Holding

Section 132 provides only a qualified privilege protecting a witness from prosecution on the basis of his own statement, and does not bar summoning him as an accused when independent, prima facie material is available.

Summary

The appellant, a bank cashier, was examined as a witness in 2016 and admitted altering the tenure of a fixed deposit, a statement recorded at the pre‑summoning stage. During the trial, another witness (PW‑1) testified in 2022 that the appellant had made the interpolations, leading the bank to move an application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to summon the appellant as an additional accused, which the trial court approved. The appellant argued that Section 132 of the Evidence Act gave him immunity from prosecution based on his own witness statement. The Supreme Court held that the proviso to Section 132 only shields a witness from prosecution on the basis of his own statement, not from prosecution when other independent, cogent material exists. The Court found prima facie material in PW‑1's testimony sufficient to justify summoning the appellant under Section 319. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed and the contempt petition disposed.

Issues considered

Whether the appellant is entitled to protection under Section 132 of the Evidence Act for a statement recorded at the pre‑summoning stage.
Whether a witness protected by Section 132 can be summoned as an additional accused when other incriminating material exists.
Whether the trial court can rely on a witness's statement, apart from the protected statement, to invoke Section 319 Cr.P.C.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 319
Evidence Act, 1872s. 132

Subjects

Section 132 of Evidence Act, 1872Section 319 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973Statement of witness at pre-summoning stageInterpolation in the documentAdditional accusedNemo Tenetur prodere seipsumAbsolute privilegeQualified privilegeBlanket immunity to witnessIncriminating evidenceAdditional materialCogent material

Judgment

[2024] 9 S.C.R. 361 : 2024 INSC 681

Raghuveer Sharan
v.
District Sahakari Krishi Gramin Vikas Bank & Anr.
(Criminal Appeal No(s). 2764 of 2024)
10 September 2024
[Prashant Kumar Mishra* and
Prasanna Bhalachandra Varale, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the appellant
is entitled for protection under Section 132 of the Evidence Act,
1872 as his statement was recorded earlier at the pre-summoning
stage as a witness for the complainant/respondent bank.

Headnotes†
Evidence Act, 1872 – s.132 – Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 – s. 319 – A criminal complaint was filed, the appellant
was also examined as one of the witnesses of the respondent
bank, wherein he admitted having changed the tenure of the
Fixed Deposit from 3 years to 10 years and later on to 15
years – This statement of the appellant was recorded at the
pre-summoning stage on 19.03.2016 – Subsequently, during
trial, PW-1 was examined in-chief on 31.03.2022 wherein he
made the statement that it was the appellant who made the
interpolation in the Fixed Deposit document – Thereafter, the
respondent-bank submitted an application u/s. 319 Cr.P.C. for
arraying the appellant as additional accused and same was
allowed – Appellant preferred criminal revision petition, which
was dismissed – Correctness:
Held: In the instant case, the appellant was summoned as an
additional accused u/s. 319 of the Cr.P.C. not only on the basis of
his pre-summoning statement but on the basis of the statement of
PW-1 who was examined as a witness on 31.03.2022 – Had the
appellant been proposed as an additional accused on the basis of
his statement, he would have been summoned immediately after
his pre-summoning statement was recorded on 19.03.2016 – Thus,
the present is a case where the appellant has been summoned
as an additional accused on the basis of the statement of PW1 –

* Author
362 [2024] 9 S.C.R.

