RAJ KUMAR SINGH @ RAJU @ BATYAversusSTATE OF RAJASTHAN

                     [2013] 8 S.C.R. 599


          RAJ KUMAR SINGH @ RAJU @ BATYA                           A
                               v.
                  STATE OF RAJASTHAN
          (Criminal Appeal Nos. 931-932 of 2009)
                         MAY 6, 2013
                                                                   B
     [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN AND FAKKIR MOHAMED
               IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, JJ.]

     Penal Code, 1860 - ss.302, 376 and 201 - Prosecution
under - For murder and rape of 4 years old girl - C
Circumstantial evidence - Conviction by Courts below - On
appeal, held: Prosecution evidence is shaky and chain of
links ·connecting the accused with the crime is inconclusive
- Prosecution failed to prove its case beyond_reasonable
doubt - Accused entitled to benefit of doubt - Hence o
acquitted.

    Evidence:

     Circumstantial evidence - In a case of circumstantial
evidence, judgment remains essentially inferential, drawn          E
from the established facts as the circumstances lead to -
Hence, all the circumstances, so established must be
conclusive, and consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt
of the accused.
                                                                   F
    Quality and credibility of evidence - In criminal case -
Suspicion and conjectures vis-a-vis proof - Held: Mere
suspcision or conjectures cannot take the place of legal proof.

      Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - s.313 - Statement
under - Evidentiary value of - The purpose of the provision G
is to meet the requirement of principles of natural justice audi
alteram partem - It is not a substantive piece of evidence -
It cannot be a substitute for prosecution evidence - It cannot
be treated as an evidence within the meaning of s.3 of
                             599                                   H
    600      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              [2013] 8 S.C.R.

A   Evidence Act - The statement under the provision cannot be
    made basis for conviction - Evidence Act, 1872 - s.3.

       Appellant-accused was prosecuted for having
  committed rape and murder of a 4 years old girl. Trial
  Court convicted him for the offences punishable under
8
  sections 302, 376 and 201 IPC, relying on the
  circumstances, viz. conduct of the appellant; evidence
  relating to injuries on the person of the deceased; false
  explanation given by the appellant; and evidence relating
  to injuries on the appellant. Appellant was sentenced to
C life imprisonment. High Court confirmed his conviction
  and sentence.

         In appeal to this Court, appellant inter alia contended
    that depositions of PWs 1, 2, 3 and 4 are not reliable as
o   there are material contradictions in their statements and
    also they are self contradictory; and that the
    circumstances of the case do not provide complete chain
    required to prove the guilt of the appellant.

          Allowing the appeal, the Court
E
      HELD: 1. The prosecution failed to prove the case
  against the appellant beyond reasonable doubt and thus,
  he becomes entitled for benefit of doubt. The conviction
  and sentence imposed on the appellant are set aside.
F [Para 40] [629-G-H; 630-A]

       2.1. While appreciating the evidence of a witness,
  minor discrepancies on trivial matters, which do not affect
  the core of the case of the prosecution, must not prompt
G the court to reject the evidence thus provided, in its
  entirety. The irrelevant details which do not in any way
  corrode the credibility of a witness, cannot be labeled as
  omissions or contradictions. Therefore, the courts must
  be cautious and very particular, in their exercise of
H appreciating evidence. The app.roach to be adopted is, if
RAJ KUMAR SINGH @ RAJU @ BATYA v. STATE OF 601
               RAJA ST HAN
the evidence of a witness is read in its entirety, and the         A
same appears to have in it, a ring of truth, then it may
become necessary for the court to scrutinize the evidence
more particularly, keeping in mind the deficiencies,
drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the said
evidence as a whole, and evaluate them separately, to              B
determine whether the same are completely against the
nature of the evidence provided by the witnesses, and
whether the validity of such evidence is shaken by virtue
of such evaluation, rendering it unworthy of belief.
"Exaggerations per se do not render the evidence brittle.          c
But it can be one of the factors to test the credibility of
the prosecution version, when the entire evidence is put
in a crucible for being tested on the touchstone of
credibility." It is in fact, the entirety of the situation which
must be taken into consideration. While appreciating the           0
evidence, the court must not attach undue importance to
minor discrepancies, rather must consider broad
spectrum of the prosecution version. The discrepancies
may be due to normal errors of perception or observation
or due to lapse of memory or due to faulty or stereotype
                                                                   E
investigation. After exercising such care and caution, and
sifting through the evidence to separate truth. from
untruth, embellishments and improvements, the court
must determine whether the residuary evidence is
sufficient to convict the accused. [Para 38) [628-C-H; 629-
A-B]                                                               F

     Bihari Nath Goswami v. Shiv Kumar Singh and Ors.
(2004) 9 SCC 186: 2004 (2) SCR 623; Vijay@ Chinee v.
State of Madhya Pradesh (2010) 8 SCC 191: 2010 (8)
SCR 1150; Sampath Kumar v. Inspector of Police,                    G
Krishnagiri AIR 2012 SC 1249: 2012 (2) SCR 289 - referred
to.
   2.2. In the instant case, there have been major
contradictions/ improvements/embellishments in the
deposition of witnesses which cannot be ignored when               H
    602      SUPREME COURT REPORTS            [2013] 8 S.C.R.

A they are examined in the correct perspective. The chain
  of links connecting the appellant with the crime appears
  inconclusive. Evidence produced by the prosecution had
  been very shaky and the chain of links connecting the
  appellant with the crime appears inconclusive. The
B circumstantial evidence is completely wanting in this
  respect. To accept the description of the evidence
  collected as flimsy, or no evidence would be too short for
  convicting the appellant for the offence, as many issues/
  circumstances virtually remained unexplained. [Paras 38
C and 40) [628-B-C; 629-E-G]

        Kehar Singh and Ors. v. State (Delhi Admn.) AIR 1988
    SC 1883: 1988 (2) Suppl. SCR 24; Subhash v. State of
    Haryana AIR 2011SC349: 2010 (14) SCR 1067- relied on.

D      3. In a case of circumstantial evidence, the judgment
  remains essentially inferential. The inference is drawn
  from the established facts as the circumstances lead to
  particular inferences. The Court has to draw an inference
  with respect to whether the chain of circumstances is
E complete, and when the circumstances therein are
  collectively considered, the same must lead only to the
  irresistible conclusion, that the accused alone is the
  perpetrator of the crime in question. All the
  circumstances so established must be of a conclusive
F nature, and consistent only with the hypothesis of the
  guilt of the accused. [Para 23) [619-A-C]

       Kali Ram v. State of Himacha/ Pradesh AIR 1973 SC
  2773: 1974 (1) SCR 722; Krishnan v. State Represented by
G Inspector of Police (2008) 15 SCC 430; Pawan v. State of
  Uttaranchal etc. etc. (2009) 15 SCC 259: 2009 (3) SCR 468;
  State of Maharashtra v. Mangi/al (2009) 15 SCC 418: 2009
  (4) SCR 49; M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1963
  SC 200: 1963 SCR 405 - relied on.

