Holding

An order of revision passed by the High Court without hearing the accused, after the magistrate has taken cognizance, violates Section 401(2) CrPC and the principles of natural justice.

Summary

The respondent company filed a complaint under Section 200 of the CrPC alleging several IPC offences against the appellant. The Metropolitan Magistrate, having taken cognizance, refused to order a police investigation under Section 156(3) and directed the complainant to present pre‑summoning evidence. The complainant filed a criminal revision before the High Court, which set aside the magistrate’s order without impleading or hearing the appellant. The appellant challenged this, arguing that under Section 401(2) CrPC the accused – or any prejudiced person – must be given an opportunity to be heard, even at the pre‑summoning stage. The Supreme Court held that once cognizance is taken, the High Court cannot pass a revision order without hearing the accused, as the principle of audi alteram partem applies. Consequently, the High Court’s order was set aside and the appeal was allowed, directing the High Court to implead the appellant and rehear the revision.

Issues considered

Whether a High Court exercising revision under Sections 397 and 401 CrPC can pass an order without hearing the accused when the magistrate has already taken cognizance of the offence.
Whether the principle of audi alteram partem under Section 401(2) CrPC applies at the pre‑summoning stage of a criminal proceeding.

Legislation cited

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973s. 156(3), s. 190, s. 200, s. 202, s. 203, s. 204, s. 397, s. 401, s. 401(2), s. 401(3)
Indian Penal Code, 1860s. 120-B, s. 323, s. 34, s. 382, s. 420, s. 465, s. 466, s. 471, s. 506

Subjects

natural justiceaudi alteram partemcriminal revisionSection 401 CrPCpre‑summoning stagecognizancepolice investigationSection 156(3) CrPCSection 200 CrPCHigh Court jurisdictionright to be heard

Judgment

[2008) 17 S.C.R. 833

RAGHU RAJ SINGH ROUSHA A
v.
~ MIS. SHIVAM SUNDRARAM PROMOTERS (P) L & ANR.
(Criminal Appeal No. 2054 of 2008)
DECEMBER 17, 2008
B
[S.B. SINHA AND CYRIAC JOSEPH, JJ.]

· Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Chapter XV and ss .
... 397, 401- Complaint u/s. 200 rlw s. 156(3) - Magistrate
~
refusing the application u/s. 156(3) and directing the c
complainant to proceed in terms of Chapter XV - Revision
application - Disposal of by High Court - Without hearing the
accused - On appeal, held: Disposal of revision without
hearing the accused not correct - Since the Magistrate had
taken cognizance of the offence, the accused was entitled to
. D
be heard in revision -The revision case being at pre-
summoning stage, even if the affected person is not an
. -..\ accused, he is entitled to be heard by virtue of s. 401(3) -
Principle of audi alteram partem is applicable to the
proceedings of the High Court - Principle of natural justice -
Principle of audi alteram partem. E
Respondent No. 1-Company filed a complaint uls.
200 CrPC against the appellant for offences punishable
ulss. 323, 382, 420, 465, 466, 471, 120-B, 506 and 34 IPC,
accompanied by an application u/s. 156(3) CrPC. The
Metropolitan Magistrate refused to direct investigation in F
terms of s. 156(3) opining that the complaint could be
. ..........,, dealt with u/s. 200 CrPC and subsequent provisions. It
directed the complainant to lead pre-summoning
evidence. Complainant filed a revision application
challenging the order of the Magistrate against State G
without impleading the appellant therein. High Court set
aside the order of Magistrate.
In appeal to this Court, the appellant contended that
~"""' di&po&al of revi&ion application without notice to the
....
• 833 H
834 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A appellant, was not correct.
Respondent-complainant contended that revision
application having been filed at pre-cognizance stage, the
appellant had no right to be heard as he could not have
been called an accused at that stage.
B Allowing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1. When a complaint petition is filed under
Chapter XV CrPC, the Magistrate ha~ a few options in
regard to exercise of his jurisdiction. He may take
cognizance of the offence and issue summons. He may
C also postpone the issue of process so as to satisfy
himself that the allegations made in the complaint petition
are prima facie correct and either inquire into the case
himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police
officer or by such other person as he thinks fit for the
D purpose of deciding as to whether or not there is
sufficien~ ground for proceeding. [Para 9) [838-F-G]
1.2. In the instant case, the Magistrate had taken
cognizance. He had applied his mind. He refused to
exercise his jurisdiction u/s. 156(3) CrPC. He arrived at a
E conclusion thaUhe dispute is a private dispute in relation
to an immovable property and, thus, police investigation
is not necessary. It was only with that intent in view, he
directed examination of the compl_ainant and his
witnesses so as to initiate and complete the procedure
F laid down under Chapter XV CrPC. If he had taken
cognizance of the offence and merely issuance of
summons upon the accused persons had been
postponed in a criminal revision filed on behalf of the
complainant, the accused was entitled to be heard before
G the High Court. [Pa-r~s 10 and 18) [839-A-B; 843-C-D]
1.3. It cannot be said that the appellant was not
prejudiced by, the impugned order and at the pre-
summoning stage he could not be called an accused.
.>--·-
Sub-section (2) of Section 401 Cr.PC refers not only to an
accused but also to any person and if he is prejudiced, ..
'
H
RAGHU RAJ SINGH ROUSHA v. SHIVAM 835
SUNDRARAM PROMOTERS (P) L & ANR.
'""
-(
he is required to be heard. An order was passed partially A
in favour of the appellant by the Magistrate. Had an
-1 opportunity of hearing been given to· the appellant, he
,,
could have shown that no revision application was
maintainable and/ or even otherwise, no case has been
made out for interference with the impugned judgment. 8
The High Court shall implead the appellant as a party in
the criminal revision application and hear the matter
afresh. [Paras 12 and 19) [839-E-F-G-H; 843-E]
... ·~ Makkapati Nagaswara Sastri vs. S.S. Satyanarayan
(1981) 1SCC62; P.Sundarrajan and Ors. vs. R. Vidhya Sekar c
(2004) 13 SCC 472; Vadilal Panchal vs. Dattatraya Dulaji
Ghadigaonkarand Anr. AIR (1960) SC 1113; Divine Retreat
Centre vs State of Kera/a and Ors. AIR (2008) SC 1614 and
Sakiri Vasu v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. (2008) 2 SCC
409, relied on
D
'" Chandra Deo Singh vs. Prakash Chandra Bose @
Chabi Bose and Anr. AIR 1963 SC 1430 and Mohd. Yousuf
' 416.
vs. Afaq Ja-han (Smt.) and Anr. (2006) 1 SCC 627,
distinguished
Gopal Das Sindhi vs. State of Assam AIR (1961) SC 986 E
and Supdt. And Remembrancer of Legal Affairs vs. Abani
Kumar Banerjee AIR (1950) Cal 437, referred to
Case Law Reference:
(1981) 1 sec 62 Relied on Para 13
(2004) 13 sec 472 Relied on Para 13 F
AIR (1960) SC 1113 Relied on Para 14
' --..., AIR (2008) SC 1614 Relied on Para 15
(2008) 2 sec 409 Relied on Para 15
(1963) SC 1430 Distinguished Para 16
(2006) 1 sec 627 Distinguished Para 17 G
AIR (1961) SC 986 Referred to Para 17
AIR (1950) Cal 437 Referred to Para 17