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The proviso to Section 132 offers statutory immunity against self-
incrimination providing that no such answer, which a witness shall
be compelled to give, shall subject him to any arrest or prosecution
or be proved against him in any criminal proceedings except a
prosecution for giving false evidence by such answer – Thus,
the only protection available is, a witness cannot be subjected to
prosecution on the basis of his own statement – It nowhere provides
that there is complete and unfettered immunity to a person even if
there is other substantial evidence or material against him proving
his prima facie involvement – Reverting to the issue as to whether
there is prima facie material against the appellant for summoning
him as an accused in exercise of power u/s. 319 Cr.P.C. – It is to
be seen that in his statement during trial recorded on 31.03.2022,
PW-1 has categorically stated in para 5 of the examination-in-chief
that the interpolations by applying fluid have been made under the
initials and signatures of the appellant – Thus, there is prima facie
material for exercise of power u/s. 319 Cr.P.C. [Paras 24, 25, 27]
Evidence Act, 1872 – Proviso to Section 132:
Held: The proviso to Section 132 of the Act is based on the maxim
nemo Tenetur prodere seipsum i.e. no one is bound to criminate
himself and to place himself in peril – In this regard the law in
England, (with certain exceptions) is that a witness need not answer
any question, the tendency of which is to expose the witness, or
to feed hand of the witness, to any criminal charge, penalty or
forfeiture – The privilege is based on the principle of encouraging
all persons to come forward with evidence, by protecting them, as
far as possible, from injury or needless annoyance in consequence
of so doing – This absolute privilege, in some cases tended to
bring about a failure of justice, for the allowance of the excuse,
particularly when the matter to which the question related was
in the knowledge solely of the witness, deprived the court of the
information which was essential to its arriving at a right decision – In
order to avoid this inconvenience, Section 132 of the Act, withdrew
this absolute privilege and affords only a qualified privilege – The
witness is deprived of the privilege of claiming excuse from testifying
altogether; but, while subjecting him to compulsion, the legislature,
in order to remove any inducement to falsehood, declared that
evidence so obtained should not be used against him, except for
the purpose in the Act declared. [Paras 12, 13]
Evidence Act, 1872 – s.132 – Whether the qualified privilege
under the proviso to Section 132 of the Act, grants complete
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 363

Raghuveer Sharan v. District Sahakari Krishi Gramin Vikas Bank & Anr.

immunity to a person who has deposed as a witness (and
made statements incriminating himself), notwithstanding the
availability of other material with the prosecution:
Held: The qualified privilege under the proviso to Section 132 of
the Act, is intended to ensure that all the evidence is placed before
the Court to reach a just conclusion – In view of this Court, it is
not fathomable that a provision in the Evidence Act, the primary
purpose of which was to ensure that all the material is before the
Court and ensure that the ends of justice are met, could itself
grant a blanket immunity to a witness (albeit complicit) – Such
an interpretation would be unsustainable – Needless to say, that
his statement cannot be used for any purpose whatsoever for the
purposes of bringing such witness to trial – Thus, the qualified
privilege under the proviso to Section 132 of the Act does not grant
complete immunity from prosecution to a person who has deposed
as a witness (and made statements incriminating himself). [Para 20]
Evidence Act, 1872 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – What
is the course available to a Court, which in the course of trial
is confronted with evidence, other than the statement of the
witness (against whom incriminating material is available);
Whether the Court can rely upon the statement of the witness
for invoking the provisions of Section 319 Cr.P.C.; Whether
reference to any statement tendered by the witness would
vitiate the order under Section 319 Cr.P.C.:
Held: There cannot be an absolute embargo on the Trial Court
to initiate process under Section 319 Cr.P.C., merely because a
person, who though appears to be complicit has deposed as a
witness – The finding to invoke Section 319 Cr.P.C., must be based
on the evidence that has come up during the course of Trial – There
must be additional, cogent material before the Trial Court apart from
the statement of the witness – An order for initiation of process
under Section 319 Cr.P.C. against a witness, who has deposed in
the trial and has tendered evidence incriminating himself, would be
tested on the anvil that whether only such incriminating statement
has formed the basis of the order under Section 319 Cr.P.C. – At
the same time, mere reference to such statement would not vitiate
the order – The test would be as to whether, even if the statement
of witness is removed from consideration, whether on the basis
of other incriminating material, the Court could have proceeded
under Section 319 Cr.P.C. [Paras 22, 23]
364 [2024] 9 S.C.R.

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Case Law Cited
R. Dinesh Kumar alias Deena v. State represented by Inspector of
Police and another [2015] 5 SCR 605 : (2015) 7 SCC 497; Sashi
Jena and Others v. Khadal Swain and another [2004] 2 SCR 260 :
(2004) 4 SCC 236; The Queen v. Gopal Doss & Anr. ILR 3 Mad
271 – referred to.
Books and Periodicals cited
Woodroffe & Amir Ali, Law of Evidence, Twenty-first edition, 2020
pp.4377 (Syn 132.1; WM Best, A Treatise on the Principles of
Evidence, 4th Edn, H Sweet, London, 1866, p 126 – referred to.
List of Acts
Evidence Act, 1872; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Constitution
of India.
List of Keywords
Section 132 of Evidence Act,1872; Section 319 of Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973; Statement of witness at pre-summoning stage;
Interpolation in the document; Additional accused; Nemo Tenetur
prodere seipsum; Absolute privilege; Qualified privilege; Blanket
immunity to witness; Incriminating evidence; Additional material;
Cogent material.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE/INHERENT JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal
No(s). 2764 of 2024
From the Judgment and Order dated 09.11.2023 of the High Court of
M.P. Principal Seat at Jabalpur in CRR No. 1925 of 2023
With
Contempt Petition (C) No. 508 of 2024 In Criminal Appeal No(s).
2764 of 2024
Appearances for Parties
Vivek K Tankha, Sr. Adv., Ms. Kajal Sharma, Rajiv Bakshi, Vipul
Tiwari, Advs. for the Appellant.
Saurabh Mishra, Anoop George Chowdhary, Mrs. June Chowdhary,
Sr. Advs., Abhinav Shrivastava, Shivang Rawat, Ms. Amrita Kumari,
Sarvam Ritam Khare, Akash Shukla, Advs. for the Respondents.
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 365

