Holding

The High Court erred in rejecting the petition; the inherent power under s.482 is exercisable notwithstanding the existence of s.397, and a censor board certificate does not preclude criminal prosecution under IPC 292/293.

Summary

The appellants, film producers of "Satyan, Shivam, Sundaram", were summoned by a Metropolitan Magistrate under sections 292, 293 and 34 of the IPC after a complaint alleging obscenity. They challenged the summons before the Delhi High Court under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, but the High Court treated the petition as a revision under section 397 and dismissed it for lack of a certified copy of the order. The Supreme Court held that the High Court’s view was erroneous: the inherent power under s.482 is not barred by the revisional power of s.397 and may be exercised where the order is interlocutory or creates harassment. The Court also ruled that a certificate issued by the Board of Film Censors under the Cinematograph Act does not provide an absolute defence against prosecution under IPC sections 292/293, though it is a relevant factor. Consequently, the appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the High Court for fresh disposal on its merits.

Issues considered

The petition filed under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code can be treated as a revision petition under section 397.
Whether the High Court was justified in rejecting the petition for non‑production of a certified copy of the magistrate's order.
Whether a certificate under the Cinematograph Act, 1952 bars the criminal court's jurisdiction to try offences under IPC sections 292 and 293.
The scope and limits of the High Court's inherent powers vis‑à‑vis its revisional powers.

Legislation cited

Cinematograph Act, 1952s. 5A, s. 6
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 200, s. 397, s. 482
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 292, s. 293, s. 34

Subjects

inherent powerrevision petitionCriminal Procedure CodeCinematograph ActobscenityIPC 292IPC 293jurisdictionfilm censorshipspecial leave

Judgment

1081
I A
RAJ KAPOOR AND ORS.
v.
STATE AND OTHERS
October 26, 1979
-. ,7· - [V. R. KRISHNA IYER & R. S. PATHAK, JJ.J B
Inherent powers vis-a-vis revisional powers of the High Court, nature of-
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 Sections 482 and 397.

Cinen1atograph Act 1952 Section 5A-Whether the issuance of the certificate
i,ssued by the specialised Board of Film Censors bars the criniinal Court's juris-
dictio11 to try for offences under Sections 292/293 l.P.C. C
Pursuant to the complaint filed by the second respondent against the appel-
lants Und'er sections '2927293 read with section 34 of the Penal Code 1'9r alleged
punitive prurience moral depravity and shocking erosion of public dei::ency of
the film Satya1n, Shivam, Sundaram, the Metropolitan Magistrate recorded the
statement of three witnesses, including the con1plainant, in· a preliminary inquiry
under sectiori 200 of lhe Code of Criminal Procedure and holding th.at a D
prima facie c-ase existed for summoning the appellants, made an Order direct~
issue qf summons for th~ir Ette·ndance. The appellants applied against the
ord~r to the. High Court of .Delhi under section 482 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, but the High CoU:rt, b'eing of opinion that a revision petition lay
3.gainst that order, decided to entertain it under section 397 of' the Code. As
th~ certified copy of the order of the Metropolitan Magistrate wae not filed
along with the petition, it v1as rejected by the ;High Court on August 3, 1979, E ·
as n.ot COJJ?.petent.

Allowing the appeal by special leav'e the Court,
l!ELD :
(Per Iyer J.)
F
Th~ opening words -0f Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure con-
tradict the contention wb.ether the inh'erent powers of the High Court under
Section 482 stands repelled when ihe revisional power under seclion 397 over-
laps because nothing iri the Code, not even section 397 can affect the amplitude
of tl:ie inherent power preserved in so many terms by the language of S~ction
482. S,tiH,......a general principle pervades this branch of Jaw wh'en a specific
1 prov?(t'On is made; easy resort to inherent, power is not right except under G
~pelling circun1stan.ces. Not that there is absence of jurisdiction but thitt
~inheren,t po"'er ::;bo.~Jld, not inv~,de a.re:as, set apart for specific power under the
·same. ~ode. · [1085 G-H, 1086AJ ·

While it is true that Section 482 is pervasive, it should not subvert legal
inte1dfts \Vritten into the.sitme code, such for instance, in seCtion 397(2). In
short; there iS no total ban on the exercise of inherent power wh'ere abuse of H
the process Of the Court or· other extracirdinary· situation excites the Court's
juris?ictio~. The limitation is self-restraint, nothing more. (1086 A-B, G]
1082 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 1 S.C.R.

