RAJIB RANJAN & ORS.versusR. VIJAYKUMAR

                        [2014] 10 S.C.R. 982


A                     RAJIB RANJAN & ORS.
                                  V.
                          R. VIJAYKUMAR
              (Criminal Appeal Nos. 729-732 of 2010)
                        OCTOBER 14, 2014
B
            [J. CHELAMESWAR AND A.K. SIKRI, JJ.]

        Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: ss.197, 482 -
  Quashing of proceedings - Tender invited by Electricity Board
C - Tender application of respondent rejected after obtaining
  performance report/certificate issued by appellant no.2, the
  Chief Engineer - Suit filed against the Electricity Board
  challenging rejection of his application - Suit withdrawn -
  Respondent filed writ petition which was a/so dismissed and
D SLP thereagainst also dismissed Respondent filed complaint
  u/ss. 120B, 468, 420 and 500 against appellants that certificate
  was false and forged - Issuance of summons - High Court
  refusing to quash the proceedings on the ground that though
  the appellants are public servants, the alleged offences
E committed by them were not in discharge of their normal
  duties and hence s.197 was not attracted - Held: Rejection
  of tender was in furtherance of and in discharge of the official
  duties by the appellant - Action of the respondent in filing the
  criminal complaint was not bonafide and amounted to misuse
F and abuse of the process of law - The a/legations of
  fabricating the records were mischievously made as an
  afterthought just to give colour of criminality to a civil case -
  High Court ought to have quashed the proceedings in
  exercise of its inherent powers uls.482.

G       Allowing the appeal, the Court

      HELD: 1. Section 197, Cr.P.C. states that if any
  offence is alleged to have been committed by a public
  servant who cannot be removed from the office except
H                           982
     RAJIB RANJAN & ORS. v. R. VIJAYKUMAR             983


by or with the sanction of the Government, the Court is      A
precluded from taking cognizance of such offence except
with the previous sanction of the competent authority
specified in this provision. The sanction is necessary if
the offence alleged against public servant is committed
by him "while acting or purporting to act in the discharge   B
of his official duties". In the instant case, the Tender
Committee had rejected the tender on the ground that the
respondent did not fulfill the pre-qualifying conditions.
Before doing so, the respondent was asked time and
again to send the performance report but he failed to        c
comply even when he had assured to do the needful. Still,
in order to verify the claim of the respondent and to
consider his bid on merits, though not strictly required,
the appellant was deputed to get the desired information
from JSEB. He met the officials of JSEB and submitted        0
his report to the effect that the works carried out by the
respondent was not satisfactory. Even, the General
Manager of the said Power Station furnished his report
wherein it was summed up that due to the defects in the
scanning system, supplied by the respondent, generation
                                                             E
was adversely effected and the said Electricity Board was
not satisfied with the equipment supplied by the
respondent. Even the report of the technical experts went
against the respondent as it opined that the respondent
was not technically suitable on the technical vetting and
comparative data. On the basis of that, the respondent's     F
tender document was not opened and returned and he
was informed accordingly. All this clearly happened in
furtherance of and in discharge of the official duties by
the appellant. [Paras 10, 11, 15) [993-G-H; 994-A; 996-F-
H; 997-A-E]                                                  G

    2. The respondent filed a civil suit. However,
withdrew the suit. Once the suit is withdrawn, that acts
as constructive res judicata having regard to the
provision of Order XXlll Rule 1, CPC. Also, when suit is     H
    984      SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A dismissed under Order IX Rule 8 CPC, fresh suit under
  Order IX Rule 9 is barred. Even when the respondent
  himself invited order of dismissal in the civil suit, he filed
  a writ petition against the order passed in the civil court
  dismissing his suit for non-prosecution, but the same was
s also dismissed by the High Court. SLP preferred by the
  respondent was also dismissed. When he did not
  succeed in the said attempt, he came out with the
  allegations of forgery. Thus, the action of the respondent
  in filing the criminal complaint was not bonafide and
c amounted to misuse and abuse of the process of law. The
  attempt was made by the respondent to convert a case
  with civil nature into criminal prosecution. The High Court
  erred in not quashing the proceedings in exercise of its
  inherent powers under Section 482, Cr.P.C. [Paras 16, 18,
D 19] [997-H; 998-A-F; 1000-C-D]

       Shambhoo Nath Misra v. State of U.P. (1997) 5 SCC
  326: 1997 (2) SCR 1139; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal,
  1992 Supp (1) SCC 335: 1991 (1) Suppl. SCR 387; Indian
  Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd. (2006) 6 SCC 736: 2006 (3)
E Suppl. SCR 704; lnder Mohan Goswami and another v. State
  of Uttaranchal and Ors. (2007) 12 sec 1: 2007 (1 O) SCR 847
  - relied on.