Raghuveer Sharan v. District Sahakari Krishi Gramin Vikas Bank & Anr.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment
Prashant Kumar Mishra, J.
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(s). 2764 OF 2024
1. The appellant seeks to challenge the judgment and order dated
09.11.2023 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Criminal
Revision No. 1925 of 2023 whereby the High Court has dismissed
the appellant’s revision application affirming the order passed by
the Special Court MP/MLA) Gwalior on 17.04.2023 in exercise of
power under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19731
to summon the appellant as an accused.
2. The facts of the case, briefly stated, are that in the year 1998, one
Rajendra Bharti was the President of the complainant/respondent
no. 12 which is now under liquidation. At the relevant time, accused
Savitri Shyam (since deceased), (mother of the accused Rajendra
Bharti), moved an application on 24.08.1998 for creating a Fixed
Deposit of Rs. 10,00,000/- for a period of 3 years with the respondent
bank, in her capacity as the President of Shyam Sunder Shyam
Sansthan, Datia, Madhya Pradesh. The amount was deposited with
the respondent bank vide 2 separate deposits of Rs. 8.5 Lakhs and
Rs. 1.5 Lakhs respectively. However, subsequently, these challans
were interpolated under the initial of the appellant who was working
as the Cashier of the respondent bank at the relevant time. Due to
the interpolation, the Fixed Deposit for 3 years was converted to
Fixed Deposit for 10 years by committing forgery. In the bank ledger
also interpolation and forgery were made by striking off the period
of “3 years” to make “15 years” under the initial of the appellant.
3. When the criminal complaint was filed, the appellant was also
examined as one of the witnesses of the respondent bank, wherein
he admitted having changed the tenure of the Fixed Deposit from
3 years to 10 years and later on to 15 years. This statement of the
appellant was recorded at the pre-summoning stage on 19.03.2016.
However, subsequently, during trial, PW-1/Narendra Singh Parmar

1 ‘Cr.P.C.’
2 ‘respondent bank’
366 [2024] 9 S.C.R.

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was examined-in-chief on 31.03.2022 wherein he made the statement
that it was the appellant who made the interpolation in the Fixed
Deposit document.
4. After the statement of PW-1/ Narendra Singh Parmar was recorded,
the respondent bank submitted application under Section 319 Cr.P.C.
for arraying the appellant and one Rakesh Bharti (brother of Rajendra
Bharti) as additional accused.
5. The trial court vide its order dated 17.04.2023 allowed the application
partly by summoning the appellant, while rejecting the same qua
Rakesh Bharti. Pursuant to the summoning, charges have already
been framed against the appellant on 15.06.2023.
6. The trial court’s order dated 17.04.2023 was challenged before the
High Court. However, under the impugned judgment and order, the
High Court dismissed the criminal revision petition preferred by the
appellant.
SUBMISSIONS
7. Mr. Vivek K. Tankha, learned senior counsel appearing for the
appellant has argued that the appellant was entitled to the benefit
under Section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act, 18723 and he could
not be held accountable for the statement made by him. It is also
argued that the evidence available on record do not make out any
prima facie case against the appellant for summoning him as an
accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C. It is further submitted that the
power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. can be exercised only in a case
when there is prima facie material giving rise to grave suspicion
against the person with respect to commission of offence. Reference
is made to R. Dinesh Kumar alias Deena v. State represented by
Inspector of Police and another.4
8. Per contra, Mr. Saurabh Mishra, learned senior counsel appearing
for the respondent bank would argue that since the appellant is
made accused on the basis of statement made by PW-1/Narendra
Singh Parmar recorded in course of trial on 31.03.2022 and not
on the basis of appellant’s pre-summoning statement recorded on

3 ‘of the Act’
4 [2015] 5 SCR 605 : (2015) 7 SCC 497
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 367

Raghuveer Sharan v. District Sahakari Krishi Gramin Vikas Bank & Anr.

