RAJESH DHIMANversusSTATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

                        [2020] 8 S.C.R. 1057                             1057


                        RAJESH DHIMAN                                    A
                                  v.
                STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH
                 (Criminal Appeal No. 1032 of 2013)
                        OCTOBER 26, 2020                                 B
             [N. V. RAMANA, SURYA KANT AND
                    HRISHIKESH ROY, JJ.]
      Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – s.20
– Both the appellants were travelling on a motorcycle and one of
                                                                         C
them was with a backpack slung over his shoulders – A police team
stopped and searched them – They discovered polythene bags
weighing 3 Kg 100 gms containing charas – The prosecution
examined nine witnesses to support their case of chance recovery,
which included eight police officials and one independent witness,
PW-3 – The appellant did not lead any defence evidence but               D
propounded an alternative version and claimed that while returning
from a nearby temple, they had given a lift to an unidentified third
person – The backpack containing the recovered narcotics was
claimed to be owned by the said stranger, who allegedly escaped
from the spot – The trial Court acquitted the appellants holding
                                                                         E
that charges under the NDPS Act were not proved beyond
reasonable doubt – The trial Court was also critical of the fact that
the complainant, PW-8 himself was the investigating officer which
caused serious prejudice to the fairness of the investigation – It
held that no charas was recovered from the appellants as deposed
by the independent witness, PW-3 – However, the High Court set           F
aside the acquittal and convicted the appellants for possession of
charas u/s. 20 of the NDPS Act and sentenced them to rigorous
imprisonment for ten years – On appeal, held: The Constitution
Bench of the Supreme Court in Mukesh Singh v. State (Narcotic
Branch of Delhi) has authoritatively settled the law that merely
                                                                         G
because the informant is the investigator, by that itself the
investigation would not suffer the vice of unfairness or bias and
therefore on the sole ground that informant is the investigator, the
accused is not entitled to acquittal – Thus, in the instant case there
is no reason to draw any adverse inference against PW-8 himself
                                                                         H
                                1057
1058            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2020] 8 S.C.R.


 A     investigating his complaint – Certain actions (or lack thereof) by
       the investigation or chinks in the prosecution case can’t be the sole
       basis for concluding bias – Further, the claim of appellants that
       seized contraband was carried by an unknown stranger is ex-facie
       fanciful and is without any evidence – Infact, this has bolstered the
       prosecution case that appellants were present on the spot and
 B
       interaction with police had taken place and that search was not
       based on any prior information but was spontaneous and thus, it
       was a case of chance recovery – PW-3 himself claims that he was
       not present at the time of incident, his statement can at best be
       construed to mean that no charas was recovered in front of him,
 C     and not that no charas was recovered from the appellants at all –
       As correctly appreciated by the High Court in detail, non-
       examination of independent witnesses would not ipso facto entitle
       one to seek acquittal – The High Court has rightly relied upon the
       testimonies of the government officials having found them to be
       impeccable after detailed re-appreciation of the entire evidence –
 D
       Thus, there is no merit in the appeals and the respondent-State is
       directed to take appellants into custody to serve the remainder of
       their ten-year sentences.
             Dismissing the appeals, the Court
 E           HELD: Whether bias was caused by complainant also being
       the investigating officer?
             1.1 Suffice to say that the law on this point is no longer res
       integra and the controversy, if any, has been set at rest by the
       Constitutional Bench of this Court in Mukesh Singh. The earlier
 F     position of law which allowed the solitary ground of the
       complainant also being the investigating officer, to become a
       spring board for an accused to be catapulted to acquittal, has
       been reversed. Instead, it is now necessary to demonstrate that
       there has either been actual bias or there is real likelihood of
       bias, with no sweeping presumption being permissible. [Para
 G     10][1065-C-D]
             1.2 Therefore, see no reason to draw any adverse inference
       against PW8 himself investigating his complaint. The appellants’
       claim of bias stems from the purported delays, non-compliance
       of statutory mandates and non-examination of independent
 H
    RAJESH DHIMAN v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH                           1059


