Holding

The right to a speedy trial is implicit in Article 21, covering all stages from FIR onward, and the trial must be concluded within the time‑limits prescribed; consequently, the appeal is allowed and the High Court order dismissed.

Summary

R.D. Sharma was charged under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 for an offence alleged in an FIR dated 2 November 1982. After a charge‑sheet in 1985, the Special CBI Judge framed charges only in 1993 and, by June 1995, had examined merely three of the forty witnesses listed. Sharma filed a writ petition seeking quashing of the prosecution on the ground that the thirteen‑year delay violated his right to a speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Patna High Court dismissed the petition, citing the shortage of Special Courts. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, reaffirming that the right to speedy trial is implicit in Article 21 and extends from the registration of the FIR onward. It supplemented the Antulay guidelines with specific time‑limits for closing prosecution evidence (two years for offences up to seven years imprisonment, three years for longer offences) and directed the Bihar government to constitute at least five Special Courts for corruption cases. The Court set aside the High Court order and directed the trial court to pass appropriate orders in the case.

Issues considered

The delay of more than thirteen years between the FIR and trial violates the accused's right to a speedy trial under Article 21.
Whether the prosecution should be quashed on the ground of such delay.
Whether a magistrate may close prosecution under Section 309(1) of the CrPC when witnesses are not produced.
What procedural guidelines should govern the closure of prosecution evidence in corruption cases.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 309(1)
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947s. 5(1)(e), s. 5(2)

Subjects

Right to speedy trialArticle 21Prevention of Corruption ActCriminal Procedure CodeSection 309Delay in criminal proceedingsQuashing of prosecutionSpecial courts

Judgment

A RAJ DEO SHARMA
v.
THE STATE OF BIHAR ....
OCTOBER 8, 1998

B [M.M. PUNCHHI CJ., K.T. THOMAS AND M. SRINIVASAN, JJ.]

Constitution of India, 1950 : Article 21.

Right to speedy trial-FIR lodged thirteen long years ago-Prosecution
c examined three witnesses out offorty witnesses-Petition for quashing entire
prosecution including FIR-Rejected-On appeal, held, right to speedy trial
flows from Article 21 and it encompasses the stage right from the date of
registration of FIR and onwards-Proposition laid down in A.R. Antulay's
case supplemented by additional directions-Prevention of Corruption Act,
1947 : Section 5(2) read with Section 5(/)(e).
D
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 : Section 309(1)-Power ofMagistrate
to close the prosecution-Held, Magistrate can close the prosecution if
witnesses are not produced in spite of repeated opportunities-Reasons to
be recorded for adjourning the case beyond a day.
E
Appellant was prosecuted on 2.11.1982 for an offence under section
5(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. A charge-sheet was
submitted on 30.8.1985 by the C.B.I and the Special Judge, CBI took
cognizance of offences and issued summons for appearance. On 24.4.1987,
appellant appeared before the Court and obtained bail. The charges were
F framed by the Special Judge on 4.3.1993. Three witnesses out of forty
witnesses were examined by the prosecution till 1.6.1995. The appellant filed
a writ petition praying inter alia for quashing the entire prosecution including
FIR on the ground that more than thirteen years had elapsed since the
institution of FIR, and his right for speedy trial was violated. High Court
dismissed the said petition holding that delay was due to the fact that there
G
was only one Special Court of CBI and large number of cases were pending
before it. Aggrieved by the order of the High Court, the appellant has
preferred the present appeal. '

Allowing the appeal and setting aside the orders of the High Court,
[
H this Court
130
R.D. SHARMA v. STATE OF BIHAR Bl
HELD: 1. The legal position adumbrated by this Court inA.R Antu/ay's A
case* that the right to speedy trial flows from Article 21 and it encompasses

- the stages right from the date of registration of the FIR and onwards remains
unaltered. (136-H; 140-F]

*Abdul Rehamn Antulay and Ors. v. R.S. Nayak, (1992] 1 SCC 225,
followed. B
2. The Code of Criminal Procedure is t:omprehensive enough to enable
the Magistrate to close the prosecution if the prosecution is unable to
produce its witnesses inspite of repeated opportunities. Section 309(1) Cr.P.C.
enjoins expeditious holding of the proceedings and continuous examination
of witnesses from day to day.1:he section also provides for recording reasons C
for adjourning the case beyond the following day. [141-A]