H         Babu v. State of Kera/a (2010) 9 SCC 189: 2010 (9)
RAJ KUMAR SINGH @ RAJU @ BATYA v. STATE OF 603
               RAJASTHAN
SCR 1039 - referred to.                                        A
     R. v. Hodge 168 ER 1163 - referred to.
    "An Essay on the Principles of Circumstantial Evidence
by William Wills" by T. & J. W Johnson & Co. 1872 - referred
~.                                                             B
      4. Suspicion, however grave it may be, cannot take
the place of proof, and there is a large difference between
something that 'may be' proved and 'will be proved'. In
a criminal trial, suspicion no matter how strong, cannot       c
and must not be permitted to take place of proof. This is
for the reason, that the mental distance between 'may be'
and 'must be' is quite large and divides vague
conjectures from sure conclusions. In a criminal case, the
court has a duty to ensure that mere conjectures or            0
suspicion do not take the place of legal proof. The large
distance between 'may be' true and 'must be' true, must
be covered by way of clear, cogent and unimpeachable
evidence produced by the prosecution, before an
accused is condemned as a convict, and the basic and
                                                               E
golden rule must be applied. In such cases, while keepirtg
in mind the distance between 'may be' true and 'must be'
true, the court must maintain the vital distance between
conjectures and sure conclusions to be arrived at, on the
touchstone of dispassionate judicial scrutiny based upon
a complete and comprehensive appreciation of all               F
features of the case, as well as the quality and credibility
of the evidence brought on record. The court must
ensure, that miscarriage of justice is avoided and if the
facts and circumstances of a case so demand, then the
benefit of doubt must be given to the accused; keeping         G
in mind that a reasonable doubt is not an imaginary,
trivial or a merely probable doubt, but a fair doubt that is
based upon reason and common sense. [Para 17] [615-
C-H; 616-A]
                                                               H
    604    SUPREME COURT REPORTS             [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A      Hanumant Govind Nargundkar and Anr. v. State of M.P.
  AIR 1952 SC 343: 1952 SCR 1091; Shivaji Sahabrao
  Bobade and Anr. v. State of Mahrashtra AIR 1973 SC 2622:
   1974 (1) SCR 489; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of
  Maharashtra AIR 1984 SC 1622: 1985 (1) SCR 88; Subhash
B Chand v. State of Rajasthan (2002) 1 SCC 702: 2001 (4)
  Suppl. SCR 163; Ashish Batham v. State of M.P. AIR 2002
  SC 3206 : 2002 (2) Suppl. SCR 146; Narendra Singh and
  Anr. v. State of M.P. AIR 2004 SC 3249: 2004 (3) SCR 1148;
  State through CBI v. Mahender Singh Dahiya AIR 2011 SC
C 1017: 2011 (1) SCR 1104 and Ramesh Harijan v. State of
  U.P. AIR 2012 SC 1979: 2012 (6) SCR 688 - relied on.
       5.1. In a criminal trial, the purpose of examining the
  accused person under Section 313 Cr.P.C., is to meet the
  requirement of the principles of natural justice i.e. audi
D alteram partem. This means that the accused may be
  asked to furnish some explanation as regards the
  incriminating circumstances associated with him, and the
  court must take note of such explanation. In a case of
  circumstantial evidence, the same is essential to decide
E whether or not the chain of circumstances is complete.
  No matter how weak the evidence of the prosecution may
  be, it is the duty of the court to examine the accused, and
  to seek his explanation as regards the incriminating
  material that has surfaced against him. The
F circumstances which are not put to the accused in his
  examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., cannot be used
  against him and have to be excluded from consideration.
  [Para 25] [620-C-E]
       State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh AIR 1992 SC
G 2100: 1992 (3) SCR 480; Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh and
  Anr. AIR 2002 SC 3582: 2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 5; Dehal
  Singh v. State of H.P. AIR 2010 SC 3594: 2010 (10)
  SCR 598; State of M.P. v. Ramesh (2011) 4 SCC 786: 2011
  (5) SCR 1; Rafiq Ahmed @ Rafi v. State of U.P. AIR 2011
H SC 3114: 2011 (11) SCR 907; Dharnidhar v. State of U.P.
RAJ KUMAR SINGH @ RAJU @ BATYA v. STATE OF 605
                RAJASTHAN
and Ors. (2010) 7 SCC 759: 2010 (8) SCR 173; Ramnaresh        A
and Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh AIR 2012 SC 1357: 2012
(3) SCR 630; Munish Mubar v. State of Haryana AIR 2013
SC 912: 2012 (9) SCR 193 and Brajendrasingh v. State of
M.P. AIR 2012 SC 1552: 2012 (3) SCR 599 - relied on.
                                                              8
     5.2. Statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. cannot be
made a basis for his conviction. Answers to the
questions put to the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
cannot be used to fill up the gaps left by the prosecution
witnesses in their depositions. Thus, the statement of the
accused is not a substantive piece of evidence and            C
therefore, it can be used only for appreciating the
evidence led by the prosecution, though it cannot be a
substitute for the evidence of the prosecution. In case the
prosecution's evidence is not found sufficient to sustain
conviction of the accused, the inculpatory part of his        D
statement cannot be made the sole basis of his
conviction. The statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is
not recorded after administering oath to the accused.
Therefore, it cannot be treated as an evidence within the
meaning of Section 3 of the Evidence Act, though the          E
accused has a right if he chooses to be a witness, and
once he makes that option, he can be administered oath
and examined as a witness in defence as required under
Section 315 Cr.P.C. An adverse inference can be taken
against the accused only and only if the incriminating        F
material stood fully established and the accused is not
able to furnish any explanation for the same. However,
the accused has a right to remain silent as he cannot be
forced to become witness against himself. [Para 36] [624-
G-H; 625-A-E]                                                 G
                    Case Law Reference:
    1952 SCR 1091                relied on       Para 17
    1974 (1) SCR 489             relied on       Para 17
                                                              H
    606      SUPREME COURT REPORTS              (2013] 8 S.C.R.

