Holding

A lease executed by a registered instrument need not bear the signatures of both parties to be valid; joint execution is a question of fact, and the eviction decree based on expiry of the lease stands.

Summary

The petitioner, a tenant, was evicted by the respondent, the landlord, under Section 11(1)(e) of the Bihar Building (Lease Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 on the ground that the fixed‑term lease had expired. The tenant contended that the lease was invalid because the registered deed of Kabuliyat was signed only by the tenant and not by the landlord, arguing that joint execution is essential under Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The trial court, the first appellate court and the Patna High Court held that the lease was valid, noting that the tenant had admitted a fixed‑term lease in his written statement. The Supreme Court examined whether the lack of the landlord’s signature rendered the lease void, interpreting "execute" in Section 107 as a factual enquiry and holding that a document signed by one party does not per se prove non‑execution by the other. Since the tenant had not disputed the lease’s validity, the Court affirmed the eviction decree and dismissed the Special Leave Petition.

Issues considered

Whether a lease for a specified period created by a registered instrument signed only by one party is valid under Section 107 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
Whether the ground of expiry of lease under Section 11(1)(e) of the Bihar Building (Lease Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 can be invoked when the lease’s validity is contested on the basis of execution.
Whether the tenant’s admission of a fixed‑term lease precludes him from later challenging its validity.

Legislation cited

Registration Acts. 17
Transfer of Property Act, 1882s. 107

Subjects

lease validityevictionexpiry of leasejoint executionregistered instrumentBihar Building ActTransfer of Property ActSpecial Leave Petition

Judgment

A RAJENDRA PRATAP SINGH
v.
RAMESHWAR PRASAD

O.CTOBER 28, 1998

B (S. SAGHIR AHMAD AND K.T. THOMAS, JJ.]

Bihar Building (Lease Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982: Section
1l(l)(e).

C Rent Control and Eviction-Suit filed by landlordfor eviction of tenant-
Grr•und-Expiry of/ease-Trial Court rejected the objection oftenant regarding
validity of lease on the ground that tenant had admitted in written statement
that tenancy was for a fixed period-Eviction decree confirmed by Appellate
Court as well as High Court-Appeal before Supreme Court-Held petitioner-
D tenant cannot depart from the actual position which he has admitted in the
trial court as well as before the first appellate Court that he had executed a
registered deed of Kabuliyat-Contention that lease was not signed by both
the landlord and tenant held not maintainable-Held High Court rightly
confirmed the findings of the Court below that decree for eviction on the
-
ground of expiry of lease was not liable to be interfered with.
E
Transfer of Property Act, 1882: Section 107.

Lease-Creation of a valid /ease-Essential conditions-Lease signed
by one party-Validity of-Merely because the document shows only the
signature of one of the parties it is not enough to conclude that the non
F signing party has not joined in the execution-Whether both parties have
executed the agreement is a question of fact-Jn this case in the written
statement the tenant did not dispute that lease was validly made-Held therefore
it is not open to him to contend that instrument was not executed by both
lessor and lessee.

G Words and Phrases:

Execute-Meaning of

Asa Ram v. Ram Kai i, AIR (1958) SC 183 and Gaon Sabha v. Jagannath
Singh, (1984) All. L. J. 518, referred to.
H 444
R.P. SINGH v. RAMESHWAR PRASAD 445

Satish Chand Makhan and Ors. v. Govardhan Das Byas and Ors., AIR A
(1984) SC 143 and Budh Ram v. Ra/la Ram, AIR (1987) SC 2078, cited.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition (C)
No. 15042 of 1998.

From the Judgment and Order dated 16.12.97 of the Patna High Court B
in Second Appeal No. 241 of 1996.

Neeraj Kr. Jain, Manish Mohan, Ms. Anita Mohan and U. S. Prasad for
the Petitioner.

The following Order of the Court was delivered by :
c
Subject matter of this litigation is a shop-room. It was rented to the
petitioner on a monthly rent of Rs. 90. Ownership of the building had passed
from the then landlord to Smt. Indrajit Kaur who, in 1982, started the litigation
for eviction of the petitioner from the building. The landlord set up a few
grounds for eviction as are envisaged in Bihar Building (Lease, Rent and D
Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (for short 'the Bihar Act'). During pendency of
the suit for eviction, ownership of the building has again been transferred and
the present respondent has come into the field. After he got himself imp leaded
as a plaintiff he jettisoned most of the grounds put forth in the suit for
eviction and confined to the surviving ground that the period of tenancy has
expired. From the trial court up to the High Court the landlord succeeded on E
the said ground. This Special Leave Petition has been filed in challenge of
the aforesaid decree of eviction as confirmed by the High Court.

