Supreme Court of India
RAGHBIR SINGH SEHRAWATversusSTATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS
- Citation
- 2011 INSC 816
- Decided
- 23 November 2011
- Disposal
- Appeal(s) allowed
- Bench
- G S SINGHVI
Holding
The acquisition was illegal because possession had not been taken and the Land Acquisition Collector failed to give a proper hearing, violating Section 5A(2) and the statutory procedure.
Summary
The appellant, a farmer, challenged the acquisition of his agricultural land by the State of Haryana, alleging that the statutory notices under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 were not properly published, he was denied a hearing, and that possession of his land was never actually taken because crops were standing at the time of the award. The High Court dismissed the writ petition on the basis that possession had been taken and the land vested in the State, but the Supreme Court found no evidence of actual possession and held that the revenue records showing paper possession were not legally valid. The Court also observed that the Land Acquisition Collector failed to serve notices to the appellant and his wife and forged signatures, thereby violating Section 5A(2) and the rules of natural justice. Applying precedents on the mode of taking possession, the Court concluded that where crops are standing, actual possession cannot be deemed taken without proper notice and physical takeover. Consequently, the acquisition was declared illegal, the impugned orders were set aside, and the appellant was awarded costs.
Issues considered
- Whether actual possession of the land was taken on the date of the award despite standing crops.
- Whether the Land Acquisition Collector complied with Section 5A(2) of the Land Acquisition Act by providing a fair hearing and proper notice.
- Whether the notifications under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) of the Land Acquisition Act were validly published.
- Whether the High Court erred in holding that paper possession sufficed to vest the land in the State under Section 16.
- Whether the acquisition should be quashed on account of procedural violations and denial of natural justice.
Legislation cited
- Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order 21 Rule 35, s. Order 21 Rule 36, s. Order 21 Rule 95, s. Order 21 Rule 96
- Land Acquisition Act, 1894s. 16, s. 17(3-A), s. 4(1), s. 5A(2), s. 6(1), s. 9(3)
Subjects
land acquisitionnatural justicepossessionnotificationSection 5Aagricultural landstatutory compliancecompensation
Judgment
[2011) 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R. 1113
RAGHBIR SINGH SEHRAWAT A
v.
STATE OF HARYANA AND OTHERS
(Civil Appeal Nos. 10080-10081 of 2011)
NOVEMBER 23, 2011
B
[G.S. SINGHVI AND SUDHANSU JYOTI .
MUKHOPADHAYA, JJ.]
Land Acquisition Act, 1894:
c
ss. 4(1), 6(1), 5A(2) and 9 - Acquisition of agricultural
land - Issuance of notification and declaration ulss. 4(1) and
6(1) - Passing of award by the Land Acquisition Collector -
Writ petition by the appellant-land owner challenging the
acquisition of land - On the ground of non-publication of 0
Notifications; not. given opportunity of hearing by the Laryd
Acquisition Collector; not served notice as per the mandate;
and that the possession of the land was still with him and the
paper possession taken by the respondents was
inconsequential - Writ petition dismissed by the High Court E
- On appeal, held: No evidence to show that actual
possession of the land on which the crop was standing had
been taken after giving notice to the_ appellant nor was he
present at the site when the possession of the acquired land
was delivered to the State Industrial Infrastructure
Development Corporation - Exercise undertaken by the F
respondents showing delivery of possession was farce and
inconsequential - Possession of the acquired land had not
been taken from the appellant on the day on which the award
was passed - Cr9ps were standing on several parcels of land
including the appellant's land and possession as such could G
not have been taken without giving notice to the landowners
- Also it was not possible to give notice to large number of
persons on the same day and take actual possession of land
comprised in various survey numbers - Thus, the record
1113 H
11T4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A prepared by the revenue authorities showing delivery of
possession of the acquired land to the Development
Corporation has no legal sanctity - High Court erred in
dismissing the writ petition on the specious ground that
possession of the acquired land had been taken and the
B same vested in the State Government in terms of s. 16 - More
so, the appellant was not given opportunity of hearing as per
the mandate of s.5A(2) - Thus, the acquisition of appellant's
land is illegal and is quashed - State directed to pay
appellant cost bf Rs. 2, 50, 0001- - Costs.
c Land acquisition - Approach of the State Government -
State and its instrumentalities resorting to massive acquisition
of agricultural land in the name of public purpose, without
complying with the mandate of the statute - Justification of -
Held: It is wholly unjust, arbitrary and unreasonable to deprive
D such persons of their houses/land/industry by way of
acquisition of land in the name of development of
infrastructure or industrialization - Before acquiring private
land the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities should, as
far as possible, use land belonging to the State for the
E specified public purposes - If the acquisition of private land
becomes absolutely necessary, then the authorities must
strictly comply with tf]e relevant statutory provisions and the
rules of natural justice.
F Appellant purchased certain land and is cultivating
the same. The State Government issued a Notification
under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act proposing
to acquire the land for industrial development. The
appellant filed an objection and pleaded that his land may
G not be acquired because it was an agricultural land and
was the only source of income. The Land Acquisition
Collector heard the objectors and made
recommendations for acquisition of some parcels of land
and for release of some parcels of land specified in the
H Notification. Thereafter, the declaration was issued under
RAGHBIR SINGH SEHRAWAT v. STATE OF 1115
HARYANA
Section 6(1) of the Act, notifying acquisition of lands. The A
Land Acquisition Collector passed an award on
28.11.2008. The appellant filed a writ petition challenging
the acquisition -of his land. He contended that the
Notifications issued under Section 4(1) and 6(1) of the Act
were not duly 'published; that he was hot given B.
opportunity of hearing by the Land Acquisition Collector;
that notice had not been served upon him as per the
mandate; and that the possession of the land was still
with him and the paper possession taken by the
respondents was inconsequential. The Division Bench of c
the High Court dismissed the writ petition. The review
petition filed by the appellant was also dismissed.
Therefore, the appellant filed the instant appeals.