A         1985 (1) SCR88            relied on        Para 17
          2001 (4) Suppl. SCR 63    relied on        Para 17
          2002 (2) Suppl. SCR 146   relied on        Para 17
          2004 (3) SCR 1148         relied on        Para 17
B
          2011 (1) SCR 1104         relied on        Para 17
          2012 (6) SCR688           relied on        Para 17
          1974 (1) SCR 722          relied on        Para 18
c         168 ER 1163               referred to      Para 19
          (2008) 15 sec 430         relied on        Para 20
          2009 (3) SCR 468          relied on        Para 20
          2009 (4) SCR 49           relied on        Para 20
D
          1963 SCR 405              relied on        Para 21
          2010 (9) SCR 1039         referred to      Para 24
          1992 (3) SCR 480          relied on        Para 26
E         2002 (3) Suppl. SCR 5     relied on        Para 27
          2010 (10)   SCR598        relied on        Para 28
          2011 (5) SCR 1            relied on        Para 29

F         2011 (11) SCR 907         relied on        Para 30
          2010 (8 ) SCR 173         relied on        Para 31
          2012 (3) SCR630           relied on        Para 32
          2012 (9) SCR 193          relied on        Para 33
G
          2012 (3) SCR599           relied on        Para 35
          2004 (2) SCR623           referred to      Para 38
          2010 (8) SCR 1150         referred to      Para 38
H         2012 (2) SCR289           referred to      Para 38
RAJ KUMAR SINGH @ RAJU @ BATYA v. STATE OF 607
                RAJAS THAN
     1988 (2) Suppl. SCR 24          relied on         Para 38       A
     2010 (14) SCR 1067              relied on         Para 39
    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No. 931-932 of 2009.
                                                                     B
     From the Judgment & Order dated 04.01.2008 of the High
Court of Rajasthan, bench at Jaipur in Crl. Jail Appeal No. 1759
of 2003.

     Vibha Datta Makhija (AC.) for the Appellant.
                                                                     c
     Pragati Neekhra, Suryanaryana Singh for the Respondent.

     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

      DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. These appeals have been
preferred against the impugned judgment and order dated              D
4.1.2008, passed by the High Court of Rajasthan (Jaipur
Bench) in D.B. Crl.A. Nos. 1250 and 1749 of 2003 by way of
which, the High Court has dismissed the aforesaid appeals and
affirmed the judgment and order dated 5.8.2003 of the learned
Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track) No. 1, Jaipur District        E
in Sessions Case No. 19 of 2002 by way of which, the appellant
stood convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 302,
376 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, (hereinafter
referred to as 'the IPC'), and was awarded a sentence of life
imprisonment alongwith a fine of Rs.1,000/- under Section 302        F
IPC; 10 years rigorous imprisonment alongwith a fine of
Rs.1,000/- under Section 376 IPC, and rigorous imprisonment
of 5 years alongwith a fine of Rs.500/- under Section 201 IPC,
and in default of depositing such fine, to further suffer rigorous
imprisonment for a period of six months. The substantive             G
sentences, however, were ordered to run concurrently.

     2. As per the case of the prosecution, the necessary facts
related to the present case are as under:

     A. Pooia. a 4 vear old airl. went missina on 22.5.2001. Her     H   -
    608      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A family members searched for her relentlessly and also reported
  the matter to the police. She was eventually found lying dead
  on the roof of a lonely house on 24.5.2001. Rohtash (PW.1 ),
  father of the deceased, submitted a written report (Ex.P-1) of
  the incident at Police Station, Kotputli and upon the receipt of
B such report, a case under Sections 302 and 201 IPC was
  registered, and investigation pertaining to the same also
  commenced. Thereafter, postmortem was performed on the
  dead body, necessary memos were drawn, and statements of
  witnesses were recorded. The appellant was arrested on
c 27.5.2001 and upon completion of the investigation,
  chargesheet was filed.

       B. The trial court concluded the trial and convicted the
  appellant under Sections 302, 376 and 201 IPC, vide impugned
  judgment and order dated 5.8.2003 and awarded the sentence
D as referred to hereinabove .

        C. Aggrieved, the appellant filed an appeal in the High
    Court which was dismissed vide impugned judgment and order
    dated 4.1.2008.
E
          Hence, these appeals.

       3. Ms. Vibha Datta Makhija, learned Amicus Curiae, has
  submitted that the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution
  have not been satisfactorily established, and that additionally,
F the circumstances said to have been established against the
  appellant do not provide a complete chain that is required to
  prove the guilt of the appellant. There are material contradictions
  in the depositions of Rohtash (PW.1 ), Indira (PW.2), Kalawati
  (PW.3) and Naurang (PW.4), who are father, mother,
G grandmother and grandfather of the deceased, respectively.
  Their depositions have wrongly been relied upon by the courts
  below, as no reliance can be placed on their evidence.
  Moreover, the statements of the witnesses are self
  contradictory, and the standard of proof required to convict a
H person in a case of circumstantial evidence, has not been met
RAJ KUMAR SINGH @ RAJU @ BATYA v. STATE OF 609
      RAJASTHAN [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
either. The law requires, that the circumstances relied upon in      A
support of the conviction must be fully established, and that the
chain of evidence furnished by those circumstances must be
so comple.te, so as not to leave any reasonable doubt for a
conclusion, consistent with the innocence of the accused. The
circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn,     B
must not only be fully established, but also be of a conclusive
nature and consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the
accused. They must not be capable of being explained by way
of any other hypothesis except the guilt of the accused, and
when all the said circumstances are collectively considered, the     c
same must lead only to the irresistible conclusion that the
accused alone is the perpetrator of the crime in question. Thus,
the appeals deserve to be allowed.

     4. Per contra Ms. Pragati Neekhra, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the State, has opposed the appeals, D
contending that the judgments of the courts below do not
warrant any interference. The circumstances relied upon by the
courts below stand fully established, the chain of circumstances
is complete, and every link in the said chain indicates that the
appellant alone, could be the accused. The discrepancies in E
the evidence of the witnesses are so minor, that none of the
same go to the root of the case and disturb such a conclusion
as mentioned hereinabove. The medical evidence also fully
supports the ocular evidence, and there is no contradiction
between the two. The appellant had approached the family of F
the victim and asked them to pay to him, a sum of Rs.2,000/-
, as he would bring Pooja back to them. The injuries found on
the person of the deceased and the appellant-accused co-
relate him to the evidence relating to the recoveries, clearly
indicating that the appellant alone is guilty of the offence. Thus, G
the appeal is liable to be dismissed.

     5. We have considered the rival submissions made by the
learned counsel and perused the record.
                                                                     H
    610          SUPREME COURT REPORTS               [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A       There is no ocular version of the incident and the entire
    case of the prosecution is based on circumstantial evidence.

         6. The courts below have found the following circumstances
    forming an incriminating chain against the appellant:
B         I.      Conduct of the appellant.

          II.     False explanation given by the appellant.

          Ill.    Evidence relating to injuries on the person of the
                  deceased.
c
          IV.     Evidence relating to injuries on the appellant.

         7. The depositions with respect to the conduct of the
    appellant have been considered by the courts below, and 4
D   witnesses (family members of the deceased) have been
    examined in this respect. All 4 have deposed that the appellant
    had approached them and had asked them for the payment of
    a sum of Rs.2,000/-, to bring Pooja home, and this
    circumstance has thus been held to have been proved against
E   him.