witness. In effect, the appellants are seeking to circuitously use       A
the very same arguments which have individually been held by
the High Court to be factually incorrect or legally irrelevant.
Although in some cases, certain actions (or lack thereof) by the
Investigating Officer might indicate bias; but mere deficiencies
in investigation or chinks in the prosecution case can’t be the
                                                                         B
sole basis for concluding bias. The appellants have at no stage
claimed that there existed any enmity or other motive for the
police to falsely implicate them and let the real culprits walk free.
Further, such a huge quantity of charas could not have been
planted against the appellants by the police on its own. [Para
11][1066-E-F]                                                            C
      Whether alternate version has been established and what
is the effect of lack of independent witnesses?
       2.1 The contention of the appellants that they are entitled
to be acquitted on the ground of there being two varying versions
of the same incident does not carry any weight. This Court may           D
firstly clarify that the expression “reasonable doubt” is a well-
defined connotation. It refers to the degree of certainty required
of a court before it can make a legally valid determination of the
guilt of an accused. These words are inbuilt measures to ensure
that innocence is to be presumed unless the court finds no               E
reasonable doubt of the guilt of the person charged. Reasonable
doubt does not mean that proof be so clear that no possibility of
error exists. In other words, the evidence must only be so
conclusive that all reasonable doubts are removed from the mind
of an ordinary person. [Para 14][1067-H; 1068-A-B]
                                                                         F
      2.2 Secondly, it is useful to point out that in their respective
statements under Section 313, CrPC the appellants have claimed
that when they were coming after visiting a temple, “a person
obtained lift from us on vehicle”. When they reached Ani Bazar,
the police officials demanded the documents of the vehicle and
for that purpose they were taken to police station “along with the       G
vehicle and in the meanwhile third person fled away from the place
of the incident.” This claim that the seized contraband was being
carried by an unknown stranger, who had mysteriously appeared
on the side of the road seeking a lift and had equally incognizably
vanished into thin air as soon as the motorcycle was stopped by          H
1060            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                         [2020] 8 S.C.R.


 A     the police is ex-facie fanciful, and is without even a shred of
       evidence. A critical appreciation of such version merely bolsters
       the prosecution case. The appellants effectively have ended up
       admitting that they were present on the spot; some interaction
       with the police had indeed taken place; that there was sufficient
       cause to stop the vehicle, and that such search was based not on
 B
       any prior information but was spontaneous and thus, it was a case
       of chance recovery. [Para 16][1068-E-G]
              2.3 As correctly appreciated by the High Court in detail,
       non-examination of independent witnesses would not ipso facto
       entitle one to seek acquittal. Though a heighted standard of care
 C     is imposed on the court in such instances but there is nothing to
       suggest that the High Court was not cognizant of this duty. Rather,
       the consequence of upholding the trial Court’s reasoning would
       amount to compulsory examination of each and every witness
       attached to the formation of a document. Not only is the imposition
 D     of such a standard of proof unsupported by statute but it is also
       unreasonably onerous in our opinion. The High Court has rightly
       relied upon the testimonies of the government officials having
       found them to be impeccable after detailed re-appreciation of the
       entire evidence. This Court sees no reason to disagree with such
       finding(s). [Para 18][1069-C-E]
 E
             Whether High Court erred in reversing acquittal in appeal?
             3.1 There is no gainsaid that High Courts are well within
       their power to reverse an acquittal and award an appropriate
       sentence; though they cautiously exercise such powers in
 F     practice. Illustratively, a few permissible reasons which would
       necessitate such interference by the High Court include patent
       errors of law, grave miscarriage of justice, or perverse findings
       of fact. [Para 19][1069-F]
             3.2 Here, the trial Court appreciated facts in a mechanical
 G     manner and dismissed the prosecution case based on a mis-
       interpretation of law, particularly qua satisfying the burden of
       proof. Hence, there were more than enough reasons for the High
       Court to interfere with the acquittal and arrive at a different finding.
       [Para 20][1069-G-H]

