RAGHBIR SINGHversusSURJIT SINGH AND ORS. ETC. ETC.

A                            RAGHBIR SINGH
                                   v.
                     SURJIT SINGH AND ORS. ETC. ETC.

                                 AUGUST 22, 1994

B                1[J.S. VERMA AND K.S. PARJPOORNAN,              JJ.]

          Represe11tation of the People Act, 1951 :

         Secti011s 5, 8(3 )-Membership of Legislative Assemblr-£lectio11
C to-Disqualificatio1i-f'rescription ~f period of disqualification based 011 clas-
  sification of offences according to their nature and period of convic-
  tiolt-Held, not arbitrary-Nor open to judicial scruti11y--i.egislature has wide
  discretion in matter of c/assificatio11.

           The respondent filed an election petition before the High Court
D   challenging appellant's election to Punjab Vidhan Sabha held in Feb. 1992,
    on the ground that be was disqualified to be a candidate at the time of the
    election. The appellant bad been convicted and sentenced to 3 years
    rigorous Imprisonment under s.32,~ read with s.149 J.P.C. by the trial cburt
    on 15.11.1984, and having failed i10 the High Court and in this Court, be
E   served out bis sentence and was released on 14.11.1988. The High Court
    declared appellant's election to be void holding that in view of the             •'
    provisions or s.8(3) of the Representation or the People Act, 1951, he was
    disqualified lo be a candidate in the said election. Aggrieved, the appellant    •'
    filed the appeal under s.116A of the Act. He also filed the writ petition
    under Article 32 or the Constitution challenging constitutional validity of
F   s.8(3) or the Act.

          It was t:ontended on behatr or the appellant that the period or
    disqualification in sub-sections (l]i, (2) and (3) or s.8 of the Act should be
    Identical and, like in sub-s.(1), 11eriod of disqualification in sub-s. (3)
G   should also be read as six years from the date of conviction and not from
    the date of release as there is no rational basis for providing different
    period of disqualification in different sub-sections of s.8 of the Act.

           Dismissing the appeal as also the writ petition, this Court

H          HELD: 1.1. Prescription ofp,eriod of disqualification in sub-sections
                                       766
              RAGHBIR SINGHv. SURJIT SINGH [VERMA, J.]                    767

(1), (2) and (3) of section 8 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951      A
for different classes of persons convicted of different offences is based on
the well recognised mode of classification ofoffecnes having regard to their
nature and period of sentence, and is within the domain of legislative
discretion and wisdom, which is not open to judicial scrutiny. The legisla-
ture has wide discretion in the matter of classification and there is no         B
arbitrariness reflected in the classification. [770-E, F, G)

       1.2. The categories of persons covered by sub-sections (1), (2) and
 (3) of section 8 of the Act being different and distinct, comparison inter se
 between any two of these three distinct classes is not permissible. While
 sub-section (1) enumerates the offences which are considered to be of one       C
 category and the period of six years disqualification from the date of
conviction is provided for them irrespective of the sentence awarded on
 such conviction, in sub-section (2) are specified some other offences,
 conviction for which is considered significant for disqualification only if
the sentence is of imprisonment for not less than six.months and in that         D
case a longer period of six years disqualification since release bas been
considered appropriate. Sub-section (3), which is the residuary provision,
governs all persons convicted of any offence [other than any offence
referred to in sub-section (1) or sub- section (2)) and sentenced to im-
prisonment for not less than two years, and it bas been considered ap-           E
propriate to prescribe the same six years period of disqualification since
release for all of them as they constitute one class. The provisions, there-
fore, cannot be said to be discriminatory. [770-D; 769-F-G-H; 770-B, C, El

      CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 933 of
~~                                                                               F
     From the Judgment and Order dated 23.12.93 of the Punjab &
Haryana High Court in E.P. No. 6 of 1992.

     R.K Jain and S.B. Upadhyay for the Appellant/Petitioner.
                                                                                 G
     K. Madhava Reddy, M.L. Verma, B.S. Jain, Mahesh Srivastava and
V.D. Khanna for the Respondents.

     The following Judgment of the Court was delivered by

     VERMA, J. Pursuant to the notification to elect a Member for the            H
     768
             ..           SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1994] SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A Punjab Vidhan Sabha to represent the Giddarbha Assembly Constituency,
     the appellant Reghbir Singh filed his 11omination on 1.2.1992 which was
     found valid in the scrutiny on 22.1992, and he contested the election held
     on 19.2.1992 wherein he was declared only elected on 20.2.1992. There-
     after, the ,respondent Surjit Singh, a voter from that constituency filed an
B    Election Petition for a declaration that the appellant's election was void on
     the ground that he was disqualified to be a candidate at the time of ·
     election. The facts on which this ground is based are admitted.

            The appellant was convicted for an offence punishable under Section
     326 read with Section 149, l.P.C. and sentenced to three years rigorous
C    imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 100 in addition to his conviction and
     sentence also under some other sections of the Indian Penal Code, by the
     Trial Court on 15.11.1984. The appellant's appeal against his conviction
     and sentence was dismissed by the High Court on 10.4.1987 and the special
     leave petition against the same was rejected by this Court on 30.11.1987.
D    The appellant was in jail to serve out his sentence from 8.9.1987 to 21.10.89
     and again from 8.2.1988 to 14.11.1989. There is no dispute that in accord-
     ance with the plain language of sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the Repre-
     sentation of the People Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the "RPA
     Act") the appellant was disqualified to be a candidate at the said election
      held in February 1992 on this ground alone. The high Court has upheld
E     this contention of the respondent-election petitioner and allowed the elec-
      tion petition declaring the appellant's said election to be void. Hence this
      appeal under Section l16A of the R.P. Act.