Allowing the appeals, the Court
D
HELD: 1.1. In the writ petition filed by the appellant,
he categorically averred that physical possession of the
acquired land was with him and he has been cultivating
the same. This assertion finds support from the entries
contained in Girdawari/Record of cultivation (years 2001 E
to 2Q10). A reading of these entries shows that during
those years crops of wheat, paddy and chari were grown
by the appellant and the date on which possession of the
acquired land is said to have been taken and delivered
to Haryana State Industrial Infrastructure Development F
Corporation (HSllDC), paddy crop was standing on 5
Kanals 2 Marlas of land. The respondents did not question
the genuineness and correctness of the entries contained
in the Girdawaris. Therefore, there is no reason to
disbelieve or discard the same. That apart, it is neither the G
pleaded case of the respondents nor any evidence was
produced before this Court to show that the appellant had
unauthorisedly taken possession of the acquired land
after 28.11.2008 as also that the appellant had been given
H
1116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A notice that possession of the acquired land would be
taken on 28.11.2008 and he should remain present at the
site. Therefore, Rojnamcha Vakyati prepared by SK and
three Patwaris showing delivery of possession to Senior
Manager (IA), HSllDC, which is a self serving document,
.s cannot be made basis for recording a finding that
possession of the acquired land had been taken by the
concerned revenue authorities. The respondents did not
produce any other evidence to show that actual
possession of the land, on which crop was standing, had
c been taken after giving notice to the appellant or that he
was present at the site when possession of the acquired
land was delivered to the Senior Manager of HSllDC. It is
not even the case of the respondents that any
independent witness was present at the time of taking
0
possession of the acquired land. The Land Acquisition
Collector and his subordinates may claim credit of having
acted swiftly inasmuch as immediately after
pronouncement of the award, possession of the acquired
land of village 'J' is said to have taken from the
landowners and handed over to the officer of HSllDC but
E keeping in view the fact that crop was standing on the
land, the exercise undertaken by the respondents
showing delivery of possession cannot but be treated as
farce and inconsequential. If the High Court had
summoned the relevant records and scrutinized the
F same, it would not have summarily dismissed the writ
petition on the premise that possession of the acquired
land had been taken and the same vested in the State
Government. [Para 16] [1128-G-H; 1129-A-H; 1130-A-B]
G 1.2. Possession of the acquired land had not been
taken from the appellant on 28.11.2008, i.e. the day on
which the award was declared by the Land Acq!Jisition
Collector because crops were standing. on several
parcels of land including the appellant's land and
H
RAGHBIR SINGH SEHRAWAT v. STATE OF 1117
HARYANA
possession thereof could not have been taken without A
giving notice to the landowners. That apart, it was
humanly impossible to give notice to large number of
persons on the same day and take actual possession of
land comprised in various survey numbers (total
measuring 214 Acres 5 Kanals and 2 Marlas). The record , B
prepared by the revenue authorities showing delivery of
possession of the acquired land to HSllDC has no legal
sanctity and the High Court committed serious error by
dismissing the writ petition on the specious ground that
possession of the acquired land had been taken and the c
same vested in the State Government in terms of Section
16 of the Act. [Paras 19 and 20] [1133-G-H; 1134·-A-C]
Ba/want Narayan Bhagde v. M. D. Bhagwat (1976) 1 SCC
700: 1975 (0) Suppl. SCR 250; Banda Development
Authority, Banda v. Moti Lal Agarwal and Ors. (2011) 5 SCC D
394; Balmokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust v.
State of Punjab (1996) 4 SCC 212: 1996 (2) SCR 643; P. K.
Ka/burqi v. State of Karnataka (2005) 12 SCC 489; NTPC
Ltd. v Mahesh Dutta (2009) 8 SCC 339; Sita Ram Bhandar
Society v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi (2009) 10 SCC 501: 2009 E
(14) SCR 507; Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v.
Industrial Development and Investment Company (P) Limited
(1996) 11 SCC 501: 1996 (5) Suppl. SCR 551; Star Wire
(India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana (1996) 11 SCC 698 :1996 (9)
Suppl. SCR 158; C. Padma v. Deputy Secretary to the F
Government of Tamil Nadu (1997) 2 SCC 627: 1996 (9)
Suppl. SCR 158; Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah
Hyder Beig (2000) 2 SCC 48: 1999 (5) Suppl. SCR 197;
Swaika Properties (P) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan (2008) 4 SCC
695: 2008 (2) SCR 521; NTPC Limited v. Mahesh Dutta G
(2009) 8 sec 339 - referred to.
1.3. A careful scrutiny of record reveals that the Land
Acquisition Collector had fixed 29.10.2006 as the date for
hearing the objections. He issued notices dated 2.11.2006 H
1118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A to inform the objectors that hearing would take place on
29.11.2006 at 11 a.m. in P.W.D. Rest House and asked
them to appear either in person or through their agent.
The notices were delivered to some of the landowners,
who acknowledged the receipt thereof. However, the
B notices issued to the appellant and his wife were not
served upon them. This is evident from the fact that other
objectors had acknowledged the receipt of notices by
putting their signatures, the notices allegedly served
upon the appellant and his wife do not bear their
c signatures and no explanation has been offered by the
respondents about this omission. The Land Acquisition
Collector proceeded to decide the objections by
assuming that the notice has been delivered to all the
objectors. Someone in the office of Land Acquisition
0 Collector forged the appellant's signature to show his
presence in P.W.D. Rest House on 29.11.2006. A bare
comparison of the signatures appearing against the
appellant's name at serial No.90 (page 184 of the paper
book) and those appearing on the vakalatnama and
E affidavit filed in support of the special leave petitions
shows that there is no similarity in the two signatures. In
the list, appended with Annexure R-3, the appellant's wife
was shown as widow of RS'. It is impossible to believe
that a woman who knows how to sign a document would
put signatures against her name showing her as a widow
F despite the fact that her husband is alive. When the court
pointed out to the counsel for the respondents that the
signatures appearing against serial No. 90 did not tally
with the signatures of the appellant on the vakalatnama
and the affidavit filed in support of special leave petitions,
G the counsel expressed his inability to offer any
explanation. He also expressed helplessness in;
defending the description of the appellant's wife as
widow of 'RS'. [Para 22] [1135-E-H; 1136-A·E]
H Munshi Singh v. Union of India (1973) 2 SCC 337: 1973
RAGHBIR SINGH SEHRAWAT v. STATE OF 1119
HARYANA
(1) SCR 973; State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh (1980) 2 SCC A
471: 1980 (1) SCR 1071; Shyam Nandan Prasad v. State of
Bihar (1993) 4 SCC 255: 1993 (1) Suppl. SCR '533; Union
of India v. Mukesh Hans (2004) 8 SCC 14; Hindustan.
Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai (2005)
7 SCC 627: 2005 (3) Suppl. SCR 388 - referred to. B
1.4. The rules of natural justice have been ingrained
in the scheme of Section 5A of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 with a view to ensure that before any person is
deprived of his land by way of compulsory acquisition, C
he must get an opportunity to oppose the decision of the
State Government and/or its agencies/instrumentalities to
acquire the particular parcel of land. At the hearing, the
objector can make an effort to convince the Land
Acquisition Collector to make recommendation against
the acquisition of his land. He can also point out that land D
proposed to be acquired is not suitable for the purpose
specified in the Notification is~ued under Section 4(1 ).
Not only this, he can produce evidence to show that
another piece of land is available and the same can be
utilized for execution of the particular project or scheme. E
Though, it is neither possible nor desirable to make a list
of the grounds on which the landowner can persuade the
Collector to make recommendations against the
proposed acquisition of land, but what is important is that
the Collector should give a fair opportunity of hearing to F
the objector and objectively consider his plea· against the
acquisition of land. Only thereafter, he shoul~ make
recommendations supported by brief reasons as to why
the particular piece of land should or should not be
acquired and whether or not the plea put forward by the · G
objector merits acceptance. The recommendations made
by the Collector must reflect objective application of mind
to the objections filed by the landowners and other
interested persons. [Paras 25) [1138-E-H; 1139-A-B]
H
1120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A 1.5. It if difficult, if not impossible, to appreciate as to
why the State and its instrumentalities resort to massive
acquisition of land and that too without complying with
the mandate of the statute. The National Commission of
Farmers have noted that the acquisition of agricultural
B land in the name of planned development or industrial
growth would seriously affect the availability of food in
future. After independence, the administrative apparatus
of the State has not spent ~nough investment in the rural
areas and those who have been doing agriculture have
.....
v
not been educated and empowered to adopt alternative
sources of livelihood. If land of such persons is acquired,
not only the current but the future generations are ruined
and this is one of the reasons why the farmers who are
deprived of their holdings commit suicide. It also appears
that the concerned authorities are totally unmindful of the
0
plight of those sections of the society, who are deprived
of their only asset like small house, small industrial unit
etc. They do not realise that having one's own house is
a lifetime dream of majority of population of this country.
Economically affluent class of society can easily afford
to have one or more houses at any place or locality in the
country but other sections of the society find it extremely
difficult to purchase land and construct house. Majority
of people spend their lifetime savings for building a small
house so that their families may be able to live with a
F semblance of dignity. Therefore, it is wholly unjust,
arbitrary and unreasonable to deprive such persons of
their houses by way of the acquisition of land in the name
of development of infrastructure or industrialisation.
Similarly, some people set up small industrial unit after
G seeking permission from the competent authority. They
do so with the hope of generating additional income for
their family. If the land on which small units are·
· established is acquired, their hopes are shattered.
Therefore, before acquiring private land the State and/or
H
RAGHBIR SINGH SEHRAWAT v. STATE OF 1121
HARYANA
its agencies/instrumentalities should, as far as possible, A
use land belonging to the State for the specified public
purposes. If the acquisition of private land becomes
absolutely necessary, then too, the concerned authorities
must strictly comply with the relevant statutory provisions
and the rules of natural justice. [Para 26] [1139-F-H; 1140- B
A-E]
1.6. The impugned orders are set as,ide. The writ
petition filed by the appellant is allowed and the
acquisition of his land is declared illegal and quashed.
The appellant would get cost of Rs. 2,50,000/- from the
c
respondents. [Para 27] [1140-F-G]
Case Law Reference:
1996 (5) Suppl. SCR 551 Referred to. Para 11
D
1996 (9) Suppl. SCR 158 Referred to. Para 11
1996 (9) Suppl. SCR 158 Referred to. Para 11
1999 (5) Suppl. SCR 197 Referred to. Para 11
E
2008 (2) SCR 521 Referred to. Para 11
(2009) 8 sec 339 Referred to. Para 12
1975 (0) Suppl. SCR 250 Referred to. Para 17
c2011) 5 sec 394 Referred to. Para 18 F
1996 (2) SCR 643 Referred to. Para 18
(2005) 12 sec 489 Referred to. Para 18
2009 (14) SCR 507 Referred to. Para 18 G
1973 (1) SCR 973 Referred to. Para 23
1980 (1) SCR 1071 Referred to. Para 23
1993 (1) Suppl. SCR 533 Referred to. Para 23
H
1122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A (2004) 8 sec 14 Referred to. Para 24
2005 (3) Suppl. SCR 388 Referred to. Para 24
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.
10080-10081 of 2011.
B
From the Judgment & Order dated 17.5.2010 of the High
Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil Writ Petition
No. 8441 of 2009 along with final order dated 19.11.2010 in
Review Application No. 321 of 2010 in Civil Writ Petition No.
C 8441 of 2009.
Neeraj Kr. Jain, Amit Singh, Dr. Kailash Chand for the
Appellant.
Ravindra Sana for the Respondent.
D
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
G.S. SINGHVI, J. 1. Delay condoned.
2. Leave granted.
E
3. More than 16 decades ago, John Stuart Mill wrote: "land
differs from other elements of production, labour and capital in
not being susceptible to infinite increase. Its extent is limited
and the extent of the more productive kinds of it more limited
F still. It is also evident that the quantity of produce capable of
being raised on any given piece of land is not indefinite. These
limited quantities of land, and limited productiveness of it, are
the real limits to the increase of production".