 H
    RAJESH DHIMAN v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH                              1061


      Mukesh Singh v. State (Narcotic Branch of Delhi) (2020)               A
      SCC OnLine SC 700; K. Gopal Reddy v. State of Andhra
      Pradesh (1979) 1 SCC 355 : [1979] 2 SCR 363 – relied
      on.
      Gyan Chand v. State of Rajasthan 1993 Cri LJ 3716;
      Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab (2018) 17 SCC 627:                       B
      [2018] 9 SCR 1006; State of Himachal Pradesh v.
      Pawan Kumar (2005) 4 SCC 350 : [2005] 3 SCR 417
      – referred to.
                        Case Law Reference
[2018] 9 SCR 1006                referred to               Para 9           C

[1979] 2 SCR 363                 relied on                 Para 15
[2005] 3 SCR 417                 referred to               Para 21
      CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.
1032 of 2013.                                                               D
      From the Judgment and Order dated 28.08.2012 of the High Court
of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla in Criminal Appeal No. 85 of 2003.
      With
      Criminal Appeal No. 1126 of 2019                                      E
      Abhinav Mukerji, AAG, Saurabh Ajay Gupta, Nishant Bishnoi,
Ms. Srishti Prabhakar, Rajat Joseph, Mrs. Bihu Sharma, Ms. Pratishtha
Vij, Advs. for the appearing parties.
      The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
                                                                            F
      SURYA KANT, J.
      1. Heard over video conferencing.
       2. These Criminal Appeals have been preferred against a common
judgment of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh dated 28.08.2012, by
which the appellants’ acquittal under Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs      G
and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (“NDPS Act”) was reversed
and a sentence of ten years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs 1,00,000
each was awarded.


                                                                            H
1062            SUPREME COURT REPORTS                          [2020] 8 S.C.R.


 A           FACTS
              3. The facts giving rise to both the appeals are common. On
       09.01.2002, at about 1.00 P.M., a police team led by ASI Purushottam
       Dutt (PW8) and also comprising Constable Sunder Singh (PW1),
       Constable Bhup Singh (PW2) and Constable Bhopal Singh (PW7) were
 B     checking traffic at Shamshar when a motorcycle without a number plate
       was spotted. Gulshan Rana (appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 1126 of
       2019) was driving the vehicle and Rajesh Dhiman (appellant in Criminal
       Appeal No. 1032 of 2013) was seated on the pillion with a backpack
       slung over his shoulders. They were signalled to stop and documents of
       the motorcycle were demanded. Meanwhile, another vehicle was halted
 C     and its occupants Karam Chand (PW3) and Shiv Ram were included in
       the search. An attempt was made to associate local residents to witness
       the subsequent proceedings, but none agreed. Subsequently, the appellants
       were given option to be searched in the presence of a Magistrate or
       Gazetted Officer but they consented to be searched by the police on the
 D     spot itself. The police then discovered polythene bags containing charas
       from the backpack carried by Rajesh Dhiman. The polythene bags were
       weighed and found to be 3kg 100gms. After separating some samples,
       the charas was duly sealed and handed over to Karam Chand (PW3)
       who later deposited it at the police station. After completion of personal
       search of the appellants, they were formally arrested.
 E
              4. The prosecution examined nine witnesses to support their case
       of chance recovery, which included eight police officials and one
       independent witness, Karam Chand (PW3). Whereas the police
       witnesses strongly corroborated each other’s testimony, PW3 was
       declared hostile for he claimed not to have witnessed the seizure of the
 F     narcotics. The spot map, arrest memo, search memos, consent memo,
       seizure memo, rukka seals, chemical analysis report and samples of
       charas were also adduced as evidence. In response, both appellants
       asserted their innocence. Although the appellants did not lead any defence
       evidence but they propounded an alternative version and claimed that
 G     while returning from a nearby temple, they had given a lift to an
       unidentified third person. The backpack containing the recovered
       narcotics was claimed to be owned by the said stranger, who allegedly
       escaped from the spot when the motorcycle was stopped by the police.
             5. The learned Special Judge through judgment dated 28.12.2002
 H     acquitted the appellants holding that charges under the NDPS Act had
       RAJESH DHIMAN v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH                              1063
                    [SURYA KANT, J.]

