Holding

The 1997 Act does not retrospectively extinguish tenancy rights vested under the 1956 Act, and the alleged deposition does not constitute a valid admission under Order XII Rule 6, so the appellants remain tenants.

Summary

The appellants, children of a tenant who died in 1970, claimed that they inherited tenancy rights under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, which were later purportedly extinguished by the 1997 Act. The landlord sought eviction, relying on a deposition in an unrelated case as an admission that the tenancy was in the mother’s name and that the five‑year protection under section 2(g) of the 1997 Act expired in 2014. The High Court accepted this admission and decreed eviction, but the Supreme Court held that the deposition did not meet the stringent criteria for a "judgment on admission" under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC. The Court further held that the 1997 Act, being prospective, could not retrospectively strip rights accrued under the repealed 1956 Act absent a clear legislative intent. Consequently, the appellants’ tenancy remained valid beyond 2006, and the lower courts' orders were set aside. The appeals were allowed, restoring the appellants’ right to occupy the premises.

Issues considered

Whether the children of the original tenant became tenants upon the father's death under s.2(h) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956.
Whether the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997, with its five‑year limitation in s.2(g), extinguishes tenancy rights accrued under the 1956 Act.
Whether the deposition in an unrelated case qualifies as a clear, unequivocal admission under Order XII Rule 6 of the CPC for a judgment on admission.
Whether the 1997 Act operates retrospectively to affect rights vested under the repealed 1956 Act.

Legislation cited

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order XII Rule 6
West Bengal General Clauses Act, 1899s. 8(c)
West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956s. 2(h)
West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997s. 2(g)

Subjects

EvictionJudgment on admissionMixed question of fact and lawAdmission against lawRepealed statuteNew statuteAmbiguous draftingLoose draftingInherited tenancy rights under Old ActProspectiveRetrospectiveInterpretation of statutory provisionAbsence of clear and unequivocal intentionUnambiguous admissionEnabling provisionSpeedy disposal of the suitsDismissal of SLP at admission stage before issuance of noticeNon-speaking order

Judgment

[2024] 9 S.C.R. 644 : 2024 INSC 719

Rajesh Mitra @ Rajesh Kumar Mitra & Anr.
v.
Karnani Properties Ltd.
(Civil Appeal No(s). 3593-3594 of 2024)
20 September 2024
[Sudhanshu Dhulia* and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether the appellants-children of the original tenant had also
became tenants upon the death of their father, by virtue of
s.2(h) of the old Act-West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956;
and whether the 1997 Act would cover such tenants who were
protected under the 1956 Act.

Headnotes†
West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 – s.2(h) – West
Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 – s.2(g) – Death of the
original tenant in the year 1970, before the commencement
of 1997 Act-prior to July 10, 2001 – Devolution of tenancy on
the tenant’s widow and the appellants, children who were
minor at the time of his death – Eviction suit by respondent-
landlord – Application u/Ord. XII r.6 by the respondent seeking
a ‘judgment on admission’ by relying on the deposition of the
appellant, in another case where the appellant had admitted
that the tenancy was in his mother’s name – Case of the
respondent that since the mother died in 2009, the appellants
not entitled to stay in the premises beyond the year 2014 in
terms of s.2(g) of the 1997 Act, which protects the rights of
the children and dependents of a tenant only for a limited
period of five years – Case of the tenant that the tenancy was
heritable as per s.2(h) of the 1956 Act, which was then in force,
thus, could not be evicted based on the New Act; and that the
appellants along with their mother had become tenants on the
property in 1970 on the death of their father – Suit decreed by
the trial court directing the tenant to vacate the suit property
and hand over the possession to the respondent – Single
Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court decreed the
suit of the landlord on the basis of alleged admission by the
appellant in another matter – Correctness:
* Author
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 645

Rajesh Mitra @ Rajesh Kumar Mitra & Anr. v.
Karnani Properties Ltd.

Held: Courts below ought not to have decreed the suit of the
landlord on the basis of alleged “admission” by the appellant made
in another unconnected matter – It does not pass muster the test
of “admission” visualised in Ord. XII r.6 – Question and its answer
are both mixed question of fact and law, a so called ‘admission’
against the law can never be an “admission” as visualised u/Ord.
XII r.6 – It is not a ‘clear admission’ as is being made out – What
has been given to the appellants under law cannot be taken
away on the basis of an unclear deposition – There cannot be
an admission against law – Furthermore, enforcement of a new
statute ipso facto will not take away the rights already accrued
under a repealed statute, unless this intention is reflected in the
new statute – Courts can, and must, differ from the literal meaning
of words if the reading of any provision provides absurd results –
Ambiguous drafting leads to manifold problems and generates
lengthy litigations – There is no clarity in the 1997 Act to suggest
that it extinguishes the rights of all tenants, who inherited tenancy
rights under Old Act retrospectively – Statutory laws operate from
the date of their enforcement i.e., prospectively – In case the
legislature intends to make law retrospective then such an intention
of legislature must be shown clearly and unambiguously in the
statute itself – Division Bench’s mere interpretation of a statutory
provision will not make the law retrospective and take away the
heritable rights of a tenant – Mother and the appellants jointly
inherited the tenancy from the father, in the year 1970 – Thus, the
impugned judgment liable to be set aside as appellants’ tenancy
did not expire in the year 2006, by the introduction of 1997 Act, in
the absence of a clear and unequivocal intention in the 1997 Act to
have a retrospective operation – Orders of the Single Judge and
the Division Bench set aside – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 –
Ord. XII r.6 – Interpretation of statutes. [Paras 17-22]

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 - Ord. XII r.6 – Judgment on
admission’ – Invocation of Ord. XII r.6, when:
Held: It is not that a court cannot pass a judgment on the basis of
an admission made in some other case – All the same, it has to
be kept in mind that Ord. XII r.6 is an enabling provision conferring
wide discretionary powers on the courts which cannot be claimed
by any party as a matter of right – Courts can invoke Ord. XII r.6
only in cases where admissions are unconditional, unequivocal
and unambiguous or when admission is based upon undisputed
646 [2024] 9 S.C.R.