19.03.2016, therefore, Section 132 of the Act, has no application in
the facts and circumstances of the case. It is also argued that the
statement recorded at the pre-summoning stage is not admissible in
evidence as held by this Court in Sashi Jena and Others v. Khadal
Swain and another.5
ANALYSIS
9. The issue to be decided herein is whether in the facts and
circumstances of the case, the appellant is entitled for protection
under Section 132 of the Act, as his statement was recorded earlier
at the pre-summoning stage as a witness for the complainant/
respondent bank.
10. Before proceeding further, it would be appropriate to refer and
reproduce the provisions contained in Section 132 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 as under: -
“132. Witness not excused from answering on ground
that answer will criminate. -
A witness shall not be excused from answering any
question, as to any matter relevant to the matter in issue
in any suit or in any civil or criminal proceeding, upon the
ground that the answer to such question will criminate, or
may tend directly or indirectly to criminate, such witness, or
that it will expose, or tend directly or indirectly to expose,
such witness to a penalty or forfeiture of any kind:
Proviso:- Provided that no such answer, which a witness
shall be compelled to give, shall subject him to any arrest
or prosecution, or be proved against him, in any criminal
proceeding, except a prosecution for giving false evidence
by such answer.”
11. In order to have clear understanding of the sweep and import of
the provisions contained in Section 132 of the Act and the proviso,
in particular, it is necessary to dwell on the principle on which the
provision is introduced in the statute.
12. The proviso to Section 132 of the Act is based on the maxim nemo
Tenetur prodere seipsum i.e. no one is bound to criminate himself

5 [2004] 2 SCR 260 : (2004) 4 SCC 236
368 [2024] 9 S.C.R.

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and to place himself in peril. In this regard the law in England, (with
certain exceptions) is that a witness need not answer any question,
the tendency of which is to expose the witness, or to feed hand
of the witness, to any criminal charge, penalty or forfeiture.6 The
privilege is based on the principle of encouraging all persons to come
forward with evidence, by protecting them, as far as possible, from
injury or needless annoyance in consequence of so doing.7 This
absolute privilege, in some cases tended to bring about a failure of
justice, for the allowance of the excuse, particularly when the matter
to which the question related was in the knowledge solely of the
witness, deprived the court of the information which was essential
to its arriving at a right decision.
13. In order to avoid this inconvenience, Section 132 of the Act, withdrew
this absolute privilege and affords only a qualified privilege. The
witness is deprived of the privilege of claiming excuse from testifying
altogether; but, while subjecting him to compulsion, the legislature, in
order to remove any inducement to falsehood, declared that evidence
so obtained should not be used against him, except for the purpose
in the Act declared.
14. It must also be borne in mind that the proviso to Section 132 of the
Act is also an extension of the protection enshrined under Article
20(3) of the Constitution of India which confers a fundamental right
that “no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself”. Under the constitutional scheme, the right is
available only to a person who is accused of an offence, the proviso
to Section 132 of the Act, in extension, creates a statutory immunity
in favour of a witness who in the process of giving evidence in any
suit or in any civil or criminal proceeding makes a statement which
criminates himself. It is settled that the proviso to Section 132 of the
Act is a necessary corollary to the principle enshrined under Article
20(3) of the Constitution of India which confers a fundamental right
that “no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself ”.8

6 See Woodroffe & Amir Ali, Law of Evidence, Twenty-first edition, 2020 pp.4377 (Syn 132.1) R v. Gopal
Dass, (1881) 3 Mad 271
7 WM Best, A Treatise on the Principles of Evidence, 4th Edn, H Sweet, London, 1866, p 126
8 Laxmipat Choraria v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1968 SC 938
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 369

Raghuveer Sharan v. District Sahakari Krishi Gramin Vikas Bank & Anr.