Under Section I l(J)(e) of the Bihar Act a landlord has the right to evict
his tenant from a building in execution of a decree passed on the ground that
the period of tenancy has expired. Petitioner tenant has adopted different F
strategies to non-suit the respondent and the main among them is this: To
attract the ground under Section 11 (I)(e) of the Bihar Act there should be
conjunction of two conditions, first there should necessarily have been a
valid lease for a specified period. Second, the aforesaid period should have
expired. Petitioner contended that there was no valid lease by which any G
specified period of tenancy has been fixed.

The trial Court before which the aforesaid contention was raised during
the time of argument spumed it down on the premise that the tenant-defendant
had admitted in the written statement that the tenancy was admittedly for a
fixed period of 5 years and hence he cannot be heard to argue differently. H
446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A The first appellate Court before which the same contention was repeated has
repelled it for the following reasons:

"It is to be noted that the plaintiff respondent in para 2 of the plaint
has clearly stated that the defendant No. I is a tenant in the suit
premises for a fixed period of five years and he executed a registered
B deed ofKabuliyat dated 4-10-1975, in favour of the ex-landlord Zafir
Ahmad and others on a monthly rental of Rs.90. The defendant No.
1 in his written statement in para 9 admitted that the statement made
in para 2 of his plaint is correct, to this extent that there was a lease
for a fixed period of five years dated 4-10-1975 and rent was payable
at the rate of Rs. 90 per month. He further admitted that the said lease
c was due to expire on 4-10-1980 but before the expiry of the lease the
defendant No. 1 gave notice to the landlord who extended the lease
for a further period of five years and extension was granted on 21-
6-1980 with the mutual consent of the parties on the same rate of
rent.
D
xxx xxx xxx xxx

So creation of fixed term tenancy is admitted by the defendant No.I
and his plea for extension of the lease is palpably false. I do not find
that any cogent evidence has been adduced on this point by the
E defendant No.I. It is clear that the objection as to validity of the lease
had been raised for the first time during the argument in the lower
court."

Learned Single Judge of the High Court of Patna who declined to
interfere with the said finding has observed a.s follows:
F "It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that in the
absence of valid execution of lease the plaintiff - respondent was not
entitled for eviction of the appellant. I am unable to accept the
submission of the learned counsel for the appellant. In view of the
admitted fact that the lease under which the defendant-appellant entered
..
G the suit premises, was for a fixed term and the period had already
expired, suit has rightly been decreed against the defendant-appellant,
on the basis of the evidence on record. This aspect stands concluded
by concurrent findings of fact. As such, no case for interference in
Second Appeal has been made out."

H As the aforesaid contention was seriously pursued before us we may
R.P. SINGH v. RAMESHWAR PRASAD 447
examine it. Material portion of Section l l(l)(e) of the Bihar Act is extracted A
below:

"11. Eviction of tenants. (I) xxx xxx where a tenant is in possession
of any building, he shall not be liable to eviction therefrom except in
execution of a decree passed by the Court on one or more of the
following grounds : B
xxx xxx xxx

(e) in case of a tenant holding on a lease for a specified period, on
the expiry of the period of the tenancy."

It is apparent that in order to make out the said ground, two conditions must
c
be satisfied: (I) The tenant should hold on a lease for a specified period. (2)
The said period should have expired. If there is no valid lease for a specified
period the landlord cannot rely on the said ground for seeking a decree of
eviction.
D
Petitioner-tenant cannot now depart from the factual position which he
has admitted in the trial court as well as before the first appellate Court that
he had executed a registered deed of Kabuliyat on 4-10-1975 (Ext.2) in
favour ofZafir Ahmad (the predecessor in title of the present landlord) agreeing
to vacate the premises on the expiry of a period of 5 years. But the contention
is that as the said instrument was not signed by both the landlord and the E
tenant, there was no valid lease created for a specified period. The contention,
in other words, is that joint execution of a lease by both the lessor and lessee
is sine qua non for creation of a valid lease.

Section I 07 of the Transfer of Property Act reads thus:
F
"A lease of immoveable property from year to year, or for any term
exceeding one year, or reserving a yearly rent, can be made only by
a registered instrument.

All other leases of immoveable property may be made either by
a registered instrument or by oral agreement accompanied by delivery G
of possession.