         8. We have also been taken through the evidence of the
    witnesses on this aspect.

         Rohtash (PW.1 ), the father of the deceased, has deposed
F   that they had reported the case to the police in the morning at
    around 8 O' Clock as Pooja was found to be missing. The
    appellant had thereafter arrived at around 4 O'Clock in the
    evening, and had asked Rohtash (PW.1), to pay to him, a sum
    of Rs.2,000/-, stating that he would bring Pooja back. They had
G   informed the police about this fact while lodging the FIR. In his
    cross examination, Rohtash (PW.1) admitted that the issue of
    the appellant asking for a sum of Rs.2,000/- had not been
    mentioned in the FIR. Then the witness himself voluntarily
    deposed, that the sum of Rs.2,000/- was asked for after the
H   said report had already been written. He further deposed that
RAJ KUMAR SINGH@ RAJU@ BATYA v. STATE OF 611
      RAJASTHAN [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
he had never seen the appellant before he had asked him for          A
the said amount of Rs.2,000/-. The witness also deposed that
the police had not made any inquiry from him in this regard,
and then made a statement to the contrary alleging that the
police had questioned him vigorously. It may also be pertinent
to mention that in his deposition, Rohtash (PW.1) was unable         B
to mention the particular date on which the appellant had
approached his family, and had asked for a sum of Rs.2,000/
-.
       9. Indira (PW.2), the mother of the deceased, Kalawati        C
(PW.3), grandmother and Naurang (PW.4), grandfather of
Pooja (deceased) had deposed that Rohtash (PW.1) had
registered a report in the police station at 8 O'Clock about the
fact that their daughter Pooja had gone missing and further
deposed that, at about 4 O'Clock in the evening, on the same
day, one boy had come to her and had asked her to pay to him         D
a sum of Rs.2,000/-, as in return for the same he would bring
back her daughter. Indira (PW.2) identified the appellant in court
as the person who had asked to pay the said sum of Rs.2,000/
-. All of them have further deposed that he had been caught by
them and had been handed over to the police. In her cross-           E
examination, she has admitted that the appellant had also been
beaten up by them, and thereafter, had been handed over to
the police on the same day.

       If the evidence of the 4 witnesses on this very issue is      F
carefully examined, it becomes evident that material
contradictions exist therein, and that further, not only do such
material contradictions exist, but embellishments and
improvements have also been made to the version of events.
In the event that the appellant had come to them and asked           G
them for money, and they had caught hold of him and called
the police, and the police had arrested him, there exists no
rational explanation as regards why such a pertinent fact has
been excluded from the FIR. Secondly, in case the witnesses
i.e. the family members of the deceased had caught hold of the
                                                                     H
    612      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 8 S.C.R.

A   appellant, why has PW.4, grandfather of the deceased,
    deposed that the appellant was shown to them immediately
    after his arrest, if the witnesses had in fact caught hold of him,
    and had themselves handed him over to the police, the question
    of the police showing the appellant to them could not arise.
B
         10. All recoveries were made on 24.5.2001, and the
    appellant was identified as the accused only on the ground that
    four witnesses i.e. PWs. 1 to 4, had deposed to the effect that
    he had asked them for a sum of Rs.2,000/- to bring back their
C   child. No one has explained how the appellant was actually
    arrested. PWs.1 to 4 have made categorical statements to the
    effect that when the appellant had asked them for money to
    bring back the girl, they had caught hold of him and handed him
    over to the police on 24.5.2001 itself. However, Gopi Singh
    (PW.14), the Investigating Officer has made it clear that the
D   appellant had been arrested on 27.5.2001 by Ext. P-14, and
    that there was no independent witness for the said arrest. An
    FIR was lodged on 24.5.2001 without naming any person, as
    the FIR itself reveals that some one had killed Pooja and had
    dumped her in the abandoned dharamshala.
E
         Naurang (PW.4), grandfather of Pooja has deposed that
    the police had shown the accused to them as soon as he was
    arrested. Therefore, there exists a material contradiction as
    regards the issue of the arrest of the appellant.
F        We have examined the original documents/records. There
    is over-writing on the arrest memo and Gopi Singh (PW.14),
    the Investigating Officer has admitted in his cross-examination
    that there did in fact exist some over-writing underneath the
    signatures in Ext. D-1, and that the same, i.e., the over-writing,
G   did not bear his initials.

        11. So far as the recovery of the clothes of the accused
    which were recovered with blood and semen stains is
    concerned, there are numerous contradictions. Hari Singh
H   (PW.9), the constable who made the said recoveries has
RAJ KUMAR SINGH@ RAJU@ BATYA v. STATE OF613
      RAJASTHAN [DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
deposed that on 27.5.2001, he had made the recovery of a light A
brown shirt, a white coloured vest on which there were blood
like stains, one cream coloured underwear on which blood like
stains and semen stains were found. The same were recovered
from the appellant. Therefore, it is clear that the recoveries of
the clothes of the appellant were made on 27 .5.2001, and not     s
on 24.5.2001. If the appellant had in fact been arrested as per
the version of events narrated by PWs.1 to 4 on 24.5.2001,
there would be no occasion for the police to make the recovery
of his clothes on 27 .5.2001. The statement of Rohtash (PW.1)
was recorded on 27.5.2001, though the same was shown as           c
recorded on 24.5.2001, and the statement of all other witnesses
was recorded on 27.5.2001. It is thus, difficult to understand how
such a material discrepancy in the evidence has been ignored
by the courts below while convicting the appellant. Exts.P-23
to P-39 are the relevant photographs. They do not bear the
                                                                   0
signature of any person and therefore, it is difficult to
comprehend how these material exhibits were sent for FSL
report.

     The High Court has doubted and in fact disbelieved the
recovery of clothes at the instance of the appellant, and has     E
remarked that the evidence of such recovery was fabricated and
false.

     12. The postmortem report (Ex.P-21) revealed the following
anti-mortem injuries on her body:                                 F

     "Body swollen, Abdomen distended, eyes protruded, lips
    swollen, no maggots over body, skin pealed off here and
    there, mouth semi opened, bleeding from both nostrils and
    Lt. ear, PM rigidly absent due to second stage of relaxer,
    PM lividity present over dependent parts of body, back of G
    chest presents and both buttocks blush black, labia majora
    swollen and teared, hymen teared, vaginal walls teared.
    Rectum protruding through posterior vagina wall, posterior
    fornix ruptured.
                                                               H
    614       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A              In the opinion of Medical Board the cause of death
          was neurogenic shock, coma due to head injury."