15. A perusal of the legislative history would reveal that the object of
the law is to secure evidence which could not have been obtained.
The purpose for granting such a statutory immunity was to enable
the court to reach a just conclusion (and thus assisting the process
of law).
16. In R. Dinesh Kumar alias Deena (supra), the two judges Bench
of this Court observed, after referring to Justice Muttusami Ayyar’s
opinion in the matter of “The Queen vs. Gopal Doss & Anr.” 9 that
the policy under Section 132 of the Act appears to be to secure the
evidence from whatever sources it is available for doing justice in a
case brought before the court. In the course of securing such evidence,
if a witness who is under obligation to state the truth because of the
Oath taken by him makes any statement which will criminate or tend
to expose such a witness to a “penalty or forfeiture of any kind etc.”,
the proviso grants immunity to such a witness by declaring that “no
such answer given by the witness shall subject him to any arrest or
prosecution or be proved against him in any criminal proceeding”.
This Court in R. Dinesh Kumar alias Deena (supra) further observed
in para 47 that no prosecution can be launched against the maker
of a statement falling within the sweep of Section 132 of the Act on
the basis of the “answer” given by a person while deposing as a
“witness” before a Court. We are in agreement with the view taken
by this Court in R. Dinesh Kumar alias Deena (supra). However,
the facts of the present case compel us to consider the matter in a
different perspective as to when apart from his own statement made
by a witness, he is still protected under the proviso of Section 132
of the Act when there is other material against him for summoning
as an accused. In R. Dinesh Kumar alias Deena (supra) a witness
examined as PW-64 during trial was sought to be summoned by
moving an application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. The Trial Court
dismissed the application, and the High Court affirmed the dismissal
order. The High Court, in the said case, observed in para 64 that
PW-64 cannot be prosecuted by summoning him as an additional
accused under Section 319 Cr.P.C. on the basis of his evidence
in the Sessions Case. However, the High Court held that PW-64
could be separately prosecuted for an offence under Section 120B

9 ILR 3 Mad 271
370 [2024] 9 S.C.R.

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of the Indian Penal Code, 186010 read with Section 302 of IPC if
independent evidence other than the statement under Section 164
Cr.P.C. of PW-64 and his evidence in Sessions Case are available
to prosecute him along with other accused.
17. This Court in R. Dinesh Kumar alias Deena (supra) refused to
consider the issue as to whether a witness protected under the
proviso of Section 132 of the Act could be separately prosecuted if
independent evidence is also available by observing thus in paras
7 & 52:
“7. In our opinion, the second conclusion recorded by the
High Court contained in para 64 extracted above, is really
uncalled for in the context of the issue before the High
Court. The question before the High Court was whether
the Sessions Court was justified in declining to summon
PW 64 in exercise of its authority under Section 319 of
the Cr.P.C. as an additional accused in Sessions Case No.
73 of 2009. We, therefore, will examine only the question
whether on the facts mentioned earlier the Sessions Court
is obliged to summon PW 64 as an additional accused
exercising the power under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C.
52. In the light of the above two decisions, the proposition
whether the prosecution has a liberty to examine any person
as a witness in a criminal prosecution notwithstanding
that there is some material available to the prosecuting
agency to indicate that such a person is also involved in
the commission of the crime for which the other accused
are being tried, requires a deeper examination.”
18. In other words, if the privilege made available to a witness under
the proviso to Section 132 of the Act is interpreted as a complete
immunity, notwithstanding availability of other evidence, it is capable
of abuse. In a particular case, a dishonest Investigating officer could
cite a person as a witness in the report under Section 173 of the
Cr.P.C, being fully aware that there is incriminating material against
such person. Similarly, a man complicit of an offence, could very well
institute a complaint under Section 200 Cr.P.C., examine himself as

10 ‘IPC’
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 371

Raghuveer Sharan v. District Sahakari Krishi Gramin Vikas Bank & Anr.

