S. Vasantha was not believed since she
stated that the appellants had gone to a temple festival in her
village but there was nothing to support this statement.           G

    20. Based principally on the evidence of PW-5 Srinivasan
and the recoveries made, the Trial Court, by its judgment and
order dated 26th November 2004 convicted Raju for offences
punishable under Section 341 of the Indian Penal Code (for
short 'IPC') and Section 3i6 of the IPC in respect ofVeerappan     H
    118      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 11 S.C.R.


A and Section 302 of the IPC for the murder of Marudayi.
  Rajkumar and Sekar were convicted of offences punishable
  under Section 302 of the IPC read with Section 34 thereof for
  the murder of Veerappan.

8 Decision of the High Court:
       21. In Criminal Appeal No.4/2005 filed by the appellants
  before the Madras High Court it was contended that since PW-
  1 Thangavel, PW-3 Rajagopal and PW-4 Sm!. Vasugi had
  turned hostile, there was no credible evidence against the
C appellants, more so, because the author of the FIR PW-1
  Thangavel had turned hostile. As such, the very basis of the
  case could not be relied upon.

       22. It was further submitted that the Trial Court had not fully
0 believed PW-2 Sm!. Thangammal and the only witness who
  came out in support of the case of the prosecution was PW-5
  Srinivasan. It was submitted that there were some
  discrepancies in his evidence and as per the FIR he was not
  present at the place of occurrence. Therefore, it was submitted,
E the evidence of PW-5 Srinivasan could not be relied upon.

        23. On the credibility of PW-5 Srinivasan, it was contended
  that the medical evidence did not match with his oral evidence
  and it would be unsafe to rely on his oral description of the
  events. In addition, it was submitted that since PW-5 Srinivasan
F was a related and interested witness, his testimony should be
  closely scrutinized and on such close scrutiny it would turn out
  that he was not a reliable witness.

       24. The High Court rejected all the contentions urged on
G behalf of the appellants. It was held that there was no doubt that
  Veerappan and Marudayi died as a result of homicidal
  violence. It was further held that on an examination of the
  evidence of PW-5 Srinivasan it could not be said that he was
  an unreliable witness. While there may have been some minor
H discrepancies in his description of the events, he was believed
  RAJU @ BALACHANDRAN & ORS. v. STATE OF                        119
       TAMIL NADU [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.)
by the Trial Judge and there was no reason for the High Court           A
to disbelieve him.

     25. The High Court noted that on a reading of the FIR it
was clear that PW-5 Srinivasan was present at the place of
occurrence. In addition thereto, the FIR also mentioned that PW-        8
1 Thangavel had asked PW-5 Srinivasan to take Marudayi to
the hospital for treatment. Consequently, the presence of PW-
5 Srinivasan at the place of occurrence could not be doubted.

     26. The High Court also held that there was some enmity
between the appellants and Veerappan and on an overview of              C
the entire case, the conviction handed down by the Trial Court
must be accepted.

    27. Accordingly, the High Court, by its judgment and order
dated 2nd August 2006 dismissed the appeal filed by the                 o
appellants.

Discussion:

     28. Before us, only two contentions were advanced by
learned counsel for the appellants. Firstly, it was contended that      E
since PW-5 Srinivasan was a related and interested witness,
his evidence must be closely scrutinized, and if his testimony
is put to close scrutiny, it will be quite clear that he ought not to
be believed. Secondly, it was contended that the prosecution
case was doubtful since there was no evidence except the                F
unreliable testimony of PW-5 Srinivasan.

     29. The first contention relates to the credibility of PW-5
Srinivasan. It was said in this regard that he was a related
witness being the elder brother of Veerappan and the son of
Marudayi both of whom were victims of the homicidal attack. It          G
was also said that he was an interested witness since
Veerappan (and therefore PW-5 Srinivasan) had some enmity
with the appellants. It was said that for both reasons, his
testimony lacks credibility.
                                                                        H
    120       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2012] 11 S.C.R.

A        30. What is the difference between a related witness and
    an interested witness? This has been brought out in State of
    Rajasthan v. Kafki, (1981) 2 SCC 752. It was held that:

          "True, it is, she is the wife of the deceased; but she cannot
B         be called an "interested" witness. She is related to the
          deceased. "Related" is not equivalent to "interested". A
          witness may be called "interested" only when he or she
          derives some benefit from the result of a litigation; in the
          decree in a civil case, or in seeing an accused person
          punished. A witness who is a natural one and is the only
c         possible eyewitness in the circumstances of a case cannot
          be said to be "interested"."