4. In 1947, the first Prime Minister of India Pt. Jawahar Lal
G . Nehru said "everything else can wait, but not agriculture". In its
fifth and final report, the National Commission on Farmers
headed by Dr. M.S. Swaminathan observed that prime farmland
must be conserved for agriculture and should not be diverted
for. non-agricultural purposes, else it would seriously affect
H,
RAGHBIR SINGH SEHRAWAT v. STATE OF 1123
HARYANA [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
availability of food in the country where 60% population still A
depends on agriculture and people living below poverty line are
finding it difficultto survive.
5. Unfortunately, these words of wisdom appear to have
become irrelevant for the State apparatus which has used the
8
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, 'the Act') in last two
decades for massive acquisition of the agricultural land in
different parts of the country, which has not only adversely
impacted the farmers, but also generated huge litigation
adjudication consumes substantial time of the Courts. These C
appeals filed against orders dated 17.5.2010 and 19.11.2010
of the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court is
one of many such cases which the landowners are compelled
to file with the hope that by Court's intervention they will be able
to save their land.
D
6; The appellant purchased 8 Kanals 4 Marlas land in
village Jatheri, District Sonepat in 1984 and is cultivating the
same. He claims to have constructed a boundary wall and is
growing different crops. His land is surrounded by agricultural
fields, factories and residential houses. In the south of his land, E
there is a canal and a school.
7.. By Notification dated 22.6.2006 issued under Section
4(1) of the Act, the Government of Haryana proposed the
acquisition of 3813 Kanals 17 Marlas (476 Acres 5 Kanals 17
Marlas) land situated at villages Badhmalik, Badkhalsa, Jatheri, F
Liwan, Pritampura and Rai, Tehsil and District Sonepat for the
development of Industrial Sector 38, Sonepat. The appellant
filed objections under Section 5A(1) and pleaded that his land
may not be acquired because the same was being used for
agricultural purposes and was the only source of income for his G
family. The other landowners also submitted their respective
objections. District Revenue Officer-cum-Land Acquisition
Collector, Sonepat (for short, 'the.Land Acquisition Collector')
is said to have heard the objectors on 29.10.2006 and made
H
1124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A recommendations for the acquisition of some parcels of land
and for release of some other parcels of land specified in
Notification dated 22.6.2006. Thereafter, the State Government
issued declaration under Section 6 (1 }, which was notified on
20.6.2007 for the acquisition of 216 Acres 7 Kanals and 11
B Marlas land. As a sequel to this, the Land Acquisition Collector
passed award dated 28.11.2008.
8. The appellant challenged the acquisition of his land in
Writ Petition No.8441 of 2009 on several grounds including the
following:
c
(i) that the notification issued under Section 4(1) had
not been published as per the requirement of the
statute,
0 (ii) that he was not given opportunity of hearing in terms
of Section 5A(2),
(iii) that land of large number of persons had been
excluded from acquisition at the stage of Section
6 declaration but his land was not released and, in
E this manner, he had been discriminated,
(iv) that there was no justification to acquire his land,
which was the only source of livelihood for him and
his family,
F
(v) that he was not served with notice in terms of
Section 9 (3), and I
(vi) that the declaration issued under Section 6(1) was
not published as per the requirement of Section
G 6(3).
9. In the written statement filed on behalf of the
respondents, it was averred that the notifications issued under
Sections 4(1) and 6(1) were duly published; that the appellant
H was given opportunity of personal hearing and that after issue
RAGHBIR SINGH SEHRAWAT v. STATE OF 1125
HARYANA [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
of declaration under Section 6(1), the Land Acquisition Collector A
. passed the award. It was furt~er averred that possession of the
acquired land had been taken and delivered to Haryana State
Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation (HSllDC) on
28.11.2008.
B
10. The appellant filed rejoinder affidavit and reiterated that
the notifications issued under Sections 4( 1) and 6( 1) had not
been duly published; that he was not given opportunity of
hearing by the Land Acquisition Collector; that notice had not
been served upon him as per the mandate of Section 9(3). He
also pleaded that possession of land was still with him and the C
paper possession taken by the respondents was
inconsequential.
11. The Division Bench of the High Court did not examine
the grounds on which the appellant challenged the acquisition D
of his land and dismissed the writ petition by relying upon the
judgments of this Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater
Bombay v. Industrial Development and Investment Company
(P) Limited (1996) 11 SCC 501, Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State
of Haryana (1996) 11 SCC 698, C. Padma v. Deputy E
Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu (1997) 2 SCC
627, Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig
(2000) 2 SCC 48 and Swaika Properties (P) Ltd. v. State of
Rajasthan (2008) 4 SCC 695, wherein it has been held that
once the award is passed and possession taken, the acquired F
land will be deemed to have vested in the Government and the
High Court cannot entertain the writ petition filed for quashing
the acquisition proceedings.
12. The appellant challenged the order of the High Court
in SLP(C) No.26631 of 201 Obut withdrew the same with liberty G
to seek review bf the impugned order. Thereafter, he filed
M.eview Application No.321 of 2010. He relied upon the
judgment of this Court in NTPC Limited v. Mahesh Dutta (2009)
8 sec 339 and pleaded that possession of the acquired land
H
1126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A cannot be treated to have been taken because the procedure
laid down in Order XXI Rule 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure
had not been followed. He also pleaded that paper possession
taken by the respondents does not have any sanctity in the eye
of law and physical possession of land was still with him. The
B Division Bench rejected the review application by observing
that the order dismissing the writ petition does not suffer from
any error apparent. However, the date of filing the writ petition
mentioned in paragraph (1) of order dated 17.5.2010 was
corrected from 27.3.2010 to 27.3.2009.
c 13. Shri Neeraj Jain, learned senior counsel for the
appellant argued that the view taken by the High Court on the
issue of maintainability of the writ petition is clearly erroneous
and the impugned orders are liable to be set aside because
possession taken by the respondents was only on papers and
D the same did not result in vesting of land in the State
Government. Learned senior counsel further argued that the
acqllisitfon of the appellant's land is liable to be quashed
because the Land Acquisition Collector had made
recommendations under Section 5A(2) without giving him
E opportunity of hearing. He submitted that the official to whom
the Land Acquisition Collector had entrusted the task of serving
the notice had not performed his duty and submitted false
report showing delivery of notice to the appellant and his wife.