a witness, make statements incriminating himself and claim immunity
from prosecution. It could also be so that an investigating officer,
under an honest mistake examines a man complicit of an offence as
a witness in the case, the Court upon examining the other evidence,
could conclude that the witness was complicit in the offence, the
question then would be whether there would be complete bar on
the Court to prosecute such witness for the offence on the basis of
such other material.
19. The question that would then arise is whether the qualified privilege
under the proviso to Section 132 of the Act, grants complete immunity
to a person who has deposed as a witness (and made statements
incriminating himself), notwithstanding the availability of other material
with the prosecution?
a. Whether a Court while trying an offence, is barred from initiating
process under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C, against a witness in
the said proceeding on the basis of other material on record?
20. As noted above, the qualified privilege under the proviso to Section
132 of the Act, is intended to ensure that all the evidence is placed
before the Court to reach a just conclusion. In our view, it is not
fathomable that a provision in the Evidence Act, the primary purpose
of which was to ensure that all the material is before the Court and
ensure that the ends of justice are met, could itself grant a blanket
immunity to a witness (albeit complicit). Such an interpretation in our
opinion would be unsustainable. Needless to say, that his statement
cannot be used for any purpose whatsoever for the purposes of
bringing such witness to trial. As such we hold that the qualified
privilege under the proviso to Section 132 of the Act does not grant
complete immunity from prosecution to a person who has deposed
as a witness (and made statements incriminating himself).
21. However, the next question that would arise is what is the course
available to a Court, which in the course of trial is confronted with
evidence, other than the statement of the witness (against whom
incriminating material is available)? Whether the Court can rely upon
the statement of the witness for invoking the provisions of Section
319 Cr.P.C? Whether reference to any statement tendered by the
witness would vitiate the order under Section 319 Cr.P.C?
22. There cannot be an absolute embargo on the Trial Court to initiate
process under Section 319 Cr.P.C., merely because a person, who
372 [2024] 9 S.C.R.

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though appears to be complicit has deposed as a witness. The finding
to invoke Section 319 Cr.P.C., must be based on the evidence that
has come up during the course of Trial. There must be additional,
cogent material before the Trial Court apart from the statement of
the witness.
23. An order for initiation of process under Section 319 Cr.P.C against
a witness, who has deposed in the trial and has tendered evidence
incriminating himself, would be tested on the anvil that whether
only such incriminating statement has formed the basis of the order
under Section 319 Cr.P.C. At the same time, mere reference to such
statement would not vitiate the order. The test would be as to whether,
even if the statement of witness is removed from consideration,
whether on the basis of other incriminating material, the Court could
have proceeded under Section 319 Cr.P.C.
24. In the case at hand, the appellant has been summoned as an
additional accused under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. not only on
the basis of his pre-summoning statement but on the basis of the
statement of PW-1/Narendra Singh Parmar who was examined as
a witness on 31.03.2022. Had the appellant been proposed as an
additional accused on the basis of his statement, he would have
been summoned immediately after his pre-summoning statement
was recorded on 19.03.2016. Thus, the present is a case where
the appellant has been summoned as an additional accused on the
basis of the statement of PW-1/Narendra Singh Parmar.
25. The proviso to Section 132 offers statutory immunity against self-
incrimination providing that no such answer, which a witness shall
be compelled to give, shall subject him to any arrest or prosecution
or be proved against him in any criminal proceedings except a
prosecution for giving false evidence by such answer. Thus, the only
protection available is, a witness cannot be subjected to prosecution
on the basis of his own statement. It nowhere provides that there is
complete and unfettered immunity to a person even if there is other
substantial evidence or material against him proving his prima facie
involvement. If this complete immunity is read under the proviso
to Section 132 of the Act, an influential person with the help of a
dishonest Investigating Officer will provide a legal shield to him by
examining him as a witness even though his complicity in the offence
is writ large on the basis of the material available in the case.
[2024] 9 S.C.R. 373

Raghuveer Sharan v. District Sahakari Krishi Gramin Vikas Bank & Anr.

26. As earlier stated, R. Dinesh Kumar alias Deena has not examined
the issue discussed in the preceding paragraph, therefore, R. Dinesh
Kumar alias Deena (supra) is of no assistance to the appellant.
27. Reverting to the issue as to whether there is prima facie material
against the appellant for summoning him as an accused in exercise of
power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. It is to be seen that in his statement
during trial recorded on 31.03.2022, PW-1/Narendra Singh Parmar
has categorically stated in para 5 of the examination-in-chief that the
interpolations by applying fluid have been made under the initials
and signatures of the appellant. Thus, there is prima facie material
for exercise of power under Section 319 Cr.P.C.
28. For the foregoing, the criminal appeal deserves to be and is hereby
dismissed.
CONTEMPT PETITION (C) NO. 508 OF 2024 IN CRIMINAL APPEAL
NO(s). 2764 OF 2024 @ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO.
3419 OF 2024.
29. In view of the above judgment passed in Criminal Appeal, the
proceedings in this Contempt Petition stand closed and the interim
order passed therein is vacated. The Contempt Petition is disposed of.

Result of the Case: A
ppeal dismissed.
Contempt petition disposed of.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan