Holding

Rule VI remained valid and applicable at the relevant date, and although the claim was delayed, the appellants’ already received benefits were to be retained without any further entitlement.

Summary

Two Lower Division Clerks, Rajinder Pal Singh Lamba and V.K. Garg, applied for promotion to Upper Division Clerk in 1986‑87 under Rule VI of Chapter 18‑A of the High Court Rules, which was framed under s.35(3) of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918. Their applications were rejected; the High Court later deemed them promoted retrospectively from 1 January 1976 but denied monetary benefits. Two sitting UDCs challenged this order, arguing that the 11‑12 year delay barred the claim and that s.35(3) had been repealed by the Government of India (Adaptation of Indian Law) Order, 1937, rendering Rule VI void. The Delhi High Court Division Bench held that Rule VI remained valid by virtue of Article 9 of the 1937 Order, but upheld the laches argument, denying any further benefit. The Supreme Court affirmed that Rule VI was applicable at the relevant time, recognized the substantial delay, and, in the interest of equity, ordered that the benefits already enjoyed by the appellants should not be withdrawn, but no additional benefits could be granted. Consequently, the appeals were disposed without altering the existing benefits.

Issues considered

Whether Rule VI of Chapter 18‑A of the High Court Rules was valid and applicable despite the repeal of s.35(3) of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918.
Whether the appellants’ claim for retrospective promotion was barred by laches due to a delay of 11‑12 years.
Whether the benefits already granted to the appellants could be set aside or additional benefits awarded.

Legislation cited

Punjab Courts Act, 1918s. 35(3)

Subjects

promotionservice lawlachesretrospective promotionstatutory ruleequityPunjab Courts ActAdaptation of Indian Law OrderHigh Court Rulesseniority

Judgment

[2008] 14 S.C.R. 260

r~
A . .RAJINDER PAL SINGH LAMBA I

v.
SURAJ BHAN & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 2274 of 2002)
OCTOBER ;3, 2008
B
[R.V."RAVEENDRAN AND DR. MUKUNDAKAM
SHARMA, JJ.] r-

High Court Rules and Orders - Chapter 18-A, r. .VI - Pro- .
c motion to post of UDC - Claim for, by LDC's with retrospective
effect in terms of Rule VI - Permanent vacancies in cadre of
UDC arising in 1975 and claim raised 11:.12 years thereafter
- In pursuance of the order of High Court, claimants gra_nted
promotion with retrospective effect but without monetary ben-
efits - Challenge to, on the ground that claim had become
D
time barred and s. 35(3) of 1918 Act, under which Rule VI
framed, stood repealed - Allowed by Division Bench - On ',._.....·

appeal, held: Rule VJ was valid and applicable on the relevant
date by virtue of Article 9 of Order 1937 - Though there was
considerable delay, on facts, in the interest of equity, benefits
E of pr9motion with retrospective effect already r~ceived by
.claimant not taken away, but not entitled to any additional ben-
efit- Punjab Courts Act, 1918- s. 35(3) - Government of In-
dia (Adaptation of Indian Law) Order 1937 - Service Law.

F ·Delay/Laches - Delay of more than a decade in ap- t
proaching court in service matters - Effect of, when applicant l
seeking equity- Held: Delay defeats equity- Delay of 11-12
years cannot be overlooked as it jeopardises the existing po-
sitions of other employees - Equity - Service law.
G Appellants-'RS' and 'VK' were appointed as LDC in
1972 and 1969 in the Ministerial Establishment in the Court I~_,,.~
;
of the District & Sessions Judge, Delhi. They became
graduates in the years 1975 and 1974 respectively. The
permanent vacancies in the cadre of UDC occurred in
H 260
RAJINDER PAL SINGH LAMBA v. SURAJ 261
BHAN & ORS:
___ :T
1975. In 1986 and 1987 appellants sought promotion to A
the posts of UDC w.e.f. 1975 in terms of Rule VI, Chapter
18-A, High Court Rules and Orders framed u/s. 35(3) of
the Punjab Courts Act, 1918. Their claim was rejected .
. However, the service appeals on the administrative side
were allowed, but the appellants.were directed to be con- B
sidered for promotion with prospective effect only. Ag-
_ _J
grieved, appellants filed writ petitions seeking promotion
and other service benefits with retrospective effect. Mean-
while, appellants were promoted to the grade of UDC with
prospective effect. The Single Judge of High Court held c
that the appellants should be deemed to have been pro-
moted as UDC w.e.f. 01.01.1976 but without monetary
benefit for the said period. It was also held that respon-
dent No. 4-High Court of Delhi and respondent No.5-Dis-
trict & Sessions Judge, Delhi would also give the benefit
D
to the other similarly situated persons who had become
..,___( graduates before 01.01.1976. Thereafter, two UDC's work-
ing on the post, filed appeals that the claim was barred by
laches as the representations were made after a lapse of
about 11-12 years; and thats. 35(3) ofthe Punjab Courts
Act, 1918 under which, Rule VI was framed stood re- E
pealed, thus, Rule VI ceased to exist. Appellants also filed
appeals claiming monetary benefits. The Division Bench
allowed the appeal filed by the said two UDCs. Hence the
appeals.
j Disposing of the appeals, the Court
F

HELD: 1.1 Rule VI of the Chapter 18-A, High Court
Rules and Orders was valid and applicable on the relevant
date despite the fact that s. 35(3) of the Punjab Courts
Act, 1918 stood repealed by the Government of India (Ad- G
aptation of Indian Law) Order 1937, by virtue of Article 9
->--\ of Order of 1937. Rule VI has been in operation without
any amendment therein until 19.03.1999 when fresh rules
of promotion were framed by the Punjab & Haryana High
Court substituting Rule VI as published in Punjab Gov- H
262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A ernment, Gaz., March 19, 1999 (PHGN, 1920, SAKA). [Para
12] [268, ~~B; 268,E-F]
1.2 Respor:ident No. 4 w~s under a fiduciary duty and
was required to consider the name of appellants for pro-
motion to the post of UDC in accordance with the statu-
s tory rule as and when the vacancy arose. Unfortunately,
there was lapse on the part of Respondent No. 4 due to
which the case .of the appellants for promotion could not
be considered. At the same time it cannot be scored out
that the appellants slept over their rights, which led to a
C considerable delay i.e. delay of 11-12 years on the part of
the appellants to give representation for promotion to the
grade of UDC. [Paras 13 and 14] [268,F-H]
1.3 Delay defeats equity is a well-known principle-of
jurisprudence. Delay of 11 to 12 years cannot be over-
0
looked when an applicant before the court seeks equity
and specially in the case of service matters as in the said
case it jeopardises the existing positions of a very large
number of members of that service. [Para 14] [269,A-B]
E 1.4 Though the appeal was filed against the common
judgment and order passed by the Single Judge but only
the appellant 'RS' was added into the array of respondents,
thus, not challenging the relief granted to the other ap-
pellant. Respondent· Nos. 1 and 2 did not raise the issue
F of de1ay and laches before the Single Judge and the said
issue was raised for the first time in appeal before the Di-
vision Bench of the High Court. The plea of delay and
laches raised by respondent Nos. 4 and 5 was declined
by the Single Judge on the ground that once there was a
G statutory rule the said respondents were obliged to fol-
low the same. [Para 17] [269,D-F]
1.5 As on date, respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have no
grievance against the appellants as they stood retired and
no benefit will accrue upon them even if the order deny-
H ing the promotion to the appellants to the post of UDC
RAJINDER PAL SINGH LAMBA v. SURAJ 263
BHAN & ORS.
-- ) w.e.f 01.01.1976 is allowed. On the other hand the promo- A
tion to the appellants with retrospective effect, i.e., w.e.f
01.01.1976 was granted subsequent to the judgment and
order of the Single Judge which was in the year 1998 and
they have been further promoted to the post of the Assis-
tant. The appellants have reaped the benefits of promo- 8
tion with retrospective effect for nearly 10 years. [Paras
---l 15 and 18] [269,F-H; 269,B]
1.6 Though it cannot be denied that there was con-
siderable delay and the observations of the Division
Bench in this regard cannot be faulted with but in the pe- c
culiar facts and circumstances of the case it would not
be fair to the appellants if the benefits they had secured
are taken away. Therefore, it is directed that the benefits
granted to the appellants and already received by them
pursuant to the order of Single Judge shall not be taken D
..... away as they have enjoyed such benefit for a very long
'-1'
period of time. However, they shall not be entitled to any
additional benefit and no additional benefit will be granted.
Such relief cannot be granted to anybody else. [Para 19]
'
[270,A-C] E
CIVIL APPEPPATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
2274 of 2002
From ~he final Judgment and Order dated 18.4.2001 of
the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in LPA No. 30 of 1999 F
7
_J

WITH
C.A. No. 6050 of 2008
C. Hari Shankar, C.M. Jayakumar, Jagdish Kainikkara and
Tara Chandra Sharma for the Appellant. G
_. __ \ 8.8. Singh, Subhash Kaushik, S. Pandey and D.S. Mahra
\

for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
H
264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA,. J. 1. Leave granted in
SLP (C) No. 6878 of 2002
2. What is challenged in these appeals is the judgment.
and order ofthe Division Bench of Delhi High ·court whereby
the appeals filed against the order of the Ld. Single Judge in ·
. B two Writ Petitions were allowed. . .
v
3. The .grievance of the appeHants as ias .raised· in the
1

·.
Writ Petitions, in nutshell·, i~.as.follows:""·
(.
·
S/Shri Rajendera Singh Lamba andV.K Garg, appellants·
G herein were appointed as LowerDiyision Clerks (for short 'LDC')
on 01. 10: 1972. and24.11.1969 respectivel'y, in th.e Ministeri<il
Establishment of the District & Sessions Judge; Delhi. During
.. their employment they co111pleted ·thei'r graduation from belhi
University in the year 1975 and 1974 respectively: S/Shri
o . Rajinderpal Singh Lamba and V.K. Garg on 24.12.1986 and.
02.01.1987 respectively submitted their applications.to the. Dis-·
trict & Sessions Juqge, Delhi see1<ing:promotion'.to the posts of·
Upper Division Clerk (.for short 'UDC'), The said. applications
were maqe seeking'benefitofHuJe VI, Chapter.18-A; High.Court.
E Rules and Orde.rs,Vof. 1. frame.d under. $edion·35(3) ofthe . ~·
Punjab Courts Act, 1918. 'r~e said.Rule reads as under:-
"Promo.tion--(1) Appointmehtsto.the hrgher grades of the
ministerial estabtishmentsh.ould.ordinarily bemade· by
seniority from lower grades, provided· thadhe official who
F would th.us rec~ive promotion poss~sses the prescrib¢d. · ,,,..
. education.al qualifications and is olhel'Wise fi:t to. perform
. the duties to which he will be prom9ted;.f.orwhich purpose
tests m~y be .imposed, This rule does nofc.ipply to such ·
posts as that. of stenographer; ·tor which speciat
qualifications are riee~ed; but preference should be given
to officers with such qualifications who are already working .
·in the lower. grades; · · ~·

Provided t·hat permanent vacandes In the 75~5-125 grade
.shall be filled by the Di'strict & Sessions Judges in the
H . following rota~ion:~- ·
RAJINDER PAL SINGH LAMBA v. SURAJ 265
BHAN & ORS. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
- y (i) By selection on merit out of graduates who have atheist A
I
two years' experience in the work of the office, if there is
no suitable graduate who fulfills this condition an 'outsider'
graduate may be appointed, but he must be one who
normally resides within the jurisdiction of the District &
Sessions Judge. B
(ii) & (iii) By normal promotion in the office, i.e., the
- ··' appointment of the next. senior man whether graduate or
non-graduate subject to his fitness:

Provided further that the rotation may be modified in very c
exceptional cases when the direct appointment of a
graduate would mean the ousting of a man, who had been
officiating quasi-permanently in the post concerned for an ·
appreciable period. What is an appreciable period will
depend on the circumstances of each case. After such a:
D
modification, the rotation should be restored as soon as
....
'-.'
possible.
(2) In making promotions preference ·may invariably be
shown to officials who are known to be strictly honest. No
promotion should be given and no recommendation for · E
promotion made in the case of an official who does not
possess and maintain a reputation for strict integrity.
Efficiency without honesty is not to be regarded as
constituting a claim to promotion."
F
.J The appellants were seeking their promotion w.e.f. 1975,
as according to them permanent vacancies in the cadre of UDC
have occurred in the year 1975.
The said appl'ications were rejected by the District and
Sessions Judge, Delhi. Aggrieved by the said rejection the ap.,.
G
pellants filed service appeals in the Administrative sioe of Delhi
.-.,.~
. High Court. By communication dated 02.03.1988, the service
appeals were allowed, but to the extent that the appellants are
entitled to be considered for promotion to the grade of UDC
and that the promotion, if any, will be prospective only.
H
266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R