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inferences – It is for the courts to see whether any statement in
the pleadings or otherwise amounts to an admission of such a
nature as to inspire the confidence of the court to pass judgment
on admission u/Ord. XII r.6 – It will depend upon the content and
kind of statement/admission which may vary from case to case –
It would depend upon the totality of facts and circumstances of a
particular given case – Ord. XII r.6 is meant for speedy disposal of
the suits in some cases and unless there is a clear, unambiguous,
unequivocal and unconditional admission, courts should not
exercise their discretion under the Rule because judgment on
admissions is without a trial which may even preclude a party to
challenge the matter on merits in the court of appeal – Provision
of law, which is meant for the expeditious disposal of appropriate
cases, should therefore be cautiously exercised and it should never
come in the way of any defendant denying him the valuable right
of contesting the claim. [Para 3]

Constitution of India – Arts.136 and 141 – Special Leave
Petition – Dismissal of SLP at the admission stage before
issuance of notice – Effect:
Held: Dismissal of SLP at the admission stage before issuance of
notice, with a non-speaking order, does not mean that this Court
has affirmed the law laid down by impugned order – Dismissal of
such SLP is no bar to decide the issue. [Para 14]

Case Law Cited
Charanjit Lal Mehra & Ors. v. Kamal Saroj Mahajan (Smt) and
Anr. [2005] 2 SCR 661 : (2005) 11 SCC 279; Raveesh Chand
Jain v. Raj Rani Jain [2015] 1 SCR 1096 : (2015) 8 SCC 428;
Uttam Singh Duggal & Co. Ltd. v. United Bank of India and Ors.
[2000] Supp. 2 SCR 187 : (2000) 7 SCC 120; Himani Alloys
Ltd. v. Tata Steel Ltd. [2011] 7 SCR 60 : (2011) 15 SCC 273;
Hari Steel & General Industries Ltd. v. Diljit Singh [2019] 6 SCR
819 : (2019) 20 SCC 425; P. Singaravelan v. District Collector,
Tiruppur [2019] 15 SCR 408 : (2020) 1 SCC (L&S) 453; Palam
Gas Service v. CIT [2017] 3 SCR 836 : (2017) 7 SCC 613;
Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala [2000] Supp. 1 SCR 538 :
(2000) 6 SCC 359 – relied on.
Goutam Dey v. Jyotsna Chatterjee, 2012 SCC OnLine Cal 642 –
approved.
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 647

Rajesh Mitra @ Rajesh Kumar Mitra & Anr. v.
Karnani Properties Ltd.

Sri. Sushil Kumar Jain & Ors. v. Pilani Properties Limited, 2017
SCC OnLine CAL 18807; Satyanarayana More v. Milagrina Rose
Correia, 2020 SCC OnLine CAL 957 – disapproved.
Prabir Kumar Jalan v. Laxmi Narayan Jalan, 2012 SCC OnLine
Cal 1313; CIT v. Vatika Township (P) Ltd. [2014] 12 SCR 1037 :
(2015) 1 SCC 1; State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy
[1978] 1 SCR 641 : (1977) 4 SCC 471; Nasimi Naqi v. Todi Tea
Company Ltd. & Ors. [2019] 17 SCR 1048 : CA No.9052/2019 –
referred to.

List of Acts
West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997; West Bengal Premises
Tenancy Act, 1956; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

List of Keywords
Eviction; Judgment on admission; Mixed question of fact and law;
Admission’ against law; Repealed statute; New statute; Ambiguous
drafting; Loose drafting; Inherited tenancy rights under Old Act;
Prospective; Retrospective; Interpretation of statutory provision;
Absence of clear and unequivocal intention; Unambiguous
admission; Enabling provision; Speedy disposal of the suits;
Dismissal of SLP at admission stage before issuance of notice;
Non-speaking order.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 3593-3594
of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 08.12.2022 of the High Court
at Calcutta in APDT No. 9 of 2022 and CS No. 154 of 2021

Appearances for Parties
Ms. Rashi Bansal, Ms. Tesu Gupta, Ms. Kriti Dang, Advs. for the
Appellants.
Sabyasachi Chowdhary, Neelesh Chowdhary, Partha Sil, Abhishek
Chowdhury, Ms. Sayani Bhattacharya, Ruchir Mishra, Abhiraj
Choudhary, Chirag Joshi, Sanjiv Kr. Saxena, Advs. for the
Respondent.
648 [2024] 9 S.C.R.

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Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.

1. The appellants (the defendants in the suit), are here in challenge to
the judgement dated 08.12.2022 whereby their Appeal was dismissed
by the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court, upholding the judgment
of the learned Single Judge (which was a judgment on admission),
dated 29.06.2022. While decreeing the suit, the Court had directed
the appellants (tenant) to vacate the suit property and handover
the vacant possession to the respondent-plaintiff, within sixty days!
2. This is a landlord-tenant matter arising out of an eviction suit filed
by the respondent before the Calcutta High Court, inter alia, praying
for eviction of appellants from Room No.208, 2nd Floor, 25-A Park
Street, Kolkata (hereafter referred as the “premises”). Even before
the appellants could file a Written Statement, the plaintiff, without
loosing any time, filed an application under Order XII Rule 61 Code
of Civil Procedure (“CPC”) seeking a ‘judgment on admission’ by
relying on the deposition of defendant no.1 in another case where
the defendant had admitted that the tenancy was in his mother’s
name. According to the plaintiff/respondent, since the mother of the
defendants/appellants had admittedly died way back in the year
2009, they are not entitled to stay in the premises beyond the year
2014 in terms of section 2(g) of the 1997 Act, which protects the
rights of the children and dependents of a tenant only for a limited
period of five years.
3. At the outset, we must state that both, the learned single-judge bench
and to some extent even the Division Bench of the High Court, in
the present case, ought not to have decreed the suit of the landlord
on the basis of alleged “admission” by the appellant no.1 which was
made in another unconnected matter, as to our mind, it does not