A The policy of law is clear that interlocutory order.i, pure and simple, should ~
not be taken upto the High Court resulting in unneceoiary litigation and delay.
At the other extreme, final orders are clearly capable of being considered in
_exercise of inherent powers, if glaring injustice stares the Court in the face.
In between there is a tertium quid where it is more than a purely interlocutory
orde1 and less than .a final disposal. The present case falls under that category
where the accused complain of harassment . through the Court's process. -itt1:. ..~
• this third catel!Ory (tertium quid) the inherent power can be exercised. (10860-H.
1087A] .
~

Merely because a copy of the . order has not been produced despite its 1
presence in the records of the Court, it cannot be said that .the entire revisory
power stands frustrated and the inherent poWllr stultified. [10870-EJ
When the order in original is before the Court, to dismiss the petition for
c non production of a copy of it is to bring the judicial process into pejoration
and if a copy were so- sacred that the original Were no substitute for it some
time could have been granted for its production which was not done. In law,
.. in life a short cut may prove a wrong cut. The content of the power so
far as the present situation is ooncemed is the same, be it under section 397
or section 482 Of the Code. [1087E-GJ

D Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, A.I.R. 1978 SC 47 at SI;
followed.
The Film Censor Board acting: under section SA of the Cinematograph Act.
1952, is specially entrusted to screen off the •ilver ocreen pictures which offen-
sively invade or deprave public morals through over-sex. A certificate by a
high powered Board of Censors with specialioed composition and statutory
mandate is not a piece of utter consequence. It i8 relevant material important
E ln its impact, though not infallible in its verdict. But the Court is not' barred
from, trying the case because the certificate is not cpnclusive. Neverthele88,
the magistrate shall not brush aside what another tribunal has, for similar
purpose found. [!088E-F]
A Board's certificate does not bar the criminal Court's jurisdiction to try
for the offences under sections 292 /293 Penal Code. Once a certifi~te unde>
F the Cinematograph Act is issued, the Penal Code pro tanto will not hang
limp. May be, even a rebuttable presumption arises in favour of the statutory
certificate but could be negatived by positive evidence. An act of recognition
of moral worthiness by a statutory agency is not opinion evid.ence but an
iDstance or transaction where the fact in issue ha3 been asserted, recognised
or affirmed. The Court will examine the film and judge whether its public
poliCy, in .the given time and cliine, so breachC3 pnOlic morals Or ves
G basic ·decency' as to offend the· penal provisions. A view of the film ma tell
more than volume of evidence will and maybe any court before making u·"--•
its mind, may like to see the picture from the angle of Sections 292f293 I.P.C.
There is no meaningful alternative for an intelligent eye. [1088G·H, 1089A~ E?
~090A-BJ
Finality and infallibility are beydnd Courts which must interpret and ad-
minister the law with pragmatic realism, rather than romantic idealism or re-
H .cluse extremism. Yet, especially when a special statute (the Cinematograph
Act) bas ;set Bpecial standards for films. for public consumption and created
a special Board to screen and censor from the angle of public morals and the
RAJ KAPOOR v. STATE (Krishna Iyer, !.) 1083