not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The trial Court viewed that           A
the witnesses on the spot had either not been examined or turned hostile.
Thus, each individual element of the prosecution case, namely, from
preparation of personal search memo to consent memo to recovery memo
to notifying appellants’ relatives about their arrest or handing over of
seal to PW3 had come under cloud for want of independent corroboration.
                                                                               B
Failure to include any other locally-resident as a neutral witness in terms
of Section 100(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”),
was also held to cast serious aspersions on the prosecution version.
Relying upon a decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Gyan Chand v.
State of Rajasthan1, learned Special Judge was also critical of the fact
that the complainant himself was the investigating officer which caused        C
serious prejudice to the fairness of the investigation. The trial Court thus
concluded that since two versions had emerged, the one which was
favourable to the accused ought to be preferred. Consequently, it held
that no charas was recovered from the appellants as deposed by the
independent witness.
                                                                               D
       6. However, the High Court in appeal, set-aside the acquittal and
convicted the appellants for possession of charas under Section 20 of
the NDPS Act. The High Court observed that although association of
independent witnesses in NDPS cases is always desirable but their non-
examination would not per se be fatal to the prosecution case, especially
when due efforts are made by the police to secure their presence.              E
Adverting to the facts of the case in hand, the High Court found no
reason to draw an adverse inference against non-examination of
independent witnesses as PW8 had deposed that an unsuccessful attempt
was made to join persons from the locality, and Shiv Ram had been won
over. The High Court re-appreciated the entire evidence on record and          F
firmly held that the chain of events commencing from seizure of
contraband to its chemical analysis, was complete in all respects. In the
absence of any allegation of bias, it was held to be wrong to discard the
otherwise impeccable statements of the official witnesses. The High
Court dissected a catena of judgments and opined that the police officers’
testimonies ought to be subjected to a vigorous standard of scrutiny and       G
corroboration; which, after careful and cautious appraisal, had been met
in the instant case. The quantity of charas recovered was held to be
‘commercial’ and consequently a sentence of 10 years rigorous

1
    1993 Cri LJ 3716.                                                          H
1064               SUPREME COURT REPORTS                        [2020] 8 S.C.R.


 A     imprisonment and fine of Rs.1,00,000 (rupees one lakh) was imposed on
       each of the appellants.
                CONTENTIONS OF P ARTIES
               7. We have heard counsels for the parties at a considerable length
       and gone through the record. Learned counsel for the appellants
 B     vehemently contended that the High Court ought not to have reversed
       the well-merited acquittal as two distinct versions of the same incident
       had emerged from the evidence on record, and thus the one beneficial to
       the appellants ought to be adopted, given the presumption of innocence
       under our legal system. It was highlighted that the complainant and
 C     investigating officer were one and the same, thus, casting doubts on the
       fairness and neutrality of the investigation. Non-examination of Shiv Ram
       and non-corroboration by Karam Chand (PW3) was projected as being
       fatal to the prosecution case. A subtle distinction was sought to be made
       between cases where independent witnesses were not present and where
       during cross-examination they actively controverted the prosecution
 D     version. It was also argued that the High Court ought not to have
       convicted the appellants only on the premise that the effect of non-
       examination of independent witness was inconsequential, for the trial
       Court’s acquittal was predicated on many other legs which have not
       been engaged with by the High Court at all, including the alternate version
 E     given by PW3, read with the statements of the appellants under Section
       313 CrPC, as well as the non-compliance of Section 50 of the NDPS
       Act.
              8. Learned State counsel, on the other side, drew our attention to
       a recent judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Mukesh
 F     Singh v. State (Narcotic Branch of Delhi)2, which has authoritatively
       settled the law on permissibility of the complainant also being the
       investigating officer in cases under the NDPS Act. Controverting the
       appellants’ contention regarding non-examination of independent
       witnesses, an attempt was made to portray the evidence of the official
       witnesses as being unimpeachable and inspiring confidence; and
 G     therefore, rescission by one independent witness being wholly insufficient
       for the appellants to earn acquittal.