        Naresh Kumar Madan v. State of M.P. (2007) 4 SCC 766
F   : 2007(4) SCR 1040; State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Budhikota
    Subbarao (1993) 2 SCC 567: 1993 (2) SCR 329 - referred
    to.
                        Case Law Reference:

G         2007(4) SCR 1040            referred to      Para 4
          1993 (2) SCR 329             referred to     Para 5
          1997 (2) SCR 1139            relied on       Para 13
          1991 (1) Suppl. SCR 387      relied on       Para 17
H
      RAJIB RANJAN & ORS. v. R. VIJAYKUMAR                     985


     2006 (3) Suppl. SCR 704           relied on         Para 18       A
     2007 (10) SCR 847                 relied on       · Para 19
    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
Nos. 729-732 of 2010.
                                                                       B
    From the Judgment & Order dated 03.06.2009 of the High
Court of Madras at Madurai in Criminal Original Petitions (MD)
Nos. 9890, 10017, 10027 and 10028 of 2008.
     Rahul Srivastava, Ram Swarup Sharma for the Appellants.
                                                                       c
     R. Vijaykumar (Respondent-in-person).
     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
     A.K. SIKRI, J. 1. These appeals are filed by four
appellants, who were arrayed as accused persons in the                 D
complaint case No.183/2007 filed by the respondent herein
before the Court of Judicial Magistrate No.II, Tiruchirapalli, Tamil
Nadu. The complaint has been filed under Sections 120-8, 468,
420 and 500 of the Indian Penal Code (for short 'the IPC'). The
learned Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the said                E
complaint and summoned the appellants. The appellants (who
were arrayed as accused Nos.3, 4, 5 and 6) challenged the
said summoning orders and sought quashment of the complaint
by filing petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (for short 'the Cr.P.C.) inasmuch as according to            F
them the allegations in the complaint did not make out any
offence under the aforesaid provisions of the IPC; the
complainant had neither any locus standi nor any legal status
to prefer any such complaint; the appellants being public
servants and Gazetted officers of the State Government of              G
Chhattisgarh, no such criminal proceedings could be initiated
against them without prior sanction from the appointing
authority as per Section 197 of the Cr.P.C.; and the complaint
was blatant misuse and abuse of the process of Court which
was fifed by the complainant after exhausting the civil remedies       H
    986     SUPREME COURT REPORTS                (2014] 10 S.C.R.


A   in which he had failed. The High Court, after examination of the
    matter, has not found any merit in any of the aforesaid
    contentions raised by the appellants and, consequently,
    dismissed their petitions.