Shri Jain referred to the typed and xerox copies of notices
F dated 2.11.2006 issued to S/Shri Madan Lal s/o. Shri Jagdish,
Ram Singh s/o. Chhote Lal, Jai Bhagwan s/o. of Hoshiar Singh,
Mukhtar Singh s/o. Lakhi Ram, Rajender Singh s/o. Hoshiar
Singh, Mohinder Singh s/o. Swarup Singh, the appellant and
his wife Smt. Moorti Devi and pointed out that while other
G addressees acknowledged the receipt of notices by putting
their signatures, the notices shown as duly served upon the
appellant and his wife do not contain their signatures
acknowledging the receipt thereof. Learned senior counsel
also invited our attention to Annexure R-3 filed with the counter
H affidavit of the respondents to show that the name of the
RAGHBIR SINGH SEHRAWAT v. STATE OF 1127
HARYANA [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
. appellant's wife has been shown as Moorti Devi widow of A
Raghbir though he is very much alive. He then pointed out that
the signatures appended against the appellant's name in the
list of objectors, who are said to have appeared before the
Land Acquisition Collector on 29.10.2006 are not that of the
appellant and someone had forged the signatures to show his 8
presence. Learned senior counsel submitted that notice under
Section 9(3) was not served upon the appellant before passing
of award dated 28.11.2008 and physical possession of the
acquired land is still with him. In support of this argument, Shri
Jain relied upon the entries contained in the copy of Girdawari/ C
Record of cultivation of village Jatheri, Tehsil and District
Sonepat for the years 2001 to 2010, which have been placed
on record as Annexure P-20. Learned senior counsel
emphasized that the High Court failed to notil-e that the
. respondents had prepared false record showing delivery of
possession of the acquired land to HSllDC and this has caused D
serious prejudice to the appellant. In the end, Shri Jain argued
that release of more than 50% of la11d proposed to be acquired
is clearly indicative of total non-application of mind by the
concerned functionaries of the State and the entire exercise
undertaken by them for the acquisition of land is liable to be E
nullified on the ground of violation of the mandate of Sections
4, SA, 6 and 9 of the Act and, in any case, there is no
justification for uprooting persons like the appellant, whose
livelihood is dependent on small parcels of land or who have
constructed residential houses or have set up small industrial F
units by spending lifetime earnings.
14. Learned counsel for the respondents supported the
impugned orders and argued that even though the appellant
may not have been given opportunity of personal hearing by the G
Land Acquisition Collector, he cannot question the acquisition
proceedings because possession of the acquired land has
already been taken by the competent authority and handed over
to HSllDC. Learned counsel submitted that minor discrepancies
in the list containing signatures of the objectors, who appeared
H
1128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A before the Land Acquisition Collector on 29.10.2006, cannot
lead to an inference that the concerned officer had not given
opportunity of personal hearing to the appellant and his wife.
He further submitted that the Land Acquisition Collector had
made recommendations after giving due opportunity of hearing
8 to the objectors and the declaration under Section 6(1) was
issued by the State Government after duly considering the
recommendations of the Land Acquisition Collector and this is
evinced from the fact that various parcels of land on which
residential houses and factories were existing on the date of
C Section 4(1) notification were not included in the declaration
issued under Section 6(1 ). Learned counsel invited our
attention to Part Layout Plan of Sector 38 (Phase II), which has
been placed on record as Annexure R-1 along with affidavit
dated 12.8.2011 of Shri Yogesh Mohan Mehra, Senior Manager
(IA), HSllDC to show that the acquired land has already been
D utilised for development of industrial estate and plots have been
allotted to entrepreneurs, who are desirous of setting up
industries. He submitted that HSllDC has taken up development
of the acquired land at an estimated cost of rupees fifty eight
crores and submitted that the acquisition of the appellant's land
E may not be quashed at this stage because 24 meter wide road
has already been constructed through his land.
15. We have considered the respective submissions and
carefully scrutinized the record.
F 16. Since the appellant has been non suited by the High
Court only on the ground that possession of the acquired land
had been taken by the concerned officers and the same will
be deemed to have vested in the State Government free from
all encumbrances, we think that it will be appropriate to first
G consider this facet of his challenge to the impugned orders. In
the writ petition filed by him, the appellant categorically averred
that physical possession of the acquired land was with him and
he has been cultivating the same. This assertion finds support
from the entries contained in Girdawari/Record of cultivation,
H
RAGHBIR SINGH SEHRAWAT v. STATE OF 1129
HARYANA [G.S .. SINGHVI, J.]
Book No.1, village Jatheri, Tehsil and District Sonepat (years A
2001 to 2010). A reading of these entries shows that during
those years crops of wheat, paddy and chari were grown by
the appellant and at the relevant time, i.e. the date on which
possession of the acquired land is said to have been taken and
delivered to HSllDC, paddy crop was standing on 5 Kanals 2 B
Marlas of land. The respondents have not questioned the
genuineness and correctness of the entries contained in the
Girdawaris. Therefore, there is no reason to disbelieve or
discard the same. That apart, it is neither the pleaded case of
the respondents nor any evidence has been produced before c
this Court to show that the appellant had unauthorisedly taken
possession of the acquired land after 28, 11.2008. It is also not
the pleaded case of the respondents that the appellant had been
given notice that possession of the acquired land would be
taken on 28.11.2008 and he should remain present at the site. 0
Therefore; Rojnamcha Vakyati prepared by Sadar Kanungo
and three Patwaris showing delivery of possession to Shri
Yogesh Mohan Mehra, Senior Manager (IA), HSllDC, Rai, which
is a self serving document, cannot be made basis for recording
a finding that possession of the acquired land had been taken
E
by the concerned revenue authorities. The respondents have
not produced any other evidence to show that actual
possession of the land, on which crop was standing, had been
taken after giving notice to the appellant or that he was present
at the site when possession of the acquired land was delivered
to the Senior Manager of HSllDC. Indeed, it is not even the case F
of the respondents that any independent witness was present
at the time of taking possession of the acquired land. The Land
Acquisition Collector and his subordinates may claim credit of
having acted swiftly inasmuch as immediately after
pronouncement of the award, possession of the acquired land G
of village Jatheri is said to have taken. from the landowners and
handed over to the officer of HSllDC but keeping in view the
fact that crop was standing on the land, the exercise undertaken
by the respondents showing delivery of possession cannot but
be treated as farce and inconsequential. We have no doubt that H
1130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A if the High Court had summoned the relevant records and
scrutinized the same, it would not have summarily dismissed
the writ petition on the premise that possession of the acquired
land had been taken and the same vested in the State
Government.