3. In view of large pend ency of the cases before the Special Court it
is necessary to lay down additional guidelines. Thus the propositions laid
down by the Constitution Bench in Antulay 's is supplemented with the following
directions : (141-B) D
1. In cases where the trial is for an offence punishable with
imprisonment for a period not exceeding seven year, whether the
accused is in jail or not, the Court shall close the prosecution
evidence on completion of a period of two years from the date of E
recording the plea of the accused on the charges framed whether
the prosecution has examined all the witnesses or not, within the
said period and the Court can proceed to the next step provided
by law for the trial of the case; (141-C]

2. In such cases as mentioned above, if the accused has been in jail F
for a period of not less than one half of the maximum period of
punishment prescribed for the offence, the trial court shall release
the accused on bail forthwith on such conditions as it deems fit.
(141-D]

3. If the offence under trial is punishable with imprisonment for a G
period exceeding seven years, whether the accused is in jail or
not, the Court shall close the prosecution evidence on completion
of three years from the date of recording the plea of the accused
on the charges framed, whether the prosecution has examined all
the witnesses or not within the said period and the Court can
proceed to the next step provided by law for the trial of the case, H
132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1998) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A unless for very exceptional reasons to be recorded and in interest
of justice the Court considers it necessary to grant further time
to the prosecution to adduce evidence beyond the aforesaid time
limit. (141-E-F)
..
4. But if the inability for completing the prosecution within the
B aforesaid period is attributable to the conduct of the accused in
protracting the trial, no Court is obliged to close the prosecution
evidence within the aforesaid period in any of the cases covered
by clauses (1) to (3). (141-G)

5. Where the trial has been stayed by orders of Court or by operation
c of law such time during which the stay was in force shall be
excluded from the aforesaid period for closing prosecution evidence.
[141-H)

Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569, explained.

D "Commom Cause" v. Union of India, [1996) 4 SCC 33; "Common
Cause" a registered Society v. Union of India, [1996) 6 SCC 775 and
Hussainara Khatoon and Ors. (IV) v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna,
[1980) 1 sec 98, relied on.

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, [1978) 1 SCC 248 ; State of
E Maharashtra v. Champa/al Punjaji Shah, [1981) 3 SCC 610 and Madhu
Mehta v. Union of India, (1989) 4 SCC 62, referred to.

4. The State of Bihar is directed to constitute within a period of three
months at least five special courts, to try the cases including offences under
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 or its corresponding previous Act
F with or without other offences allied to them. [142-C)

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 1045
of 1998.

From the Judgment and Order dated 7.12.95 of the Patna High Court in
G C.R.W.J.C. No. 809of1995.
Gopal Subramaniam, Atul Sreedharan, K.C. Sudershan for Mis. K.L.
Mehta & Co. for the Appellant.

B.B. Singh for Respondent.

H A.S. Nambiar and P. Parmeswaran for C.B.I.
R.D. SHARMA v. STATE OF BIHAR 133
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A
Leave granted. (I) On November 2, 1982, a case was registered against
the petitioner regarding an offence under Section 5(2) read with Section 5( 1)
(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Act 11 of 1947). A charge sheet was
submitted on 30.8.1985 by the C.B.I. in which the alleged disproportionate
assets of the petitioner as on 5.11.1982 amounted to Rs. 9, 10,932.41 along with B
a list of 40 witnesses and 20 documents. The Special Judge, C.B.I., South
Bihar, Patna took cognizance of the offences on 14. l 1.1986 and issued summons
focing 2.12.1986 as the date for appearance. On 24.4.1987, the petitioner appeared
before court, applied for and obtained bail. The charges were framed by the
Special Judge on 4.3.1993. Three witnesses were examined by the prosecution C
till l.6.1995.

2. The petitioner filed a writ petition in the High Court of Patna on
5.12.1995 praying inter alia for quashing the entire prosecution including the
F.l.R. on the ground that more than 13 years had elapsed since the institution
of the F.l.R. and thus the right of the petitioner to speedy trial was violated. D
The petition registered as Cr. W.J.C. No. 809/95 was dismissed by the High
Court on 7.12.1995 on the ground that the delay was due to the fact that there
was only one Special Court of the C.B.I. functioning and a large number of
cases were pending before it. It is the said order which is challenged in this
petition. E
3. After service of notice and appearance of the respondent, the
Superintendent of Police, C.B.I., Patna was arrayed as second respondent. By
order dated 9.12.1996. a report was called for from the Special Judge as to the
condition of the present case as well as other cases similarly blocked up. The
report of the Special Judge dated 25.12. 1996 has disclosed a shocking state F
of affairs. As regards the present case, the relevant part of the report reads
as follows:-

"According to chargesheet there are as many as forty witnesses out
of whom, the prosecution has examined till today only three witnesses. G
The last witness was examined on 3.9.93. Thereafter 36 adjournments
were given to the prosecution for examination of remaining witnesses.
However, the prosecution has failed to examine any of the remaining
witnesses. The next date fixed in the case for production of witness
by the prosecution is 6.1.97. it would not be out of place that myself
joined as Special Judge only on 21.9.96, thereafter I also directed the H
134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A C.B.I. to produce witnesses."

-
4. The report contains details of other pending cases. There are as many
as 52 cases ranging from 197 5 to 1996 pending at the stage of evidence
relating to C.B.I., South Bihar and 44 cases ranging from 1972 to 1992 relating
B to C.B.I. , North Bihar. By order dated 6.1.1997, we directed the Superintendent
of Police to file a counter affidavit explanatory to the remarks made by the
Special Judge in his report with regard to the pendency of matters. The
counter affidavit filed by the Superintendent of Police in February, 1997 has
attempted to throw the blame on the accused. In para 9 thereof, it is stated
as follows:-
c
"However, on perusal of the order sheet it would appear that all
the times despite the police papers being made available and inspection
being completed, the accused with a view to delay framing of the
charge, filed petition after petition for supply of police papers. Such
petitions on behalf of the accused were nothing but a dilatory device
D to delay framing of the charge. Ultimately, charge was framed on
4.3.93; it is also true that only 3 PWs have been examined till date,
for the only reason that there has been only one court of Special
Judge at Patna hearing Special Cases of C.B.I. since 19.4.94 till date.
It is also submitted that on a number of occasions the accused
E remained absent. No bailable warrant or non bailable warrants could
be obtained against the witnesses, as the trial court always remained
busy in other cases. It is pertinent to mention that the Special Judge
for C.B.I., is also Special judge for Vigilances Cases of the State of
Bihar, Special Judge for atrocities on Harizans cases. The Special
Court for C.B.I. also hears Sessions Trials and Civil Appeals and as
F such the Court is hardly left with time to hear exclusively the cases
of Anti Corruption matters. Over and above, C.B.I. had 256 cases
pending before the special judge in June. 1995, besides cases of
Vigilance Department, Government of Bihar and other regular cases
such as Cr. Appeals, Session trials entrusted to him by the District
and Session Judge, Patna."
G
5. A rejoinder has been filed by the petitioner refuting the allegations
in the counter-affidavit and reiterating that the delay in this case is entirely
due to the fault of the prosecution which has prejudiced his fundamental right
to speedy trial. It is stated therein that the prosecution failed to produce the
H documents on 48 occasions and failed to produce witnesses on 46 occasions.
R.D. SHARMAv. STATEOFBIHAR 135
6. The question before us is whether on the facts and circumstances of A
the case, the prosecution against the petitioner is to be quashed on the
ground of delay in the conduct of trial. The petitioner has never suffered
incarceration. As stated earlier, his application for bail was ordered on the day
he appeared before the Court and presented the same.

7. The entitlement of the accused to speedy trial has been repeatedly B
emphasised by this Court. Through it is not enumerated as a fundamental
right in the Constitution, this Court has recognized the same to be implicit in
the spectrum of Article 21. In Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State
ofBihar, [1980] l SCC 81, the Court while dealing with the \:ases ofundertrials
who had suffered long incarceration held that a procedure which keeps such C
large number of people behind bars without trial so long cannot possibly be
regarded as reasonable, just or fair so as to be in conformity with the
requirement of Article 21. The Court laid stress upon the need for enactment
of a law to ensure reasonable, just and fair procedure which has creative
connotation after Maneka Gandhi's case [1978 1 SCC 248] in the matter of
criminal trials. D
8. In Hussainara Khatoon and Ors., (IV) v. Home Secretary State of
Bihar, Patna, [1980] 1 SCC 98 this Court held that financial constraints and
priorities in expenditure would not enable the Government to avoid its duty
to ensure speedy trial to the accused.
E
9. In State of Maharashtra v. Champa/al Punjaji Shan, [1981] 3 S.C.C.
610 the Court took cognizance of the fact that the prosecution would in some
cases deliberately adopt delaying tactics to keep the accused persons in jail
as long as possible and to harass them particularly when the evidence is of
a weak character and the conviction is not a probable result. The Court also F
pointed out that the accused person may be seriously jeopardised in the
conduct of his defence with the passage of time as witnesses for the defence
may become unavailable and their memories may fail. However, the Court
pointed out that a delayed trial is not necessarily an unfair trial and the delay
may be occasioned by the tactics or the conduct of the accused himself.
G
10. In Madhu Mehta v. Union of India, [1989] 4 SCC 62 this Court
commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment while holding that inordinate
delay should be taken into account for purpose of deciding whether the
execution of the sentence should be carried out or should be altered into
imprisonment for life. The Court also observed that no fixed period of delay
would be considered to be decisive. H
136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A 11. In Abdul Rehman Antulay and Ors. v. R.S. Nayak and Anr., [1992]
I SCC 225 the Constitution Bench of this Court dealt with this aspect of the
matter and laid down certain guidelines. The relevant passages in the judgment
are as follows:-

"Another question seriously canvassed before us related to the
B consequence flowing from an infringement of right to speedy trial.
Counsel for accused argued on the basis of the observations in
Sheela Barse and Strunk that the only consequence is quashing of
charges and/or conviction, as the case may be. Normally, it may be
so. But we do not think that is the only order open to court. In a given
c case, the facts-including the nature of offence - may be such that
quashing of charges may not be in the interest of justice. After all,
every offence-more so economic offences, those relating to public
officials and food adulteration - is an offence against society. It is
really the society - the State - that prosecutes the offender. We may
in this connection recall the observations of this court in Champa/al
D Punjaji Shah. In cases, where quashing of charges/convictions may
not be in the interest of justice, it shall be open to the court to pass
such appropriate orders as may be deemed just in the circumstances
of the case. Such orders may, for example, take the shape of order for
expedition of trial and its conclusion within a particular prescribed
E period, reduction of sentence when the matter comes up after
conclusion of trial and conviction, and so on.

In view of the above discussion, the following propositions emerge,
meant to serve as guidelines. We must forewarn that these propositions
are not exhaustive. It is difficult to foresee all situations. Nor is it
F possible to lay down any hard and fast rules. These propositions are:-
(1) Fair, just and reasonable procedure implicit in Article 21 of the
Constitution creates a right in the accused to be tried speedily. Right
to speedy trial is the right of the accused. The fact that a speedy trial
is also in public interest or that it serves the social interest also does
G not make it any the less the right of the accused. It is in the interest
of all concerned that the quilt or innocence of the accused is determined
as quickly as possible in the circumstances.

(2) Right to speedy trial flowing from Article 21 encompasses all
the stages, namely the stage of investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal,
H revision and re-trial. That is how, this Court has understood this right
R.D. SHARMA v. STATEOFBIHAR 137
and there is no reason to take a restricted view. A
(3) The concerns underlying the right to speedy trial from the
point of view of the accused are :-

(a) the period of remand and pre-conviction detention should be as
short as possible. In other words, the accused should not be B
subjected to unnecessary or unduly long incarceration prior to
his conviction;

(b) the worry, anxiety, expense and disturbance to his vocation and
peace, resulting from an unduly prolonged investigation, inquiry
or trial should be minimal; and C
(c) undue delay may well result in impairment of the ability of the
accused to defend himself, whether on account of death,
disappearance or non-availability of witnesses or otherwise.

(4) At the same time, one cannot ignore the fact that it is usually D
the accused who is interested in delaying the proceedings. Af is often
pointed out, "delay is a known defence tactic". Since the burden of
proving the guilt of the accused lies upon the prosecution, delay
ordinarily prejudices the prosecution. Non-availability of witnesses,
disappearance of evidence by lapse of time really work against the
interest of the prosecution. Of course, there may be cases where the E
prosecution, for whatever reason, also delays the proceedings.
Therefore, in every case, where the right to speedy trial is alleged to
have been infringed, the first question to be put and answered is -
who is responsible for the delay? Proceedings taken by either party
in good faith to vindicate their rights and interest, as perceived by F
them, cannot be treated a.q delaying tactics nor can the time taken in
pursuing such proceedings be counted towards delay. It goes without
saying that frivolous proceedings or proceedings taken merely for
delaying the day of rockoning cannot be treated as proceedings taken
in good faith. The mere fact that an application/petition is admitted
and an order of stay granted by a superior court is by itself no proof G
that the proceeding is not frivolous. Very often these stays are obtained
on ex-parte representation.

(5) While dete]lllining whether undue delay has occurred (resulting
in violation of Right to Speedy Trial) one must have regard to all the
attendant circumstances, including nature of offence, number of H
138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A accused and witnesses, the workload of the court concerned, prevailing
local conditions and so on • what is called, the systemic delays. It is
true that it is the obligation of the State to ensure a speedy trial and
State includes judiciary as well, but a realistic and practical approach
should be adopted in such matters instead of a pedantic one.

B (6) Each and every delay does not necessarily prejudice the
accused. Some delays may indeed work to his advantage. As has
been observed by Powell, J. in Barker "it cannot be said how long
a delay is too long in a system where justice is supposed to be swift
but deliberate". The same idea has been stated by white, J. in US. v.
Ewell in the following words:
c
' ... the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is necessarily
relative, is consistent with delays, and has orderly expedition, rather
than more speed, as its essential ingredients; and whether delay in
completing a prosecution amounts to an unconstitutional deprivation
of rights depends upon all the circumstances'.
D
However, inordinately long delay may be taken as presumptive
proof of prejudii;,e. In this context, the fact of incuceration of accused
will also be a relevant fact. The prosecution should not be allowed to
become a persecution. But when does the prosecution become
persecution, again depends upon the facts of a given case.
E
(7) We cannot recognize or give effect to, what is called the
'dem1µ1d' rule. An accused cannot try himself; he is tried by the court
at the behest of the prosecution. Hence, an accused's plea of denial
of speedy trial cannot be defeated by saying that the accused did at
F no time demand a speedy trial. If in a given case, he did make such
a demand and yet he was not tried speedily, it would be a plus point
in his favour, but the mere non-asking for a speedy trial cannot be put
against the accused. Even in USA, the relevance of demand rule has
been substantially watered down in Barker and other succeeding
cases.
G
(8) Ultimately, the court has to balance and weigh the several
relevant factors -balancing test or 'balancing process' ·and determine
in each case whether the right to speedy trial has been denied in a
given cases.

H (9) Ordinarily speaking, where the court comes to the conclusion
R.D. SHARMA v. STATEOFBIHAR 139
that right to speedy trial of an accused has been infringed the charges A
or the conviction, as the case may be, shall be quashed. But this is
not the only course open. The nature of the offence and other
circum~tances in a given case may be such that quashing of
proceedings may not be in the interest of justice. In such a case, it
is open to the court to make such other appropriate order - including
an order to conclude the trial within a fixed time where the trial is not B
concluded or reducing the sentence where the trial has concluded -
as may be deemed just and equitable in the circumstances of the case.

(I 0) It is neither advisable nor practicable to fix any time limit for
trial of offences. Any such rule is bound to be qualified one. Such rule C
cannot also be evolved merely to shift the burden of proving
justification on to the shoulders of the prosecution. In every case of
complaint of denial of right to speedy trial, it is primarily for the
prosecution to justify and explain the delay. At the same time, it is thl
duty of the court to weigh all the circumstances of a given case before
pronouncing upon the complaint. The Supreme Court of USA too has D
repeatedly refused to fix any such outer time limit in spite of the Sixth
Amendment. Nor do we think that not fixing any such outer limit
ineffectuates the guarantee of right to speedy trial.

( 11) An objection based on denial of right to speedy trial and for relief
on that account, should first be addressed to the High Court. Even E
if the High Court entertains such a plea, ordinarily it should not stay
the proceedings, except in a case of grave and exceptional nature.
Such proceedings in High Court must, however, be disposed of on a
priority basis.

12. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, [1994] 3 SCC 569 another F
Constitution Bench to which one of us (M.M. Punchhi, J. as he then was)
party observed thus:

"The concept of speedy trial is read into Article 21 as an essential
part of fundamental right to life and liberty guaranteed and preserved G
under out Constitution. The right to speedy trial begins with the
actual restraint imposed by arrest and consequent incarceration and
continues at all stages, namely, the stage of investigation, enquiry,
trial, appeal and revision so that any possible prejudice that may
result from impermissible and avoidable delay from the time of the
commission of the offence till it consummates into a finality, can be H
140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A averted. In this context, it may be noted that the constitutional
guarantee of speedy trial is properly reflected in Section 309 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure ................ .

Of course, no length of time is per se too long to pass scrutiny
under this principle nor the accused is called upon the show the
B actual prejudict by delay of disposal of cases. On the other hand, the
Court has to adopt a balancing approach by taking note of the
possible prejudices and disadvantages to be suffered by the accused
by avoidable delay and to determine whether the accused in a criminal
proceeding has been deprived of his right of having speedy trial with
unreasonable delay which could be identified by the factors - ( 1)
c length of delay, (2) the justification for the delay, (3) the accused's
assertion of his right to speedy trial, and (4) prejudice caused to the
accused by such delay. However, the fact of delay is dependent on
' the circumstances of each case because reasons for delay will vary,
such as delay in investigation on account of the widespread ramification
D of crimes and its designed network either nationally or internationally,
the deliberate absence of witness or witnesses, crowded dockets on
the file of the court etc."

13. The above observations have to be understood in the backdrop of
the issues involved in that case. The constitutional validity of Terrorist and
E Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 (TADA) was questioned and a
five judge bench was then considering various contentions including the
possibility of persons accused of offences under TADA remaining in jail as
undertrial prisoners for Jong period on account of harsher and more stringent
provisions relating to grant of bail. The observations made therein cannot,
F therefore, be read as in any way different from the observations made by the
seven judge bench in AR Antulay, [1992] J SCC 225. Hence, the legal position
adumbrated by this court in AR Antu/ay that the right to speedy trial flows
from Article 21 and it encompasses the stages right from the date of registration
of the FIR and onwards remains unaltered.

G 14. But it has become necessary to consider the matter at some length
and Jay down the additional guidelines in view of the large pendency of the
cases before the Special Court, Patna for more than two decades by now.
There may be similar pendency in other States also.

15. The Code of Criminal Procedure is comprehensive enough to enable
H the ·Magistrate to close the prosecution if the prosecution is unable to
R.D. SHARMA v. STATEOFBIHAR 141
produce its witnesses inspite ofrepeated opportynities. Section 309(1) Cr. P.C. A
supports the above view as it enjoins expeditious holding of the proceedings
and continuous examination of witnesses from day today. The section also
provides for recording reasons for adjourning the case beyond the following
day.

16. After deep consideration of the matter, we proceed to supplement B
the propositions laid down by the Constitution Bench in Antulay's case
(supra) with the following directions:-

(i) In cases where the trial is for an offence punishable with imprisonment
for a period not exceeding seven years, whether the accused is in jail or not, C
the court shall close the prosecution evidence on completion of a period of
two years from the date of recording the plea of the accused on the charges
kamed whether the prosecution has examined all the witnesses or not, within
the said period and the court can proceed to the next step provided by law
for the trial of the case.
D
(ii) In such cases as mentioned above, if the accused has been in jail
for a period of not less than one half of the maximum period of punishment
prescribed for the offence, the trial court shall release the accused on bail
forthwith on such conditions as it deems fit.

(iii) If the offence under trial is punishable with imprisonment for a E
period exceeding 7 years, whether the accused is in jail or not, the court shall
close the prosecution evidence on completion of three years from the date
of recording the plea of the accused on the charge framed, whether the
prosecution has examined all the witllesses or not within the said period and
the court can proceed to the next step provided by law for the trial of the case,
unless for very exceptional reasons to be recorded and in the interest of F
justice the court considers it necessary to grant further time to the prosecution
to adduce evidence beyond the aforesaid time limit.

(iv) But ifthe inability for completing the prosecution within the aforesaid
period is attributable to the conduct of the accused in protracting the trial, G
no court is obliged to close the prosecution evidence within the aforesaid
period in any of the cases covered by clauses (i) to (iii).

(v) Where the trial has been stayed by orders of court or by operation
of Jaw such time during which the stay was in force shall be excluded frOlll
the aforesaid period for closing prosecution evidence. The above directio)ls H
142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1998] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A will be in addition to and without prejudice to the directions issued by this
Court in "Common Cause" v. Union of India, [1996] 4 SCC 33 as modified
by the same bench through the order reported in "Common Cause" a
registered Society v.. Union of India, [1996] 6 SCC 775.

17. In the result, we set aside the impugned order passed by the High
B Court and direct the Special Judge, C.B.I. South Bihar, Patna to pass appropriate
orders in the case of the petitioner in pursuance of this judgment. The appeal
is allowed accordingly.

18. We issue the following additional direction in so far as the State
of Bihar is concemed:-
C
The State of Bihar shall constitute, within a period of three months from
today, at least five Special Courts, to try the cases involving offences under
the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988 or its corresponding previous Act with
or without other offences allied to them.
D S.V.K.l Appeal allowed.