B        2. Before we advert to the submissions of the appellants,
    which are mirror image of what was argued before the High
    Court, it would_ be appropriate to traverse through the relevant
    facts and events leading to the filing of the said complaint by
    the complainant. These are as under:
c         The Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board (for short 'the
    CSEB') issued an advertisement inviting tender (NIT) bearing
    No. T-136/2004 dated 02.06.2004 for its work at Hasedeo
    Thermal Power Station (Korba West) towards Designing,
    Engineering, Testing, Supply, Erection & Commission of HEA
D   Ignition system. The applications received there under were
    required to be processed in three stages successively namely;
    Part-I (EMO); Part-II (Techno-Commercial Criteria) and Part Ill
    (Price Bid). The respondent herein submitted an application on
    26.08.2004 as Chief Executive Officer of M/s Control
E   Electronics India (CEI) requesting for Tender Document. The
    application was rejected on the ground that it was accompanied
    by incomplete documents i.e. non-submission of documentary
    evidence of past performance and experience of the
    respondent. The respondent made a complaint dated
F   06.09.2004 against appellant No. 3 herein alleging that the
    Tender Documents were not issued to the respondent. It was
    followed by several letters requesting for issuance of Tender
    Documents. He was informed that rather than pressurising the
    appellants here or other officials, he should furnish documents
G   as per pre-qualifying condition of the Tender. In response
    thereto, vide his letter dated 05.11.2004, the respondent filed
    a copy of purchase order dated 28.01.2002 placed by
    Jharkhand State Electricity Board (for short 'the JSEB') and
    assured to supply other documentary evidence (performance
H   report) subsequently. On such assurance, the Tender
     RAJIB RANJAN & ORS. v. R. VIJAYKUMAR                  987
                 [AK. SIKRI, J.]
Documents were issued to the respondent. The respondent            A
vide his letter dated 08.12.2004, mentioned that the
Performance Report was enclosed in Part-II. However, the said
report was not found enclosed and even after repeated requests
from the CSEB to furnish documents, respondent did not fulfill
the necessary requirement. As the respondent did not submit        B
the necessary documents, the CSEB sought the information
from the Chief Engineer of JSEB (arrayed in the complaint as
accused No.2) vide letter dated 10.12.2004 about the
performance of the respondent. Appellant No.2 herein was also
deputed to get the desired information from JSEB. After            c
meeting the officials of JSEB, appellant No.2 submitted his
report stating that the works carried out by the respondent were
not satisfactory as many defects were found therein. As per the
appellants, even technical expertise was sought from SE (ET&I)
KW (CSEB)·and found that the respondent was not technically        0
suitable as per the technical vetting and comparative data of
SE (ET&I) KW letter dated 04.02.2005. On that basis, tender
of the respondent was rejected. The appellants submit that as
an outburst, in not getting the Tender in his favour, the
respondent made complaints alleging irregularities to various
                                                                   E
fora including the State Government, which ordered the CSEB
to conduct an enquiry. The CSEB submitted its report on
21.02.2006 stating that there were no such irregularities and
that the respondent had not furnished the necessary documents
despite repeated requests. At this stage, the respondent filed
the Civil Suit (26-A/06) before the Civil Judge Class-II, Korba    F
against the CSEB. However, the respondent moved an
application seeking to withdraw the said suit. In any case he
did not appear on the date fixed and accordingly the suit was
dismissed for non-prosecution on 12.09.2006. The respondent
herein then filed a Writ Petition No.2951 of 2006 before the       G
Chhattisgarh High Court which was dismissed on 25.06.2007.
Even costs of Rs.25,000/- was imposed while dismissing the
writ petition with the observations that it was abuse of the
process of Court. Thereafter, SLP No.15897 of 2007 was
preferred by the respondent which also came to be dismissed        H
    988         SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A vide order dated 14.09.2007. After the exhaustion of these
  remedies, albeit unsuccessfully, the respondent filed a
  complaint before K.K. Nagar P.S., Thirucharapalli, Tamil Nadu.
  The police authorities refused to register the same on the
  ground that it is a civil dispute. It is, thereafter, that the
B respondent filed the said Criminal Complaint under Sections
  120-B, 468, 420 & 500 IPC before the trial Court, which was
  registered as C.C. No. 183/07 and the trial Court issued
  summons to the appellants herein and accused No.1
  (Successful Bidder) & accused No. 2 (then Chief Engineer,
c JSEB). Petitions of the appellants seeking quashing of the said
  complaint have been dismissed by the order of the High Court,
  which is impugned before us.

        3. A reading of the said complaint reveals the following
    broad allegations levelled by the respondent:
D
          (a)     The respondent/complainant alleges that the
                 appellants and accused No.1 (Successful Bidder)
                 & accused No. 2 (then Chief Engineer, JSEB) had
                 conspired secretly to disentitle the complainant's
E                company by creating a discredit and for the said
                 purpose, they were in constant touch so as to create
                 the said Performance Report Cum Certificate,
                 which was issued by accused No.2.

          (b)    The respondent/complainant alleges that the said
F
                 conspiracy started with an agreement entered into
                 by the 1st accused and the appellants herein and
                 they planned to fabricate the said certificate dated
                 28.12.2004. For this purpose, accused No. 2 was
                 approached so as to tailor the certificate totally
G                discrediting the CEI (Company of the Complainant)
                 with reference to supply and service relationship
                 with Patratu Thermal Power Station (for short 'the
                 PTPS') and JSEB.

H         (c)    The respondent/complainant alleges that the said
      RAJIB RANJAN & ORS. v. R. VIJAYKUMAR                   989
                 [AK. SIKRI, J.]

            Certificate cum Report is false, fabricated,             A
            motivated and malafide and the same was contrary
            to the minutes of meeting that the complainant and
            his officials had with the officials of PTPS and
            JSEB. He further alleges that for the said reasons,
            the accused No. 2 was demoted from his post.             B

      (d)   The respondent/complainant alleges that on
            suspicion of such Certificate Cum Report, the
            complainant visited the CSEB and on verifying
            about the same, he found that the said tender was        C
            being given to Company of the 1st accused against
            the Complainant's Company and so he wrote a
            letter to the Chief Secretary and Chairman of JSEB
            for verifying and cancelling such certificate. He also
            wrote to many officials of the CSEB.
                                                                     D
      (e)   The respondent/complainant alleges that the said
            Certificate is perse defamatory as against the
            complainant's company and is a crude attempt to
            favour accused No.1 by spoiling the image of the
            Complainants company. He further alleges that this       E
            caused a wrongful loss to the complainant's
            company by robbing its due chance to get a
            contract for the Boiler Plant Units at Korba.