-f-
A The appellants still aggrieved, as the promotion and other i
service benefits were not granted with retrospective effect, ap-
proached the Delhi High Court, on Judicial Side, by filing two
separate writ petitions.
4. In the meantime acting upon the a~ove-mentior:ied com-
B munication dated 02.03.1988 the appellants viz. V.K. Garg and
Rajinderpal Singh Lamba were promoted to the grade of UDC
with effectfrom 1.4.1988 and 30; 1.1992 respectively, with pro-
spective effect.
c 5. The Ld. Single Judge while disposing of the writ peti-
tions held that as there were number of vacancies in the·post of
UDC in the year 1975-76, the claims of the appellants could
and should have been considered in accordance with the statu-
tory rules embodied in Rule VI, Chapter 18-A, High Court Rules
and Orders and consequently ordered that the appellants be
0
deemed to have been promoted as UDC w.e.f. 01.01.1976.
However, they were denied monetary benefit for the said pe-
riod ..
The Ld. Single Judge further helo that the High Court of
E Delhi and the District & Sessions Judge, Delh.i being. respon-
dent No. 4 and 5 herein, would also give the benefit to the other
similarly situated persons like the appellants, who had become
graduates before 01.01.1976.
6. The order of the td. Single Judge was challenged by
F two of the private respondents viz. Shri Suraj. Bhan and Radha
Krishan, who were working on the post of UDC at that point of
time, primarily on the below mentioned grounds::-
i) The representations were made after a lapse of about
11/12 years, thus the claim was barred by !aches;·
G
ii) Section 35(3) of the Punjab Courts Act,' 1918 under
which, Rule VI was framed stood. repealed by the
Government of India (Adaptation of indian Law) Ord~t
1937 as a result of which the said rule ceased to
' '
H exist.
RAJINDER PAL SINGH LAMBA v. SURAJ 267
BHAN & ORS. [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
-.
---- ~
An appeal was also filed by the appellants claiming mon- A
etary benefits, which were denied by the Ld. Single Judge.
7. The Division Bench allowed the appeal filed by the pri-
vate respondents, respondent No. 1 and 2 herein, primarily on
the ground that since the rule of promotion with retrospective
effect involves the issue of seniority as well, the said issue and B

-·-\
question cannot be re-opened after lapse of a considerable time
and reasonable period to disturb the settled position. It was
therefore held that the writ petition was liable to be rejected. On
the issue of validity and applicability of Rule VI it was held that
the said rule was applicable at the relevant trme as the same c
was saved by virtue of Article 9 of Order of 1937. As against the
said impugned order this appeal was filed.
8: It is pertinent to mention at this stage that both the ap-
pellants after being promoted to the post of UDC in the year
D
.... 1988 were further promoted to the post of Assistant, in the year
( 1995 in case of Shri V.K. Garg and in the year 1997 in case of
Shri Rajender Pal Singh.
9. In the backdrop of the aforesaid facts we heard learned
couns_el for the parties and perused the record. E
10. The learqed counsel for the appellants placing reliance
on Rule VI contended that as per the said statutory rule which
was valid and applicable at the relevant time the respondent
Nos. 4 and 5 were obliged to consider appellants for promotion
"'j· to the grade of UDC when there were number of vacancies in F
the said grade in the year 1975-76. He further argued that as
the rule was statutory in nature the benefit of the said rule can-
.. , not be denied on the ground of delay and laches .
11. None appeared on behalf of respondent No. 1 and 2,
G
viz. Shri Suraj Bhan and Radha Krishan who filed the appeal
r',.) before the Division Bench of the High Court. We were told that
both of them have retired during .the pendency of present pro-
ceedings. Counsel appearing for the remaining respondents
reiterated the stand taken before the Division Bench.
H
268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S. C.R.