1 6. Judgment on admissions.— (1) Where admissions of fact have been made either in the pleading or
otherwise, whether orally or in writing, the Court may at any stage of the suit, either on the application of
any party or of its own motion and without waiting for the determination of any other question between
the parties, make such order or give such judgment as it may think fit, having regard to such admissions.
(2) Whenever a judgment is pronounced under sub-rule (1) a decree shall be drawn up in accordance
with the judgment and the decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was pronounced.
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 649

Rajesh Mitra @ Rajesh Kumar Mitra & Anr. v.
Karnani Properties Ltd.

pass muster the test of “admission” visualised in Order XII Rule 6
CPC. It is not that a court cannot pass a judgment on the basis of
an admission made in some other case. All the same, what has to
be kept in mind is that Order XII Rule 6 is an enabling provision
conferring wide discretionary powers on the courts which cannot
be claimed by any party as a matter of right. Courts can invoke
Order XII Rule 6 only in cases where admissions are unconditional,
unequivocal and unambiguous or when admission is based upon
undisputed inferences. (See: Charanjit Lal Mehra & Ors. v. Kamal
Saroj Mahajan (Smt) And Anr. (2005) 11 SCC 279, Raveesh Chand
Jain v. Raj Rani Jain (2015) 8 SCC 428, Uttam Singh Duggal &
Co. Ltd. v. United Bank of India And Ors. (2000) 7 SCC 120)
Here, we would like to reproduce that portion of the cross-examination
of appellant no. 1, as quoted by the Single Judge of the High Court,
which is alleged to be an admission on part of the appellant no.1
to deny him the right of occupying the disputed premises. It is as
follows:
“33. Flat No.208 in respect whereof you are an occupant-
is it a tenancy?
Yes, it is in my mother’s name.
34. Your mother is Usha Mitra- am I right?
Yes, Late Usha Mitra.
35. When did Usha Mitra expire?
On 3rd November, 2009”
This deposition is the so called ‘admission’ on which the respondent-
landlord relies to claim that only the mother (Usha Mitra) of the
appellants was the tenant and not the appellants. The appellant
no.1 had admitted that the tenancy was in the name of his mother.
We have perused the examination-in-chief and cross-examination
of appellant no.1 made in that ‘other case’ where this statement
was made. Such questions and their answers are common place
in depositions before courts, but every such statement cannot be
considered as an ‘admission’ to invoke Order XII Rule 6 of CPC. It
is for the courts to see whether any statement in the pleadings or
otherwise amounts to an admission of such a nature as to inspire
the confidence of the court to pass judgment on admission under
650 [2024] 9 S.C.R.

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Order XII Rule 6 of CPC. It will depend upon the content and kind
of statement/admission which may vary from case to case. In other
words, it would depend upon the totality of facts and circumstances
of a particular given case. In the present case, here, it is not a ‘clear
admission’ as is being made out. Moreover, where the question
and its answer are both a mixed question of fact and law, as in the
present case, a so called ‘admission’ against the law can never be
an “admission” as visualised under Order XII Rule 6. However, more
on this later.
Order XII Rule 6 is meant for speedy disposal of the suits in some
cases but on the risk of repetition, we would like to caution that
unless there is a clear, unambiguous, unequivocal and unconditional
admission, courts should not exercise their discretion under the
Rule because judgment on admissions is without a trial which may
even preclude a party to challenge the matter on merits in the court
of appeal. The provision of law, which is meant for the expeditious
disposal of appropriate cases, should therefore be cautiously
exercised and it should never come in the way of any defendant
denying him the valuable right of contesting the claim. (See: Himani
Alloys Ltd. v. Tata Steel Ltd. (2011) 15 SCC 273, Hari Steel &
General Industries Ltd. v. Diljit Singh (2019) 20 SCC 425)
4. We will have to go briefly on the facts of the case in order to have a
perspective of what we have before us. The premises was originally
let out to one Sri S.K. Mitra. Subsequent to his death in 1970, as
per section 2(h) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956
(hereafter referred to as “1956 Act” or the “old Act”), the tenancy
devolved on his legal heirs who were ordinarily residing with him.
Section 2(h) of the old Act defined the ‘tenant’ as follows:
“(h) “tenant” [means any person] by whom or on whose
account or behalf, the rent of any premises is, or but for
a special contract would be, payable and [includes any
person continuing in possession after the termination of
his tenancy or in the event or such person’s death, such
of his heirs as were ordinarily residing with him at the time
of his death,] but shall not include any person against
whom any decree or order for eviction has been made
by a Court of competent jurisdiction.”
(emphasis supplied)
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 651

Rajesh Mitra @ Rajesh Kumar Mitra & Anr. v.
Karnani Properties Ltd.

In other words, in the event of the death of the tenant the tenancy
devolved on the legal heirs of the tenant ‘who ordinarily resided
with him’. In the case at hand, therefore, the tenancy devolved on
SK Mitra’s widow and the appellants, who were his children aged 2
and 5 years, at the time of his death.
Subsequently, the new act, i.e., the West Bengal Tenancy Premises
Act, 1997 (hereafter “1997 Act”) came into force with effect
from 10.07.2001. Under the 1997 Act, the tenancy would devolve
to the legal heirs of the tenant as specified under section 2(g), but
for a limited period of five years. The spouse of the tenant though is
excluded from the time limit provided she meets the criteria as laid
therein. Section 2(g) of the 1997 Act reads as follows:
“(g) “tenant” means any person by whom or on whose
account or behalf the rent of any premises is or, but for
a special contract, would be payable, and includes any
person continuing in possession after termination of his
tenancy and, in the event of death of any tenant, also
includes, for a period not exceeding five years from the
date of death of such tenant or from the date of coming
into force of this Act, whichever is later, his spouse, son,
daughter, parent and the widow of his predeceased son,
who were ordinarily living with the tenant up to the date
of death of the tenant as the members of his family and
were dependent on him and who do not own or occupy
any residential premises, and [in respect of premises let
out for non-residential purpose his spouse, son, daughter
and parent who were ordinarily living with the tenant up
to the date of his death as members of his family, and
were dependant on him or a person authorised by the
tenant who is in possession of such premises] but shall
not include any person against whom any decree or order
for eviction has been made by a Court of competent
jurisdiction:
Provided that the time-limit of five years shall not apply
to the spouse of the tenant who was ordinarily living with
the tenant up to his death as a member of his family and
was dependent on him and who does not own or occupy
any residential premises,
652 [2024] 9 S.C.R.