      4. After recording preliminary evidence, the Magistrate
                                                                     F
took cognizance of the complaint which order was challenged
in the High Court. Before the High Court, the appellants, inter
alia, contended that the allegations made by the respondent
under Sections 120-B, 468, 420 & 500 of IPC pertained to the
award of tender in favour of accused No.1 in which the
respondent was also a competing party. It was also pleaded           G
that the said complaint has been lodged as an afterthought,
having failed in the civil suit for injunction which was dismissed
and likewise, after unsuccessful attempt to challenge the award
of contract in favour of accused No.1 as the writ petition of the
                                                                     H
    990     SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A respondent was dismissed by the High Court. Thus, the lodging
  of complaint before Judicial Magistrate-II, Tiruchirapalli was
  nothing but abuse of process of law. The appellants also
  contended that the respondents herein had no locus standi nor
  any legal status to prefer the said complaint, as CEI is not a
B registered company, having a legal entity. The appellants further
  relied on Naresh Kumar Madan v. State of M.P., (2007) 4 SCC
  766 wherein it has been held that an employee working in the
  Electricity Board is covered under the definition of 'Public
  Servant' and State of Maharashtra v. Dr. Budhikota Subbarao,
c (1993) 2 sec 567 for the proposition that the absence of
  sanction order from the appropriate authority under Section 197
  Cr.P.C for prosecuting a public servant, vitiates the
  proceedings.

        5. The respondent refuted the aforesaid submissions by
D arguing that the appellants herein had deliberately conspired
  and had committed the offences against the complainant and
  therefore he has a right to lodge a complaint for the offences
  committed by the appellants along with accused No. 2 (Chief
  Engineer, JSEB) in rejecting the tender submitted by the
E complainant with a view to accept the tender of the 1st accused.
  It was argued that they conspired and created false document
  with an idea of rejecting the claim of the complainant. The
  respondent further submitted that complainant's locus standi as
  a company was not questioned in the earlier proceedings
F before the Chhattisgarh High Court and that the Judicial
  Magistrate had applied his mind and after satisfying himself
  that the complainanUrespondent has got legal status to lodge
  the said complaint, had taken cognizance of the offences
  committed by the accused persons. It was also contended that
G the question of obtaining sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C.
  will not arise in so far as the present complaint is concerned,
  as the accused are charged for conspiracy, cheating, criminal
  breach of trust and defamation. He further submitted that his
  allegation in the complaint pertained to the fabrication of the
H Certificate-cum-Report dated 28.12.2004 which was used
     RAJIB RANJAN & ORS. v. R. VIJAYKUMAR                    991
                 [A.K. SIKRI, J.]

against him in rejecting his tender and 1st accused was              A
favoured with the award of work. Therefore, they had committed
offences against the complainant and damaged the reputation
of the respondent/ complainant.

    6. The High Court while dismissing the petition of the           8
appellants recorded that:

     (a)   As far as mandatory provisions of Section 197
           Cr.P.C is concerned, the High Court accepted that
           the appellants are 'Public Servants'. It also
           observed that if the accusation against the               C
           appellants under Sections 120-8, 468, 420 & 500
           IPC are connected with the discharge of their duty
           viz. if the said acts had reasonable connection with
           discharge of his duty then applicability of Section
           197 cannot be disputed. However, on going through         D
           the allegations in the complaint, the High Court held
           that even though the appellants are "Public Servant',
           the alleged offences committed by them are
           cognizable offences are not in discharge of their
           normal duties, in which component of criminal             E
           breach of trust is found as one of the elements and
           hence the provisions of Section 197 Cr.P.C. are not
           attracted.

     (b)   It has also been observed that the evidence
                                                                     F
           regarding the allegations made in the complaint
           have to be recorded and gone into by the trial court
           after the evidence have been adduced by the
           complainant. It is only thereafter the lower Court, can
           decide as to whether the allegations about the
           falsity of the Certificate with conspiracy of accused     G
           No. 2 and the appellants herein are correct or not.

     7. It is clear from the above that primarily two questions
arise for consideration namely:
                                                                     H
    992         SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 10 S.C.R.