            There being no controversy that according to the plain language of
 F    sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the R.P. Act, the appellant was disqualified
      to be a candidate at the said election held in February 1992, the appellant
      has also filed Writ Petition (Civil) No. 243 of 1994 along with this appeal
      challenging the constitutional, it is obvious that the appeal also must fail.
      Thus, the only question for consideration by us is the constitutional validity
      of sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the R.P. Act.
 G
            The submission of Shri R.K. Jain, learned counsel for the appellant
      is that the period of disqualification in sub-section (1) of Section 8 being
      only six years from the date of such conviction, the longer period of
      disqualification prescribed in sub-section (3) thereof extending to six years
 H    since his release is discriminat~ry. The submission is that the period of
             RAGHBIRSINGHv. SURJITSINGH[VERMA,J.]                        769

disqualification in sub-section (3) should also be read as six years from the A
date of such conviction and not the longer period extending to six years
from the date of release. In short, the submission is that the period of
disqualification in sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 8 should be
                                                       a
identical and there is no rational basis for providing different period of
disqualification in the different sub-sections of Section 8. We are unable B
to accept this argument.

       Seciion 8 prescribes disqualification on conviction for certain offec-
nes. Sub-section (1) provides the disqualifaction for a period of six years
from the date of conviction for the offences specified in clauses (a) to (i)
thereof. In sub-section (1), the only reference is to conviction for the        C
specified offences irrespective of the sentence awarded on such conviction.
Sub- section (2) then prescribes that on conviction for the offences
specified therein and sentence to imprisonment for not less than six
months, that person shall be disqualified from the date of such conviction
and shall continue to be disqualified for a further period of six years since   D
his release. Thus, in case of conviction for the offences specified in sub-
section (2), the disqualification is attracted only if the sentence is of
imprisonment for not less than six months and in that event the dis-
qualification is for a period of not merely six years from the date of such
conviction but commencing from the date of such conviction it shall             E
continue for a further period of six years since his release. Sub-section (3)
then prescribes a similar longer period of disqualification from the date of
such conviction to continue for a further period of six ye¥s since his
release where a person is convicted of any offence and sentenced \o
imprisonment for not less than two years, other than any offence referred
to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2). The classification is clear. This     F
classification is made with reference to the offences and the sentences
awarded on conviction. In sub-section (1) are specified the offences which
are considered to be of one catagory and the period of six years dis-
qualification from the date of conviction is provided for them irrespective
of the sentence awarded on such conviction. In sub- section (2) are             G"
specified some other offences, the conviction for which is considered
significant for disqualification only if the sentence is of imprisonment for
not less than six months and in that case a longer period of disqualification
has been considered appropriate. Then comes sub-section (3) which is the
                                                                                H
    770                   SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1994) SUPP. 2 S.C.R.

A   residuary pro,ision of this kind \\'herein the disqualification is prescribed
    only with reference to the period of sentence of imprisonment of not less
    than two years for which the longer period of disqualification is considered
    appropriate. The legislature itself has classified the offences on the basis
    of their nature and in the residuar:1 pro\ision contained in sub-section (3),
                                        1



B   the classific~tion is made only \>ith reference to the priod of sentence being
    not less than tv.·o years.

           In sub-section (3) of Section 8, all persons con\icted of any offence
    and sentences to imprisonment for not less than two years [other than any
    offence referred to in sub-section (1) or sub- section (2)) are classified
c   together and the period of disqualification prescribed for all of them is the
    same. All persons comicted of offences other than any offence referred to
    in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) and sentenced to imprisonment of not
    less than two years constitute one class and are governed by sub-section
    (3) prescribing the same period of disqualification for all of them. The
D   category of persons covered by sub-secti.ons (1), (2) and (3) being different
    and distinct; the question of comparison i11ter se between any two of these
    three distinct classes does not arise, without such a comparison between
   persons governed by these different sub- sections being permissible, the
   very basis of attack on the ground of discrimination is not available.
E Prescription of period of disqualification for different classes of persons
  ·convicted of different offences is within the domain of legislative discretion
   and wiodon;i, which is not open to judicial scrutiny.

           Classification of offence for certain purposes on the basis of the
    period of sentence is a well known method of classification. The First
F   Schedule to the Code of Criminal Procedure relates to Classification of
    Offences for purposes of cognizance, bail and trial, and therein the clas'
    sification of offences against laws other than the Indian Penal Code is made
    on the basis of the sentence prescribed for the offence. It is, therefore,
    clear that the mode of classification adopted in the different sub-sections
G   of Section 8' of R.P. Act is a well recognised mode of classification of
    offences. The legislature having wide discretion in the matter of classifica-
    tion and there being no arbitrariness reflected in the classification, the
    matter must end there .
                .   '
H          There is thus no merit in the challange to the constitutional validity
             RAGHBIRSINGHv. SURJITSINGH[VERMA,J.]                         771

of sub-section (3) of Section 8 of the R.P. Act. Consequently, the writ          A
petition is dismisaed which results in dismissal of the civil appeal also. The
appellant/petitioner will pay the costs to the respondents. Costs quantified
at Rs. 10,000 (Rupees ten thousand) only.

R.P.                                         Appeal and petition dismissed.