Holding

The Supreme Court held that the land is not agricultural; therefore Section 8 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act does not apply and the Trust’s right to recover possession stands, making the High Court’s dismissal of the heirs’ appeals unassailable.

Summary

The Lala Nanak Chand Trust leased a plot in Meerut to trustee Bateshwar Dayal for 30 years with a renewal clause. After the lease expired, the Trust sued for possession and obtained a decree; the lessee’s heirs later sought specific performance of the renewal clause, but their suit was dismissed as time‑barred. While the appeals were pending, the Uttar Pradesh Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1956 declared the land agricultural and a notification under Section 8 was issued. The Trust obtained a writ quashing the notification and the High Court abated the pending suits and appeals. The Supreme Court set aside the abatement, ordered the matters restored, and, after a statutory enquiry, held that the land was not agricultural; consequently Section 8 did not apply and the Trust’s right to possession remained. The Court affirmed the High Court’s dismissal of the heirs’ appeals, finding them in unauthorized occupation.

Issues considered

Whether the disputed land qualifies as 'agricultural land' under the Uttar Pradesh Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1956 and whether Section 8 notification is applicable.
Whether civil courts have jurisdiction to entertain a suit for possession of land declared agricultural under the Act.
Whether the renewal clause in the lease can be enforced by specific performance and the effect of the limitation period under Section 14 of the Limitation Act.
Whether the High Court could decide the appeals without waiting for the result of the statutory enquiry.
Whether the Trust’s intermediary interest is extinguished by the Act.

Legislation cited

Limitation Acts. 14
U.P. Tenancy Acts. 3(b)

Subjects

tenancyleaserenewal clausespecific performancelimitation periodagricultural landZamindari Abolition Actpossessionland reformcivil jurisdiction

Judgment

A RAJESHWAR DAYAL AND ORS.
v.
AVNEESH KUMAR AVASTHI AND ORS.

APRIL 4,,2002

B [D.P. MOHAPATRA AND BRIJESH KUMAR, JJ.]

Tenancy Laws :

Claim for possession ofsuit land by lessor after expiry of lease period-
C During pendency oflitigation suit land declared agricultural land by Zamindari
Abolition Act-After enquiry, land found not to be agricultural-Held, lessor
entitled to recovery ofpossession since its interest in the land was not ousted
by virtue ofproceedings under the Act-Uttar Pradesh Urban Areas Zamindari
Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1956-Section 8.
D · The land in dispute was leased out by lessor-,Trust to one of its trustees
- the predecess~r of the appellants, for a period of 30 years. The lease deed
contained renewal clause.

After expiry of the lease period, Trust filed suit for possession of the
E land which was dismissed. First Appellate Court allowed the appeal of the
Trust

Thereafter, appellants-legal heirs of the lessee filed suit for specific
performance of the contract. The case was dismissed by Trial Court as well
as First Appellate Court, as time barred.
·F
Appellant filed two Second Appeals in High Court against both the
orders of the Appellate Courts.

During pendency of the Second Appeals, Uttar Pradesh Urban Areas,
Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1956 came into force and , '
G notification under Section 8 of the Act was issued declaring the disputed land
as 'agricultural land'. Appellants filed application for abatement of the
pending appeals in view of the land being declared as 'agricultural land'. High
Court allowed the application and the suits and appeals arising therefrom
stood abated.

H
926
.,
1

RAJESHW AR DAYAL v. A VNEESH KUMAR AVAST HI 927
~

~
The Trust filed appeal to this Court against the order of High Court A
abating the appeals. It also filed writ" petition praying for quashing the
notification under Section 8 of the Act The writ petition was aUowed quashing
the notification. However, Government was directed to hold enquiry for
• finding out as to whether the land was agricultural and held that if the land
in dispute was found to be not agriculthral land no further notification would
be issued under Section 8 of the Act The appeals were allowed setting aside B
the orders of High Court abating the appeals and suits and the same were
directed to be restored to their original numbers. However, it directed that
~ appeals would be decided on merits by the High Court only after the result
of the enquiry under the Act, if it was found that the land was not an
agricultural land. c
High Court decided the appeals, without waiting for the result of the
enquiry and dismissed both the appeals upholding the findings of the First
Appellate Court. Hence the present appeals.

;.. During pendency of the appeals, this Court directed the enquiry to be D
completed. After completion of the enquiry the concerned authorities gave
concurrent finding that the land in dispute was not agricultural land on the
relevant date.

