RAJESH KOHLIversusHIGH COURT OF J & K AND ANR.

                   [2010] 11 S.C.R. 699


                      RAJESH KOHLI                              A
                              V.
            HIGH COURT OF J & K AND ANR.
            (Writ Petition (Civil) No. 95 of 2004)
                  SEPTEMBER 21, 2010
                                                                B
           [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA AND
                  ANIL R. DAVE, JJ.]

       Service law: Judicial service - Higher Judicial service -
 Termination of service of probationary judicial officer - C
 Challenged on the ground that the order of termination was
stigmatic - Held: Reference in the order that service of the
judicial officer was unsatisfactory do not amount to stigma nor
does it amount to casting any aspersion on him - The order
 of termination was a fall out of his unsatisfactory service D
 adjudged on the basis of his overall performance and the
manner in which he conducted himself - Mere grant of yearly
increments would not in any manner indicate that after
completion of the probation period, the High Court
 (administrative side) was not competent to scrutinize his E
 records and on the basis thereof take a decision as to whether
 or not his service should be confirmed or dispensed with or
 whether his probation period should be extended - The High
 Court has a solemn duty to consider and appreciate the
 service of a judicial officer before confirming him in service F
- The District Judiciary is the bedrock of Indian judicial
 system and is positioned at the primary level of entry to the
 doors of justice - Upright and honest judicial officers are
needed not only to bolster the image of the judiciary in the
eyes of litigants, but also to sustain the culture of integrity, G
 virtue and ethics among judges - Jammu & Kashmir Higher
Judicial Service Rules - Rule 15 - Administrative law -
Administrative authority - Judiciary.

    The writ petitioner was appointed as a judicial officer
                           699                                  H
    700      SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [201 O] 11 S.C.R.

A on temporary basis. During probation period of two
  years, certain c.riminal complaints were made against him
  and the matters were recorded in his personal records.
  After completion of the initial two years of his
  probationary period, his records and his case were
B placed before the Full Court of the High Court for
  consideration of -his case for confirmation or extension
  of period of probation or otherwise. The Full Court
  resolved that the service of the petitioner was not
  satisfactory and thus the probation was not extended.
C The resolution of the Full Court meeting and the
  recommendation were forwarded to the State
  Government and the State Government passed an order
  dispensing with the service of the petitioner.

      In the instant writ petition, the petitioner challenged
D the order of the High Court recommending the
  termination of the service of the petitioner and also
  against the order of the State government dispensing
  with the service of the petitioner.

E         Dismissing ttie writ petition, the Court

       HELD: 1. Rule 15 of the Jammu & Kashmir Higher
  Judicial Service Rules permitted an officer to be kept on
  probation ordinarily for a period of at least three years.
  The petitioner was temporarily appointed as District &
F Sessions Judge on 24.08.2000 and therefore completed
  his initial period of probation of two years on 23.08.2002.
  Thereafter his matter was placed on the administrative
  side before the Full Court of the High Court in its meeting
  held on 26.04.2003 for the purpose of confirmation of his
G service or otherwise or for extension of probationary
  period. The Full Court on consideration of the records of
  the petitioner held that his service was not found to be
  satisfactory and therefore, his probation period would not
  be extended and accordingly the Full Court
H
RAJESH KOHLI v. HIGH COURT OF J & KAND ANR. 701


recommended that the services of the petitionei: be          A
dispensed with. [Paras 11, 12, 14] [708-C-F]

    Satya Narayan Athya v. High Court of M.P. (1996) 1 SCC
560 - referred to.
     2. The order of termination of service of the petitioner B
was not issued by the High Court but it only
recommended his termination as his service was not
found to be satisfactory. The said recommendation was
accepted by the Government which finally ordered the ·
termination of his service,' The said order was an order C
of the competent authority and issued by the State
Government and, therefore, it was a valid order and
should be treated as such, although it was specifically
not issued in the name of the Governor. [Para 16] [710-F-
G]                                                           D
     3. The services rendered by a judicial officer during
probation are assessed on the basis of judicial
performance, and also on the probity as to how he had
conducted himself. If an order of termination refers to      E
unsatisfactory service of the person concerned, the
same cannot be said to be stigmatic. None of the said two
orders could be said to be a stigmatic order as no stigma
was attached. The order of termination was a fall out of
petitioner's unsatisfactory service adjudged on the basis
                                                             F
of his overall performance and the manner in which he
conducted himself. Such satisfaction, even if recorded
that his service is unsatisfactory would not make the
order stigmatic or punitive. [Paras 14, 19, 23] [710-B-C;
711-E-F; 714-E-F]
                                                             G
   Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi PG/ Of
Medical Sciences (2002) 1 SCC 520 - relied on.

    Satya Narayan Athya v. High Court of M.P. (1996) 1 SCC
560 - referred to.                                           H
    702      SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2010] 11 S.C.R.


A      4. The mere grant of yearly increments would not in
  any manner indicate that after completion of the probation
   period the Full Court of the High Court was not competent
  to scrutinize his records and on the basis thereof take a
  decision as to whether or not his service should be
B confirmed or dispensed with or whether his probation
  period should be extended. The High Court has a solemn
  duty to consider and appreciate the service of a judicial
  officer before confirming him in service. The District
  Judiciary is the bedrock of Indian judicial system and is
c positioned at the primary level of entry to the doors of
  justice. In providing the opportunity of access to justice
  to the people of the country, the judicial officers who are
  entrusted with the task of adjudication must officiate in
  a manner that is becoming of their position and
  responsibility towards society. Upright and honest
0
  judicial officers are needed not only to bolster the image
  of the judiciary in the eyes of litigants, but also to sustain
  the culture of integrity, virtue and ethics among judges.
  The public's perception of the judiciary matters just as
E much as its role in dispute resolution. The credibility of
  the entire judiciary is often undermined by isolated acts
  of transgression by a few members of the Bench, and
  therefore it is imperative to maintain a high benchmark
  of honesty, accountability and good conduct. [Paras 25,
  26] [715-A-F]
F
       Krishnadevaraya Education Trust v. L.A. Balakrishna
  (2001) 9 SCC 319; Chaitanya Prakash v. H. Omkarappa
  (2010) 2 SCC 623; State of Punjab v. Bhagwan Singh (2002)
  9 sec 636 - relied on.
G
                        Case Law Reference:
          (1996) 1 sec 560       referred to          Para 13
          (2002) 1 sec 520       relied on            Para 19
H
RAJESH KOHLI v. HIGH COURT OF J & K AND ANR. 703


    (2001) s sec 319           relied on             Para 20        A

    (201 O) 2 sec 623          relied on             Para 21

    (2002) s sec 636           relied on             Para 22

    CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Civil) No.         9
95 of 2004.
    Rajesh Kohli, Petitioner-in-Person.

   Anis Suhrawardy, S.M. Imam, Tabrez Ahmad, Parnez
Dabas, Sunil Fernandes, Renu Gupta, Sidhan Goel, Vikrant            C
Nagpal for the Respondents.

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

     DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J. 1. The present Writ
Petition has been filed by the petitioner under Article 32 of the   D
Constitution of India against the impugned administrative order
of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir [Respondent No. 1)
recommending the termination of service of the petitioner who
was working as a probationary Judicial Officer, and also against
the order issued by the State of Jammu & Kashmir [Respondent        E
No. 2) on the basis of such recommendation, on 03.07.2003,
dispensing with the services of the petitioner as a District &
Sessions Judge.

     2. The petitioner herein was recommended by the High           F
Court of Jammu & Kashmir for appointment as the District and
Sessions Judge on a temporary basis. This aforesaid
recommendation of the High Court was accepted by the
Government of Jammu & Kashmir and an order of appointment
was issued to him appointing him as the District and Sessions       G
Judge on a temporary basis. It was clearly mentioned in the
said order of appointment issued by the State Government that
the petitioner would remain on probation for a period of two
years as provided under the Jammu & Kashmir Higher Judicial
Service Rules. Consequent upon the aforesaid temporary
                                                                    H
    704       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2010] 11 S.C.R.

A   appointment, the petitioner was appointed as 3rd Additional
    District Sessions Judge, Srinagar by order dated 28.08.2000.
    Thereafter he was transferred and posted as Additional District
    and Sessions Judge, Jammu by issuing an order dated
    05.06.2001.
B
          3. At this stage, it is required to be mentioned that in terms
~tlw. Jammu & Kashmir Higher Judicial Service Rules, the
  total period of probation 'for a Judici~I Offic~r. aft~r his initial
  appointment could be for three years for when he is i"nitially
C appointed, at the first instance his probation period is given as
  two years and thereafter the same could be extended by another
  one year. In this connection, reference could be made to Rule
  15 of the Jammu & Kashmir Higher Judicial Service Rules
  which provides as follows: -

D        "15. Probation - (1) All persons shall on appointment to
        ·the service in the substantive vacancies be placed on
         probation. The period of probation shall, in each case, be
         two years; provided that the period for which an officer has
         been continuously officiating immediately prior to his
         appointment may be taken into account, for the purpose
         of computing the period of probation.

          (2) The Governor may in consultation with the Court, at any
          time extend the period of probation; provided that the total
          period of probation shall not ordinarily exceed three years.
F         An order sanctioning such extension of probation shall
          specify whether or not such extension shall count for
          increment in the time-scale.

          (3) If it appears to the appointing authority at any time
G         d1..;ing or at the end of the period of probation or extended
          period of probation, as the case may be, that a
          probationer has not made sufficient use of his
          opportunities or has otherwise failed to give satisfaction,
          his service may be dispensed with immediately.
H
RAJESH KOHLI v. HIGH COURT OF J & K AND ANR. 705
       [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
     (4) A person whose services are dispensed with shall not         A
     be entitled to any compensation."

     4. The petitioner was also given his increments in terms
of the rules. However, while the petitioner was so serving as
an Additional District and Sessions Judge, a complaint was
                                                                      B
received against him, filed by one Mr. Babu Ram, which was
duly supported by an affidavit dated 06.08.2001, contending
inter a/ia that the petitioner while acting as a counsel for him
fraudulently withdrew an amount of Rs. 2.6 lacs deposited with
the Registrar [Judicial], High Court of Jammu & Kashmir which
was payable to the complainant - Babu Ram.                            c
     5. The aforesaid complaint was enquired into by the Chief
Justice of the High Court through the Registrar [Vigilance] of
the High Court. On conclusion of the enquiry, a report was
submitted stating inter alia that Mr. Rajesh Kohli, the petitioner    D
herein, who was engaged by Mr. Narain Dutt - the attorney
holder of Babu Ram, identified someone else as Babu Ram
before Registrar [Judicial], Jammu & Kashmir High Court and
received an account payee cheque in the name of Babu Ram.
In the said report, it was also alleged that the petitioner besides   E
identifying the impersonator as Babu Ram, also introduced him
to Vijay Bank at the time of opening of the Bank account and
thereby managed to unlawfully receive an amount of Rs. 2.6
lacs, while the real beneficiary - Babu Ram neither appeared
before the Registrar [Judicial] or before Vijaya bank nor did he
                                                                      F
receive the said amount. The aforesaidfeport of the Registrar
[Vigilance] dated 24.12.2001 was placed before the Chief
Justice of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court who directed that
the matter be referred to the Chairman, Disciplinary Committee
for necessary action. The Registrar [Judicial] of the High Court
was asked to file a criminal complaint against the petitioner         G
before the SHO of the concerned police station.
    6. Further, during the period when the petitioner was
posted to District - Kargil as Principal District & Sessions
Judge, he did not join there, w.e.f., 24.12.2001to18.01.2002          H
    706       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010] 11 S.C.R.

A and an explanation was sought from him in that regard. Even
  thereafter, a complaint from a judicial employee of District Kargil
  was received wherein it was alleged that the petitioner had
  been abusing the employees and had created lot of problems
  at the District Kargil. These matters are recorded in the
8 personal records of the petitioner. After completion of the initial
  two years of his probationary period, his records and his case
  were required to be placed before Full Court for consideration
  of his case for confirmation or extension of period of probation
  or otherwise. Consequently his records were considered by the
C High Court in its full court meeting held on 26.04.2003 at
  Jammu, wherein it was resolved as under: -


          resolved that services of Shri Rajesh Kohli, District and
          Sessions Judge are not found satisfactory and thus the
D
          probation of the officer is not extended .................. His
          services are dispensed with .............. ."
  The aforesaid resolution of the full court meeting with the
  recommendation was forwarded to the State Government and
E the State Government passed an order on 03.07.2003,
  whereby the services of the petitioner was dispensed with as
  recommended by the Hon'ble High Court. This action was taken
  in exercise of the powers vested on the competent authority
  under sub Rules 3 and 4 of Rule 15 of the Judicial Service
F Rules.
        7. Being aggrieved by the issuance of the aforesaid order
  dated 03.07.2003 dispensing with his service, the petitioner
  filed the present Writ Petition on which notice was issued. On
  service of notice, the High Court has entered appearance and
G also filed the counter affidavit explaining the circumstances
  under which the service of the petitioner came to be terminated.
      8. The petitioner appeared in person before us and
  submitted that the aforesaid order issued by the Government
H of Jammu & Kashmir of 03.07.2003 is illegal and without
RAJESH KOHLI v. HIGH COURT OF J & K AND ANR. 707
       [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
jurisdiction as the said order was not issued by the Governor        A
but was issued by the Government of Jammu & Kashmir. He
also submitted that the recommendation of the High Court as
communicated under letter dated 05.05.2003 is also illegal and
liable to be set aside as the High Court terminated the service
of the petitioner under the aforesaid order for which no power       B
 is vested on the High Court to dispense with the service under
its own order. It was also submitted by him that he h2d
completed his two years' probation period on 23.08.2002 and
since there was no order of extension of his probation period
prior to and immediately after 23.08.2002, he should be              c
deemed to have been confirmed in the judicial service and
therefore his service could not have been terminated on the
ground that he was on probation.
      9. The petitioner also submitted that his service was
terminated on the ground of an alleged misconduct, namely,           D
pendency of a criminal complaint and his alleged behaviour with
subordinate staff and, therefore, the said order of termination
of service was in the nature of a punishment by casting a
stigma on the petitioner and therefore illegal and without
jurisdiction as no opportunity of hearing was given to the           E
petitioner prior to passing of the order of his termination. He
also submitted that since he was granted increments by the
respondent, it is proved that the Respondents were satisfied
with his service and, therefore, the order terminating his service
is without jurisdiction.                                             F
      10. Counsel appearing for the respondent, the High Court
of Jammu & Kashmir, however, refuted the aforesaid
submissions and placed before us the records of High Court
connected with the service of petitioner and also the records
leading to his termination from service. He submitted that the       G
petitioner continued to be on probation even after two years as
no order of his confirmation was issued or passed by the
respondent and that his service was terminated within the three
years period of his probation on the ground of unsatisfactory
service. He denied that the impugned order is stigmatic or in        H
    708      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2010] 11 S.C.R.


A   any way punitive or that there was any violation of the principles
    of natural justice. He submitted that since the service of the
    petitioner was terminated on the ground of unsatisfactory
    service, there was no question of drawing up of any·
    departmental proceedings against him.
B
        11. In the light of the aforesaid submissions of the counsel
  appearing for the parties we have perused the records. The
  petitioner was recommended by the High Court of Jammu &
  Kashmir for appointment as a District and Sessions Judge on
  temporary basis. The appointment letter placed on record
C clearly indicates that his initial appointment was not only on
  temporary basis but he was also kept on probation for a period
  of two years. Rule 15 of the Jammu & Kashmir Higher Judicial
  Service Rules permits an officer to be kept on probation
  ordinarily for a period of at least three years.
D
          12. The petitioner was temporarily appointed as District
    & Sessions Judge on 24.08.2000 and therefore completed his
  initial period of probation of two years on 23.08.2002.
  Thereafter his matter was placed on the administrative side
E before the full court of the High Court in its meeting held on
  26.04.2003 for the purpose of confirmation of his service or
  otherwise or for extension of probationary period. The full court
  on consideration of the records of the petitioner held that his
  service was not found to be satisfactory and therefore, his
F probation period would not be extended and accordingly the
  full court recommended that the services of the petitioner be
  dispensed with. At this stage, it may also be noted that when
  by the order dated 03.07.2003 the service of the petitioner was
  terminated, the period of probation of the petitioner was
  extended for the period from 24.08.2000 to 05.05.2003, the
G date on which a follow-up order was issued by the High Court
  to the State Government recommending his case for
  termination. Finally by the order dated 03.07.2003, the service
  of the petitioner was terminated.
H         13. Since the rule permits probation to be extended for
RAJESH KOHLI v. HIGH COURT OF J & K AND ANR. 709
       [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
another one year and since there was no order of confirmation             A
passed by the respondents confirming his service, the petitioner
would be deemed to be continuing on probation immediately
after his expiry of the initial two years of probation. In this regard,
we may refer to the casE;i of Satya Narayan Athya v. High
Court of M.P. reported in (1996) 1 sec 560 in which a judicial            B
officer was not given any confirmation letter even after the
completion of his two years' of probation period. The rules in
the said case provided for the extension of initial two years of
probation period for a further period of two years. This Court
in that case held at Paragraphs 3 & 5 that : -                            c
     "3 ....................... A reading thereof would clearly
     indicate that every candidate appointed to the cadre shall
     undergo training initially for a period of six months before
     he is appointed on probation for a period of two years. On
     his completion of two years of probation, it may be open             D
     to the High Court either to confirm or extend the probation.
     At the end of the probation period, if he is not confirmed
     on being found unfit, it may be extended for a further period
     not exceeding two years. It is seen that though there is
     no order of extension, it must be deemed that he was                 E
     continued on probation for an extended period of two
     years. On completion of tv•o years, he must not be
     deemed to be confirmed automatically. There is no order
     of confirmation. Until the order is passed, he must be
     deemed to continue on probation.                                     F
     5. Under these circumstances, the High Court was justified
     in discharging the petitioner from service during the period
     of his probation. It is not necessary that there should be a
     charge and an enquiry on his conduct since the petitioner
     is only on probation and during the period of probation, it          G
     would be open to the High Court to consider whether he
     is suitable for confirmation or should be discharged from
     service."

     14. During the period of probation an employee remains               H
    710      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [201 OJ 11 S.C.R.


A under watch and his service and his conduct is under scrutiny.
  Around the time of completion of the probationary period, an
  assessment is made of his work and conduct during the period
  of probation and on such assessment a decision is taken as
  to whether or not his service is satisfactory and also whether
B or not on the basis of his service and track record his service
  should be confirmed or extended for further scrutiny of his
  service if such extension is permissible or whether his service
  should be dispensed with and terminated. The services
  rendered by a judicial officer during probation are assessed
c not solely on the basis of judicial performance, but also on the
  probity as to how one has conducted himself.
       15. The aforesaid resolution taken by the full court on its
  administrative side clearly indicates that the matter regarding
  his confirmation or otherwise or extension of his probation
D period for another one year was considered by the full court but
  since his service was not found to be satisfactory on
  consideration of the records, therefore, the full court decided
  not to confirm him in service and to dispense with his service
  and accordingly recommended for dispensation of his service.
E On the basis of the aforesaid recommendation of the High
  Court, an order was passed by the Government of Jammu &
  Kashmir dispensing with the service of the petitioner.
       16. These facts clearly prove and establish that the order
  of termination of service of the petitioner was not issued by the
F Jammu & Kashmir High Court but it only recommended his
  termination as his service was not found to be satisfactory. The
  aforesaid recommendation was accepted by the Government
  which finally ordered the termination of his service. The
  aforesaid order was an order of the competent authority and
G issued by the Government of Jammu & Kashmir. Since the said
  order was issued by the competent authority, it was a valid order
  and should be treated as such, although it was specifically not
  issued in the name of the Governor.

H
          17. In the present case, two orders are challenged, one,
RAJESH KOHLI v. HIGH COURT OF J & KAND ANR. 711
       [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
which was the order of the High Court based on the basis of              A
the resolution of the full court and the other one issued by the
Government of Jammu & Kashmir on the ground that they were
stigmatic orders.
       18. In our considered opinion, none of the aforesaid two
                                                                         B
orders could be said to be a stigmatic order as no stigma is
attached. Of course, aforesaid letters were issued in view of
the resolution of the full court meeting where the full court of the
High Court held that the service of the petitioner is
unsatisfactory. Whether or not the probation period could be
or should be extended or his service should be confirmed is              C
required to be considered by the full court of the High Court and
while doing so necessarily the service records of the petitioner
are required to be considered and if from the service records
it is disclosed that the service of the petitioner is not satisfactory
it is open for the respondents to record such satisfaction               D
regarding his unsatisfactory service and even mentioning the
same in the order would not amount to casting any aspersion
on the petitioner nor it could be said that stating in the order
that his service is unsatisfactory amounts to a stigmatic order.
                                                                         E
      19. This position is no longer res integra and it is well-
settled that even if an order of termination refers to
unsatisfactory service of the 1,arson concerned, the same
cannot be said to be stigmatic. In Pavanendra Narayan Verma
 v. Sanjay Gandhi PG/ Of Medical Sciences reported in (2002)
1 SCC 520, this Court has explained at length the tests that
                                                                         F
would apply to determine if an order terminating the services
of a probationer is stigmatic. On the facts of that case it was
held that the opinion expressed in the termination order that the
probationer's "work and conduct has not been found
satisfactory" was not ex facie stigmatic and in such                     G
circumstances the question of having to comply with th~
principles of natural justice do not arise. In this case court had
the occasion to determine as to whether the impugned order
therein was a letter of termination of services simpliciter or
stigmatic termination. After considering various earlier                 H
    712      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2010] 11 S.C.R.


A   decisions of this Court in para 21 of the aforesaid decision it
    was stated by this Court thus: (SCC p. 528)
       "21. One of the judicially evolved tests to determine whether
  in substance an order of termination is punitive is to see
  whether prior to the termination there was (a) a full-scale formal
8
  enquiry (b) into allegations involving moral turpitude or
  misconduct which (c) culminated in a finding of guilt. If all three
  factors are present the termination has been held to be punitive
  irrespective of the form of the termination order. Conversely if
  anyone of the three factors is missing, the termination has been
C upheld."

        In para 29 of the judgment, it further held thus: (SCC,
    p.529)

          "29. Before considering the facts of the case before us one
D         further, seemingly intractable, area relating to the first test
          needs to be cleared viz. what language in a termination
          order would amount to a stigma? Generally speaking when
          a probationer's appointment is terminated it means that
          the probationer is unfit for the job, whether by reason of
E         misconduct or ineptitude, whatever the language used in
          the termination order may be. Although strictly speaking,
          the stigma is implicit in the termination, a simple
          termination is not stigmatic. A termination order which
          explicitly states what is implicit in every order of
F         termination of a probationer's appointment, is also not
          stigmatic. The decisions cited by the parties and noted by
          us earlier, also do not hold so. In order to amount to a
          stigma, the order must be in a language which imputes
          something over and above mere unsuitability for the job."
G      20. In the case of Krishnadevaraya Education Trust v. L.A.
  Balakrishna reported in (2001) 9 SCC 319, the services of
  respondent-Assistant Professor were terminated on the ground
  that his on the job proficiency was not upto the mark. This Court
  held that merely a mention in the order by the employer that the ·
H services of the employee are not found to be satisfactory would
RAJESH KOHLI v. HIGH COURT OF J & K AND ANR. 713
       [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
no! tantamount to the order being a stigmatic one. This Court         A
held in para 5 thus:-
    "5. There can be no manner of doubt that the employer is
    entitled to engage the services of a person on probation.
    During the period of probation, the suitability of the recruit/
                                                                      B
    appointee has to be seen. If his /services are not
    satisfactory which means that he is not suitable for the job,
    then the employer has a right to terminate the services as
    a reason thereof. If the termination during probationary
    period is without any reason, perhaps such an order would
    be sought to be challenged on the ground of being                 c
    arbitrary. Therefore, normally services of an employee on
    probation would be terminated, when he is found not to be
    suitable for the job for which he was engaged, without
    assigning any reason. If the order on the face of it states
    that his services are being terminated because his                D
    performance is not satisfactory, the employer runs the risk
    of the allegation being made that the order itself casts a
    stigma. We do not say that such a contention will succeed.
    Normally, therefore, it is preferred that the order itself does
    not mention the reason why the services are being                 E
    terminated."
    6. If such an order is challenged, the employer will have to
    indicate the grounds on which the services of a probationer
    were terminated. Mere fact that in response to the
                                                                      F
    challenge the employer states that the services were not
    satisfactory would not ipso facto mean that the services
    of the probationer were being terminated by way of
    punishment. The probationer is on test and if the services
    are found not to be· satisfactory, the employer has, in
    terms of the letter of appointment, the right to terminate        G
    the services."
    21. In the case of Chaitanya Prakash v. H. Omkarappa
reported in (2010) 2 sec 623, the services of respondent were
terminated by the appellant company. During the period of             H
    714       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2010) 11 S.C.R.


A   probation, his services were not found to be satisfactory and
    he was also given letters for improvement of his services and
    his period of service was also extended and ultimately company
    terminated him. Court after referring to a series of cases held
    that the impugned order of termination of respondent is not
B   stigmatic.
         22. In the case of State of Punjab v. Bhagwan Singh
    reported in (2002) 9 SCC 636 this Court at paragraphs 4 & 5
    held as follows: -

c         "4 .............................. In our view, when a probationer
          is discharged during the period of probation and if for the
          purpose of discharge, a particular assessment of his work
          is to be made, and the authorities referre~ to such an
          assessment of his work, while passing the order of
D         discharge, that cannot be held to amount to stigma.
          5. The other sentence in the impugned order is, that the
          performance of the officer on the whole was "not
          satisfactory". Even that does not amount to any stigma."
E        23. In the present case, the order of termination is a fall
    out of his unsatisfactory service adjudged on the basis of his
    overall performance and the manner in which he conducted
    himself. Such satisfaction even if recorded that his service is
    unsatisfactory would not make the order stigmatic or punitive
F   as sought to be submitted by the petitioner. On the basis of the
    aforesaid resolution, the matter was referred to the State
    Government for issuing necessary orders.
       24. One of the issues that were raised by the petitioner
  was that he was granted two increments during the period of
G two and a half years of his service. Therefore the stand taken
  by the respondents that his service was unsatisfactory is belied
  according to the petitioner because of the aforesaid action
  even on the part of the respondents impliedly accepting the
  position that his service was satisfactory.
H
RAJESH KOHLI v. HIGH COURT OF J & KAND ANR. 715
       [DR. MUKUNDAKAM SHARMA, J.]
      25. The aforesaid submission of the petitioner is devoid          A
of any merit in view of the fact that since the petitioner was
continuing in service, therefore, the case for granting increment
was required to be considered which was so granted. The mere
granting of yearly increments would not in any manner indicate
that after completion of the probation period the full court of the     B
High Court was not competent to scrutinize his records and on
the basis thereof take a decision as to whether or not his
service should be confirmed or dispensed with or whether his
 probation period sh_ould be extended. The High Court has a
 solemn duty to consider and appreciate the service of a judicial       c
 officer before confirming him in service. The district judiciary
 is the bedrock of our judicial system and is positioned at the
primary level of entry to the doors of justice. In providing the
opportunity of access to justice to the people o(the country, the
judicial officers who are entrusted with the task of adjudication
                                                                        D
must officiate in a manner that is becoming of their position and
responsibility towards society.

     26. Upright and honest judicial officers are needed not only
to bolster the image of the judiciary in the eyes of litigants, but
also to sustain the culture of integrity, virtue and ethics among       E
judges. The public's perception of the judiciary matters just as
much as its role in dispute resolution. The credibility of the entire
judiciary is often undermined by isolated acts of transgression
by a few members of the Bench, and therefore it is imperative
to maintain a high benchmark of honesty, accountability and             F
good conduct.

       27. In the light of the aforesaid discussion, the contentions
raised by the petitioner are found to be without any merit and
consequently they are rejected.
                                                                        G .
     28. As a result, there is no merit in this Writ Petition, which
is hereby dismissed, leaving parties to bear their own costs.

D.G.                                     Writ Petition dismissed.