Holding

Casual or temporary employees cannot claim a legal right to regularisation merely on the basis of long service, and courts cannot override the constitutional scheme of public appointment under Article 14.

Summary

The petitioners, who were engaged on a daily‑wage basis at the Rajasthan Krishi Vishva Vidyalaya research centre, were terminated when work ceased and sought regularisation as Class IV employees with regular pay, also challenging sections 7, 9, 11 and 19 of the Rajasthan Regulation of Appointments to Public Service and Rationalisation of Staff Act, 1999 as unconstitutional. The Rajasthan High Court held sections 9, 11 and 19 ultra‑violet and directed the university to consider the petitioners' regularisation claims. On appeal, the Supreme Court examined whether long‑duration casual or contractual service creates a legal right to regularisation, referring to earlier decisions such as Bhawani Singh, Secretary State of Karnataka v. Umadevi and Dr Rai Shivendra Bahadur. It held that acceptance of temporary employment is with full knowledge of its nature, and the constitutional scheme of public appointment under Article 14 does not permit courts to compel permanent appointment merely on the basis of length of service or legitimate expectation. Consequently, the Court remitted the matters to the High Court to be reconsidered in light of the Uma Devi decision, allowing the appeals without costs.

Issues considered

The validity of sections 7, 9, 11 and 19 of the Rajasthan Regulation of Appointments to Public Service and Rationalisation of Staff Act, 1999.
Whether casual or temporary employees who have rendered long service are entitled to regularisation and regular pay.
Whether the doctrine of legitimate expectation or a mandamus can be invoked to compel the State to make such employees permanent.

Subjects

regularisationcasual employmenttemporary employmentpublic service appointmentArticle 14legitimate expectationmandamusRajasthan Regulation of Appointments Act

Judgment

[2008] 2 S.C.R. 853

• RAJASTHAN KRISHI VISHVA VIDHYALAYA, BIKANER
v.
A

DEVI SINGH
(Civil Appeal No. 4327 of 2003)
FEBRUARY 14, 2008
B
[DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT AND P. SATHASIVAM, JJ.]
,~ -
'"' Service Law:
Regularisation - Claim for, by casual workers - On the
ground of long rendition of service - High Court directed the c
employer to consider their case for regularization - On appeal,
Held: Matter needs consideration in the light of decision in
Uma Devi's case - Remitted to High Court - Rajasthan
Regulation of Appointments to Public Service and
Rationalisation of Staff Act, 1999 - ss. 7, 9, 11 and 19 - D
--

' ....,. Constitution of India, 1950 - Article 14 - Public appointment.
Respondents were appointed on daily wage basis.
..... Their services were terminated as there was no further
work in the research centre where they were appointed.
They filed writ petitions praying for a direction to the E
\ employer-appellant to give benefit of regularization on the
post of Class IV employees and to give regular scale of
pay with effect from the date from which persons junior
to him were given benefit of regularization and regular
pay scale. A prayer was also made to declare ss.7, 9, 11 F
and 19 of the Rajasthan Regulation of Appointments to
Public Service and Rationalisation of Staff Act, 1999 to be
ultra vires to the Constitution of India, 1950. High Court
declared ss. 9, 11 and 19 as ultra vires and directed the
appellant to consider the case of the respondents-writ G
-:.... t',
petitioners.
In appeal to this Court, appellant contended that
.. • since none of the respondents was in employment of the
853 H

----i --- ----- ----
854 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R.
•
~ - .,.

A University from 1992 to 1995, the question of extending
the benefit of regularization from the date when his junior,
if any, was regularized does not arise.
Respor,idents contended that they were entitled to
regulariz11tion because of long rendition of service.
B
Allowing the appeals and remitting the matter to the
High Court, the Court
HELD: 1. While directing that appointments,
temporary or casual, be regularized or made permanent,
C courts are swayed by the fact that the concerned person
has worked for some time and in some cases for a
considerable length of time. It is not as if the person who
accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in
nature, is not aware of the nature of his employment. He
D accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true
that he is not in a position tp bargain - not at arms length
- since he might have been searching, for some
employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts
whatever he gets. But on that ground alone, it would not
E be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of
appointment and to take the view that a person who has
temporarily or casually got employed should be directed
to be continued permanently. By doing so, it will be
creating another mode of public appointment which is not
F permissible. [Para 6] [857-D, E, F & G]
1.2. The argument that since one has been working
for some time in the post, it will not be just to discontinue
him, even though he was aware of the nature of the
employment when he first took it up, is not one that
G would enable the jettisoning of the procedure established
by law for Public employment and'would have to fail when
tested on the touchstone of constitutionality and equality
of opportunity enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution.
It cannot also be held that the §ltate has held out any
H promise while engaging these persons either to continue
'l J..
RAJASTHAN KRISHI \l!SHVA VIDHYALAYA, BIKANER
v. bEVI SINGH [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, .l.J
- . The
them where they are-or to make them permanent.
State cannot con~titutionaliy make such ~ promise.
855