8
17. The legality of the mode and manner of taking
possession of the acquired land h<:as been considered in a
number of cases. In Ba/want Narayan Bhagde v. M. D.
Bhagwat (1976) 1 SCC 700, Untwalia, J. referred to provisions
of Order 21 Rules 35, 36, 95 and 96 of the Code of Civil
C Procedure and opined that delivery of symbolic possession
should be construed as delivery of actual possession of the
right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor. His Lordship
further observed that if the property is land over which there is
no building or structure, then delivery of possession over the
D judgment-debtor's property becomes complete and effective
against him the moment the delivery is effected by going upon
the land. The learned Judge went on to say:
"When a public notice is published at a convenient place
E or near the land to be taken stating that the Government
intends to take possession of the land, then ordinarily and
generally there should be no question of resisting or
impeding the taking of possession. Delivery or giving of
possession by the owner or the occupant of the land is not
F required. The Collector can enforce the surrender of the
land to himself under Section 47 of the Act if impeded in
taking possession. On publication of the notice under
Section 9(1) claims to compensation for all interests in the
land has to be made; be it the interest of the owner or of
a person entitled to the occupation of the land. On the
G
taking of possession of the land under Section 16 or 17(1)
it vests absolutely in the Government free from all
enc.umbrances. It is, therefore, clear that taking of
possession within the meaning of Section 16 or 17(1)
means taking of possession on the spot. It is neither a
H
RAGHBIR S1NGH SEHRAWAT v. STATE OF 1131
HARYANA [G.S. SINGHVl, J.]
possession on paper nor a 'symbolical' possession as A
generally understood in civil law. But the question is what
is the mode of taking possession? The Act is silent on the
point. Unless possession is takeri by the written agreement
of the party concerned the mode of taking possession
obviously would be for the authority to go upon the land and 8
to do some act which would indicate that the authority has
taken possession of the land. It may be in the form of a
declaration by beat of drum or otherwise or by hanging a
written declaration on the spot that the authority has taken
possession of the land. The presence of the owner or the C
occupant of the land to effectuate the taking of possession
is not necessary. No further notice beyond that under
Section 9(1) of the Act is required. When possession has
been taken, the owner or the occupant of the land is
dispossessed. Once possession has been taken the land D
vests in the Government."
Bhagwati, J. (as he then was) and Gupta, J., who
constituted the majority did not agree with Untwalia, J. and
observed as under :
E
"We think it is enough to state that when the Government
proceeds to take possession of the land acquired by it
under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, it must take actual
possession of the land, since all interests in the land are
sought to be acquired by it. There can be no question of F
taking 'symbolical' possession in the sense understood by
judicial decisions under the Code of Civil Procedure. Nor
would possession merely on paper be enough. What the
Act contemplates as a necessary condition of vesting of
the land in the Government is the taking of actual G
possession of the land. How such possession may be
taken would depend on the nature of the land. Such
possession would have to be taken as the nature of the
land admits of. There can be no hard-and-fast rule laying
down what act would b_e sufficient to constitute taking of
possession of land. We should not, therefore, be taken as H
1132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A laying down an absolute and inviolable rule that merely
going on the spot and making a declaration by beat of
dtum or otherwise would be sufficient to constitute taking
of possession of land in every case. But here, in our
opinion, since the land was lying fallow and there was no
crop on it at the material time, the act of the Tahsildar in
B
going on the spot and inspecting the land for the purpose
of determining what part was waste and arable and should,
therefore, be taken possession of and determining its
extent, was sufficient to constitute taking of possession. It
appears that the appellant was not present when this was
c done by the Tahsildar, but the presence of the owner or
the occupant of the land is not necessary to effectuate the
taking of possession. It is also not strictly necessary as a
matter of legal requirement that notice should be given to
the owner or the occupant of the land that possession
D would be taken at a particular time, though it may be
desirable where possible, to give such notice before
possession is taken by the authorities, as that would
eliminate the possibility of any fraudulent or collusive
transaction of taking of mere paper possession, without
E the occupant or the owner ever coming to know of it."
18. In Banda Development Authority, Banda v. Moti Lal
Agarwal and others (2011) 5 SCC 394, the Court referred to
the judgments in Ba/want Narayan Bhagde v. M. D. Bhagwat
F (supra), Balmokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust v.
State of Punjab (1996) 4 SCC 212, P.K. Kalburqi v. State of
Karnataka (2005) 12 SCC 489, NTPC Ltd. v. Mahesh Dutta
(supra), Sita Ram Bhandar Society v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi
(2009) 10 sec 501 and culled out the following propositions:
G "(i) No hard-and-fast rule can be laid down as to what act
would constitute taking of possession of the acquired land.
(ii) If the acquired land is vacant, the act of the State
authority concerned to go to the spot and prepare a
H
RAGHBIR SINGH SEHRAWAT v. STATE OF 1133
HARYANA [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
panchnama will ordinarily be treated as sufficient to A
constitute taking of possession.
(iit) If crop is standing on the acquired land or building/
structure exists, mere going on the spot by the authority
concerned will, by itself, be not sufficient for taking 8
possession. Ordinarily, in such cases, the authority
concerned will have to give notice to the occupier of the
building/structure or the person who has cultivated the land
and take possession in the presence of independent
witnesses and get their signatures on the panchnama. Of C
course, refusal of the owner of the land or building/structure
may not lead to an inference that the possession of the
acquired land has no! been taken.