A         (a)    Whether prior sanction of the competent authority
                 to prosecute the appellants, who are admittedly
                 public servants, is mandatory under Section 197 of
                 the Code?

B         (b)    Whether, on the facts of this case, the complaint
                 filed by the respondent is motivated and
                 afterthought, after losing the battle in civil litigation
                 and amounts to misuse and abuse of law?

       We would like to remark that having regard to the facts of
C this case the two issues are interconnected and narratives
  would be overlapping, as would become apparent when we
  proceed with the discussion hereinafter.

         8. For this purpose, we would first like to point out that the
0   High Court has itself taken note of the judgment of this Court
    in the Case of Naresh Kumar Madan (supra) to hold that the
    appellants are covered by the description of public servants
    within the meaning of Section 21 of IPC. Following observations
    therefrom have been quoted:
E      "The officers of the State Electricity Board are required to
       carry out public functions. They are public authorities. Their
 · --action in one way or the other may entail civil or evil
       c~ncestolh~onsumers of electrical energy. They
       may prosecute a person~hey-are1lmpowered-to enter into
F      the house of the Board's consumers. It is only for proper
       and effective exercise of those powers, the statute provides
       that they would be public servants, wherefore a legal fiction
       has been created in favour of those employees, when
       acting or purported to act in pursuance of any of the
G      provisions of the Act within the meaning of Section 21 of
       the Indian Penal Code. Indian Penal Code denotes various
       persons to the public servants. It is, however, not
       exhaustive. A person may be public servant in terms of
       another statute. However we may notice that a person,
H      who, inter alia, is in the service or pay of the Government
      RAJIB RANJAN & ORS. v. R. VIJAYKUMAR                   993
                  [A.K. SIKRI, J.]

    established by or under a Central, Provincial or State Act,     A
    would also come within the purview thereof. Section 2 (1)
    (c) of the 1988 Act also brings within its embrace a person
    in the service or pay of a corporation established by or
    under a Central Act."
                                                                    B
    9. The question is of the applicability of Section 197 of the
Code. Said provision with which we are concerned is
reproduced below:

    "Prosecution of Judges and public servant. (1) When any
    person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public          C
    servant not removable from his office save by or with the
    sanction of the Government is accused of any ofence
    alleged to have been committed by him while acting or
    purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no
    Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with         D
    the previous sanction-

      (a)   In the case of a person who is employed, or as the
            case may be, was at the time of commission of the
            alleged offence employed, in connection with the        E
            affairs of the Union, of the Central Government;

      (b)   in the case of a person who is employed or, as the
            case may be, was at the time of commission of the
            alleged offence employed, in connection with the
            affairs of a State, of the State Government."           F

     10. This provision makes it clear that if any offence is
alleged to have been committed by a public servant who cannot
be removed from the office except by or with the sanction of
the Government, the Court is precluded from taking cognizance       G
of such offence except with the previous sanction of the
competent authority specified in this provision.

     11. The sanction, however, is necessary if the offence
alleged against public servant is committed by him "while acting
or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties". In   H
    994       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A   order to find out as to whether the alleged offence is committed
    while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official
    duty, following yardstick is provided by this Court in Dr.
    Budhikota Subbarao (supra) in the following words:

B         "If on facts, therefore, it is prima facie found that the act or
          omission for which the accused was charged had"
          reasonable connection with discharge of his duty then it
          must be held to be official to which applicability of Section
          197 of the Code cannot be disputed."
c        12. This principle was explained in some more detail in
    the case of Raghunath Anant Govilkar v. State of Maharashtra,
    which was decided by this Court on 08.02.2008 in SLP(Crt.)
    No.5453 of 2007, in the following manner:

D         "On the question of the applicability of Section 197 of the
          Code of Criminal Procedure, the principle laid down in two
          cases, namely, Shreekantiah Ramayya Munipalli v. State
          of Bombay and Amrik Singh v. State of Pepsu was as
          follows:
E         It is not every offence committed, by a public servant that
          requires sanction for prosecution under Section 197 (1) of
          Criminal Procedure Cod; nor even every act done by him
          while he is actually engaged in the performance of his
          official duties; but if the act complained of is directly
F         concern ·d with his official duties so that, if questioned, it
          could be claimed to have been done by virtue of the office,
          then sanction would be necessary.