         13. As already described, the dead body of Pooja was
    subjected to an autopsy by the Medical Board. Dr. Laxman
B   Singh (PW.12) deposed that the body was swollen, abdomen
    distended, eyes protruding, lips swollen, no maggots over
    body, skin pealed off here and there, mouth semi opened,
    bleeding from both nostrils and left ear. PM rigidly absent due
    to second stage of relaxation, PM lividity present over
    dependent parts of body, back of chest present and both
C   buttocks bluish black. Labia majora swollen and hymen torn.
    Vaginal walls torn. Rectum protruding through posterior vaginal
    wall, posterior fornix ruptured. The cause of death was
    neurogenic shock, coma due to head injury. The testimony of
    Dr. Laxman Singh clearly reveals that the inn9cent helpless soul
D   Pooja was first subjected to monstrous sexual assault, and was
    then mercilessly killed by inflicting injuries on her head so that
    there remains no direct evidence against culprit.

          14. The appellant after his arres.t on 27.5.2001 was
E   medically examined by Dr. Laxman Singh (PW.12) on May 28,
    2001 and vide his medical examination report (Ext. P-22), an
    abrasion of the size of 0.2 x 0.2 cm on the corona penis was
    found. The body of the penis and glands therein were swollen
    and tenderness and inflammation was present. There was
F   nothing to suggest that the appellant was incapable of indulging
    in intercourse.

        15. The evidence of Dau lat Ram (PW. 7), the driver had
  been to the extent that on 22.5.2001, the appellant had travelled
  with him to certain places and had slept in his jeep that night
G and did not go to his house, and the appellant could not furnish
  any explanation as to why he had slept in the jeep and did not
  go to his house. Therefore, his conduct was suggestive of the
  fact-that the offence had been committed by him.

H         The trial court also doubted the conduct of the appellant
                                                                   ...
                                                                       t
RAJ KUMAR SINGH @ RAJU @ BATYA v. STATE OF 615
      RAJASTHAN [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
for the reason that he had slept ·in the jeep though he was        A
neither the driver of a jeep nor the servant of Daulat Ram
(PW.7), the driver. The High Court had taken note of the
appellant's statement under Section 313 of Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, (hereinafter referred to as ·cr.P.C.'), wherein
the appellant had replied that the aforesaid deposition was        B
wrong, and held that explanation furnished by him was false.

     16. The courts below have proceecfed on the basis that
there was no evidence of enmity against any of the witnesses
which may lead to the presumption that the appellant has been
falsely implicated in the case.                               C

     17. Suspicion, however grave it may be, cannot take the
place of proof, and there is a large difference between
something that 'may be' proved and 'will be proved'. In a
criminal trial, suspicion no matter how strong, cannot and must D
not be permitted to take place of proof. This is for the reason,
that the mental distance between 'may be' and ·must be' is
quite large and divides vague conjectures from sure
conclusions. In a criminal case, the court has a duty to ensure
that mere conjectures or suspicion do not take the place of legal E
proof. The large distance between ·may be' true and ·must be'
true, must be covered by way of clear, cogent and
unimpeachable evidence produced by the prosecution, before
an accused is condemned as a convict, and the basic and
golden rule must be applied. In such cases, while keeping in F
mind the distance between ·may be' true and ·must be' true,
the court must maintain the vital distance between conjectures
and sure conclusions to be arrived at, on the touchstone of
dispassionate judicial scrutiny based upon a complete and
comprehensive appreciation of all features of the case, as well G
as the quality and credibility of the evidence brought on record.
The court must ensure, that miscarriage of justice is avoided
and if the facts and circumstances of a case so demand, then
the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused, keeping in
mind that a reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a
                                                                  H
    616      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A   merely probable doubt, but a fair doubt that is based upon
    reason and common sense. (Vide: Hanumant Govind
    Nargundkar & Anr. v. State of M. P., Al R 1952 SC 343; Shivaji
    Sahabrao Bobade & Anr. v. State of Mahrashtra, AIR 1973
    SC 2622; Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra,
B   AIR 1984 SC 1622; Subhash Chand v. State of Rajasthan,
    (2002) 1 SCC 702; Ashish Batham v. State of MP., AIR 2002
    SC 3206; Narendra Singh & Anr. v. State of MP., AIR 2004
    SC 3249; State through CBI v. Mahender Singh Dahiya, AIR
    2011 SC 1017; and Ramesh Harijan v. State of UP., AIR
c   2012 SC 1979)

        18. In Kali Ram v. State of Himacha/ Pradesh, AIR 1973
    SC 2773, this Court observed as under: ·

          "Another golden thread which runs through the web of the
D         administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two
          views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case
          one pointing -to the guilt of the accused and the other to
          his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused
          should be adopted. This principle has a special
E         relevance in cases where in the guilt of the accused is
          sought to be established by circumstantial evidence."

         19. In R. v. Hodge 168 ER 1163, the court held that before
    a person is convicted entirely on circumstantial evidence, the
F   court must be satisfied not only that those circumstances were
    consistent with his having committed the act, but also that the
    facts were such, so as to be inconsistent with any other rational
    conclusion other than the one that the accused is the guilty
    person.

G       20. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (Supra), this Court held
    as under:

          ''The facts so established should be consistent only with
          the hypothesis of the ?guilt of the accused. There should
          not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that
H
RAJ KUMAR SINGH @ RAJU @ BATYA v. STATE OF 617
      RAJASTHAN [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]

     the accused is guilty. The circumstances should be of a         A
     conclusive nature and tendency. There must be a chain
     of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable
     ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence
     of the accused and must show that in all human
     probability the act must have been done by the accused."        B
    A similar view has been reiterated in Krishnan v. State
Represented by Inspector of Police, (2008) 15 SCC 430;
Pawan v. State of Uttaranchal, etc. etc. (2009) 15 SCC 259;
and State of Maharashtra v. Mangilal, (2009) 15 SCC 418.
                                                                     c
       21. In M. G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC
200, this Court held, that if the circumstances proved in a case
are consistent either with the innocence of the accused, or with
his guilt, then the accused is entitled to the benefit of doubt.
When it is held that a certain fact has been proved, then the        D
question that arises is whether such a fact leads to the inference
of guilt on the part of the accused person or not, and in dealing
with this aspect of the problem, benefit of doubt must be given
to the accused and a final inference of guilt against him must
be drawn only if the proved fact is wholly inconsistent with the     E
innocence of the accused, and is entirely consistent with his
guilt.

     Similarly, in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (Supra), this Court
held as under:
                                                                     F
           "Graver the crime, greater should be the standard
     of proof. An accused may appear to be guilty on the
     basis of suspicion but that cannot amount to legal proof.
     When on the evidence two possibilities are available or
     open, one which goes in the favour of the prosecution and       G
     the other benefits an accused, the accused is
     undoubtedly entitled to the benefit of doubt. The principle
     has special relevance where the guilt or the accused is
     sought to be established by circumstantial evidence ..
                                                                     H
    618       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                  [2013) 8 S.C.R.