(iv) If the acquisition is of a large tract of land, it may not
be possible for the acquiring/designated authority to take D
physical possession of each and every parcel of the land
and it will be sufficient that symbolic possession is taken
by preparing appropriate document in the presence of
independent witnesses and getting their signatures on such
document. E
(v) If beneficiary of the acquisition is an agency/
instrumentality of the State and 80% of the total
compensation is deposited in terms of Section 17(3-A)
and substantial portion of the acquired land has been
F
utilised in furtherance of the particular public purpose, then
the court may reasonably presume that possession of the
acquired land has been taken."
19. If the appellant's case is examined in the light of the
propositions culled out in Banda Development Authority, Banda G
v. Moti Lal Agarwal and others, we have no hesitation to hold
that possession of the acquired land had not been taken from
the appellant on 28.11.2008, i.e. the day on which the award
was declared by the Land Acquisition Collector because crops
were standing on several parcels of land including the H
1134 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A appellant's land and possession thereof could not have been
taken without giving notice to the landowners. That apart, it was
humanly impossible to give notice to large number of persons
on the same day and take actual possession of land comprised
in various survey numbers (.otal measuring 214 Acres 5
B Kanals and 2 Marlas).
20. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the record
prepared by the revenue authorities showing delivery of
possession of the acquired land to HSllDC has no legal sanctity
C and the High Court committed serious error by dismissing the
writ petition on the specious ground that possession of the
acquired land had been taken and the same vested in the State
Government in terms of Section 16.
21. The judgments on which reliance has been placed in
D the impugned order are clearly distinguishable. In Municipal
Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Industrial Development
and Investment Company (P) Limited (supra), this Court
reversed the judgment of the Bombay High Court which had
quashed the acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act,
E 1894 read with the provisions of Maharashtra Regional and
Town Planning Act, 1966. This Court noted that the respondent
had approached the High Court after a gap of four years' and
held:
"It is thus well-settled law that when there is inordinate delay
F in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the
acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court
should be loath to quash the notifications. The High Court
has, no doubt, discretionary powers under Article 226 of
the Constitution to quash the notification under Section 4(1)
G and declaration under Section 6. But it should be exercised
taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration.
When the award was passed and possession was taken,
the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the
award which is a material factor to be taken into
H consideration before exercising the power under Article
RAGHBIR SINGH SEHRAWAT v, STATE OF 1135
HARYANA [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
226. The fact that no third party rights were created in the A
case is hardly a ground for interference. The Division
Bench of the High Court was not right in interfering with
the discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge
dismissing the writ petition on the ground of !aches."
B
Similar view was expressed in C. Padma v. Deputy
Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu (supra), Star Wire
(India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana (supra), Municipal Council,
Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig (supra) and Swaika
Properties (P) Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan (supra). In all the
cases, challenge to the acquisition proceedings was negatived C
primarily on the ground of delay. An additional factor which
influenced this Court was that physical possession of the
acquired land had been taken by the concerned authorities. In
none of these cases, the landowners appear to have
questioned the legality of the mode adopted by the concerned D
authorities for taking possession of the acquired land.
Therefore, these judgments cannot be relied upon for sustaining
the High Court's negation of the appellant's challenge to the
acquisition of his land.
E
22. The next issue which merits consideration is whether
the acquisition of the appellant's land is vitiated due to violation
of Section 5A(2) and the rules of natural justice. A careful
scrutiny of record reveals that the Land Acquisition Collector
had fixed 29.10.2006 as the date for hearing the objections. F
He issued notices dated 2.11.2006 to inform the objectors that
hearing will take place on 29.11.2006 at 11 a.m. in P.W.D. Rest
House, Rai and asked them to appear either in person or
through their agent. The notices were delivered to some of the
landowners, who acknowledged the receipt thereof. However, G
the notices issued to the appellant and his wife were not served
upon them. This is evident from the fact that other objectors had
acknowledged the receipt of notices by putting their signatures,
the notices allegedly served upon the appellant and his wife do
not bear their signatures and no explanation-has been offered H
1136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A by the respondents about this omission. The Land Acquisition
Collector proceeded to decide the objections by assuming that
the notice has been delivered to all the objectors. Not only this,
someone in the office of Land Acquisition Collector forged the
appellant's signature to show his presence in P.W .D. Rest
B House, Rai on 29.11.2006. A bare comparison of the
signatures appearing against the appellant's name at serial
No.90 (page 184 of the paper book) and those appearing on
the vakalatnama and affidavit filed in support of the special
leave petitions shows that there is no similarity in the two
c signatures. Not only this, in the list, appended with Annexure
R-3, the appellant's wife has been shown as widow of Raghbir
Singh. It is impossible to believe that a woman who knows how
to sign a document would put signatures against her name
showing her as a widow despite the fact that her husband is
alive. When the Court pointed out to the learned counsel for
0
the respondents that the signatures appearing against serial
No. 90 at page 8 of Annexure R-3 (page 184 of the paper book)
do not tally with the signatures of the appellant on the
vakalatnama and the affidavit filed in support of special leave
petitions, the learned counsel expressed his inability to offer any
E explanation. He also expressed helplessness in defending the
description of the appellant's wife Smt. Moorti Devi as widow
of Raghbir Singh.
23. From what we have stated above, it is clear that the
F appellant had not been given opportunity of hearing as per the
mandate of Section 5A(2). The importance of Section 5A(2)
was highlighted by this Court in Munshi Singh v. Union of India
(1973) 2 sec 337 in the following words:
"Sub-section (2) of Section 5-A makes it obligatory on the
G
Collector to give an objector an opportunity of being heard.
After hearing all objections and making further inquiry he
is to make a report to the appropriate Government
containing his recommendation on the objections. The
decision of the appropriate Government on the objections
H
RAGHBIR SINGH SEHRAWAT v. STATE OF 1137
HARYANA [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
is then finai. The declaration under Section 6 has to be A
made after the appropriate Government is satisfied, on a
consideration of the report, if any, made by the Collector
under Section 5-A(2). The legislature has, therefore, made
complete provisions for the persons interested to file
objections against the proposed acquisition and for the B
disposal of their objections. It is only in cases of urgency
that special powers have been conferred on the
appropriate Government to dispense with the provisions
of Section 5-A.
In State of Punjab v. Gurdia/ Singh (1980) 2 SCC 471, C
this Court observed:
".... it is fundamental that compulsory taking of a man's
property is a serious matter and the smaller the man the
more serious the matter. Hearing him before depriving him D
is both reasonable and pre~emptive of arbitrariness, and
denial of this administrative fairness is constitutional
anathema except for good reasons. Save in real urgency
where public interest does not brook even the minimum
time needed to give a hearing land acquisition authorities E
should not, having regard to Articles 14 (and 19); burke
an enquiry under Section 17 of the Act. Here a slumbering
process, pending for years and suddenly exciting itself into
immediate forcible taking, makes a travesty of emergency
power." F
In Shyam Nandan Prasad v. State of Bihar (1993) 4 SCC
255, this Court reiterated that compliance with provisions of
Section SA is sine qua non for valid acquisition and observed
as under:
G
"The decision of the Collector is supposedly final unless
the appropriate Government chooses to interfere therein
and cause affectation, suo motu or on the application of
any person interested in the land. These requirements H
1138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A obviously lead to the positive conclusion that the
proceeding before the Collector is a blend of public and
individual enquiry. The person interested, or known to be
interested, in the land is to be served personally of the
notification, giving him the opportunity of objecting to the
B acquisition and awakening him to such right. That the
objection is to be in writing, is indicative of the fact that
the enquiry into the objection is to focus his individual
cause as well as public cause. That at the time of the
enquiry, for which prior notice shall be essential, the
c objector has the right to appear in person or through
pleader and substantiate his objection by evidence and
argument."
24. The same view has been reiterated in Union of India
v. Mukesh Hans (2004) 8 SCC 14, Hindustan Petroleum
D Corporation Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai (2005) 7 SCC 627,
Anand Singh v. State of U.P. (supra) and Radhy Shyam v.
State of U. P. (supra).
25. In this context, it is necessary to remember that the rules
E of natural justice have been ingrained in the scheme of Section
5A with a view to ensure that before any person is deprived of
his land by way of compulsory acquisition, he must get an
opportunity to oppose the decision of the State Government
and/or its agencies/instrumentalities to acquire the particular
F parcel of land. At the hearing, the objector can make an effort
to convince the Land Acquisition Collector to make
recommendation against the acquisition of his land. He can also
point out that land proposed to be acquired is not suitable for
the purpose specified in the notification issued under Section
G 4(1). Not only this, he can produce evidence to show that
another piece of land is available and the same can be utilized
for execution of the particular project or scheme. Though, it is
neither possible nor desirable to make. a list of the grounds on
which the landowner can persuade the Collector to make
recommendations against the proposed acquisition of land, but
H
RAGHBIR SINGH SEHRAWAT v. STATE OF 1139
HARYANA [G.S. SINGHVI, J.]
what is important is that the Collector should give a fair A
opportunity of hearing to the objector and objectively consider
his plea against the acquisition of land. Only thereafter, he
should make recommendations supported by brief reasons as
to why the particular piece of land should or should not be
acquired and whether or not the plea put forward by the objector 8
merits acceptance. In other words, the recommendations made
by the Collector must reflect objective application of mind to the
objections filed by the landowners and other interested persons.
26. Before concluding, we deem it necessary to observe
that in recent past, various State Governments and their C
functionaries have adopted very casual approach in dealing with
matters relating to the acquisition of land in general and the rural
areas in particular and in a large number of cases, the
notifications issued under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) with or without
the aid of Section 17 and the consequential actions have been D
nullified by the Courts on the ground of violation of the
mandatory procedure and the rules of natural justice. The
disposal of cases filed by the landowners and others take some
time and the resultant delay has great adverse impact on
implementation of the projects of public importance. Of course, E
the delay in deciding such cases may not be of much
significance when the State and its agencies want to confer
benefit upon private parties by acquiring land in the name of
public purpose. It if difficult, if not impossible, to appreciate as
to why the State and its instrumentalities resort to massive F
acquisition of land and that too without complying with the
mandate of the statute. As noted by the National Commission
on Farmers,.the acquisition of agricultural land in the name of
planned development or industrial growth would seriously affect
the availability of food in future. After independence, the G
administrative apparatus of the State has not spent enough
investment in the rural areas and those who have been doing
agriculture have not been educated and empowered to adopt
alternative sources of livelihood. If land of such persons is
acquired, not only the current but the future generations are H
1140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 14 (ADDL.) S.C.R.
A ruined and this is one of the reasons why the farmers who are
deprived of their holdings commit suicide. It also appears that
the concerned authorities are totally unmindful of the plight of
those sections of the society, who are deprived of their only
asset like smaH house, small industrial unit etc. They do not
8 realise that having one's own house is a lifetime dream of
majority of population of this country. Economically affluent class
of society can easily afford to have one or more houses at any
place or local.ity in the country but other sections of the society
find it extremely difficult to purchase land and construct house.
C Majority of people spend their lifetime savings for building a
small house so that their families may be able to live with a
semblance of dignity. Therefore, it is wholly unjust, arbitrary and
unreasonable to deprive such persons of their houses by way
of the acquisition of land in the name of development of
infrastructure or industrialisation. Similarly, some people set up
D small industrial unit after seeking permission from the
competent authority. They do so with the hope of generating
additional income for their family. If the land on which small units
are established is acquired, their hopes are shattered.
Therefore, before acquiring private land the State and/or its
E agencies/instrumentalities should, as far as possible, use land
belonging to the State for the specified public purposes. If the
acquisition of private land becomes absolutely necessary, then
too, the concerned authorities must strictly comply with the
relevant statutory provisions and the rules of natural justice.
F
27. In the result, the appeals are allowed. The impugned
orders are set aside. As a corollary to this, the writ petition filed
by the appellant is allowed and the acquisition of his land is
declared illegal and quashed. The appellant shall get cost of
G Rs.2,50,000/- from the respondents.
N.J. Appeals allowed.
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