       The real question therefore, is whether the acts complained
G of in the present case were directly concerned with the official
  duties of the three public servants. As far as the offence of
  criminal conspiracy punishable under Sections 120-B read with
  Section 409 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned and also
  Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, are concerned
H they cannot be said to be of the nature mentioned in Section
      RAJIB RANJAN & ORS. v. R. VIJAYKUMAR                      995
                 [AK. SIKRI, J.]
197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. To put it shortly, it is         A
no part of the duty of a public servant, while discharging his
official duties, to enter into a criminal conspiracy or to indulge
in criminal misconduct. Want of sanction under Section 197 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure is, therefore, no bar."
                                                                        B
     13. Likewise, in Shambhoo Nath Misra v. State of UP.
and others, (1997) 5 SCC 326, the Court dealt with the subject
in the following manner:

    "5. The question is when the public servant is alleged to
    have committed the offence of fabrication of record or              C
    misappropriation of public fund etc. can be said to have
    acted in discharge of his official duties? It is not the official
    duty of the public servant to fabricate the false record and
    misappropriate the public funds etc. in furtherance of or in
    the discharge of his official duties. The official capacity only    D
    enables him to fabricate the record or misappropriate the
    public fund etc. It does not mean that it is integrally
    connected or inseparably interlinked with the crime
    committed in the course of same transaction, as was
    believed by the learned Judge. Under these circumstances,           E
    we are of the opinion that the view expressed by the High
    Court as well as by the trial Court on the question of
    sanction is clearly illegal and cannot be sustained."

      14. The ratio of the aforesaid cases, which is clearly
discernible, is that even while discharging his official duties, if     F
a public servant enters into a criminal conspiracy or indulges
in criminal misconduct, such misdemeanor on his part is not
to be treated as· an act in discharge of his official duties and,
therefore, provisions of Section 197 of the Code will not be
attracted. In fact, the High Court has dismissed the petitions          G
filed by the appellant precisely with these observations namely
the allegations pertain to fabricating the false records which
cannot be treated as part of the appellants normal official
duties. The High Court has, thus, correctly spelt out the
proposition of law. The only question is as to whether on the           H
    996      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A facts of the present case, the same has been correctly applied.
  If one looks into the allegations made in the complaint as stand
  alone allegations, probably what the High Court has said may
  seem to be justified. However, a little deeper scrutiny into the
  circumstances under which the complaint came to be filed
B would demonstrate that allegation of fabricating the false record
  is clearly an afterthought and it becomes more than apparent
  that the respondent has chosen to level such a make belief
  allegation with sole motive to give a shape of criminality to the
  entire dispute, which was otherwise civil in nature. As noted
c above, the respondent had in fact initiated civil action in the form
  of suit for injunction against the award of the contract in which
  he failed. Order of civil court was challenged by filing writ
  petition in the High Court. Plea of the respondent was that the
  action of the Department in rejecting his tender and awarding
  the contract to accused No.1 was illegal and motivated. Writ
0
  petition was also dismissed with cost. These orders attained
  finality. It is only thereafter criminal complaint is filed with the
  allegation that accused No.1 is favoured by creating a false
  certificate dated 28.12.2004. We would dilate this discussion
  with some elaboration, hereinafter.
E
         15. As already pointed above, tender was floated by the
  CSEB and the CEI herein was one of the parties who had
  submitted its bid through the respondent. However, tender
  conditions mentioned certain conditions and it was necessary
F to fulfill those conditions to become eligible to submit the bid
  and have it considered. As per the appellants, tender of the
  respondent was rejected on the ground that plant and
  equipment erected by the respondent at Patratu Thermal Power
  Station, Patratu, Jharkhand was not functioning well. This
G information was received by the Tender Committee from JSEB.
  When the report was sought by CSEB in December, 2004, the
  Tender Committee took the view that the respondent did not
  fulfill the pre-qualifying conditions and rejected his tender.
  Before doing so, the respondent was asked time and again to
H send the performance report which he had promised but he
       RAJIB RANJAN & ORS. v. R. VIJAYKUMAR                     997
                   [A.K. SIKRI, J.]

 failed to comply even when he had assured to do the needful.           A
 In fact, that itself was sufficient to reject that bid of the
 respondent as it was non compliant with the tender conditions.
 Still, in order to verify the claim of the respondent and to
 consider his bid on merits, though not strictly required, the
 appellant R.C. Jain was deputed to get the desired information         B
 from JSEB. He met the officials of JSEB and submitted his
 report to the effect that the works carried out by the respondent
 at Patratu Thermal Power Station was not satisfactory. Even,
 Shri B.M. Ram, General Manager of the said Power Station
 furnished his report dated 28.12.2004 wherein it was summed            c
 up that due to the defects in the scanning system, supplied by
 the respondent, generation had been adversely effected and
 the said Electricity Board was not satisfied with the equipment
 supplied by the respondent. In spite of the aforesaid material,
 the tender Committee acted with caution and even the technical         0
 expertise was sought. Even the report of the technical experts
 went against the respondent as it opined that the respondent
 was not technically suitable on the technical vetting and
 comparative data. On the basis of the aforesaid material, the
 respondent's tender document was not opened and returned
 and he was informed accordingly. All this has clearly happened
                                                                        E
 in furtherance of and in discharge of the official duties by the
 appellant. In the facts of the present case, we are of the view
 that allegations of fabricating the records are mischievously
 made as an afterthought, just to give colour of criminality to a
 civil case.                                                            F