A       22. In an Essay on the Principles of Circumstantial
    Evidence by William Wills by T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1872, it
    has been explained as under:

          "In matters of direct testimony, if credence be given to the
B         relators, the act of hearing and the act of belief, though
          really not so, seem to be contemporaneous. But the case
          is very different when we have to determine upon
          circumstantial evidence, the judgment in respect of which
          is essentially inferential. There is no apparent necessary
          connection between the facts and the inference; the facts
c         may be true, and the inference erroneous, and it is only
          by comparison with the results of observation in similar
          or analogous circumstances, that we acquire confidence
          in the accuracy of our conclusions. ?·

D         The term PRESUMPTIVE is frequently used as
          synonymous with CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; but it
          is not so used with strict accuracy, The word"
          presumption, " ex vi termini, imports an inference from
          facts; and the adjunct "presumptive," as applied to
E         evidentiary facts, implies the certainty of some relation
          between the facts and the inference. Circumstances
          generally, but not necessarily, lead to particular
          inferences; for the facts may be indisputable, and yet their
          relation to the principal fact may be only apparent, and
F         not real; and even when the connection is real, the
          deduction may be erroneous. Circumstantial and
          presumptive evidence differ, therefore, as genus and
          species.

                The force and effect of circumstantial evidence
G         depend upon its incompatibility with, and incapability of,
          explanation or solution upon any other supposition than
          that of the truth of the fact which it is adduced to prove;
          the mode of argument resembling the method of
          demonstration by the reductio ad absurdum."
H
RAJ KUMAR SINGH @ RAJU @ BATYA v. STATE OF 619
      RAJASTHAN [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
     23. Thus, in view of the above, the Court must consider a        A
case of circumstantial evidence in light of the aforesaid settled
legal propositions. In a case of circumstantial evidence, the
judgment remains essentially inferential. The inference is drawn
from the established facts as the circumstances lead to
particular inferences. The Court has to draw an inference with        8
respect to whether the chain of circumstances is complete, and
when the circumstances therein are collectively considered, the
same must lead only to the irresistible conclusion, that the
accused alone is the perpetrator of the crime in question. All
the circumstances so established must be of a conclusive              C
nature, and consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the
accused.

     24. This Court in Babu v. State of Kera/a, (2010) 9 SCC
189 has dealt with the doctrine of innocence elaborately and
held as under:                                                        D

     "27. Every accused is presumed to be innocent unless
     the guilt is proved. The presumption of innocence is a
    human right. However, subject to the statutory
     exceptions, the said principle forms the basis of criminal E
    jurisprudence. For this purpose, the nature of the offence,
     its seriousness and gravity thereof has to be taken into
     consideration. The courts must be on guard to see that
    merely on the application of the presumption, the same
    may not lead to any injustice or mistaken conviction.
                                                                  F
     Statutes like the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; the
    Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988; and the Terrorist and
    Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, provide for
    presumption of guilt if the circumstances provided in
    those statutes are found to be fulfilled and shift the burden
    of proof of innocence on the accused. However, such a G
    presumption can also be raised only when certain
    foundational facts are established by the prosecution.
     There may be difficulty in proving a negative fact.

           28. However, in cases where the statute does not           H
    620       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A         provide for the burden of proof on the accused, it always
          lies on the prosecution. It is only in exceptional
          circumstances, such as those of statutes as referred to
          hereinabove, that the burden of proof is on the accused.
          The statutory provision even for a presumption of guilt
B
          of the accused under a particular statute must meet the
          tests of reasonableness and liberty enshrined in Articles
          14 and 21 of the Constitution."

       25. In a criminal trial, the purpose of examining the accused
  person under Section 313 Cr.P:C., is to meet the requirement
C of the principles of natural justice i.e. audi alterum partem. This
  means that the accused may be asked to furnish some
  explanation as regards the incriminating circumstances
  associated with him, and the court must take note of such
  explanation. In a case of circumstantial evidence, the same is
D essential to decide whether or not the chain of circumstances
  is complete. No matter how weak the evidence of the
  prosecution may be, it is the duty of the court to examine the
  accused, and to seek his explanation as regards the
  incriminating material that has surfaced against him. The
E circumstances .which are not put to the accused in his
  examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., cannot be used
  against him and have to be excluded from consideration.

        26. In State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh, AIR 1992
F   SC 2100, this Court observed as under:

          " ... if there is no evidence or circumstance appearing in
          the prosecution evidence implicating the accused with the
          commission of the crime with which he is charged, there
          is nothing for the accused to explain and hence his
G         examination under Section 313 of the Code would be
          wholly unnecessary and improper. In such a situation the
          accused cannot be questioned and his answers cannot
          be used to supply the gaps left by witnesses in their
          evidence."
H
RAJ KUMAR SINGH@ RAJU@ BATYA v. STATE OF 621
      RAJASTHAN [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
    27. In Mohan Singh v. Prem Singh & Anr., AIR 20QJ! SC           A
3582, this Court held:

     "The statement of the accused under Section 313 CrPC
     is not a substantive piece of evidence. It can be used for
     appreciating evidence led by the prosecution to accept 8
     or reject it. It is, however, not a substitute for the evidence
     of the prosecution. If the exculpatory part of his statement
     is found to be false and the evidence Jed by the
     prosecution is reliable, the inculpatory part of his
     statement can be taken aid of to lend assurance to the C
     evidence of the prosecution. If the prosecution evidence
     does not inspire confidence to sustain the conviction of
     the 'accused, the incu/patory part of his statement under
     Section 313 CrPC cannot be made the sole basis of his
     conviction."
                                                                     D
     28. In Dehal Singh v. State of H.P., AIR 2010 SC 3594,
                               1


this Court observed:

           "Statement under Section 313 of the Code of
    Criminal Procedure is taken into consideration to E
    appreciate the truthfulness or otherwise of the case of the
    prosecution and it is not an evidence. Statement of an
    accused under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal
    Procedure is recorded without administering oath and,
    therefore, the said statement cannot be treated as F
    evidence within the meaning of Section 3 of the Evidence
    Act. The appellants have not chosen to examine any other
    witness to ?support this plea and in case none was
    available they were free to examine themselves in terms
    of Section 315 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which,
    inter- alia, provides that a person accused of an offence G
    is a competent witness of the defence and may give
    evidence on oath in disproof of the charges. There is
    reason not to treat the statement under Section 313 of the
    Code of Criminal Procedure as evidence as the accused
    cannot be cross-examinec' with reference to those H
    622       SUPREME COURT REPORTS                   [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A         statements. However, when an accused appears as a
          witness in defence to disprove the charge, his version can
          be tested by his cross-examination."