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Provided further that the son, daughter parent or the
widow of the predeceased son of the tenant who was
ordinarily residing with the tenant in the said premises
up to the date of death of the tenant as a member of his
family and was dependent on him and who does not own
or occupy any residential premises, shall have a right of
preference for tenancy in a fresh agreement in respect of
such premises [on condition of payment of fair rent]. This
proviso shall apply mutatis mutandis to premises let out
for non-residential purpose.”
(emphasis supplied)
5. The landlord’s case is that after the death of Sh. S.K. Mitra in 1970
his wife Smt. Usha Mitra had become the tenant as per section 2(h)
of the 1956 Act. There is also a mention that she gave an undertaking
to the landlord that only she succeeds on the property as a tenant
and it was her who continued to pay rent after the death of her
husband. When Smt. Usha Mitra died in 2009, the appellants would
be considered tenants only till 03.11.2014 (five years after the death
of Usha Mitra on 03.11.2009), as per section 2(g) of the 1997 Act.
As we have already referred earlier, the main thrust of the landlord’s
case was that the appellant/defendant had admitted, in his deposition
in a different matter, that his mother was the tenant on the property
who had passed away in 2009. Hence, their tenancy had expired
long back in 2014 as per his own admission.
In their Written Statements, appellants did not deny the deposition
made by appellant no.1 as a “witness” in another case but submitted
that this cannot be used as an admission under Order XII Rule 6.
Further, it was asserted that it was not just their mother who had
become a tenant after the death of his father in the year 1970, but
both appellants had also become tenants as the tenancy was heritable
as per section 2(h) of the 1956 Act, which was then in force.
6. The Single Judge of the High Court, however, did not accept this
contention. What was relied upon were the rent receipts in the
name of Smt. Usha Mitra (the mother of the present appellant),
for the period between 1970 and 2009 and an affidavit attested by
Smt. Usha Mitra, showing that she was the sole tenant of the premises
while dismissing the claim of the defendants.
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 653

Rajesh Mitra @ Rajesh Kumar Mitra & Anr. v.
Karnani Properties Ltd.

Undisputedly, Smt. Usha Mitra had become a tenant under section 2(h)
of the 1956 Act. However, when these facts were considered along
with the deposition of appellant no. 1, it was held by the Single Judge
of the High Court that after the death of Smt. Usha Mitra in 2009, the
appellants would be tenants under section 2(g) of the 1997 Act only
for a period of five years which would be calculated from the date of
Usha Mitra’s death due to the words “whichever is later” appearing
in section 2(g). Five years got completed on 02.11.2014, after which
the appellants had no right to remain on the premises. As we have
already stated above, the learned Single Judge was not correct in
decreeing the suit on this so called “admission”. Looking at the facts
of the case and the position of law, it was not proper for the Court
to give a judgment on admission simply because there cannot be
an admission against law and in any case, it is not an unambiguous
admission as is being made out.
In view of the discussion above, the legal question to be determined by
us is whether the appellants had also became tenants upon the death
of their father, by virtue of section 2(h) of the old Act. Further, what
effect would the enforcement of the new Act have on their tenancy.
This goes to the root of the controversy and involves a question of
law and thus, the learned single Judge erred in passing the judgment
under Order XII Rule 6. What has been given to the appellants under
law cannot be taken away on the basis of an unclear deposition. In
short, there cannot be an admission against law. Whether a particular
statement amounts to an “admission” will depend on the fact of each
case. In the case at hand, we are of the opinion that it is not an
admission as visualised under Order XII Rule 6.
7. The appellants filed an appeal against this order before the Division
Bench of the High Court which was dismissed, vide order dated
08.12.2022, which is presently under challenge before us. The Division
Bench held that under section 2(g), the legislature intended that
where the original tenant has died before the coming into force of the
1997 Act, his legal heirs would be protected for five years from the
date of coming into force of the act. Otherwise, the latter phrase in
section 2(g) “from the date of coming into force of this Act, whichever
is later” would stand frustrated. This is what the High Court held:
“What can be logically deduced therefrom that the
heritability of the estate of the tenant was restricted for
654 [2024] 9 S.C.R.

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a period of five years from the date of the death in case
the tenant died after promulgation of the said Act to the
other heirs excluding the spouse who have been kept in
the exception (provided the conditions imposed therein
are duly fulfilled and/or satisfied). A striking feature may
further be noticed from the definition of tenant under 1997
Act in relation to the fixation of the time limit fixed therein
which, if lost sight of, shall frustrate the legislative intent.
The son, daughter and parents shall not be entitled to take
protection under the aforesaid definition, if the tenant dies
prior to the promulgation of the said Act and the aforesaid
period would be reckoned from the date of coming into
force of the said Act. Otherwise, the expression “from the
date of coming into force of this Act, whichever is later”
shall be redundant and meaningless. What can be legally
deduced therefrom is that even if the tenant dies when
the Act of 1956 was in vogue, yet the heirs other than the
spouse would not get any protection in relation to a time
limit under the definition of the tenant in the Act of 1997
and, therefore, the concept of “devolution” of the tenancy
right under the 1956 Act cannot be said to be inflexible.
The legislatures can restrict the heritability of the tenanted
estate which does not offend the constitutional ethos nor
can be impinge (sic: impinged) on the ground of restricting
the succession in relation to our tenanted property. What
can be culled out from the aforesaid discussion that the
heirs other than the spouse, even if they satisfy the other
conditions laid down in the definition provision, loses
their right as a tenant nor protected under the provisions
thereof after the expiration of five years from the date
of death and in the event the death occurs after coming
into force of the said Act or upon expiration of five years
from the date of coming into force of the Act or 1997,
whichever is later.”
The entire case here rests upon the interpretation of “tenant” as
defined in the new Act. In case, the defendants i.e., the present
appellants come under the definition of “tenant” the order impugned
has to be set aside. However, if the case is that the appellant does
not come under the definition of “tenant” as referred above, this
appeal would fail.
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 655

Rajesh Mitra @ Rajesh Kumar Mitra & Anr. v.
Karnani Properties Ltd.

8. On behalf of the appellants, we have heard learned counsel Ms. Rashi
Bansal, who relies on the decision of the Single Judge of the Calcutta
High Court (Goutam Dey v. Jyotsna Chatterjee reported in 2012
SCC OnLine Cal 642). In the above cited case, the original tenant
had died prior to the enforcement of the1997 Act. He was survived
by his daughter and her husband, Goutam Dey. Subsequently, the
daughter of the original tenant also died in 2011, after which the
respondent-landlord filed a suit for eviction against Goutam which
was decreed. By virtue of section 2(h) of the 1956 Act, it was held
that a vested right had accrued in favour of the daughter of the
original tenant, which could not be abrogated by the enactment of the
1997 Act. It was further held that if section 2(g) of the 1997 Act was
interpreted literally, it would mean that all inherited tenancies under
the 1956 Act would expire on 09.07.2006 (five years after the coming
into force of the 1997 Act). This is a position which cannot be tenable
in law according to the learned Single Judge in the above case. It
was held that the phrase “or from the date of coming into force of
the act, whichever is later” was wrongly drafted by the legislature,
and it is in fact redundant. This is what was said:
“19. Even otherwise, I am of the further view that portion
of section 2(g), as extracted in the preceding paragraph
starting from “or” and ending with “later”, and on which
Mr. Bhattacharya laid emphasis, if read literally would
produce absurd results and, therefore, the provision must
be so read so as to make it meaningful. Law is well settled
that in exceptional circumstances, it would be proper for
the Court to depart from the literal rule and such rule of
interpretation could be adopted that is just, reasonable
and sensible, and does not offend the sense of justice.
In the context, one may possibly conceive either of three
inevitable situations, - death of a tenant (i) before July
10, 2001; (ii) after July 10, 2001; and (iii) on July 10,
2001. Regarding situation (i) i.e. death of a tenant before
July 10, 2001 and the case with which I am concerned
(Sunil died on May 4, 1997), undoubtedly it was the Act
of 1956 that was in force and had a tenant governed by
the provisions of the Act of 1956 died on July 9, 2001 or
even previous to that date, the tenancy would be governed
by that Act meaning thereby that the tenancy being
656 [2024] 9 S.C.R.

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heritable, the heirs would be justified in claiming tenancy
right subject to fulfilment of the residence requirement in
section 2(h) of the Act of 1956 but unfettered by the other
two conditions newly inserted and the stipulation of five
years in section 2(g) of the Act of 1997. Law appears to
be settled that provisions of a new statute which touch a
right in existence at the date it is enforced are not to be
applied retrospectively in the absence of express provision
or necessary intendment. The Act of 1997 has not been
given retrospective effect so as to bring within its coverage
death of tenants occurring prior to July 10, 2001 and a
different intention does not appear on a reading of the
Act of 1997 so as to affect any right or privilege that has
been acquired or has accrued in favour of the specified
heirs of the deceased tenant under the Act of 1956, since
repealed. Having regard to section 8(c) of the Bengal
General Clauses Act, 1899, a vested right that accrued
in favour of an heir like Subhra on the death of the tenant
i.e. Sunil cannot be abrogated. There is a presumption
against curtailment of or washing away a vested right by
a repealing legislation, and a construction involving such
curtailment of or washing away the right accrued ought not
to be adopted unless a contrary intention clearly appears
in the repealing legislation. It could not have been and
it does not seem to be the intention of the legislature to
fix July 9, 2006 as the last date fill which tenancy of an
heir of a deceased tenant would continue (assuming all
the other conditions were fulfilled), no matter when he
died prior to July 10, 2001. The absurd result that the
aforesaid extract of section 2(g) of the Act of 1997 has
the potential of producing is best illustrated by the facts of
the present case and needs no further elaboration. Insofar
as situations (ii) and (iii) are concerned, it is obvious that
the definition of tenant in section 2(g) of the Act of 1997
shall apply and for achieving the purpose that it seeks
to achieve, it was not necessary to insert the phrase “or
from the date of coming into force of this Act, whichever is
later”. The period of five years mentioned in section 2(g)
automatically would have application only in respect of
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 657

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death of tenants occurring on and from July 10, 2001
and in such case the portion extracted above, is in my
considered view, a piece of loose drafting and ought to
be considered redundant unless in a given case, which
I have been unable to perceive, the same is shown to
have application. I hasten to record here that the above
observation regarding redundancy has been made by me
despite my best effort to make the statute effective with
all the words that have been used by the legislature and
conscious of the principle that legislature is presumed not
to waste words.”
Relying upon the above Judgment of Calcutta High Court, the counsel
for the appellants would submit that similarly the tenancy in the
present case had in fact devolved in favour of the present appellants
way back in the year 1970 on the death of their father, who was the
original tenant. This could not be undone by applying the provisions
of the 1997 Act which was a subsequent legislation. In other words,
in 1970, the tenancy was heritable and thus the appellants along
with their mother had become tenants on the property/premises.
9. On the other hand, learned counsel Mr. Sabyasachi Chowdhary
appearing on behalf of the respondent-landlord would rely on the
findings given by the High Court, in the present case, and in addition,
he would rely upon two judgments of the Calcutta High Court
Sri. Sushil Kumar Jain & Ors. v. Pilani Properties Limited, 2017
SCC OnLine CAL 18807 and Satyanarayana More v. Milagrina
Rose Correia, 2020 SCC OnLine CAL 957, which are both Division
Bench judgments laying down a law contrary to the judgment in
Goutam Dey (supra).
The Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Sushil Kumar (supra)
had in fact overruled the judgment of the Single Judge in Goutam
Dey (supra). It relied on the statement of objects and reasons of the
1997 Act and its purpose which was to do away with the heritability
of tenancy. The relevant paragraphs have been reproduced below:
“20. The underlying logic of the judgment in Goutam Dey
is that if a right vests in a person under a statute, the same
cannot be undone. As a proposition of law it may sound
attractive, but it will not hold good in all cases. While it is true
that certain rights if they vest under a predecessor statute
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cannot be undone by a successor statute, the purpose of
the statutes, the nature of the rights and the extent of the
vesting of such rights are relevant considerations.
21. The 1956 Act provided for a degree of protection to
certain classes of tenants in this State. In course of time,
the legislative wisdom provided for a relaxation in the
norms such that the protection was limited to a smaller
class of persons and in certain specified situations by the
Act of 1997. It cannot be said, for instance, that merely
because a tenancy had been created prior to the 1997 Act,
the protection enjoyed under the 1956 Act would continue
even after the 1997 Act has come into operation. The 1997
Act does not admit of such a situation…
* * *
23. It must also be added that courts ought to be very
cautious before finding words used in the statute to be
otiose or meaningless. The intention of Section 2(g) of the
1997 Act is to regard heirs of the original tenant who were
dependent on him and were residing with him at the time of
his death as tenants for a period of five years. That would
imply that for a period of five years from the death of the
original tenant, the heirs of the original tenant who were
dependent on the original tenant and were residing with
him will be entitled to the same protection under Section
6 of the 1997 Act as the original tenant. However, such
umbrella of protection is removed upon the conclusion of
the fifth year from the date of death of the original tenant,
in case the original tenant died after the 1997 Act came
into effect. For the similar heirs of the original tenants who
had died prior to the 1997 Act coming into force, a period
of five years was counted from the date of the 1997 Act
coming into operation.
24. It was a policy decision taken by the legislature to
afford a five-year period for the dependents of the original
tenant who ordinarily resided with him at the time of his
death to make alternative arrangements. To ensure that all
such heirs of the original tenant had the same time period
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to make alternative arrangements, the clause “whichever
is later” was introduced in Section 2(g) of the 1997 Act
so that the heirs of the original tenant who had died prior
to the 1997 Act coming into force did not have a shorter
time to make such alternative arrangements. That is the
meaning and purpose of the expression, “whichever is
later”, in Section 2(g) of the Act.”
Thus, the counsel for the respondent/landlord would argue that
even if the appellants claim tenancy under the 1956 Act, then also
their tenancy would expire on 09.07.2006, i.e., five years after the
1997 Act came into force. This logic is based on the interpretation
of the term “whichever is later”. In other words, protection is only
for five years, even for the one who had inherited ‘tenancy’ when
the old Act was in force, as it say five years from the death of the
tenant or five years from the enforcement of the Act, “whichever
is later”. Since the new Act came into force in 2001, therefore,
although the tenant (and in this case it would be the father of the
appellant i.e., the original tenant) died in the year 1970 but five
years will be counted from 2001. In other words, the language of
the statute suggests that its purpose was to cover even the death
of a tenant which occurred during the subsistence of the old Act.
But such an interpretation would depend upon whether the new Act
has a retrospective application!
10. Whether the 1997 Act would cover such tenants who were protected
under the 1956 Act is the question? The High Court has held that
the legislature by virtue of section 2(g) of the 1997 Act, intended
to extinguish the tenancy of all such legal heirs, who inherited it on
the death of their predecessor-in-interest before the enforcement
of the 1997 Act. Such rights would expire after five years from the
commencement of Act.
To understand the intention of the legislature, we will have to examine
the provisions of the 1956 Act and also the 1997 Act.
11. The West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 received assent
from the President of India on 28.11.1998 and as per notification
dated 09.07.2001, the provisions of the 1997 Act came into force
on 10.07.2001. The Object and Reasons of the 1997 Act are also
important, the portion relevant for our examination is reproduced
below:
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“The National Housing Policy approved by the Central
Government recommended that appropriate amendment
in existing laws and regulations be carried out for
creating enabling atmosphere for housing activities in
the country. A number of export bodies such as the
Economic Administration Reform Commission and the
National Commission on Urbanisation have recommended
reforming the rent legislation in a way that balances the
interests of both the landlords and the tenants and also
that stimulates future construction to meet the growing
demands for housing.
On the basis of the various recommendations of the
experts and also after a series of consultations with the
State Governments, the Ministry of Urban Development
of India prepared a Model Rent Control Legislation, and
sent to the States for consideration.”
12. The entire issue revolves around the interpretation of the phrase “for
a period not exceeding five years from the date of death of such
tenant or from the date of coming into force of this Act, whichever
is later” used in section 2(g) of the 1997 Act. There is no ambiguity
in case the original tenant passes away after the commencement of
1997 Act, as in such a case, it is clear that the specified heirs will
get a limited protection of five years only. The difficulty is in enforcing
the above provision of section 2(g) of 1997 Act in a situation where
the original tenant had died before the commencement of 1997 Act
i.e., prior to July 10, 2001. The matter at hand falls in the latter.
The Single Judge in Goutam Dey (supra) observed that a literal
reading of ‘or from the date of coming into force of this Act, whichever
is later’ would lead to absurd results as all tenancies devolved
under the 1956 Act, would end together on the same day (July 9,
2006), i.e., five years after the enforcement of the 1997 Act! Thus,
the Single Judge held the aforesaid phrase to be redundant and a
piece of loose drafting by the State Legislature.
13. Subsequently, the Calcutta High Court considered this issue in Prabir
Kumar Jalan v. Laxmi Narayan Jalan, 2012 SCC OnLine Cal 1313
where another Bench of a learned Single Judge did assign meaning
to the phrase, which was referred to as a piece of loose drafting
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 661