Dismissing the appeals, the Court
E
HELD : I. In view of concurrent findings of the concerned Authorities
that the land in dispute was not agricultural land on the relevant date, the
question of government issuing a notification under Section 8 of the Act
' abolishing the intermediary interest held by the Trust in the property does
not arise. [933-D]
F
2. Judgment of the High Court dismissing the second appeals filed by
the appellant is unassailable since the appellants who were in unauthorised
occupation of the land since the expiry of the period of the lease have no valid
reason to resist the claim of the Trust for recovery of possession of the
property. (933-E] G
y'

CIVIL APPELLATE WRISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 2462-63
of 2002.

From the Judgment and Order dated 9.9.99 of the Allahabad High Court
in S.A. Nos. 425/60 and 1649 of 1962. H
928 SUPREME COURT REPORTS f2002] 2 S.C.R.

A R.B. Mehrotra, M.M. Kshatriya and Jagdish Singh for the Appellants. T

P.P. Malhotra, Shaiiendra Sharma, Ms. Binu Tamta, Pramod Swarup,
Praveen Swarup, Ms. Prema Swarup, Amit Singh and Prashant Chaudhary for
the Respondents.

B The Judgment of the Court was delivered by :

D.P. MOHAPATRA, J. Leave granted.

These appeals filed by heirs and legal representatives of the erstwhile ,1..

lessee are directed against the judgment dated 9. 9.1999 of the High Court of
C Judicature at Allahabad dismissing the second appeal nos. 425/1960 and 1649/
1962. The dispute raised in both the appeals relates to the property under old
plot No. 5199 which corresponds to new plot no. 4635-A with an area of 1
bigha 2 biswas situate in the city of Meerut which fonns a part of the estate
of a charitable trust, the Lala Nanak Chand Trust. Bateshwar Dayal was one
of the trustees of the said trust. A registered lease deed was executed by the
D trust in his favour for a period of 30 years w.e.f. 1.6.1926 on annual rental of ..J..
Rupees 12 and 8 annas. After expiry of the period of lease on 1. 7.1956 the
trust instituted the suit, Original Suit No.690 of 1956, against Bateswar Dayal
and others seeking recovery of possession of the property. The trial court
dismissed the suit. The trust filed an appeal, Civil Appeal No. 914 of 1958,
E which was allowed and the suit for eviction was decreed. The lower appellate
court while decreeing the suit observed that if the defendants so like they may
file a suit for specific perfonnance of contract to enforce the renewal clause
of the registered agreement between the trust and the defendants. Taking clue
from the observation of the lower appellate court the appellants who are the -i.
heirs and legal represenUj.tives of Bateshwar Dayal who died on 6.3 .1958,
F instituted a suit, O.S. No. 34/60 for specific performance of contract. The trust
contested the suit. The trial· court dismissed the suit vi de the judgment dated
30. l 0.1961. The appeal filed by the plaintiff was also dismissed.

Two second appeals were filed in the High Court challenging the
G judgments of the first appellate courts in the two suits. Second appeal No.
425/60 arose from Original Suit No. 690/56; the second appeal no. 1649/62;
arose out of original suit No. 34/60. In second appeal No. 425/60 the High Y
Court formulated the following substantial questions of Jaw for decision :

"l. If the Civil Court has jurisdiction to try the suit
H 2. If the plaintiffs got a decree for eviction in view of renewable
RAJESHWAR DA VAL v. AVNEESH KUMAR A VAS THI ID.P. MOHAPATRA, J .] 929

clause in the agreement ?" A
In second appeal No. 1649of1962 a substantial question of law settled
for decision was :

"If the time consumed in pursuing the suit No.690 of 1956 and Civil
Appeal No. 914 of 1958 should be given in aid to the time of limitation · B
for filing a suit for specific perfonnance of contract in the present
case?."

During pendency of second appeal No.425 of 1960 the Uttar Pradesh
;. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (UP Act No.IX of
1957) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') came into force in the city of C
Meerut. The land in dispute was declared as agricultural area and a notification
under Section 8 of the Act was issued by the Government of Uttar Pradesh.
The trust filed an appeal in the High Court praying for quashing of the
notification issued under section 8 of the Act. The appellants in the second
appeal which was pending before the High Court filed application for abating
the appeals since the area was declared agricultural area under section 8 of the D
>- Act. The High Court allowed the application and the suits and the appeals
arising therefrom were abated. Against the order of abatement the trust filed
special leave petition before this Court which gave rise to civil appeal Nos.1402/
69 and 1403/69 (wrongly stated as 1492 and 1493 ) and also a writ petition
bearing No.185/69 (wrongly stated as 105/69) for quashing the Government E
Notification dated 16.6.1964 under Section 8 of the Act. A Constitution Bench
of this Court by the judgment reported in [1973] 2 SCC 238 S.P. Wale/ and
Ors. v. State of U.P. allowed the writ petition and quashed the Notification
dated 16.6.1964 under Section 8 of the Act in respect of the land in dispute
and issued certain directions to the State Government. The operative portion
of the judgment reads as follow: F
"In the result, we allow the \\Tit petition and quash the Government
notification under Section 8 of the Act, dated June 16, 1964, with
respect to the land in dispute. We direct the Government to proceed
afresh with respect to the land in dispute in accordance with Sections G
3,4,5 and 6 of the Act. If it is found in the course of enquiry under
Sections 3,4 and 5 that the land in dispute was an "agricultural area"
and was being used for agriculture or horticulture on the relevant date,
it will be open to the Government to issue a notification with respect
to it under Section 8 if, on the other hand, it is found in that enquiry
that it was not an "agricultural area" on the said date, no notification H
930 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2002] 2 S.C.R.

A under Section 8 should be issued with respect to it. The appeals are
also allowed. The orders· of the High Court abating the appeals and the
suits are set aside. The High Court will restore the appeals and the
suits to their original numbers. The appeals will be decided on merits
when the appropriate authority under Section 5 of .tpe Act has held
that the land in dispute is not an "agricultural area". If it is held by
B. him that the land in dispute is an "agricultural area" and the State
Government issues a notification under Section 8 of the Act with
respect to the land, the appeals will be disposed of in accordance with
the provisions of the Act. In the circumstances of this case parties
shall bear their own costs."
c From the impugned judgment it appears that the learned single Judge
dealing with the contentions raised on behalf of the appellants that the civil
court has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter took note of the decision of
the Constitution Bench and held :

D "Since 28th March, 1973 uptil now admitted to both parties, the State
of U.P. has not issued a fresh notification under section 8 of the U.P.
Urban Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court has taken note of the affidavit of Trust that the suit land is kothi
land and it is not agricultural land. Under the circumstances there
remains no material at all to hold that the suit land is land under the
'
E definition of Section 3(b) of the U.P. Tenancy Act. The lower appellate
Court has, of course, observed that the suit land is a grove· 1and but
after the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court there remains no
point for argument to the appellants that the Civil Court has no
jurisdiction to try the suit."
F Dealing with the question of enforcement of the renewal clause of the
contract the learned Judge held that appellate court was right in holding that
in the context of the case remedy, if any, available to.-the plaintiff was to file
a suit for specific performance of the renewal clause of the contract. The
learned single Judge upheld the decision of the Court below decreeing the suit
G filed by the trust for recovery of possession of the property.

Dealing with the suit filed by the appellants herein for specific
performance of the renewal clause of the contract of lease the learned single
Judge held that they are not entitled to take the help of section 14 of the
Limitation Act. They cannot be accepted to be bona fide pursuing the remedy
H in a court of law for enforcing the :-enewal clause. Therefore, the time consumed
RAJESHWAR DAYAL v. AVNEESHKUMARAVASTHI [D.P. MOHAPATRA,J.] 93 J

in defending the eviction suit filed by the trust could not be availed by them A
.. under the provisions of section 14 of the Limitation Act. The learned single
Judge further observed that the period of limitation for instituting a suit for
specific performance of contract will run from the date on which cause of
action for such suit arose. So computed the suit filed by the appellants was
clearly barred by limitation and was rightly dismissed as time barred. The B
learned single Judge also observed that undisputedly the 30 years term for
which the claim of renewal was made by the appellants had expired in 1986
and thus the appellants had enjoyed the extended period of lease despite
refusal of extension by the landlord. On the above findings the learned Judge
dismissed the second appeal vide judgment dated 9.9. 1999. These appeals by
special leave are directed against the said judgment. C
During pendency of these appeals, this Court in the order dated 6.11.2000
referring to the directions issued in the judgment of the Constitution Bench
had observed :

"It is unfortunate that after 1978 nothing concrete was done in this D
matter for several years but the aforesaid directions were binding on
the High Court. The aforesaid enquiry as directed by this Court is not
yer completed but the High Court has now disposed of the Second
Appeals on merits, without waiting for the result of the inquiry. In
these appeals the question is whether the property is 'agricultural land' E
and that question is still pending inquiry, as directed by this Court
earlier. It appears that the said inquiry is in progress and the
Commissioner, Meerut Division is proceeding to complete the inquiry.
We direct that the inquiry into the demarcation under sub-section (2)
& (3) of Section 4 and Rule 30 of the U.P. Urban Zarnindari Abolition
and Land Reforms Act, I956 shall be completed within three months F
from the date of the receipt of this order and the Commissioner shall
submit a report to this Court by sending it to the Registrar (General)
of this Court. As and when the report is received, the copies of the
same will be furnished to the parties and the matter will be listed for
further orders."
G
Thereafter the Commissioner, Meerut Division passed an order under
Section 52 on 1.5.200 I. The appeal filed against the said order under sub-
s~ction (3) of section 5 of the Act, appeal No. 93-Z(M) /2001 titled Rajeshwar
Dayal and Ors. v. State of UP. and Ors., was decided by the Board of
Revenue, U.P. vide order dated 19.11.2001. H
932 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2002) 2 S.C.R.

A From the order dated 1.5.2001 of the Commissioner, Meerut Division it '!'"
appears that the.authority has discussed in great detail the different steps taken
\.-
for verification of the revenue records in respect of the land in dispute over
a span of four decades; the spot visits made by the demarcation officer and
his report containing the observations regarding the prevailing state of things
on the land; the contentions raised by both sides and the position of law with
B reference to the relevant provisions of the Act. The ultimate findings recorded
by the Commissioner are quoted hereunder:
c
''I have heard the contentions of the learned Advocates and perused A..
the available evidence on record. From the comments of demarcation
c officer of the years 1976 and 2000, it is clear that disputed land is not c
being used as agricultural land. Revenue Records which are produced
by Sri Rajeshwar Dayal, they are of the year late than 1956 when the
decision is to be taken for the year 1956 whether the disputed land
Was sued for agriculture purposes. From the comments of Demarcation
officer it is clear that on the appointed date, disputed land was not
D used for agricultural purpose but was land appurtenant to the house ~

built in abadi which was given by Nanak Chand Trust for fixed period
on Patta to Pt. Bateshwar Dayal. Evidence available on record on the
basis of comments of Demarcation Officer it is clear that on the
appointed date disputed land was not being used for agricultural (;.
purpose. On the appointed date the aforesaid land is not agricultural
E land. Accordingly, objections are disposed of and there is no
requirement of (Simankan) Demarcation."
In the appeal filed by Rajeshwar Dayal and others against the order of
the Commissioner, Meerut Division App. No.93 '(Z) M 2000-2001 the Member,
Board of Revenue, dismissing the appeal, by his order dated 19 .11.200 l made
F the following observations :

"...... The main dispute in this case is that whether the disputed land is
being used by Pt. Bateshwar Dayal Sharma and his legal heirs for the
purpose of agriculture or plantation or not. For determination of this ....
fact, on perusal of the evidence adduced on the record of file, it is \.
G clear that in the Reports dated 05.04.1976 and 13.11.2000 of
..,..,
Demarcation Officer, in this regard, it is clearly mentioned that the
disputed land is not bemg used for agricultural purpose. In this respect,
I am fully in agreement with the view of Commissioner, Meerut
Division, Meerut that the assessment of the disputed land is to be
H determined on the basis of prescribed year 1956 and the evidence I.

I
RAJESHWAR DAYAL v AVNEESH KUMAR AVASTHI [D.P MOHAPATRA, J.] 933

adduced on the record by Rajeshwar Dayal and Ors. is related to after A
the year 1956. In such circumstances, I am fully in agreement with the
conclusion of the Commissioner, Meerut Division and I uphold the
order dated 1.5.200 I passed by him and do not consider any need of
interference of any kind. The present appeal being devoid of any
substance, is liable to be dismissed.
B
In view of the above discussion, this appeal is dismissed. Order dated
1.5.2001 passed by the Commissioner, Meerut Division, Meerut is
confirmed."

From the discussions in the foregoing paragraphs the position that
emerges is that the revenue authorities i.e. Commissioner, Meerut -Division C
and the Member, Board of Revenue, have in compliance with the directions
issued in the Judgment of the Constitution Bench in S.P. Watel case (supra) -
have determined the question whether the land in dispute was 'agricultural
land' on the relevant date. They have concurrently held that the land was not
being used as agricultural land on the relevant date. In view of such concurrent D
findings the question of Government issuing a notification under Section 8 of
the Act abolishing the intermediary interest held by the trust in the property
does not arise. The consequential position that follows is that the appellants
who are in unauthorized occupation of the land since the expiry of the period
of the lease have no valid reason to resist the claim of the trust for recovery
of possession of the property. Therefore the judgment of the High Court E
dismissing the second appeals filed by the appellant herein is unassailable.

In the result these appeals being devoid of merit are' dismissed with
)
costs. Hearing fee is assessed at Rs. 20,000.

K.K. T. Appeals dismissed. F