       31. In light of the Constitution Bench decision in State of
  Bihar v. Basawan Singh, AIR 1958 SC 500 the view that a
D "natural witness" or "the only possible eyewitness" cannot be
  an interested witness may not be, with respect, correct. In
  Basawan Singh, a trap witness (who would be a natural
  eyewitness) was considered an interested witness since he
  was "concerned in the success of the trap". The Constitution
E Bench held:

        "The correct Rule is this: if any of the witnesses are
        accomplices who are parliceps criminis in respect of the
        actual crime charged, their evidence must be treated as
        the evidence of accomplices is treated; if they are not
F       accomplices but are partisan or interested witnesses, who
        are concerned in the success of the trap, their evidence
        must be tested in the same way as other interested
        evidence is tested by the application of diverse
        considerations which must vary from case to case, and in
G       a proper case, the court may even look for independent
        corroboration before convicting the accused person."
       32. The wife of a deceased (as in Ka/k1), undoubtedly
  related to the victim, would be interested in seeing the accused
H person punished - in fact, she would be the most interested in
  RAJU @ BALACHANDRAN & ORS. v. STATE OF                    121
       TAMIL NADU [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]
seeing the accused person punished. It can hardly be said that      A
she is not an interested witness. The view expressed in Kalki
is too narrow and generalized and needs a rethink.

     33. For the time being, we are concerned with four
categories of witnesses - a third party disinterested and           8
unrelated witness (such as a bystander or passer-by); a third
party interested witness (such as a trap witness); a related and
therefore an interested witness (such as the wife of the victim)
having an interest in seeing that the accused is punished; a
related and therefore an interested witness (such as the wife       C
or brother of the victim) having an interest in seeing the
accused punished and also having some enmity with the
accused. But, more than the categorization of a witness, the
issue really is one of appreciation of the evidence of a witness.
A court ,should examine the evidence of a related and interested
witness having an interest in seeing the accused punished and       D
also having some enmity with the accused with greater care
and caution than the evidence of a third party disinterested and
unrelated witness. This is all that is expected and required.

     34. In the present case, PW-5 Srinivasan is not only a         E
related and interested witness, but also someone who has an
enmity with the appellants. His evidence, therefore, needs to
be scrutinized with great care and caution.

     35. In Dalip Singh v. State of Punjab, 1954 SCR 145 this
Court observed, without any generalization, that a related
                                                                    F
witness would ordinarily speak the truth, but in the case of an
enmity there may be a tendency to drag in an innocent person
as an accused - each case has to be considered on its own
facts. This is what this Court had to say:
                                                                    G
     "A witness is normally to be considered independent
     unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to
     be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has
     cause, such as enmity against the accused, to wish to
     implicate him falsely. Ordinarily, a close relative would be   H
    122        SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2012] 11 S.C.R.


A         the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an
          innocent person. It is true, when feelings run high and there
          is personal cause for enmity, that there is a tendency to
          drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a
          grudge along with the guilty, but foundation must be laid
B         for such a criticism and the mere fact of relationship far
          from being a foundation is often a sure guarantee of truth.
          However, we are not attempting any sweeping
          generalisation. Each case must be judged on its own facts.
          Our observations are only made to combat what is so often
c         put forward in cases before us as a general rule of
          prudence. There is no such general rule. Each case must
          be limited to and be governed by its own facts."

        36. ow the evidence of such a witness should be looked
  at was again considered in Darya Singh v. State of Punjab,
D (1964) 3 SCR 397. This Court was of the opinion that a related
  or interested witness may not be hostile to the assailant, but if
  he is, then his evidence must be examined very carefully and
  all the infirmities taken into account. It was observed that where
  the witness shares the hostility of the victim against the
E assailant, it would be unlikely that he would not name the real
  assailant but would substitute the real assailant with the "enemy"
  of the victim. This is what this Court said:

        "There can be no doubt that in a murder case when
F       evidence is given by near relatives of the victim and the
        murder is alleged to have been committed by the enemy
        of the family, criminal courts must examine the evidence
        of the interested witnesses, like the relatives of the victim,
        very carefully. But a person may be interested in the victim,
        being his relation or otherwise, and may not necessarily
G
        be hostile to the accused. In that case, the fact that the
        witness was related to the victim or was his friend, may
        not necessarily introduce any infirmity in his evidence. But
        where the witness is a close relation of the victim and is
        shown to share the victim's hostility to his assailant, that
H
 RAJU @ BALACHANDRAN & ORS. v. STATE OF                  123
      TAMIL NADU [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]
   naturally makes it necessary for the criminal courts A
   examine the evidence given by such witness very carefully
   and scrutinise all the infirmities in that evidence before
   deciding to act upon it. ....... [l]t may be relevant to
   remember that though the witness is hostile to the
   assailant, it is not likely that he would deliberately omit to B
   name the real assailant and substitute in his place the
   name of the enemy of the family out of malice. The desire
   to punish the victim would be so powerful in his mind that
   he would unhesitatingly name the real assailant and would
   not think of substituting in his place the enemy of the familyc
   though he was not concerned with the assault. It is not
   improbable that in giving evidence, such a witness may
   name the real assailant and may add other persons out
   of malice and enmity and that is a factor which has to be
   borne in mind in appreciating the evidence of interested 0
   witnesses. On principle, however, it is difficult to accept the
   plea that if a witness is shown to be a relative of the
    deceased and it is also shown that he shared the hostility
    of the victim towards the assailant, his evidence can never
    be accepted unless it is corroborated on material E
    particulars."