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in Gautam Dey (supra). In Prabir Kumar (supra), the High Court
decreed the suit for eviction against the respondent-defendant therein
and observed that if the Legislature intended to apply section 2(g)
of 1997 Act only to the deaths which would have occurred after the
commencement of the new Act, then legislature was not required
to use the phrase “or from the date of coming into force of this Act,
whichever is later”. This is what was said:
“21. Now, if Ms. Doshi’s argument that the rights of the
original tenant vested in the defendants on his death on
25th December, 1999 was true, then there would be no
occasion for the legislature to enact that the status of a
tenant would cease on expiry of five years from the date
of the Act or five years after the death whichever was
later. If the legislature had intended to protect the heirs
of a tenant under the 1956 Rent Act, the tenant having
died before coming into force of the new Rent Act, the
legislature would have only prescribed five years from the
date of death which must occur on or after coming into
force of the new Act. Or better still it could have said five
years from the death and no more. The legislature need
not have said any more…”
But to our mind, the Single Judge bench while deciding this case
did not consider the observations made in Goutam Dey (supra).
Eventually, this issue came before a Division Bench of the Calcutta
High Court.
14. In Sushil Kumar Jain (supra), the Division Bench, in its effort to give
meaning to the words of sec. 2(g) of the 1997 Act, held that there
appears to be ‘a different intention’ on the part of the legislature,
which was to dilute the rights of the tenant given under the old
Act. A challenge against this decision was also made before this
Court, which came to be dismissed without issuance of notice at
the admission stage itself with the following order:2
“We see no reason to interfere with the impugned order
passed by the High Court at Calcutta.
The Special Leave Petition is, accordingly, dismissed.

2 SLP(C) No.2750/2018, decided on 07.02.2018.
662 [2024] 9 S.C.R.

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However, as prayed for, one month’s time is granted
to vacate the suit premises subject to filing usual
undertaking in the Registry of this Court within two
weeks from today, stating that the petitioners shall not
create any third party rights, will clear all the rent/dues/
occupational charges in the meanwhile and will peacefully
vacate the suit premises concerned at the end of one
month positively.”
Here, we want to pause for a while to note that this dismissal of
SLP is no bar on us to decide the issue at hand. The dismissal of
an SLP at the admission stage before issuance of notice, with a
non-speaking order, does not mean that this Court has affirmed the
law laid down by impugned order. [See: P.Singaravelan v. District
Collector, Tiruppur (2020) 1 SCC (L&S) 453; Palam Gas Service
v. CIT (2017) 7 SCC 613; Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala (2000)
6 SCC 359]
15. Subsequently, the view taken in Sushil Kumar Jain (supra) by
the Calcutta High Court, was reiterated by another Division Bench
in Satyanarayan More v. Milagrina Rose Correia, 2020 SCC
OnLine Cal 957. Both these judgments have put much emphasis
on the object behind the promulgation of the 1997 Act. According
to them, the new Act aims to free the landlords from the clutches
of the 1956 Act by creating a balance between the rights of tenants
and interest of the landlord. We agree with the view so far as it says
that the purpose of the 1997 Act was to create a balance between
the interests of tenants and landlords but we doubt that it can be
extended to say that legislature intended to extinguish the rights of
legal heirs (who had become tenants under the old Act after the
death of their predecessor-in-interest) on a particular date.
16. The current position of law as it seems from the decision of the
Calcutta High Court is that the 1997 Act represents a shift of legislative
intent. While the 1956 Act approached tenancy as a heritable right
that can be claimed by legal heirs of an original tenant, this position
was changed by the 1997 Act, to provide a limited protection of five
years to the specific heirs of an original tenant and, as per the High
Court, in cases where original tenant had died during the existence
of old Act, five years shall be counted from the commencement of
the new Act.
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17. In our considered opinion, the above view of the Calcutta High
Court cannot be sustained. The High Court in the case of Goutam
Dey (supra) has held that the new statute which touches upon the
existing rights cannot be retrospective, without an express provision
or necessary implication expressing the clear intent of the Legislature.
Goutam Dey (supra) relied upon Section 8(c) of the West Bengal
General Clauses Act to say that a new statute does not affect existing
rights. Section 45 of the 1997 Act repealed the 1956 Act but that
cannot mean that rights accrued under the old Act are extinguished
altogether with the enforcement of the new Act.
The enforcement of a new statute ipso facto will not take away the
rights already accrued under a repealed statute, unless this intention
is reflected in the new statute.
This Court in CIT v. Vatika Township (P) Ltd., (2015) 1 SCC 1
reiterated the general principles concerning retrospectivity of statutes.
This is what was said:
“28. Of the various rules guiding how a legislation has
to be interpreted, one established rule is that unless a
contrary intention appears, a legislation is presumed not
to be intended to have a retrospective operation. The idea
behind the rule is that a current law should govern current
activities. Law passed today cannot apply to the events
of the past. If we do something today, we do it keeping
in view the law of today and in force and not tomorrow’s
backward adjustment of it. Our belief in the nature of the
law is founded on the bedrock that every human being is
entitled to arrange his affairs by relying on the existing law
and should not find that his plans have been retrospectively
upset. This principle of law is known as lex prospicit non
respicit: law looks forward not backward. As was observed
in Phillips v. Eyre [(1870) LR 6 QB 1], a retrospective
legislation is contrary to the general principle that legislation
by which the conduct of mankind is to be regulated when
introduced for the first time to deal with future acts ought
not to change the character of past transactions carried
on upon the faith of the then existing law.
29. The obvious basis of the principle against retrospectivity
is the principle of “fairness”, which must be the basis of
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every legal rule as was observed in L’Office Cherifien des
Phosphates v. Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd.
[(1994) 1 AC 486 : (1994) 2 WLR 39 : (1994) 1 All ER 20
(HL)] Thus, legislations which modified accrued rights or
which impose obligations or impose new duties or attach
a new disability have to be treated as prospective unless
the legislative intent is clearly to give the enactment a
retrospective effect; unless the legislation is for purpose
of supplying an obvious omission in a former legislation
or to explain a former legislation.”
(emphasis supplied)
18. It is to be kept in mind that Courts can, and must, differ from the
literal meaning of words if the reading of any provision provides
absurd results.
There are specific grounds under which a landlord can seek eviction
of the tenant. There are provisions as well for immediate recovery
of possession for certain classes of landlords. But Section 2(g) of
the 1997 Act cannot be interpreted in the manner it has been done by
the Calcutta High Court in Sushil Kumar (supra) and Satyanarayan
More (supra).
19. We are of the view that the phrase “or from the date of coming into
force of this Act, whichever is later”, used in section 2(g) of 1997
Act, was rightly held to be superfluous in Goutam Dey (supra). We
do not doubt the wisdom of the legislature but we are constrained
to hold that the case at hand reflects loose drafting, as it seems to
have created more problems than it sought to resolve.
Francis Bennion, who has been quoted by Krishna Iyer, J. in State of
Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy (1977) 4 SCC 471 while dealing
with Karnataka Contract Carriages (Acquisition) Act, 1976, had said
the following words about the Renton Committee Report (Report on
Preparation of Legislation):
“The Renton Committee points out that the problem of
obscure statute law is important to every citizen.
There is hardly any part of our national life or of our personal
lives that is not affected by one statute or another. The
affairs of local authorities, nationalised industries, public
corporations and private commerce are regulated by
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legislation. The life of the ordinary citizen is affected by
various provisions of the statute book from cradle to grave.
The committee might have added that the rule of law and
parliamentary democracy itself are imperilled if laws are
incomprehensible. They did say that it is of fundamental
importance in a free society that the law should be readily
ascertainable and reasonably clear, and that otherwise it
is oppressive and deprives the citizen of one of his basic
rights. It is also needlessly expensive and wasteful. Reed
Dicerson, the famous American draftsman, said it cost
the Government and the public ‘many millions of dollars
annually.”
Justice Iyer in State of Karnataka v. Ranganatha Reddy (1977)
4 SCC 471 further observes that “our draftsmen handle foreign
know-how meant for different circumstances, and without full grasp of
the economic regulation or the leisure and facilities for such study”.
He went on to further state that:
“In a country where the people are, by and large, illiterate,
where a social revolution is being pushed through by
enormous volume and variety of legislation and where new
economic adventures requiring unorthodox jural techniques
are necessitous, if legal drafting is to be equal to the
challenge of change, a radicalisation of its methodology and
philosophy and an ability for the legislative manpower to
express themselves in streamlined, simple, project-oriented
fashion is essential. In the hope that a role-conscious
court communicates to a responsive Cabinet, we make
this observation.”
(Para 49)
Ambiguous drafting leads to manifold problems and generates
lengthy litigations, as it has evidently done in the case at hand.
There is no clarity in the 1997 Act to suggest that it extinguishes
the rights of all tenants (who inherited tenancy rights under Old
Act) retrospectively.
20. This is also not the first occasion where Section 2(g) of the 1997
Act has been under consideration by this Court. In Nasimi Naqi
v. Todi Tea Company Ltd. & Ors. (CA No.9052/2019, decided
666 [2024] 9 S.C.R.