- '""'~

'
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal
No. 2054 of 2008. H
836 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A From the Judgment & Order dated 25.2.2008 of the High
Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Criminal Revision Petition No.
116 of 2008. "'-
H.S. Phoolka, Kuldip Singh, R.K. Pandey, T.P. Mishra and
H.S. Sandhu for the Appellant.
B Jaspal Singh, Krishna Kumar, Savitri Pandey, D.S. Mahra,
Prabhjit Jauhar, S.S. Jauhar, Sanjeev Anand and Yakesh Anand
for the Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
S.B. SINHA, J. 1. Leave granted.
c
2. Whether the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction.
under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
(for short "the Code") can pass an order in absence of the
accused persons in the facts and circumstances of this case
D is the question involved in this appeal which arises out of a
-
judgment and order dated 25.02.2008 passed by the High
Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Criminal Revision Petition No.
116 of 2008.
3. Before adverting to the said question, we may notice
E the admitted fact of the matter.
4. Respondent No. 1 is a company registered and
incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. It filed a
complaint petition in the Court of Additional Chief MetropG.llitan
Magistrate, New Delhi at Patiala House Courts under Section
200 of the Code in respect of an offence purported to have been
F committed and punishable under Sections 323, 382, 420, 465,
468, 471,. 120-B, 506 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code
accompani~d by an application under Section 156(3) of the
Code.
G . 5. It is not necessary for us to deal with the allegations
made in the said complaint petition in details. Suffice it to say
that by reason of an order dated 7.02.2008, the Metropolitan
Magistrate, New Delhi in whose court the aforementioned
complaint petition was transferred, refused to direct
investigation in the matter by the .Station House Officer in terms
H of Section 156(3) of the Code, stating:
RAGHU RAJ SINGH ROUSHA v. SHIVAM 837
SUNDRARAM PROMOTERS (P) L & ANR. [S.B. SINHA, J.]
...,-
"In the present case all the facts and circumstances of the A
' case are within the knowledge of the complainant. Both the
•' --?
- complainant and the accused company have been dealing
with one another by way of contractual agreement and a
MOU dt. 05/08i05 was entered between them as alleged
in the complaint. From the complaint and the documents B
placed on record, it appears that there is some dispute
between the parties in respect of immovable property and
the payments pertaining to the sale of the same. The
complainant submits that the accused had cheated him.
~
In the facts and circumstances of the case there is no c,
requirement of collection of evidence by the police at this
stage as the complainant can lead his evidence. In view
of this, present application u/s 156(3) CrPC is dismissed.
The qomplaint can be conveniently dealt with U/s 200 CrPC
and subsequent prcv'i"Sions. if th&re is necessity however
of police that shall be taken u/s 202 Cr.P.C." D
On the aforementioned premise, the complainant was
i _..._ asked to lead pre-summoning evidence. It was directed to
furnish list of witnesses, if any.
6. Aggrieved by and dissatisfied therewith, respondent No.
1 filed a revision application before the High Court impleading E
the State only as a party. By reason of the impugned judgment,
the High Court, having regard to the purported consent of the
learned APP appearing for the State, on the very first day of
hearing, passed the following order:
"On hearing learned counsel for the parties, it is agreed F
... ---, that the impugned order dated 7.2.2008 be set aside with
direction to the learned MM to examine the matter afresh
after calling for a report from the police authorities. The
police authorities to hold a preliminary inquiry on basis of
the complaint made by the petitioner/ complainant and G
submit a report to the learned Magistrate within three
weeks from today. The petitioner to appear before the trial
- --".. Court on 24.03.2008. Petition stand disposed of."
Appellant is, thus, before us.
H
838 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A 7. Mr. H.S. Phoolka, learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant, would contend that having regard to the
fact that the complaint petition was filed in terms of Section 200
of the Code read with Section 156 (3) thereof and as the
learned Magistrate directed the respondent No. 1 to produce
8 witnesses so as to enable it to proceed in terms of Chapter
XV of the.Code, the.revision application could not have been
disposed of without notice to the appellant.
8. Mr. Jaspal Singh, learned senior counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondent No. 1, on the other hand, would contend
c that the crimina·1 revision application having been filed at the
pre-cognizance stage, the accused has no right to be heard.
Strong reliance in this behalf has been placed on Chandra Deo
Singh v. Prakash Chandra Bose alias Chabi Bose and
another[AIR 1963 SC 1430] and Mohd. Yousufv. Afaq Jahan
D (Smt) and Another [(2006) 1 SCC 627].
9. A person intending to set the criminal law in motion inter
alia may file an application under Section 156(3) of the Code.
When a First Information Report is lodged, a police officer has
the requisite jurisdiction to investigate into the cognizable
offence in terms of Section 156(1) of the Code. Where,
E however, a Magistrate is entitled to take cognizance of the
offence unde[ Section 190 of the Code, he may also direct that
such investigation be carried out in terms thereof.
.When a complaint petition is filed under Chapter XV of the
Code, the Magistrate has a few options in regard to exercise
F of his jurisdietion. He may take cognizance of the offence and
issue summons. He may also postpone the issue of process
so as to satisfy himself that the allegations made in the
complaint petition are prim a facie correct and either inquire into
the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a
G police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit for the
purpose of deciding as to whether or not there is sufficient
ground for proceeding. By reason of the aforementioned order
dated 7.02.2008, the learned Magistrate intended to inquire into >---
the case himself. It is for the said purpose, he directed
H examination of the complainant and his witnesses.
RAGHU RAJ SINGH ROUSHA v. SHIVAM 839
SUNDRARAM PROMOTERS (P) L & ANR. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