        16. As pointed out above, the respondent had even filed
  the civil suit challenging the decision of the Electricity Board in
  returning his tender documents on the ground that the same
  were not as per pre-qualifying conditions of the tender. He had       G
  thus resorted to the civil remedy. However, he failed therein as
  for the reasons best known to him, he sought to withdrew the
  same and accordingly the same was dismissed for non-
. prosecution. It is trite that once the suit is withdrawn, that acts
  as constructive res judicata having regard to the provision of        H
    998      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A Order XXlll Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Also, when
  suit is dismissed under Order IX Rule 8 CPC, fresh suit under
  Order IX Rule 9 is barred. The legal implication would be of that
  the attempt of the respondent in challenging the decision of the
  Tender Committee in not considering his tender remained
B unfaulted. Even when the respondent himself invited order of
  dismissal in the civil suit, curiously enough, he filed a writ
  petition against the order passed in the civil court dismissing
  his suit for non-prosecution, but the same was also dismissed
  by the High Court on 25.06.2007 and even a cost of Rs.25,000/
c - was imposed on the respondent as the said writ petition was
  perceived by the High Court as 'abuse of process of the court'.
  SLP preferred by the respondent was also dismissed by this
  Court on 14.09.2007. It is only thereafter the respondent filed
  the criminal complaint out of which present proceedings
  emanate. No doubt, the respondent in his complaint has right
0
  to colour his complaint by levelling the allegations that the
  appellants herein fabricated the records. However, on the facts
  of this case, it becomes difficult to eschew this allegation of the
  respondent and we get an uncanny feeling that the contents of
  FIR with these allegations are a postscript of the respondent
E after losing the battle in civil proceedings which were taken oat
  by him challenging the action of the Department in rejecting his
  tender. When he did not succeed in the said attempt, he came
  out with the allegations of forgery. It is thus becomes clear that
  the action of the respondent in filing the criminal complaint is
F not bonafide and amounts to misuse and abuse of the process
  of law.

       17. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC
  335, this Court has laid down principles on which Court can
G quash the criminal proceedings under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.
  These are as follows:

          "102.(1) Where the allegations made in the first
                information report or the complaint, even if they are
                taken at their face value and accepted in their
H
RAJIB RANJAN & ORS. v. R. VIJAYKUMAR                   999
            [A.K. SIKRI, J.]

      entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or   A
      make out a case against the accused.

(2)   Where the allegations in the first information report
      and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR
      do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an
                                                              B
      investigation by police officers under Section 156
      (1) of the Code except under an order of a
      Magistrate within the purview of Section 155 (2) of
      the Code.

(3)   Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the        c
      FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in
      support of the same do not disclose the
      commission of any offence and make out a case
      agai_nst the accused.
                                                              D
(4)   Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute
      a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
      cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by
      a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
      contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the Code.
                                                              E
(5)   Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint
      are so absurd and inherently improbable on the
      basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a
      just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for
      proceeding against the accused.                         F

(6)   Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
      any of the provisions of the Code or the Act
      concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is
      instituted) to the institution and continuance of the   G
      proceedings and/or where there is a specific
      provision in the Code or the Act concerned,
      providing efficacious redress for the grievance of
      the aggrieved party.
                                                              H
    1000         SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A          (7)    Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended
                  with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is
                  maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
                  wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a
                  view to spite him due to private and personal
B                 grudge."

        Principle Nos.6 and 7 are clearly applicable in the present
    case.