A

[Para 6] [858-E & F; 859-B]
Bhawani Singh and Ors. v. State and Ors. l2002)' 3
Western Law cases 728; Secretary, State of Kamataka. and
Ors. v. Umadevi (3) and Ors. (2006) 4 sec 1 - relied on • B

.. ~
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.
4327 of 2003.
r
From the Judgment and Order dated 06.02.2003 of the .
High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jodhpur in D.B. Civil C
Writ Petition No .. 849 of 2002.

WITH
Civil Appeal Nos. 712/2004, 1053, 4309, 4310, 11311,
"' 4312, 4313 & 4314 of 2006. D
~
Aruneshwar Gutpa, A.AG., Puneet Jain, Christi Jain, H.D.
Thanvi, Sarad Kr. Singhania, Sushil Kumar Jain, Naveen Kumar
.
Singh, Shashwat Gupta, Syed Ali Ahmad, Syed Tanweer Ahmad, .
GirdharG Upadhyay, Vinita G Upadhyay,Asha Upadhyay, U.K. E
Shandilya, Vijay Kumar Panditar f.wadhesh Kr. Singh, S.S.
Bandhopadhyay, R.D. Upadhyay, B.D. Sharma, R.C. Kohli,
·Surya Kant, A. Mariarputhan, Aruna Mathur, (for Mis. Arputham,
Aruna & Co.), Sushil Balwada_, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal for
. the appearing parties.
r F
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. Challenge in these appeals is
to the orders passed by a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High
Court, Jodhpur directing consideration of the case of respondent
G
in each case under the Rajasthan (Regulation of Appointments
">';
to Public Service and Rationalisation of Staff) Act, 1999 (in,short
the 'A\:t'). · .
2. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:
H
856 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R.
t"
j

,;...
A Respondents were appointed on daily wage basis. Their
services were terminated as there was no further work in the
research centre where they were appointed and/or on the
basis that there was no work available and there was no
approved list. The State of Rajasthan passed the Act in the
~
B year 1999.
3. Respondent in each case filed a writ petition praying
for a direction to the present appellant to give benefit of
. ~.

regularization on the post of Class IV employees and to give
regular scale of pay with effect from the date from which persons
c junior to him were given benefit of regularization and regular
pay scale. Prayer was also made to declare Sections 7, 9, 11
and 19 of the Act to be ultra vires to the Constitution of India,
1950 (in short the 'Constitution').
4. The High Court placing reliance on an earlier judgment
D ~
in Bhawani Singh and Ors. v. State and Ors. (2002 (3) Western
~
Law cases 728) declared Sections 9, 11 and 19 as ultra vires
and directed the appellant to consider the case of the writ
petitioner in each case for regularization in the light of aforesaid
judgment and if found eligible to consider his case for
E regularization with effect from the date on which any other person
junior to him had been granted the same benefits.
5. Stand of the appellant is that since none of the
respondents was in employment of the University from 1992 to
F 1995, the question of extending the benefit of regularization from ""'j
the date when his junior, if any, was regularized does not arise.
Respondents' stand was that each was entitled to regularization
because of long rendition of service. The question relating to
regularization of service on the ground ·of long rendition of
G service was the subject matter in a decision by a Constitution
· Bench of this Court in Secretary, State of Kamataka and Ors. v. ~
/~
'1
Umadevi (3) and Ors. (2006 (4) SCC 1). \.
t

6. The said issue has been elaborately dealt with in the \

judgment. It was inter alia held as follows:
H
~

RAJASTHAN KRISHI VISHVAVIDHYALAYA, BIKANER 857
v. DEVI SINGH [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]
,,.
"33. It is not necessary to notice all the decisions of this A
Court on this aspect. By and large what emerges is that
regular recruitment should be insisted upon, only in a
contingency and ad hoc appointment can be made in a
permanent vacancy, but the same should soon be followed
by a regular recruitment and that appointments to non B
available posts should not be taken note of for
,-.t\ ~
regularization. The cases directing regularization have
mainly proceeded on the basis that having permitted the
employee to work for some period, he should be absorbed,
without really laying down any law to that effect, after c
discussing the constitutional scheme for public
employment.
xxx xxx xxx
45. While directing that appointments, temporary or
D
casual, be regularized or made permanent, courts are
swayed by the fact that the concerned person has worked
for some time and in some cases for a considerable length
of time. It is not as if the person who accepts an
engagement either temporary or c~sual in nature, is not
aware of the nature of his employment. He accepts the E
employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not
in a position to bargain - not at arms length - since he
might have been searching for some employment so as
to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets.
)'
But on tha1 ground alone, it would not be appropriate to F
jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment and to
take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually
got employed should be directed to be continued
permanently. By doing so, it will be creating another mode

.. 't
of public appointment which is not permissible. If the court
were to void contractual employment of this nature on the
ground that the parties were not having equal bargaining
G

power, that too would not enable the court to grant any
relief to that employee. A total embargo on such casual or
temporary employment is not possible. Given the H

..
L
1
858 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R.

~
A exigencies of administration, and if imposed, would only
mean that some people who at least get employment
temporarily, contractually or casually, would not be getting
even that employment, moreover when securing of such
employment brings at least some succor to them. After all,
I-
B innumerable citizens of our vast country are in search of ),-

employment and one is not compelled to accept a casual
~ )>.
or temporary employment if one is not inclined to go in for
such an employment. It is in that context that one has to
proceed on the basis that the employment was accepted
c fully knowing the nature of it and the consequences flowing
from it. In other words, even while accepting the
employment, the person concerned knows the nature of ,_
his employment. It is not an appointment to a post in the
real sense of the term. The claim acquired by him in the
post in which he is temporarily employed or the interest in
D
that post cannot be considered to be of such a magnitude )..._
as to enable the giving up of the procedure established,
for making regular appointments to available posts in the
services of the State. The argµment that since one has
been working for some time in the post, it will not be just
E to discontinue him, even though he was aware of the
nature of the employment when he first took it up, is not
one that would enable the jettisoning of the· procedure·
established by law for Public employment and would have
to fail when tested on the touchstone of constitutionality
F and equality of opportunity enshrined in Article 14 of the i
Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx
47. When a person enters a temporary employment or
G gets engagement as a contractual or casual worker and
the engagement is not based on a proper selection as 7 ....
recognized by the relevant rules or Procedure, he is aware
of the consequences of the appointment being temporary,
casual or contractual in nature. Such a person cannot
H . invoke the theory of legitimate expectation for being

I
)
RAJASTHAN KRISHI VISHVAVIDHYALAYA, BIKANER 859
v. DEVI SINGH [DR. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.]

confirmed in the post when an appointment to the post A
could be made only by following a proper procedure for
selection and in concerned cases, in consultation with the
Public Service Commission. Therefore, the theory of
legitimate expectation cannot be successfully advanced
by temporary, contractual or casual employees. It cannot s
also be held that the State has held out any promise while
engaging these persons either to continue them where
they are or to make them permanent. The State cannot.
·constitutionally make such a promise. It is also obvious
that the theory cannot be invoked to seek a positive relief c
of being made permanent in the post.
xxx xxx xxx
52. Normally, what is sought for by such temporary
employees when they approach the court, is the issue of
0
a writ of mandamus.directing the employer, the State or its
instrumentalities, to absorb them in permanent service or
tG allow them to continue. In this context, the question arises
whether a mandamus could be issued in favour of such
persons. At this juncture, it will be proper to refer to the E
decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Dr. Rai
Shivendra Bahadur v. The Governing Body of the
Nalanda College (1962) Supp. 2 SCR 144. That case
arose out of a refusal to promote the writ petitioner therein
as the Principal of a college. This Court held that in order
that a mandamus may be issued to compel the authorities F
to do something, it must be shown that th~ statute imposes
a legal duty on the authority and the aggrieved party had
a legal right under the statute or rule to enforce it. This
classical position continues and a mandamus could not
be issued in favour of the employees directing the G
government to make them permanent since the employees
- lil; cannot show that they have an enforceable legal right to
be permane11~ly absorbed or that the State has a legal
duty to make them permanent." (See Chief Commissioner
of Income Tax & Ors. v. Smt. Susheela Prasad and Ors. H
860 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 2 S.C.R.

A (2007 (8) Supreme 635)."
7. In view of what has been stated in Uma Devi's case
(supra), we deem it proper to remit the matter to the High Court
to consider the cases afresh in the light of the said decision.
B 8. The appeals are allowed to the aforesaid extent with no
order as to costs.
D.G. Appeals allowed. . ;..

0