10. One of the questions which arises for consideration is A
as to whether the learned Magistrate has taken cognizance of
-)- the offence. Indisputably, if he had taken cognizance of the
offence and merely issuance of summons upon the accused !

persons had been postponed; in a criminal revision filed on
behalf of the complainant, the accused was entitled to be heard 8
before the High Court.
11. Section 397 of the Code empowers the High Court to
call for records of the case to exercise its power of revision in
order to satisfy itself as regards correctness, legality or propriety ;
of any finding, sentence or order recorded or passed and as· c
to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. Sub-
section (2) of Section 397 of the Code, however, prohibits
exercise of such power in relation to any interlocutory order
passed in any proceeding. Whereas Section 399 of the Code
deals with the Sessions Judge's power of revision; Section 401
thereof deals with the High Court's power of revision. D
Sub-section (2) ol Section 401 of the Code reads, thus:
"(2) No order under this section shall be made to the
prejudice of the accused or other person unless he has
had an opportunity of being heard either personally or by E
pleader in his own defence."
12. Submission of Mr. Jaspal Singh that by reason of the•
impugned order the appellant was not prejudiced and in any
event at the pre-summoning stage, he was not an accused,
cannot be accepted. F
Sub-section (2) of Section 401 of the Code refers not only
to an accused but also to any person and if he is prejudiced,
he is required to be heard.
An order was passed partially in his favour. The learned
Metropolitan Magistrate has refused to e);Cercise its jurisdiction G
under Section _156(3) of the Code. Had an opportunity of
hearing been given to the appellant, he could have shown that
no revision application was maintainable and/ or even
otherwise, no case has been made out for interference with the'
impugned judgment. H
840 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008] 17 S.C.R.

A 13. In Makkapati Nagaswara Sastri v. S.S. Satyanarayan
[(1981) 1 SCC 62], this Court opined that the principle of audi
alteram partem is applicable in a proceeding before the High ~-

Court.
Yet again in P. Sundarrajan and Others v. R. Vidhya Sekar
B [(2004) 13 SCC 472], this Court held:
"4. On the above basis, it proceeded to consider the
material produced by the petitioner before it and without
taking into consideration the defence that was available
to the respondent proceeded to set aside the order of the ,..- -~

c Magistrate, and directed the said court to take the
comp1aint on file and proceed with the same in accordance
with law.
5. In our, opinion, this order of the High Court is ex facie
unsustainable in law by not giving an opportunity to the
D appellant herein to defend his case that the learned Judge
violated all principles of natural justice as also the
requirement of law of hearing a party before passing an
adverse order."
14. We may also notice that this Court in Vadilal Panchal
E v. Dattatraya DuJaji Ghadigaonkar and another [Al R 1960 SC
1113], opined:
"9. The general scheme of the aforesaid sections is
quite clear. Section 200 says inter alia what a Magistrate
taking cognisance of an offence on complaint shall do cin
F receipt of such a complaint. Section 202 says that the
Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, for reasons to be recorded
in writing, postpone the issue of process for compelling the
y.
attendance of the person complained against and direct
an inquiry for the purpose of ascertaining the truth or
falsehood of the complaint; in other words, the scope of
G
an inquiry under the section is limited to finding out the truth
or falsehood of the complaint in order to determine the
question of the issue of process. The inquiry is for the
;;.-., ~
purpose of ascertaining the truth or falsehood of the
complaint; that is, for ascertaining whether there is
H
RAGHU RAJ SINGH ROUSHA v. SHIVAM 841
S,UNDRARAM PROMOTERS (P) L & ANR. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

evidence in support of the complaint so as to justify the A
_.., issue of process and commencement of proceedings
;> against the person concerned. The section does not say
that a regular trial for adjudging the guilt or otherwise of
the person complained against should take place at that
stage; for the person complained against can be tegally B
called upon to answer the accusation made against hirr.
only when a process has issued and he is put on trial.
"--.
/
Section 203, be it noted, consists of two parts: the first part
indicates what are the materials which the Magistrate must
"""" consider, and the second part says that if after considering
those materials there is in his judgment no sufficient ground
c
for proceeding, he may dismiss the complaint. Section 204
says that if in the opinion of the Magistrate there is
sufficient ground for proceeding, he shall take steps for the
issue of necessary process."
15. The question again came up for consideration before
D