like, with its verdicts being subject to higher review, inexpert criminal Courts A
must be cautious to "rush in" and indeed must "fear to tread", lest the judicial
process should become a public footpath for any highway man wearing a moral
mask holding up a film-maker who bas travelled the expensive and perilous
journey to exhibition of his "certificated" picture. Omniscience is not the
property of a judge. [1084E-F, 10890]
(Per Patliak J.)
B
In a trial for the offences under sections 292/293 of the Indian Penal Code
11 certificate granted under s. 6 of the Cinematogmph Act by the .Board of
'Censors does not provide an irrebuttable defence to accused who have been
granted such a certificate, but it is certainly a relevant fact of some weight
to be taken into consideration by the criminal Court in deciding whether the
offence charged is established. Regard must be had by the court to the fact
that the certificate represents· the judgment of a body of persons particularly C
selected under the statute for the specitlc purpose of adjudging the suitability
of films for public exhibition, and that judgment extends to a consideration of
the principal ingredients which go to constitute the offences under ss. 292 and·
293 of the Indian Penal Code. At the same time, the Court must remind itself
that the function of deciding whether the ingredients ere established is primarily
and essentially. its own function, and it cannot abdicate that function in favour
cf another, no matter how august and qualified be the statutory authority. , D
[1091 A-DJ
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 621
of 1979.
Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated
23-8-1979 of the Delhi High Court in Cr!. Misc. No. 13 /79.
E
B. K. L. Iyengar, M. Iyengar and P. R. Ramasesh for the Appel-
lants.
R. N. Sachthey for Respondent No. 1.
Arun Kapil, Shiv Kumar and R. K. lain for Respondent No. 2.
The following Orders. were delivered :
F
KRISHNA IYER, J. In our· constitntional order, fragrant with
social justice, broader considerations of final relief must govern the
judicial process save where legislative interdict plainly forbids that
course. The dismissal by the High Court, on a little pohit of proce-
dure, has led to this otherwise avoidable petition for special leave, at a
tlfue _;when torrents of litigation drown this Court with an unmanage-
able .flood of dockets, The negative order under challenge was made
by th~ High Court refusing to exercise its inherent power under s. 482
of the Criminal Procedure Code (the Code, for short) because the
subject fell under its revisiona~ power under s. 397 and this latter
power was not unsheathed because a copy 'Of the short order of the
trial conrt had not been filed as required, not by the Code, but by a
High Court rule, although the original 6rder, together with all the
records, had been sent for and was 'before the. court ! A besetting sin
1084 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 1 S.C.R.

A of our legal system is the tyranny of technicality in the name of finical
legality, hospitably entertained sometimes in the halls of justice.
Absent orientation, justicing be<::0mes 'computering' and ceases to be
social engineering .

. The story briefly. Only a wooclcut of the profile of the case will
B do. A·unique pro bono publico prosecution was launched by a pri-
vate complainant, cla_iming (before us) to be the President of a Youth
Organisation devoted to defending Indian cultural standards, inter alia,
against the unceasing waves of celluloid anti-culture, arraigning,
together with the theatre owner, the producer, actors and photographer
of a sensationally captioned and loudly publicised film by name
c Satyam, Sivam, Sundaram, under Ss. 282, 283 and 34 Indian Penpl
Code (hereinafter referred to as the Penal Code) for alleged punitive
prurience, moral depravity and shocking erosion of public decency.
Were there serious merit in the charge, a criminal prosecution
would serve to sanitize the polluted celluloid; hand cuff cinemas run-
D ning erotic and amok, and become fl curial super-censorship of sala-
cious films. Why not? Were it otherwise, the precarious film pro-
ducer had to face a new menace to public exhibition easily set in
motion through the process of the court by any busy body willing to
blackmail of wanting to harass, prodded by rival producers. E';;pccially
when a special statute (the Cinematograph Act) has set special
E standards for films for public consumption and. created a special board
to screen and censor from the angle of public morals and the like, with
its verdicts being subject to higher review, inexpert criminal courts
must be cautious to• 'rush in' and, indeed, must 'fear to tread', lest the
judicial process should bi:come a public footpath for any high way
man wearing a moral mask holding up a film maker who has travelled
' the expensive and perilous journey to exhibition of his 'certificated'
picture. Omniscience, if one may adapt a great thought of Justice
Holmes, is not the property of a judge. We pronounce no, opinion
at this stage, on the merits of the rival stances with reference to the
picture Satyam, Sivam, Sundaram.
The trial court examined a few witnesses and, thereafter, issued·.
summons to the appellants who, naturally, were scared by this novel
process and rushed for refuge to the High Court. A petition under
s. 482 to quash the proceedings was moved. The learned judge held :
"a revision under s. 397 lay against an order summoning
the accused persons. Once the revision petition lies, the
·petition canot bv entertained under the inherent powers of
this Court.
RAJ KAPOOR v: STATE (Krishna Iyer,!.) 1085