       2
           2020 SCC OnLine SC 700.
 H
       RAJESH DHIMAN v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH                               1065
                    [SURYA KANT, J.]

         ANALYSIS                                                               A
         I.    Whether bias was caused by complainant also being the
              investigating officer?
       9. The primary issue debated by both sides concerns the effect of
the complainant in the present case, PW8, also being the investigating
officer. The appellants sought to contend that a long line of cases, ending     B
with Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab3, has laid down the legal proposition
that investigation by the complainant himself would be contrary to the
scheme of the NDPS Act, thus jeopardizing the entire trial.
       10. Suffice to say that the law on this point is no longer res integra
and the controversy, if any, has been set at rest by the Constitutional         C
Bench of this Court in Mukesh Singh (supra). The earlier position of
law which allowed the solitary ground of the complainant also being the
investigating officer, to become a spring board for an accused to be
catapulted to acquittal, has been reversed. Instead, it is now necessary
to demonstrate that there has either been actual bias or there is real          D
likelihood of bias, with no sweeping presumption being permissible. It
would be worthwhile to extract the following conclusions drawn in the
afore-cited judgment:
         “102. From the above discussion and for the reasons stated
         above, we conclude and answer the reference as under:                  E
              I. That the observations of this Court in the cases of
              Bhagwan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (1976) 1 SCC 15;
              Megha Singh v. State of Haryana, (1996) 11 SCC 709;
              and State by Inspector of Police, NIB, Tamil Nadu v.
              Rajangam, (2010) 15 SCC 369 and the acquittal of the              F
              accused by this Court on the ground that as the informant
              and the investigator was the same, it has vitiated the trial
              and the accused is entitled to acquittal are to be treated to
              be confined to their own facts. It cannot be said that in the
              aforesaid decisions, this Court laid down any general
              proposition of law that in each and every case where the          G
              informant is the investigator there is a bias caused to the
              accused and the entire prosecution case is to be disbelieved
              and the accused is entitled to acquittal;

3
    (2018) 17 SCC 627.                                                          H
1066             SUPREME COURT REPORTS                            [2020] 8 S.C.R.


 A               II. In a case where the informant himself is the investigator,
                 by that itself cannot be said that the investigation is vitiated
                 on the ground of bias or the like factor. The question of
                 bias or prejudice would depend upon the facts and
                 circumstances of each case. Therefore, merely because
                 the informant is the investigator, by that itself the
 B
                 investigation would not suffer the vice of unfairness or bias
                 and therefore on the sole ground that informant is the
                 investigator, the accused is not entitled to acquittal. The
                 matter has to be decided on a case to case basis. A contrary
                 decision of this Court in the case of Mohan Lal v. State of
 C               Punjab, (2018) 17 SCC 627 and any other decision taking
                 a contrary view that the informant cannot be the
                 investigator and in such a case the accused is entitled to
                 acquittal are not good law and they are specifically
                 overruled.”
 D                                                          [emphasis supplied]
              11. We, therefore, see no reason to draw any adverse inference
       against PW8 himself investigating his complaint. The appellants’ claim
       of bias stems from the purported delays, non-compliance of statutory
       mandates and non-examination of independent witness. In effect, the
 E     appellants are seeking to circuitously use the very same arguments which
       have individually been held by the High Court to be factually incorrect or
       legally irrelevant. Although in some cases, certain actions (or lack thereof)
       by the Investigating Officer might indicate bias; but mere deficiencies in
       investigation or chinks in the prosecution case can’t be the sole basis for
       concluding bias. The appellants have at no stage claimed that there existed
 F     any enmity or other motive for the police to falsely implicate them and
       let the real culprits walk free. Further, such a huge quantity of charas
       could not have been planted against the appellants by the police on its
       own.
             12. The appellants have creatively sought to argue that failure of
 G     the police to investigate the alternate theory proffered at the stage of
       Section 313 CrPC, has caused serious prejudice to them and that reason
       alone is sufficient not to hold them guilty ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.
       They have explicitly relied upon Paras 18 and 19 of Mukesh Singh
       (supra), which we deem appropriate to extract as follows:-
 H
    RAJESH DHIMAN v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH                                1067
                 [SURYA KANT, J.]