        18. Having regard to the circumstances narrated and
C explained above, we are also of the view that attempt is made
  by the respondent to convert a case with civil nature into criminal
  prosecution. In a case like this, High Court would have been
  justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of its inherent
  powers under Section 482 of the Code. It would be of benefit
D to refer to the judgment in the case of Indian Oil Corpn. v.
  NEPC India Ltd. and others, (2006) 6 SCC 736, wherein the
  Court adversely commented upon this very tendency of filing
  criminal complaints even in cases relating to commercial
  transaction for which civil remedy is available is available or
E has been availed. The Court held that the following
  observations of the Court in this behalf are taken note of:

        "13. While on this issue, it is necessary to take notice of a
        growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil
        disputes into criminal cases. This is obviously on account
F       of a prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time
        consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of
        lenders/creditors. Such a tendency is seen in several family
        disputes also, leading to irretrievable breakdown of
        marriages/families. There is also an impression that if a
G       person could somehow be entangled in a criminal
        prosecution, there is a likelihood of imminent settlement.
        Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not
        involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure through
        criminal prosecution should be deprecated and
H
     RAJIB RANJAN & ORS. v. R. VIJAYKUMAR                   1001
                 [A.K. SIKRI, J.]

    discouraged. In G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., (2000) 2         A
    SCC 636, this Court observed: (SCC p. 643, para 8)

    "It is to be seen if a matter, which is essentially of a civil
    nature, has been given a cloak of criminal offence.
    Criminal proceedings are not a short cut of other remedies       B
    available in law. Before issuing process a criminal court
    has to exercise a great deal of caution. For the accused
    it is a serious matter. This Court has laid certain principles
    on the basis of which the High Court is to exercise its
    jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. Jurisdiction         C
    under this section has to be exercised to prevent abuse
    of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends
    of justice."

    14. While no one with a legitimate cause or grievance
    should be prevented from seeking remedies available in           D
    criminal law, a complainant who initiates or persists with
    a prosecution, being fully aware that the criminal
    proceedings are unwarranted and his remedy lies only in
    civil law, should himself be made accountable, at the end
    of such misconceived criminal proceedings, in                    E
    accordance with law. One positive step that can be taken
    by the courts, to curb unnecessary prosecutions and
    harassment of innocent parties, is to exercise their power
    under Section 250 CrPC more frequently, where they
    discern malice or frivolousness or ulterior motives on the       F
    part of the complainant. Be that as it may."

     19. In lnder Mohan Goswami and another v. State of
Uttaranchal and others, (2007) 12 SCC 1, the Court reiterated
the scope and ambit of power of the High Court under Section
482 of the Code in the following wo~ds:                              G

    "23. This Court in a number of cases has laid down the
    scope and ambit of courts' powers under Section 482
    CrPC. Every High Court has inherent power to act ex
    debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the     H
    1002   SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2014] 10 S.C.R.


A      administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent abuse
       of the process of the court. Inherent power under Section
       482 CrPC can be exercised:

              (i) to give effect to an order under the Code;
B             (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and

              (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice.

       24. Inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC though wide
       have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great
c      caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests
       specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the
       court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of
       the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of
       the court, then the could would be justified in preventing
D
       injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of
       specific provisions in the statute.

       Discussion of decided cases

E      25. Reference to the following cases would reveal that the
       courts have consistently taken the view that they must use
       this extraordinary power to prevent injustice and secure the
       ends of justice. The English courts have also used inherent
       power to achieve the same objective. It is generally agreed
       that the Crown Court has inherent power to protect its
F
       process from abuse. In Connellyv. OPP, 11964 AC 1254
       Lord Devlin stated that where particular criminal
       proceedings constitute an abuse of process, the court is
       empowered to refuse to allow the indictment to proceed
       to trial. Lord Salmon in OPP v. Humphrys, 1977 AC 1
G      stressed the importance of the inherent power when he
       observed that it is only if the prosecution amounts to an
       abuse of the process of the court and is oppressive and
       vexatious that the judge has the power to intervene. He
       further mentioned that the court's power to prevent such
H
      RAJIB RANJAN & ORS. v. R. VIJAYKUMAR                    1003
                  [A.K. SIKRI, J.]

     abuse is of great constitutional importance and should be         A
     jealously preserved.

     46. The court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not
     used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private
     vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the
                                                                       B
     accused. On analysis of the aforementioned cases, we are
     of the opinion that it is neither possible nor desirable to
     lay down an inflexible rule that would govern the exercise
     of inherent jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction of the High
     Courts under Section 482 CrPC though wide has to be
     exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only          C
     when it is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the
     statute itself and in the aforementioned cases. In view of
     the settled legal position, the impugned judgment cannot
     be sustained."
                                                                       D
     20. As a result, these appeals are allowed. Order of the
High Court is set aside. Consequently, cognizance taken by the
learned Magistrate and orders summoning the appellants as
accused is hereby set aside resulting into the dismissal of the
said complaint. There shall however be no order as to costs.           E
Devika Gujral                                       Appeals allowed.