Therefore, the petition has to be treated as a petition for A
revision under Section 397(1) of the Code. A petition under
Section 397 (1) of the Code ought to be accompanied by a
copy of the order impugned. [See Rule 3-A of ·Chapter
1-A(b) of Volume V, High Court Rules and Orders of the
Punjab High Court, as applicable to Delhi]. The original
,,,,,,..,. ... - su=ons filed, are not orders and no revision lies against B
those summons. The revision lies only against the order
summoning the petitioners.
Revisjon petition against the order of summoning with-
out filing certified copy of the order su=oning the peti-
tioners, is not competent. The revision .Petition is accord- c
ingly dismissed for want of certified copy of the impugned
orders.''
Thus, the inherent power was repelled because a revision lay and
the revision was rejected because a copy of the order was not filed
though the original itself was in the file. Thus the merits of the revi-
sion remain to be decided ,and preliminary skirmishes on points of
procedure in a criminal prosecution have consumed well over a year.
Two questions may be formulated for decision,.....one of jurisdiction
and consequent procedural compliance, the other of jurisprudence as
to when, in the setting of the Penal Code, a picture to be publicly
exhibited can be castigated as prurient and obscene and violative of
nornis against venereal depravity. Art, morals and law's manacles
on aesthetics are a sensitive snbject where jurisprudence meets c:ther
social sciences and never goes alone Jo bark and bite because State-
made straight-jacket is an inhibitive prescription for a free c·ountry
unless enlightened society actively participates in the administration
of justice to aesthetics .
. The world's greatest paintings, sculptures, songs and dances,
India's lustrous heritage, the Konaraks and Khajurahos, lofty epics,
luscious in patches, may be asphyxiated by law, if prudes and prigs and
State moralists prescribe paradigms and proscribe heterodoxies. It is
plain that the procedural issue is important and the substantive issue
G
,POrtehtous.
The first question is as to whether the inherent power of the High
Court under s. 482 stands repelled when the revisional power under
s. 397 overlaps. The opening words of s. 482 contradict this conten-
tion because nothing in the Code, not ·even s. 397 can affect the ampli-
tude of the inherent power preserved in so many terms by the language
of s. 482. Even so, a general principle pervades this branch of Jaw
when a specific provision is made; ea,sy resort to inherent power is not
1086 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 1 s.c.R.
\
A ·right ·except under compelling circumstances. Not that there is
absence of jurisdiction but that inherent power should not invade areas
set apart for specific power under the same Code. In Madhu Limaye"s
case(I) this Court has exhaustively and, if I may say so with great
respect, correctly discussed and delineated the Jaw beyond mistake.
' While it is true that s. 482 is pervasive it should not subvert legal
B interdicts written into the same Code, such, for instance, in s. 397 (2) .·
Apparent conflict may arise in some situations between the two provi-
sions and a happy solution :
"woul~ be to say that the bar provided in sub'.section (2)
of section 397 operates only in exercise of the revisional
c power of the High Court meaning thereby that the High
Court will have no power of revision in relation to any inter-
locutory order. Then, in accordance with one or the other
principle enunciated above, the inherent power will come into
play, there being no other provision in the Code for ihe
redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. But then if
D the assailed is purely on an interlocutory character which
could be corrected in exercise of the revisional power of the
High Court under the 1898 Code, the High Court will re-
fuse to exercise its inherent power. But in case the im-
pugned order clearly brings about a situation 'which is an
abuse of the process of the .Court or for the purpose .of
E
securing the ends of justice interference by the High Court
is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in Section
397 (2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power
by the High Court. But such cases would be few and far
between. The High Court must exercise the inherent power
F very sparingly. One such case wonld be the desirability of
the quashing of a criminal proceeding initiated illegally,
vexatiously or as being without jurisdiction."(")

In short, there is no total ban on the exercise of inher~nt power
where abuse of the process of the court or other extra-ordinary situa-
G tion excites the court's jurisdiction. The limitation is self-restraim,
nothing more. The policy of the law is clear that interlocutory·, ..
orders, pure and simple, should not be taken up to the High Court
resulting in unnecessary litigation and. delay. At the other extreme,
final orders are clearly capable of being considered in exercise of in-
herent power, if glating injustice stares the court iu the face. In
B (I) Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra AIR _1978 SC 47
(2) AIR 1978 SC 47 at 51.
RA.J KAPOOR v. STATE (K~ishna Iyer, J.) I 087

between is a tertium quid, as Untwalia, J. has pointed out as for A
example, where it is more than a purely interlocutory order and Jess
than ·a final disposal. The present case falls under ·that category
where the accused complain of harassment through the courts process.
Can we state that in this third category the inherent power can be
exercised? In the words of Untwalia. J. : '

-
•
"The answer is obvious that the bar will not operate to
prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and/or to
secure the ends of justice. The label of the petition filed by
B

an aggrieved party is immaterial. · The High Court can
examine the matter in an approprate case under its in-
herent powers. The present case undoujltedly falls for c
exercise of the power of the High Court in accordance with
Section 482 of the 1973 Code, even assuming, although not
accepting, that invoking the revisional power of the High
.Court is impermissible."
.-
I am, therefore, clear in my mind that the inherent power is ncil; D
rebuffed in the case situation before us. Counsel on both sides,, sensi-
tively responding to our allergy for legalistics, rightly agreed that the
fanatical insistence O!ll the formal filing. of a copy of the order under
cassation need not take up this court's time. OuJ" conclusion concurs
with the 'concession of counsel on both sides that merely because; . a!
. copy of the order has not been produced, despite its presence in the E
records in the court, it is not possible for me to hold that !he entire
rcvisory power stands frustrated and the inherent power stultified.
i When the order, in original, is before you, lo dismiss the petition
for non-production of a copy of it is to bring the judicial process into
pejoration, and, if a copy were so sacred that the. original were no F
substitute for it some time could have been granted for its production.
which W'as not done. Jn law, as in life, a short cut may prove wwng
cut. I disinter the cassation proceeding and direct it to he disposed

l of de novo by the High Court. The content of the power, so far as
the present situation is cqncerned, is the same, be it under s. 397 or
(- s. 48~ the Code. G
~e next point urged before us by Shri Iyengar is that once a
certificate under the Cinematograph Act is !lfanted, the homage to the
law of morals is paid and the further challenge under the Penal Code
is barred. - Jurisprudentially speaking, law, in the sense of command
to do or not to do, must be a reflection of the community's cultural H
norms, not the State's regimentation of aesthetic expression or artistic
creation. Here we will realise the superior jurisprudentiiil value of
1088 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1980] 1 S.C.R.

dharnur, which is a beautiful blend of the sustaining sense of morality,
right conduct, society's enlightened consensus and the binding force of
norms so woven' as against positive law in the Austinian sense, with
an awesome halo and barren autonomy around the. legislated text is
fruitful area for creative exploration. But morals made to measure
by statute and court is a risky operation with pQrtentous impact on
B fundamental freedoms, and in <mr constitutional order the root principl&"'-
is liberty of expression and its reasonable control with the limits of
'public order, decency or morality'. Here, sdcial dynamics guides
legal dynamics in the province _of 'policing' art forms.

It is deplorable that a power for good like the cinema, by a subtle
c process, and these days, by a ribald display, vulgarises the public palate.
pruriently infiltrates adolescent minds, commercially panders to the
lascivious appetite of rendy crowds and inflames the lecherous craze
of the people who succumb to the seduction of sex and resort, in
actual life, to 'horror' crimes of venereal violence. The need-' to
banish cinematographic pornos and the societal strategy in that behalf
D
had !e.d to the Cinematograph Act, 1952.. The Censor Board, under
this Act, is charged with power to direct doctoring, tailoring, sanitizing
and even tabooing films so that noxious obscenity may not be foul and
erotic aroma make mass appeal.

I am satisfied that the Filml Censor Board, acting under s. SA, is
E
specially entrusted to screen off the silver screen pictures which offen-
sively invade or deprave public morals through over-sex. There is
no doubt-and counsel on both sides agree--that a certificate by a
high-powered Board of Cansors with specialised composition and statu-
tory mandate is not a piece of utter incoasequence. It is relevant
F material, important in its impact, though not infallible in its verdict.
But the Court is not barred from trying the case because the certificate
is not conclusive. Nevertheless, the magistrate shall not brush aside
what another tribunal has for similar purpose, found. May be, ewn
a rebuttable presumption arises in favour of the statutory certificate
but could be negatived by positive evidence. An act of recognition of . ~
G moral worthiness by a statutory agency is not opinion evidellC!Lbut an ..t
instance or transaction where the fact in issue has been asserted, re«,og- ~
nised or affirmed. '-..J
I am not persuaded that once a certificate under the CinenmtoQra ""
Act fa issued the Penal Code, pro tanto, wm hang limp. The Ccurt .
B will examine the film and judge whether it~ public display, in the given
time and cliine, so breaches public morals or depraves basic decency
as to offend the penal provisions., Statutory expressions are not
RAJ KAPOOR v. STATE (Krishna Iyer, J.) 1089

petrified by time but must be up-dated by changing ethos even as
popular ethics are not absolutes but abide and evolve as community
A
consciousness enlivens and escalates. Surely, the satwa of society
must rise progressively if mankind is to move towards its, timeless des-
tiny and this can be guaranteed only if the ultimate value-vision is
rooted in the unchanging basics, Truth-Goodness-Beauty; Satyam,
· ~Sivam, Sundaram. The relation between Reality and Relativity mus~
haunt the court's evaluation of obscenity, expressed in society's perva-
sive humanity, not law's penal prescriptions. Social scientists and
spiritual scientists will broadly agree that man lives not alone by mystic,
squints, ascetic chants and austere abnegation but by luscious Jove of
Beauty, sensuous joy of companionship and m·oderate non-denial of
normal demands of the flesh. Extremes and excesses boomerang al-· c
though some crazy artists and film directors do practise Oscar Wilde's
observation : "Moderation is a fatal thing. Nothing succeeds like
excess'~.

All these add lip to one conclusion that finality and infallibility are
beyond courts which must interpret and administer the law with prag-
I)
matic realism, rater than romantic idealism or recluse extremism.
After aU, Cohen's words, in Reason and Law, are good counsel :
"The law is not a homeless, wandering ghost. It is ll phase ofj human
life located in time and space." ( 1)
I reject the extreme contention that a board certificate bars the cri-
minal court's jurisdiction to try for offences under s. 292/i293 I.P.C. E.
The general guide-lines, so far as is necessary, have been given.
Since we are directing the High Court to re-hear the case, there is
no room for further examination of the law except to sketch the perspec-
tive. The inter-action and cross-fertilisation of law and morality are
interesting subjects for research and the guardian role of the court to
paint paradigms of virtue or prescribe paran1eters of morals is too moot F
for glib assertion. Public policy on good morals is woven by society
from within, although when degeneracy goes deep the State cannot
sleep. Speaking generally, government-prescribed morality often:
turns out to be a remedy which aggravates the malady. Bu~ law's im-
wra!!Ves 'ahd court's ·commands can work well once popular institu-
G
__.-tions and voluntary groups mobilise the basic virtues and catalise thr..
buried values. Spiritual secular movements, at a time of value crisis,
are the salvationary agents of society, with the State, keeping its police
power unsheathed, activising the voluntary process towards goodness.
I hold that the proceeding was maintainable before the High Court
and its rejection was wrong. I would, therefore, set aside that order R
(l) M.R. Cohen, Reason and Law 4 (1950)
l5-743SCl/79
1090 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1980] 1 S.C.R.

A but direct the court to proceed with the bearing and bring it to a
close expeditiously. A view of the film may tell more than vblumes
of evidence will and, maybe, any court before making up its mind, may
like to see the picture from the angle of s. 292/1293 I.P .C. There
is no meaningful alternative for an intelligent eye. ·
For the reasons assigned above. I allow the appeal and send the
S case back for fresh disposal. ~-
PATHAK, J. This is an appeal against an ocder of the High Oiurt
of Delhi rejecting a petition filed by the appellants for quashing an
order summoning the appellants on a complaint filed by the second
respondent in respect of offences under sections 292 and 293 read
c with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
Pursnant to a complaint filed by the second respondent the Metro-
politan Magistrate recorded the statement of three witnesses, including
the complainant, in a preliminary inquiry under s. 200 of the Code o~
Criminal Procedure, and holding that a prima facie. case existed Tor
summoning the appellants, he made an order directing i~sue of sum-
D mons for the petitioners attendance of the appellants. The appellants
applied against the'. order to the High Court of Delhi under section 482
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, but the High Court, being of
opinion that a revision petition lay against that order, decided to enter-
tain it as a revision petition. As the certified copy of the order of the
Metropolitan Magistrate summoning the appellants was not filed along
E with the petition, it was rejected by the High Court on August 3; 1979
as not competent. The present appeal is directed against that order.
The questions which arises on the order of the High Court are
whether (a) the petition filed by the appellants under s. 482 of the )
Code of the Criminal Procedure could be treated by the High Court
F as a revision petition under s. 397 of the Code, and (b) assuming
that it could be regarded as a revision petition, whether the High Court
was right in rejecting it On the ground that a certified copy of the
Metropolitan Magistrate's order summoning the appellants was not
filed with it. Aftea- arguments before us had proceeded to a point, ~
counsel for the parties agreed t11at the High Court should not have 4
G rejected the revision petition at the stage it had reached aftCf that qie ,J
matter called for a decision on the merits. In the circumstances, tits...__J
controversies embodied in the two questions become wholly academic,
and it is unecessary to adjudicate °'1 them.
Bizt the further question which bas been debated before us relates
to tlll> relevance and probative value of the certificate issued by the
H Board of Censors certifying under s. 6 of the Cinematograph Act that
the film "Satyam Shivam Sundaram" has been approved for public
exhibition to an adult audience. We have been invited to express our
RAJ KAPOOR v. STATE (Pathak, J.) 1091

views on the point as, counsel urge, it will arise directly in\ the litigation Ii f
pending before the High Court and the Metropolitan Magistrate and
our observations, they say, would foreclose any further dispute on an
issue of law of some importance. There is nol difficulty in laying: down
that in a trial for the offences under ss. 292 and 293 of the Indian
l Penal Code a certificate granted under s. 6 of the Cincmatograph Act 8
"-t,y the Board ol Censors does not provide a. irrebuttable defence to
accused who have been granted such a certificate, but it is certainly a
relevant fact of some weight to be taken into consideration by the,
criminal court in deciding whether the offence charged is established.
Regard must be had by the court to the fact that the certificate repre-
sents the judgment of a body of persons particularly selected under C
the statute for the specific purpose of adjudging the suitability of films
for public exhibition, and that judgment extends to a consideration of
the principal ingredients which go to constitute the offences under ss.
292 and 293 of the Indian Penal Code. At the same time, the court
must remind itself that the function of deciding whether the ingredients
are established is primarily and essentially its own function, and it B
cannot abdicate that function in favour of another, no matter how
august and qualified. be the statutory authority.
The order of the High Court rejecting the petition being erroneous
it is set aside, and thei High Court is directed to dispose of the petitio-n
on the merits within two weeks from today. In case the petition is E
dismissed on the merits by the High Court, it will direct foe Court
below to proceed with the trial expeditiously and to bring to an early
close the case pending before it.

ORDER OF THE COURT
We direct the High Court to dispose of the petition on the merits F
as soon as may be, not later than one month from today. In case,
the petition is dismissed on the merits, by the High Court, it will direct
the Court below to proceed with the trial as soon a~ possible and to
bring to an early close the case pending before it.

~:.,
S.R. Appeal allowed and remitted.