A 12. So far as Rule VI, of the Chapter 18-A, High Court
Rules and Orders is concerned the same was-valid and appli-
cable on the relevant date despite the fact that Section 35(3) of
I-
the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 stood repealed by the Government I:-
of India (Adaptation of Indian Law) Order 1937, by virtue of Ar- i
,..__
B ticle 9 of Order of 1937. Article 9 reads as under:
'
"The provisions of this Order which adapt or modify Indian
laws so as to alter the manner in which, the authority by
which, or the law under, or in accordance with which, any
powers are exercisable, shall not render invalid any
c notification, order, commitment, attachment, byelaw, rule
or regulation duly made, or issued, or anything duly done,
before the commencement, of this Order; and any such
'
notification, order, commitment, attachment, byelaw, rule, Ir
regulation or thing may be revoked, varied or undone in
the like manner, to the like extent and in the like
circumstances as if it had been made, issued or done
after the commencement of this Order by the competent
authority and under and in accordance with the provisions
then applicable to such a case." ·
E Rule VI has been in operation without any amendment
therein until 19.03.1999 when fresh rules of promotion were
framed by the Punjab & Haryana High Court substituting Rule I
J'"
VI vide Punjab Government, Gaz., March 19, 1999 (PHGN, ·-,

F
1920, SAKA).
.
4

13. The Respondent No. 4 was under a fiduciary duty and r-
was required to consider the name of appellants for promotion
to the post of UDC in accordance with the statutory rule as and
~
when the vacancy arose. Unfortunately, there was lapse on the
G part of the Respondent No. 4 due to which the case of the ap-
pellants for promotion could not be considered.
14. At the same time it cannot be scored out that the ap-
pellants slept over their rights, which led to a considerable de-
lay i.e. delay of 11-12 years on the part of the appellants to give
H representation for promotion to the grade of UDC. Delay de-
RAJINDER PAL SINGH LAMBA v. SURAJ 269
BHAN & ORS. [DR MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
>
' feats equity is a well-known principle of jurisprudence. Delay of
11 to 12 years cannot be overlooked when an applicant before
A

the court seeks equity and specially in the case of service mat-
ters as in the said case it jeopardises the existing positions of
a very large number of members of that service.
15. The appellants, however, submitted that pursuant to B
the order of the Ld. Single Judge they have been granted pro-
~-\
motion w.e.f 01.01.1976 and they have been further promoted
to the· post of the Assistant.
16. Thus the question is, whether we should now take away c
the benefit which the appellant had actually obtained under the
I
order of the Ld. Single Judge. The settled position has been once
/
unsettled by the order of the Ld. Single Judge which has now
some how settled again, the question is also that should we by
our order now once again unsettle the so called settled position.
D
... 17. Interestingly though the appeal was filed against the
----.,
common judgment and order passed by the Ld. Single Judge
but only Shri Rajendera Singh Lamba was added into the array
of respondents, thus, not challenging the relief granted to Shri
V.K. Garg. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 did not raise the issue of E
delay and laches before the Ld. Single Judge and the said is-
sue was raised for the first time in appeal before the Division
Bench of the High Court. The plea of delay and laches raised
by respondent Nos. 4 and 5 was declined by the Ld. Single
.. Judge on the ground that once there was a statutory rule the F
-+ said respondents were obliged to follow the same.
18. As of today respondent Nos. 1 and 2 have no griev-
ance against the appellants as they stood retired and no ben-
efit will accrue upon them even if the order denying the promo-
tion to the appellants to the post of UDC w.e.f 01.01.1976 is G
allowed. On the other hand the promotion to the appellants with
. / ~;
retrospective i.e. w.e.f 01.01.1976 was granted subsequent to
the judgment and order of the Ld. Single Judge which was in
the year 1998. As of now, the appellants have reaped the ben-
efits of promotion with retrospective effect for nearly 10 years. H
270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 14 S.C.R.

A 19. Though it cannot be denied that there was consider- 1 <

able delay and the observations of the Division Bench in this
regard cannot be faulted with but in the peculiar facts and cir-
cumstances of the case we do not think that it would be fair to
the appellants if the benefits they had secured are taken away.
s Therefore, we direct that the benefits granted to the appellants
and already received by them pursuant to the order of Ld. Single
. Judge shall not be taken away as they have enjoyed such ben-
efit for a very long period of time. However, they shall not be
entitled to any additional benefit and no additional benefit will
c be granted. Obviously, such relief cannot be granted to anybody
else.
20. We make it clear that all the observations made herein
are our views and opinion in the peculiar facts and circum-
stances of the present case. The questions of law raised be-
D fore the High Court are kept open to be examined by this Court
in an appropriate case. Needless to say, this order shall not be
construed as a precedent in any other matter.
21. Accordingly, the appeals are disposed of in terms of
the aforesaid order. No order as to cost.
E
N.J. Appeals disposed of.