        29. In State of MP. v. Ramesh, (2011) 4 SCC 786, this
    Court held as under:                 ·
8
          "The statement of the accused made under Section 313
          CrPC can be taken into consideration to appreciate the
          truthfulness or otherwise of the prosecution case.
          However, as such a statement is not recorded after
C         administration of oath and the accused cannot be cross-
          examined. his statement so recorded under Section 313
          CrPC cannot be treated to be evidence within the
          meaning of Section 3 of the Evidence Act. 1872. Section
          315 CrPC enables an accused to give evidence on his
D         own behalf to disprove the charges made against him.
          However, for such a course, the accused has to offer
          in writing to give his evidence in defence. Thus, the
          accused becomes ready to enter into the witness box, to
          take oath and to be cross-examined on behalf of the
E         prosecution and/or of the accomplice, if it is so required. "

        30. In Rafiq Ahmed@ Rafi v. State of U.P., AIR 2011 SC
    3114, this Court observed as under:

                "It is true that the statement under Section 313
F         CrPC cannot be the sole basis for conviction of the
          accused but certainly it can be a relevant consideration
          for the courts to examine, particularly when the
          prosecution has otherwise been able to establish the
          chain of events .... "
G
         31. In Dhamidhar v. State of U.P. & Ors., (2010) 7 SCC
    759, this Court held:

                "The proper methodology to be adopted by the
          Court while recording the statement of the accused under
H         Section 313 CrPC is to invite the attention af the accused
RAJ KUMAR SINGH @ RAJU @ BATYA v. STATE OF 623
      RAJASTHAN [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
     to the circumstances and substantial evidence in relation        A
     to the offence, for which he has been charged and invite
     his explanation. In other words, it provides an opportunity
     to an accused to state before the court as to what is the.
     truth and what is his defence, in accordance with law. It
     was for the accused to avail that opportunity and if he fails    B
     to do so then it is for the court to examine the case of
     the prosecution on its evidence with reference to the
     statement made by the accused under Section 313
     CrPC."

    32. In Ramnaresh & Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh, AIR             C
2012 SC 1357, this Court held as under:

           "It is a settled principle of law that the obligation to
     put material evidence to the accused under Section 313
     CrPC is upon the court. One of the main objects of               D
     recording of a statement under this provision of CrPC is
     to give an opportunity to the accused to explain the
     circumstances appearing against him as well as to put
     forward his defence, if the accused so desires. But once
     he does not avail. this opportunity, then consequences in        E
     law must follow. Where the accused takes benefit of this
     opportunity, then his statement made under Section 313
     CrPC, insofar as it supports the case of the prosecution,
     can be used against him for rendering conviction. Even
     under the latter, he faces the consequences in law."             F
     33. In Munish Mubar v. State of Haryana, AIR 2013 SC
912, this Court, while dealing with the issue of the examination
of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. held, that the
accused has a duty to furnish an explanation in his statement
under Section 313 Cr.P.C. as regards any incriminating                G
material that has been produced against him. Such a view was
taken in light of the fact that there existed evidence to show that
the accused had parked his car at the Delhi Airport, and that
the same had remained there for several hours on the date of
commission of the crime in question. Thus, in light of the fact       H
    624      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A   that such a fact had been established, and that such
    circumstances also simultaneously existed, the accused was
    expected to explain the reason for which he had gone to the
    airport, and why the car had remained parked there for several
    hours.
B
          34. In Ramnaresh (Supra), this Court had taken the view
  that if an accused is given the freedom to remain silent during
  the investigation, as well as before the Court, then the accused
  may choose to maintain silence or even remain in complete
C denial, even at the time when his statement under Section 313
  Cr.P.C. is being recorded. However, in such an event, the Court
  would be entitled to draw an inference, including such adverse
  inference against the accused, as may be permissible in
  accordance with law. While such an. observation has been
  made, this part of the judgment must be read alongwith the
D subsequent observation of the court stating that if he keeps
  silent or furnishes an explanation, in both cases, the same can
  be used against him for rendering a conviction, in so far as it
  supports the case of the prosecution.

E        35. In Brajendrasingh v. State of M.P., AIR 2012 SC 1552,
    this Court held, that it is equally true that a statement under
    Section 313 Cr.P.C., simpliciter cannot normally be made the
    basis for convicting the accused. But where the statement of
    the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is in line with the case
F   of the prosecution, then the heavy onus of providing adequate
    proof on the prosecution, that is placed is to some extent,
    reduced.

       36. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be
  summarised to the effect that statement nder Section 313
G Cr.P.C. is recorded to meet the requirement of the principles
  of natural justice as it requires that an accused may be given
  an opportunity to furnish explanation of the incr.iminating
  material which had come against him in the trial. However, his
  statement cannot be made a basis for his conviction. His
H answers to the questions put to him under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
RAJ KUMAR SINGH @ RAJU @ BATYA v. STATE OF 625
      RAJASTHAN [DR. S.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
cannot be used to fill up the gaps left by the prosecution A
witnesses in their depositions. Thus, the statement of the
accused is not a substantive piece of evidence and therefore,
it can be used only for appreciating the evidence led by the
prosecution, though it cannot be a substitute for the evidence
of the prosecution. In case the prosecution's evidence is not-        s
found sufficient to sustain conviction of the accused, the
inculpatory part of his statement cannot be made the sole basis
of his conviction. The statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. is
not recorded after administering oath to the accused. Therefore,
it cannot be treated as an evidence within the meaning of c
Section 3 of the Evidence Act, though the accused has a right
if he chooses to be a witness, and once he makes that option,
he can be administered oath and examined as a witness in
defence as required under Section 315 Cr.P.C.

     An adverse inference can be taken against the accused            D
only and only if the incriminating material stood fully established
and the accused is not able to furnish any explanation for the
same. However, the accused has a right to remain silent as he
cannot be forced to become witness against himself.
                                                                      E
     37. We have considered the case in the light of the
aforesaid settled legal propositions and reached the following
inescapable inferences:

      I.    Kalawati (PW.3), grandmother of the deceased
            Pooja, has stated that Indira (PW.2), mother of the       F
            deceased Pooja, had removed her silver Kada and
            had placed it near Pooja. The said Kada has
            however, not been seized from either the place of
            occurrence, from their cart, or from the appellant.
                                                                      G
      II.   Witnesses PW.1 to PW.4 have submitted, that the
            pant, shirt, vest, brief and shoes of the appellant
            were found lying near the dead body of Pooja. This
            statement has been disbelieved in its entirety by the
            High Court, and to such extent, it has been held all      H
    626          SUPREME COURT REPORTS                 [2013] 8 S.C.R.


A                 the witnesses have given a false statement.

          Ill.    There has been an evidence in respect of recovery
                  of blood stained clothes of the appellant which
                  stand falsified by the deposition of Daulatram
                  {PW. 7) who had categorically deposed that when
B
                  he woke him up while sleeping in the jeep, his
                  clothes did not have any blood stained. Hari Singh
                  {PW.9) admitted in his deposition that in _Arrest
                  Memo, Ex.P-14 there was no mention that there was
                  any blood on the body of the accused or his c,lothes.
c
          IV.     As per the evidence of PWs.1 to 4, the appellant
                  was apprehended by them when he came and
                  made a demand of Rs.2,000/- to bring Pooja back
                  on 23.5.2001 and was handed over to the police.
D                 There could be no explanation by the Investigating
                  Officer as how his arrest had been shown on
                  27.5.2001.

          V.      Naurang (PW.4) has categorically deposed that the
                  appellant was shown to such witnesses
E
                  immediately after his arrest by the police.

          VI.     The High Court has taken the view that the appellant
                  has also furnished a false explanation. Daulatram
                  {PW. 7) was a prosecution witness and the
F                 appellant has submitted that he has deposed falsely.
                  Such a statement made by the appellant could not
                  be held to be a false explanation.

          VII.    The discovery of the body of Pooja by Kalawati
G                 (PW.3) is also grossly suspect, owing to the fact
                  that it is neither natural to defecate on the roof of a
                  house, nor to go to the roof of a vacant building in
                  the wee hours of the morning.

          VIII.   Even if the missing report was filed at 8 O'Clock in
H                 the morning of 23.5.2001 and the appellant had
RAJ KUMAR SINGH @ RAJU @ BATYA v. STATE OF 627
      RAJASTHAN [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
           approached the witnesses to pay to him a sum of A
           Rs.2,000/-, to bring Pooja back the very same day,
           there is no reason why the said fact is found to be
           missing in the FIR that was lodged on 24.5.2001.

    IX.    In their statements recorded under Section 161 8
           Cr.P.C., witnesses PW.1 to PW.4 have expressed
           the doubt that they had with respect to the appellant.
           It is pertinent to note however, that all the statements
           were recorded on 27.5.2001 and there is no
           explanation for why such a statement is missing in C
           the FIR lodged on 24.5.2001.

    X.     Statement of Rohtash (PW.1) was shown to have
           been recorded on 27.5.2001 though the same was
           recorded on 24.5.2001 as is evident from the
           overwriting in the original record.                   D

    XI.    The recoveries are also highly unbelievable as
           Daulatram (PW.7) and another witness Ummaid
           (PW.8), who had been declared hostile, have
           deposed in the court stating that they had been       E
           asked to sign on blank papers. In such
           circumstances, why was Daulatram (PW. 7) also not
           declared hostile by the prosecution?

    XII.   Doctor Laxman Singh (PW.12), has deposed F
           before the court, stating that the appellant had 01:1
           his person, several injuries and that some of the
           said injuries that were on his right leg, could have
           been caused by a blunt weapon. No explanation
           was furnished by the prosecution with respect to G
           such injuries. Moreover, even if some injuries were
           found on the private parts of the appellant, the same
           does not conclusively connect him to the crime.

   XIII.   Gopi Singh (PW.14), the investigating officer, has
           deposed in_court, that a white semen like             H
    628      SUPREME COURT REPORTS                    [2013] 8 S.C.R.

A               substance was seized from the spot. Such a
                statement is not possible to be taken as true for the
                reason that the colour of the semen is said to have
                remained white even after the lapse of several
                hours.
B
          38. In the instant case, there have been major
    contradictions/ improvements/embellishments in the deposition
    of witnesses which cannot be ignored when they are examined
    in the correct perspective. The chain of links connecting the
C   appellant with the crime appears inconclusive. It is a settled
    legal proposition that, while appreciating the evidence of a
    witness, minor discrepancies on trivial matters, which do not
    affect the core of the case of the prosecution, must not prompt
    the court to reject the evidence thus provided, in its entirety. The
    irrelevant details which do not in any way corrode the credibility
0   of a witness, cannot be labeled as omissions or contradictions.
    Therefore, the courts must be cautious and very particular, in
    their exercise of appreciating evidence. The approach to be
    adopted is, if the evidence of a witness is read in its entirety,
    and the same appears to have in it, a ring of truth, then it may
E   become necessary for the court to scrutinize the evidence more
    particularly, keeping in mind the deficiencies, drawbacks and
    infirmities pointed out in the said evidence as a whole, and
    evaluate them separately, to determine whether the same are
    completely against the nature of the evidence provided by the
F   witnesses, and whether the validity of such evidence is shaken
    by virtue of such evaluation, rendering it unworthy of belief.
    "Exaggerations per se do not render the evidence brittle. But
    it can be one of the factors to test the credibility of the
    prosecution version, when the entire evidence is put in a
G   crucible for being tested on the touchstone of credibility." It is
    in fact, the entirety of the situation which must be taken into
    consideration. While appreciating the evidence, the court must
    not attach undue importance to minor discrepancies, rather
    must consider broad spectrum of the prosecution version. The
H   ~iscrepancies may be due to normal errors of perception or
RAJ KUMAR SINGH @ RAJU @ BATYA v. STATE OF 629
      RAJASTHAN [DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.]
observation or due to lapse of memory or due to faulty or            A
stereo-type investigation. After exercising such care and
caution, and sifting through the evidence to separate truth from
untruth, embellishments and improvements, the court must
determine whether the residuary evidence is sufficient to convict
the accused. (Vide: Bihari Nath Goswami v. Shiv Kumar Singh          B
& Ors., (2004) 9 SCC 186; Vijay@ Chinee v. State of Madhya
Pradesh, (2010) 8 SCC 191; and Sampath Kumarv. Inspector
of Police, Krishnagiri, AIR 2012 SC 1249).

     In Kehar Singh & Ors. v. State (Delhi Admn.), AIR 1988          C
SC 1883, this Court has held that if the discrepancies are
material it would be safer to err in acquitting than in convicting
the accused.

     39. In Subhash v. State of Haryana, AIR; 2011 SC 349,
this Court has held that a significant omission in the statement     D
of a witness recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. may amount
to a major contradiction. However, it may depend upon the facts
of case and in case of a material contradiction the accused
becomes entitled for benefit of doubt and thus acquittal~
                                                                     E
     40. Thus, we find force in the submissions advanced by
Ms. Makhija, learned Amicus Curiae, that evidence produced
by the prosecution had been very shaky and the chain of links
connecting the appellant with the crime appears inconclusive.
The circumstantial evidence is completely wanting in this            F
respect. To accept the description of the evidence collected as
flimsy, or no evidence would be too short for convicting the
appellant for the offence, as many issues/circumstances virtually
remained unexplained.
                                                                     G
     In view of the above, we have no hesitation in holding that
the prosecution failed to prove the case against the appellant
beyond reasonable doubt and thus, he becomes entitled for
benefit of doubt. Thus, the appeals succeed and are allowed.
The conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant are set         H
    630      SUPREME COURT REPORTS               (2013) 8 S.C.R.


A   aside. The appellant be released forthwith unless wanted in
    some other case.

         Before parting with the case, we record our appreciation
    to Ms. Vibha Datta Makhija, Advocate who rendered invaluable
8   service as Amicus Curiae in disposal of these appeals.

    K.K.T.                                      Appeal allowed.