     37. More recently, in Waman v. State of Maharashtra,
(2011) 7 SCC 295 this Court dealt with the case of a related
witness (though not a witness inimical to the assailant) and
while referring to and relying upon Sarwan Singh v. State of     F
Punjab, (1976) 4 SCC 369, Balraje v. State of Maharashtra,
(2010) 6 SCC 673, Prahlad Patel v. State of Madhya
Pradesh, (2011) 4 SCC 262, /srar v. State of Uttar Pradesh,
(2005) 9 SCC 616, S. Sudershan Reddy v. State of Andhra
Pradesh, (2006) 10 SCC 163, State of Uttar Pradesh v.            G
Naresh, (2011) 4 SCC 324, Jamail Singh v. State of Punjab,
(2009) 9 SCC 719 and Vishnu v. State of Rajasthan, (2009)
10 sec 477 it was held:

    "It is clear that merely because the witnesses are related   H
    124       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2012) 11 S.C.R.

A         to the complainant or the deceased, their evidence cannot
          be thrown out. If their evidence is found to be consistent
          and true, the fact of being a relative cannot by itself discredit
          their evidence. In other words, the relationship is not a
          factor to affect the credibility of a witness and the courts
B         have to scrutinise their evidence meticulously with a little
          care."

       38. The sum and substance is that the evidence of a
  related or interested witness should be meticulously and
  carefully examined. In a case where the related and interested
C witness may have some enmity with the assailant, the bar would
  need to be raised and the evidence of the witness would have
  to be examined by applying a standard of discerning scrutiny.
  However, this is only a rule of prudence and not one of law, as
  held in Da/ip Singh and pithily reiterated in Sarwan Singh in
D the following words:

          "The evidence of an interested witness does not suffer from
          any infirmity as such, but the courts require as a rule of
          prudence, not as a rule of law, that the evidence of such
E         witnesses should be scrutinised with a little care. Once that
          approach is made and the court is satisfied that the
          evidence of interested witnesses have a ring of truth such
          evidence could be relied upon even without corroboration."

         39. We have gone through the evidence of PW-5
F Srinivasan by applying the discerning scrutiny standard and find
  it difficult to overturn the view expressed by both the Courts in
  their acceptance of his evidence. His description of the events
  is simple and straightforward and the cross-examination does
  not demolish his version of the events. In fact, the cross-
G examination is directed more at proving that one Subramaniam
  may have been the assailant since Veerappan had an illicit
  relationship with Subramaniam's first wife Periammal. This was
  ruled out by PW-5 Srinivasan who did not want to shield the
  real assailant and put the blame for the occurrence on someone
H else.
  RAJU @ BALACHANDRAN & ORS. v. STATE OF                    125
       TAMIL NADU [MADAN B. LOKUR, J.]

     40. As far as the second contention is concerned, it           A
overlaps with the first. Both the Trial Court and the High Court
have concurrently held that PW-5 Srinivasan was an eye
witness to the murder of Veerappan and Marudayi. The
conclusion arrived at by both the Courts has not been shown
to be perverse in any manner whatsoever nor has it been shown       B
deserving of reversal.

     41. The presence of PW-5 Srinivasan at the place of
occurrence cannot be doubted in view of the FIR lodged by
PW-1 Thangavel and his testimony. Even though PW-1
Thangavel may have turned hostile, the fact remains that a report   C
was made to the police about the homicidal attack on
Veerappan and Marudayi. That there was a homicidal attack
on them is not in dispute. This is confirmed even by the
witnesses who turned hostile. It is also not in dispute that
Veerappan died on the spot and that Marudayi was grievously         D
injured. This too is confirmed by the witnesses who turned
hostile. That PW-5 Srinivasan took Marudayi to the hospital
immediately after she was attacked is confirmed by PW-1
Thangavel. On the basis of these facts, which are evident from
the record, there is no option but to accept the conclusion of      E
both the Courts that PW-5 Srinivasan was present at the place
of occurrence and was an eye witness to the incident. His
testimony is not unreliable but is supported in its essential
details by the testimony of the other witnesses.
                                                                    F
Conclusion:

     42. We find the evidence of PW-5 Srinivasan credible
notwithstanding that he was a related and interested witness.
Accordingly, we uphold the conviction and sentence awarded
to the appellants by the Trial Court and confirmed by the High      G
Court.

     43. The appeal is dismissed.

B.B.B.                                      Appeal dismissed.
                                                                    H