Where a lease of immoveable property is made by a registered
instrument, such instrument or, where there are more instruments
than one, each such instrument shall be executed by both the lessor
and the lessee. H
448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Provided that the State Government may, from time to time, by
notification in the Official Gazette, direct that lease of immoveable
property, other than leases from year to year, or for any term exceeding
one year, or reserving a yearly rent, or any class of such leases, may
be made by unregistered instrument or by oral agreement without
delivery of possession."
B
Barring the proviso which enables the State Government to relax the
conditions, the above section consists of 3 paragraphs. The middle paragraph
contains an exception to the first paragraph. The wording of the first paragraph
shows that it is mandatory that if a lease is to be created for any term
C exceeding one year it can be made "only by a registered instrument". If the
instrument is not registered the corollary is that no lease exceeding one year
is created at all. Such an instrument if not registered cannot be admitted as
evidence in view of Section 17 of the Registration Act either for proving the
terms of the lease or otherwise. "vide Salish Chand Makhan and ors. v.
Govardhan Das Byas and Ors., AIR (1984) SC 143 and Budh Ram v. Raila
D Ram, AIR (1987) SC 2078.

But as for third paragraph of Section I07 of the Transfer of Property
Act the only requirement is that execution of the lease through a registered
instrument shall be a joint endeavour of both lessor and lessee. The said
E paragraph in the section was introduced by the Transfer of Property
(Amendment) Act, 1929 (Act XX of 1929). The reason for introducing the
aforesaid paragraph in the said section was to settle the conflict of opinion
expressed by different High Courts regarding the validity of a lease made
through a rent note signed by the lessee alone. Allahabad High Court has
held the view that a lease can be created only by an instrument signed by
F both the lessor and lessee while Madras High Court took a contrary view.
Both views received approval by different High Courts. In the light of the
said conflict the legislature thought it fit to resolve it by introducing the third
paragraph in this section.

A close reading of the third paragraph indicates that there is no stipulation
G that the instrument must be signed by both parties. The requirement is that
when the lease is made by a registered instrument, "such instrument shall be
executed by both the lessor and lessee." What is underlined in it is that the
creation of a lease is not a unilateral exercise of one of the parties but a
bilateral endeavour of both the lessor and the lessee.
H The word "execute" is given the meaning in Black's Law Dictionary as
R.P. SINGH v. RAMESHWAR PRASAD 449
"to complete; to make; to sign; to perform; to do; to follow out; to carry out A
according to its terms; to fulfil the command or purpose of." In "Words and
Phrases" (Permanent Edition) the word "execute" is given the meaning as "to
complete as a legal instrument; to perform what is required to give validity
to." An instrument is usually executed through multifarious steps of different
sequences. At the first instance, the parties might deliberate upon the terms B
and reach an agreement. Next the terms so agreed upon would be reduced to
writing. Sometimes one party alone would affix the signature on it and deliver
it to the other party. Sometimes both parties would affix their signature on
the instrument. If the document is required by law to be registered, both
parties can be involved in the process without perhaps obtaining the signatures
of one of them. In all such instances the instrument can be said to have been C
executed by both parties thereto. If the instrument is signed by both parties
it is presumptive of the fact that both of them have executed it, of course it
is only rebuttable presumption. Similarly if an instrument is signed by only
one party it does not mean that both parties have not executed it together.
Whether both parties have executed the instrument will be a question of fact D
to be determined on evidence if such a determination is warranted from the
pleadings of the particular suit. Merely because the document shows only the
signature of one of the parties it is not enough to conclude that the non-
signing party has not joined in the execution of the instrument.
In this connection it is appropriate to refer to a three-Judge Bench
decision of this Court in Asa Ram v. Ram Kali, AIR (1958) SC 183. A E
Kabuliat was executed by the lessees in favour of their lessors, but the latter
did not execute any instrument in favour of the lessees. It was contended that
the lessees could not claim the status of tenants solely on the strength of the
Kabuliat which was only a unilateral undertaking. But the evidence showed
that the lessors had accepted the Kabuliat and received rent as prescribed F
therein. On the aforesaid facts this Court overruled the contention that the
lessees could not claim the status of tenants. The Allahabad High Court
-· which adopted the contrary view prior to the introduction of the Amendment
in 1929 to Section I 07 of the Transfer of Property Act, had occasion to
consider a similar contention regarding one Kabuliat executed after such
amendment. In Gaon Sabha v. Jagannath Singh, (1984) All. L.J. 518 the G
High Court following the ratio of Asa Ram v. Ram Kali, AIR (1958) SC 183
has held that there was no violation of Section I 07 of the Transfer of Property
Act.

When the defendant in this case did not dispute in the written statement
the fact that the lease was validly made it is not open to him to raise a H
450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A contention later, viz the instrument was not executed by both lessor and
lessee and consequently the lease is void. The High Court, has therefore,
rightly confirmed the finding of the courts below that the decree for eviction
on the ground under Section l l(l)(e) of the Bihar Act is not liable to be
interfered with.

B Accordingly we dismiss this Special Leave Petition.

T.N.A. Petition dismissed.

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