.... this Court recently in Divine Retreat Centre v. State of Kera/a
& Ors. [AIR 2008 SC 1614], wherein this Court opined that the
jurisdiction of the High Court even in terms of Section 482 of
the Code is not unlimited. It was held that even in a case where
no action is taken by the police, the. informant's remedy lies E
under Sectiorts 190 and 200 of the- Code.·
--
-+ Similar view has been expressed by this Court in Sakiri
_..., Vasu v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others ((2008) 2. SCC
409].
16. It is in the aforementioned backdrop the decision of F
'- '-( this Court in Chandra Deo Singh (supra) may be considered.
Therein, this Court opined that although an accused has no right
to participate unless the process is issued, he may remain
present either in person or through a counsel or agent with a
view to be informed of what is going on. It was held that one of G
the objects behind the provisions of Section 202 of the Code
.... l"i._
is to enable the Magistrate to scrutinize carefully the allegations
made in the complaint with a view to prevent a person named
~ therein as accused from being called upon to face an obviously
frivolous complaint but that-is not the stage where defence of H
842 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2008) 17 S.C.R.

A an accused can be gone into, stating:
"... An enquiry under Section 202 can in no sense be t-
-:'
character.ised as a trial for the simple reason that in law
there can. be but one trial for an offence. Permitting an
accused person to intervene during the enquiry would
B frustrate its very object and that is why the legislature has
made no specific provision permitting an accused person
to take part in an enquiry. It is true that there is no direct
eviqence in the case before us that the two persons who r-·~
/

were examined as court witnesses were so examined at
c the .·instance of Respondent 1 but from the fact that they
wete persons who were alleged to have been the
associates of Respondent 1 in the first information report
lodged by Panchanan Roy and who were alleged to have
been arrested on the spot by some of the local people, they
would not have been summoned by the Magistrate unless
D suggestion to that effect had been made by counsel
appearing for Respondent 1. This inference is irresistible
and we hold that on this ground, the enquiry made by the
enquiring Magistrate is vitiated ... "
It was emphasized that the question as to whether a
E process has to be issued or not lies within the exclusive
domain of the Magistrate so as to enable him .to arrive at a
satisfaction that there is sufficient ground for proceeding but not
with a view to see as to whether there is sufficient ground for
..
~

conviction, stating:
F " ... No doubt, as stated in sub-section (1) of Section
202 itself, the object of the enquiry is to ascertain the truth r·-
or falsehood of the complaint, but the Magistrate making
the enquiry has to do this only with reference to the intrinsic ·
quality of the statements made before him at the enquiry
G which would naturally mean the complaint itself, the
statement on oath made by the complainant and the
statements made before him by persons examined at the ,)If .....
instance of the complainant."
17. In Mohd. Yousuf (supra), whereupon reliance has been
H placed by Mr. Jaspal Singh, this Court made a distinction
RAGHU RAJ SINGH ROUSHA v. SHIVAM 843
!
SUNDRARAM PROMOTERS (P) L & ANR. [S.B. SINHA, J.]

-:" between a pre-cognizance stage and post-cognizance stage. A
\ It was opined that an order under Sub-section (3) of Section
-·t
156 of the Code need not be passed when the Magistrate
intends to take cognizance. Extensively referring to the
decisions in Gopal Das Sindhi v. State of Assam [AIR 1961
SC 986] and Supdt. and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs v.' B
Abani Kumar Banerjee [AIR 1950 Cal 437] as also other
decisions, it was held that as in those cases cognizance had
not been taken.
~
18. Here, however, the learned Magistrate had taken
cognizance. He had applied his mind. He refused to exercise c
his jurisdiction under Section 156(3) of the Code. He arrived
at a conclusion that the dispute is a private dispute in relation
to an immovable property and, thus, police investigation is not
necessary. It was only with that intent in view, he directed
examination of the complainant and his witnesses so as to
initiate and complete the procedure laid down under Chapter D
XV of the Code.
19. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the impugned
judgment cannot be sustained and is set aside accordingly. The
High Court shall implead the appellant as a party in the criminal ,
revision application, hear the matter afresh and pass an E
appropriate order.
20. The Appeal is allowed.
K.K.T. Appeal allowed.

·~