      “18. If the defence of the accused is not properly investigated         A
      to rule out all other possibilities, it cannot ever be said that
      the prosecution has established the guilt “beyond reasonable
      doubt”. A tainted investigation by a complaint who is a
      “witness” himself to a substantial ingredient of an offence,
      would in fact give rise to a “doubt” and it is impossible that
                                                                              B
      the case can be established on the parameter of “beyond
      reasonable doubt”;
      19. A person accused of criminal offence punishable with a
      peril to his life or liberty, enjoys certain rights under the
      Constitution or through long standing development of criminal
      jurisprudence. Any action which impinges or affects those               C
      rights would be said to cause “prejudice to an accused”. That
      in the case of Rafiq Ahmad v. State of U.P., (2011) 8 SCC
      300, it is observed and held that prejudice to an accused or
      failure of justice has to be examined with reference to (i) right
      to fair trial (ii) presumption of innocence until pronouncement         D
      of guilt and (iii) the standards of proof. It is observed in the
      said decision that whenever a plea of prejudice is raised by
      the accused, it must be examined with reference to the above
      rights and safeguards, as it is the violation of these rights
      alone that may result in the weakening of the case of the
      prosecution and benefit to the accused in accordance with               E
      law;”
        13. At the outset, we may clarify that the observations relied upon
by the appellants, are not findings, conclusion or resolution by this Court
in Mukesh Singh (supra). Instead, a perusal of the judgment shows
that it was a contention put forth by one of the parties - which the Bench    F
eventually disagreed with. Further, not only the alternative version
projected by the appellants is vague and improbable, but it escapes our
comprehension how non-investigation of a defence theory disclosed only
at an advanced stage of trial, could indicate bias on part of the police.
      II. Whether alternate version has been established and what             G
          is the effect of lack of independent witnesses?
      14. The contention of the appellants that they are entitled to be
acquitted on the ground of there being two varying versions of the same
incident does not carry any weight. We may firstly clarify that the
                                                                              H
1068                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2020] 8 S.C.R.


 A     expression “reasonable doubt” is a well-defined connotation. It refers to
       the degree of certainty required of a court before it can make a legally
       valid determination of the guilt of an accused. These words are inbuilt
       measures to ensure that innocence is to be presumed unless the court
       finds no reasonable doubt of the guilt of the person charged. Reasonable
       doubt does not mean that proof be so clear that no possibility of error
 B
       exists. In other words, the evidence must only be so conclusive that all
       reasonable doubts are removed from the mind of an ordinary person.
             15. This Court in K. Gopal Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh,4
       explained that “if two reasonably probable and evenly balanced views
       of the evidence are possible, one must necessarily concede the
 C     existence of a reasonable doubt. But, fanciful and remote
       possibilities must be left out of account. To entitle an accused person
       to the benefit of a doubt arising from the possibility of a duality of
       views, the possible view in favour of the accused must be as nearly
       reasonably probable as that against him.”The appellants in the present
 D     appeal have miserably failed to make out a case where two reasonable
       conclusions can be reached on the basis of evidence on record.
              16. Secondly, it is useful to point out that in their respective
       statements under Section 313, CrPC the appellants have claimed that
       when they were coming after visiting a temple, “a person obtained lift
 E     from us on vehicle”. When they reached Ani Bazar, the police officials
       demanded the documents of the vehicle and for that purpose they were
       taken to police station “along with the vehicle and in the meanwhile
       third person fled away from the place of the incident.” This claim
       that the seized contraband was being carried by an unknown stranger,
       who had mysteriously appeared on the side of the road seeking a lift and
 F     had equally incognizably vanished into thin air as soon as the motorcycle
       was stopped by the police is ex-facie fanciful, and is without even a
       shred of evidence. A critical appreciation of such version merely bolsters
       the prosecution case. The appellants effectively have ended up admitting
       that they were present on the spot; some interaction with the police had
 G     indeed taken place; that there was sufficient cause to stop the vehicle,
       and that such search was based not on any prior information but was
       spontaneous and thus, it was a case of chance recovery.
             17. Reliance can also not be placed on Karam Chand’s (PW3)
       testimony by the appellants. First, his statement that he was told by the
       4
 H         (1979) 1 SCC 355.
    RAJESH DHIMAN v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH                                  1069
                 [SURYA KANT, J.]

police that there was a third person on the spot is hearsay and inadmissible    A
in view of Section 60 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Second, his
credibility had effectively been impeached by the prosecutor during trial.
PW3 denies in his examination-in-chief being on the spot or a party to
any proceeding; but later he makes a poor attempt to contradict the
prosecution story. He also admits to having travelled to the trial Court on
                                                                                B
the morning of his deposition along with Shiv Ram, who had been won
over by the appellants. Third, given that PW3 himself claims to not
being present at the time of incident, his statement can at best be construed
to mean that no charas was recovered in front of him, and not that no
charas was recovered from the appellants at all.
        18. As correctly appreciated by the High Court in detail, non-          C
examination of independent witnesses would not ipso facto entitle one
to seek acquittal. Though a heighted standard of care is imposed on the
court in such instances but there is nothing to suggest that the High
Court was not cognizant of this duty. Rather, the consequence of upholding
the trial Court’s reasoning would amount to compulsory examination of           D
each and every witness attached to the formation of a document. Not
only is the imposition of such a standard of proof unsupported by statute
but it is also unreasonably onerous in our opinion. The High Court has
rightly relied upon the testimonies of the government officials having
found them to be impeccable after detailed re-appreciation of the entire
evidence. We see no reason to disagree with such finding(s).                    E

      III. Whether High Court erred in reversing acquittal in
           appeal?
      19. There is no gainsaid that High Courts are well within their
power to reverse an acquittal and award an appropriate sentence; though         F
they cautiously exercise such powers in practice. Illustratively, a few
permissible reasons which would necessitate such interference by the
High Court include patent errors of law, grave miscarriage of justice, or
perverse findings of fact.
      20. Here, the trial Court appreciated facts in a mechanical manner        G
and dismissed the prosecution case based on a mis-interpretation of law,
particularly qua satisfying the burden of proof. Hence, there were more
than enough reasons for the High Court to interfere with the acquittal
and arrive at a different finding.

                                                                                H
1070                SUPREME COURT REPORTS                      [2020] 8 S.C.R.


 A            21. The appellants’ claim that the High Court erred in not
       considering non-compliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act at the
       stage of appeal, is also premised upon a mistaken understanding of the
       law. As held in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Pawan Kumar5, the
       safeguards for search of a person would not extend to his bag or other
       article being carried by them. Given how the narcotics have been
 B
       discovered from a backpack, as per both the prosecution and defence
       versions, there arises no need to examine compliance with Section 50 of
       NDPS Act.
                CONCLUSION
 C            22. For the afore-stated reasons, we do not find any merit in these
       appeals which are accordingly dismissed. The appellants’ bail bonds, if
       any, are cancelled and the respondent-State is directed to take them into
       custody to serve the remainder of their ten-year sentences. All other
       pending applications are disposed of accordingly.
 D
       Ankit Gyan                                                Appeals dismissed.




 E




 F




 G




       5
 H         (2005) 4 SCC 350.