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on 26.11.2019) the second proviso to the same section was held to
contain an inadvertent omission as the spouse was not given the
right of preference for tenancy in case of a fresh agreement, which
was given to certain other specified heirs. This is what was said:
“The exclusion of a spouse of a deceased tenant is
without rationale, discriminatory and deprives the surviving
spouse of a valuable entitlement granted to the other heirs.
There is a valid justification for amending the provision
so as to bring the widow within the ambit of the second
proviso. This is a matter which, in our view, deserves
to be considered by the legislature. Having due regard
to the object and purpose underlying the recognition
of a right of preference under the second proviso and
the social welfare purpose underlying the enactment of
the legislation, it would be appropriate if this aspect is
considered… There would appear to be no justification
for not considering the grant of such a protection on the
spouse of the original tenant. We hope and trust that this
aspect of the omission in the second provisio will engage
the attention of the law makers so as to fulfill the salutary
purpose of the provision.”
21. It is true that legislature can restrict heritability by amending or
repealing the law, as the case might be. The Division Bench’s finding
(in the impugned judgment dated 08.12.2022), is that since legislature
can restrict the heritability it has done precisely that in the 1997 Act,
by adding the words “five years from the date of death of such tenant
or from the date of coming into force of this Act, whichever is later”.
Hence, as per the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court, the
death of SK Mitra in 1970 also stands covered under new Act. In
other words, the 1997 Act changes “heritable rights” retrospectively
according to the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court. Although,
the actual date when eviction would happen is post the new Act but
it does have a retrospective application as well in as much as it is
applicable retrospectively to an earlier date (1970 in the present
case) and had taken away a right of the appellants, given to them
under the old statute.
Statutory laws operate from the date of their enforcement i.e.,
prospectively. In case the legislature intends to make a law
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 667

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retrospective then such an intention of the legislature must be shown
clearly and unambiguously in the statute itself. The Division Bench’s
mere interpretation of a statutory provision will not make the law
retrospective and take away the heritable rights of a tenant.
22. In view of the above, we hold that Smt. Usha Mitra and the appellants
jointly inherited the tenancy from Sh. S.K. Mitra, in the year 1970.
Thus, the impugned judgment is liable to be set aside as appellants’
tenancy did not expire in the year 2006, by the introduction of 1997
Act, in the absence of a clear and unequivocal intention in the 1997
Act to have a retrospective operation.
23. Accordingly, these appeals are allowed. Orders dated 29.06.2022 and
08.12.2022 of the Single Judge and the Division Bench respectively
are set aside.
24. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
25. Interim order(s), if any, shall stand vacated.

Result of the Case: Appeals allowed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain