Holding

A purchaser who acquires property after the institution of arbitration proceedings and after the award, which is a deemed decree, is a transferee pendente lite/post‑arbitral‑award purchaser and, under Order XXI Rule 102 of the CPC, cannot resist execution of the award.

Summary

The dispute arose from a sale of cotton bales between CCI and M/s Lakshmi Ganesh Textiles Ltd, which led to an arbitral award for recovery of money in 2001. The award was challenged but the challenge was dismissed in 2013. Subsequently, ICICI Bank, as a secured creditor, attached the debtor's properties under the SARFAESI Act and an execution petition was filed in 2019. While the execution was pending, the debtor company sold one of the attached properties to the appellant, the mother of the company's managing director, by a deed dated 23‑04‑2015. The appellant claimed ownership and sought removal of the attachment, arguing that the sale was for consideration and without notice of the pending award. The Supreme Court held that the sale occurred after the arbitration proceedings were instituted and after the award became a deemed decree, making the appellant a transferee pendente lite/post‑arbitral‑award purchaser barred by Order XXI Rule 102 of the CPC from resisting execution. Consequently, the appellant’s claim petition was dismissed and the appeal was rejected.

Issues considered

Whether the sale of the property to the appellant was made without notice of the existing liability arising from the arbitral award.
Whether the appellant, having purchased the property after the institution of arbitration proceedings and after the award, qualifies as a transferee pendente lite/post‑arbitral‑award purchaser and is therefore barred by Order XXI Rule 102 of the CPC from resisting execution.
Whether execution of a money award can attach property that has been transferred to a third‑party purchaser after the award.

Legislation cited

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996s. Section 34, s. Section 36
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908s. Order XXI Rule 102, s. Rule 100, s. Rule 101, s. Rule 92(3), s. Rule 98, s. Section 47
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002
Transfer of Property Act, 1882s. Section 52

Headnote

Issue for Consideration Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the sale in favour of the Appellant was without notice; whether the sale in favour of the Appellant can be brought within the purview of pendente lite, given that the arbitral award is for the recovery the Appellant is a transferee pendente lite/post arbitral award purchaser, and is barred by Or.XXI r.102, CPC from resisting the execution. Headnotes† Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or.XXI r.102 – Transferee pendente lite/post arbitral award purchaser barred by Or.XXI r.102

Subjects

Order XXI Rule 102CPCTransferee pendente litePost‑arbitral award purchaserSale without noticeSection 52 Transfer of Property ActThird‑party strangerJudgment‑debtorExecution petitionExecution of awardArbitration award enforcementSARFAESI Act

Judgment

[2026] 3 S.C.R. 113 : 2026 INSC 150

R. Savithri Naidu
v.
M/s The Cotton Corporation of India Limited
and Another
(Civil Appeal No. 1602 of 2026)
12 February 2026
[Pankaj Mithal and S.V.N. Bhatti,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration
Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the sale
in favour of the Appellant was without notice; whether the sale
in favour of the Appellant can be brought within the purview of
pendente lite, given that the arbitral award is for the recovery of
money; whether the Appellant is a transferee pendente lite/post
arbitral award purchaser, and is barred by Or.XXI r.102, CPC from
resisting the execution.

Headnotes†
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or.XXI r.102 – Transferee
pendente lite/post arbitral award purchaser barred by Or.XXI
r.102 from resisting execution – A sale agreement was entered
into between the first and second respondents for the sale
of cotton bales – On account of a dispute in recovery of
the sale price of cotton bales supplied, first respondent
raised arbitral dispute for recovery of money – Arbitrator
passed award in favour of first respondent – Challenged by
Respondent No. 2-Company, dismissed in 2013 – In 2019,
first respondent filed execution petition (EP) for executing
the award – In the meantime, a tripartite agreement was
entered into between ICICI Bank, Respondent No.2 (borrower
of ICICI Bank which initiated recovery proceedings under
SARFAESI Act for default of payment of the sums borrowed
and attached the properties of Respondent No.2) and the
Appellant-mother of the Company’s MD, resulting in a Sale
Deed in 2015 executed by Respondent No.2 in favour of the
Appellant for one of the EP Schedule Property – Executing
court ordered the conditional attachment of EP Schedule

* Author
114 [2026] 3 S.C.R.

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Property – Appellant claiming to be a third party sought
removal of the attachment order stating that through the
registered sale deed executed by Respondent No.2, she had
become the absolute owner of the EP Schedule Property –
Executing court dismissed the claim petition of the Appellant
inter alia holding that the third-party claimant took the risk
of the execution petition, and the objection is hit by r.102
of Or.XXI; revision thereagainst was also dismissed by High
Court:
Held: Impugned order upheld – The non-production of tripartite
agreement, which is the genesis for discharging the claim of ICICI
Bank, as has been rightly held by the Executing Court, shows that
the sale in favour of Appellant, even if for consideration cannot be
without notice of the existing liability of the Company/Respondent
No. 2 – The recovery proceedings under SARFAESI Act are
independent and does not give any shield of protection to other
claims against the Judgment Debtor/Borrower in default – In the
circumstances of the case, the argument that the sale in favour of
the Appellant is without notice, rejected – Appellant is a purchaser
post-arbitral award for recovery of the amount – The execution
proceeding was pending when the sale deed was entered into
between Respondent No. 2 and the Appellant – Appellant is a
transferee pendente lite/post arbitral award purchaser, and is
barred by Or.XXI r.102 from resisting the execution – Moreover,
the Appellant failed to discharge the onus on the sale being without
notice of the existing claim – The arbitral award remains unrealised
till date – Therefore, in the circumstances of this case, and by
following the ratio in Danesh, the claim petition of the Appellant
was rightly dismissed by the courts below – If the argument
of the appellant is accepted allowing pendente lite purchasers
or third parties to bypass the strict procedural safeguards and
institute separate suits or raise belated objections long after the
execution processes (like attachment and sale) have advanced,
it would completely derail the statutory machinery – Judgment-
debtors would be incentivized to systematically defeat decrees
by transferring properties or planting surrogate objectors to
initiate endless collateral litigation – Transfer of Property Act,
1882 – s.52 – Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. [Paras 10,
13, 13.1, 14]
[2026] 3 S.C.R. 115

R. Savithri Naidu v.
M/s The Cotton Corporation of India Limited and Another

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or.XXI r.102 – On facts, Appellant
is a transferee pendente lite/post arbitral award purchaser, and
is barred by Or.XXI r.102 from resisting the execution:
Held: In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the
arbitral proceeding was instituted in 1999, and the award is
dated 11.06.2001 – U/s.36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996, an arbitral award is enforceable in the same manner as if it
were a decree of a court, essentially, a deemed decree – Or.XXI
r.102 of the CPC explicitly states that the protections available
to bona fide claimants under rr.98 and 100 do not apply to a
transferee pendente lite – A transferee pendente lite is someone
to whom the property is transferred after the institution of the suit
in which the decree was passed – The suit, i.e., the arbitration
proceeding, was instituted in 1999, and the Appellant purchased
the property on account of a sale deed dated 23.04.2015 – Since
the transfer occurred after the institution of the proceedings and
the passing of the award, the Appellant is a transferee pendente
lite/post arbitral award purchaser, and is barred by Or.XXI r.102
from resisting the execution – Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996 – s.36. [Para 10]

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Order XXI:
Held: A suit may take 5 years to conclude, but its execution
takes 10 years – Or.XXI was comprehensively amended in 1976
specifically to cure this mischief, operating as a self-contained
code that strictly bars separate suits (u/s.47, rr.92(3), and 101)
and imposes rigid limitation periods for raising objections – If
the argument of the appellant is accepted allowing pendente
lite purchasers or third parties to bypass these strict procedural
safeguards and institute separate suits or raise belated objections
long after the execution processes (like attachment and sale) have
advanced, it would completely derail the statutory machinery –
Judgment-debtors would be incentivized to systematically defeat
decrees by transferring properties or planting surrogate objectors
to initiate endless collateral litigation – Consequently, execution
proceedings would not merely take 10 years, but would get trapped
in an infinite loop and practically never get completed, reducing the
hard-won decrees of competent courts to mere “paper tigers” – The
provisions in the CPC must be employed to secure actual relief,
not just a formal decree. [Paras 13, 13.1]
116 [2026] 3 S.C.R.

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Case Law Cited
Danesh Singh and Others v. Har Pyari (Dead) Thr. LRs., 2025
INSC 1434; Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram [2008] 4 SCR 1192 : (2008)
7 SCC 144 : AIR 2008 SC 1997 – relied on.
Jini Dhanrajgir v. Shibu Mathew [2023] 5 SCR 551 : (2023) 20
SCC 76 – referred to.
General Manager of the Raj Durbhunga v. Coomar Ramaput Singh
(1871-72) 14 MIA 605; 1872 SCC OnLine PC 16 – referred to.

List of Acts
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; Transfer of Property Act, 1882;
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

List of Keywords
Order XXI Rule 102, CPC; Transferee pendente lite/post arbitral
award purchaser; Transferee pendente lite/post arbitral award
purchaser barred by Order XXI Rule 102, CPC from resisting
execution; Sale was not without notice; Purchaser post-arbitral
award for recovery of the amount; Sale pendente lite; Arbitral award
for the recovery of money; Section 52, Transfer of Property Act,
1882; Third-party stranger; Judgment-debtor; Execution petition;
Execution of award.

Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1602 of
2026
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.07.2024 of the High Court
of Judicature at Madras in CRP No. 469 of 2022

Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Appellant(s):
Gopal Sankarnarayanan, Sr. Adv., Udian Sharma, Anirudh Sriram,
Manav Mitra, Ms. Harsha Sadhwani, Sahil Saraswat.
Adv. for the Respondent(s):
Ms. Sunita Singh, Abhigya Kushwah, Pradeep Kumar
Dubey, Siddharth Rajkumar Murarka, Rohan Rohatgi,
Ms. Shubhangini Rohatgi, Rohan Dewan, Rudra Deosthali,
Ms. Garima Jain.
[2026] 3 S.C.R. 117

R. Savithri Naidu v.
M/s The Cotton Corporation of India Limited and Another

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

S.V.N. Bhatti, J.

1. Leave granted.
2. M/s Lakshmi Ganesh Textiles Limited, Avinashi Road, Peelamedu,
Coimbatore/Respondent No. 2 was a Public Limited Company, and
on 30.06.2011, was incorporated as a Private Limited Company. The
Cotton Corporation of India Limited, Ramanathapuram, Coimbatore
(“CCI”)/Respondent No. 1 primarily engages in the business of sale
and purchase of cotton/cotton bales. On 22.01.1998, a sale agreement
was entered into between the first and second respondents for the
sale of cotton bales. On account of a dispute in recovery of the
sale price of cotton bales supplied under the sale agreement dated
22.01.1998, the first respondent raised an arbitral dispute in AP No.
9 of 1999 for recovery of Rs. 37,51,380/- with interest and cost. On
11.06.2001, the learned arbitrator passed an award for a sum of Rs.
26,00,572.90/- with future interest at 18% per annum and cost. On
25.09.2001, Respondent No. 2 filed AOP No. 10 of 2006 before the
Court of Principal District Judge, Coimbatore under Section 34 of
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
3. The Appellant is the mother of the Managing Director of Respondent
No. 2, wife of ex-director, and was also a non-executive director of
the Respondent No. 2/Company from 2007 to 2012.
4. On 21.01.2013, AOP 10 of 2006 was dismissed, and has become
final, since no appeal was filed by Respondent No. 2.
5. Respondent No. 2 is a borrower of ICICI Bank. For default of payment
of the sums borrowed, ICICI Bank initiated recovery proceedings on
11.11.2013 under the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial
Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (“SARFAESI
Act”) and attached the properties of Respondent No. 2. The Execution
Petition (“EP”) Schedule Properties are among the properties brought
for sale by ICICI Bank. A tripartite agreement was entered into
between ICICI Bank, Respondent No. 2 and the Appellant, resulting
in a Sale Deed dated 23.04.2015, executed by Respondent No. 2
118 [2026] 3 S.C.R.

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in favour of the Appellant. OA No. 120 of 2013, filed by ICICI Bank,
was closed pursuant to a compromise evidenced by the tripartite
agreement dated 29.12.2014.
6. On 16.07.2019, Respondent No. 1 filed EP before the Court of
Principal District Judge, Coimbatore, for executing the award dated
11.06.2001. EP was transferred to the Court of Principal District
Judge, Tirupur. On 19.08.2021, in EP No. 300 of 2019, the executing
court ordered the conditional attachment of EP Schedule Property.
The Appellant, claiming to be a third party, filed EA No. 141 of 2021
under Order XXI Rule 58 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,
praying for the removal of the attachment ordered in EP No. 300
of 2019 of the EP Schedule Property. The Appellant states that on
23.04.2015, through a registered sale deed executed by Respondent
No. 2 to the Appellant, she has become the absolute owner of the
EP Schedule Property. The sale in favour of Appellant is for valid
consideration and without notice, namely, the existing liability arising
out of the arbitral award. The EP was filed in 2019, and attachment
was effected on 19.08.2021.
6.1 On the date of attachment, the judgment-debtor is not the
owner of the property. Therefore, the attachment of the EP
Schedule and the consequent realisation steps for the sum due
under the arbitral award dated 11.06.2001 are unsustainable
and illegal. The EP schedule is, therefore, not available for
either attachment or sale by the executing court in EP No.
300 of 2019 for realisation of the arbitral award. The EP was
filed in 2019 and is therefore not maintainable against the
property purchased by the Appellant under the sale deed dated
23.04.2015. To sum up, it is alleged that the Appellant is the
absolute owner of the EP Schedule, paid consideration, and is
without knowledge of the ongoing dispute between Respondent
No. 1 and Respondent No. 2.
6.2 Respondent No. 1 alleges collusion between the Appellant
and Respondent No. 2 and brought into existence the sale
deed dated 23.04.2015. The completion of the sale under the
SARFAESI Act will not affect the right of the decree holder in
AOP No. 10 of 2006. The Appellant is a purchaser subsequent
to the arbitral award in favour of the first respondent. The
executing court recorded the claimant’s evidence and dismissed
[2026] 3 S.C.R. 119

R. Savithri Naidu v.
M/s The Cotton Corporation of India Limited and Another

the claim petition. A finding relevant to the Appellant’s claim is
that the AOP had been pending since 1999 and concluded in
2013. Respondent No. 2 is under an obligation to disclose the
award, as well as the pending AOP proceedings to the Appellant.
The tripartite agreement preceding the sale deed has not been
exhibited to establish the absence of collusion or ignorance of
ongoing proceedings. The third-party claimant has taken the
risk of the execution petition, and the objection is hit by Rule
102 of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure Code, 1908
(“CPC”). The claim petition was thus dismissed by order dated
03.01.2022. The Appellant carried the order in revision before
the High Court in CRP No. 469 of 2022. By the impugned order
dated 12.07.2024, the said revision was dismissed.
7. Hence, the appeal at the instance of the purported third-party claimant.
8. Mr. Gopal Sankaranarayanan, Senior Advocate, contends that in the
execution of the arbitral award, the property of the Judgment Debtor
can be attached and brought for sale. The Appellant is the absolute
owner under the registered document sale deed dated 23.04.2015.
The Appellant cannot be treated as a pendente lite purchaser,
inasmuch as, on the date of the purchase, neither a suit nor a legal
proceeding was pending. The arbitral award is for the recovery of
money. In other words, the subject matter of the arbitration does
not concern the EP property. From the admitted circumstances, the
Appellant is treated as an independent purchaser for consideration
without notice. Therefore, the attachment of the Appellant’s property
purchased through a sale deed dated 23.04.2015 is ex facie illegal
and liable to be set aside. The arguments have been substantially
made based on the chronology of events, as admitted by the parties.
9. Advocate Sunita Singh appearing for Respondent No. 1 argues that
the basis of the claim petition is that the purchase of Appellant is
for valid consideration and without notice. In the peculiar facts, the
plea is too broad inasmuch as the Appellant is the mother of the
Managing Director of Respondent No. 2/Company. At the time of
sale, Respondent No. 2 was a private limited company. The claim
for realisation of unpaid sale consideration for the purchase of cotton
bales from CCI has been pending since 2001, and the property
available with Respondent No. 2 is available for realisation of the
arbitral award amount, subject to the claims of other secured creditors.
120 [2026] 3 S.C.R.

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The non-production of the tripartite agreement is crucial, and the
courts below have correctly inferred that it was not produced, while
refusing to remove the attachment on the EP Schedule property.
The subject matter of the arbitral award, though not concerning the
immovable property, still is the immovable property of the judgment
debtor, which is available for realising the arbitral award. The Appellant
cannot defeat the right of the first respondent, being a post-arbitral
award purchaser. The first respondent relies on the judgment of
Madras High Court in CMSA No. 13 of 2019 dated 26.04.2021,
which has been referred to and approved by this Court in Danesh
Singh and others v. Har Pyari (Dead) Thr. LRs.1 for the proposition
that the principle of lis pendens cannot, in terms, be excluded for
money decrees.
10. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, the arbitral
proceeding was instituted in 1999, and the award is dated 11.06.2001.
Under Section 36 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, an
arbitral award is enforceable in the same manner as if it were a
decree of a court, essentially, a deemed decree. Order XXI Rule
102 of the CPC explicitly states that the protections available to
bona fide claimants under Rules 98 and 100 do not apply to a
transferee pendente lite. A transferee pendente lite is defined as
someone to whom the property is transferred after the institution of
the suit in which the decree was passed. The suit, i.e., the arbitration
proceeding, was instituted in 1999, and the Appellant purchased
the property on account of a sale deed dated 23.04.2015. Since
the transfer occurred after the institution of the proceedings and the
passing of the award, the Appellant is a transferee pendente lite/
post arbitral award purchaser, and is barred by Order XXI Rule 102
from resisting the execution. The Appellant, per contra, argues that
the Section 34 challenge was dismissed in 2013, and the sale was
in 2015, implying no litigation was pending. However, the argument
under Order XXI Rule 102 does not depend on the pendency of
the Section 34 challenge, but on the fact that the transfer occurred
after the institution of the suit in 1999, and after the arbitral award
(decree) came into existence in 2001. A judgment debtor cannot
defeat a decree by alienating the property after the decree is passed
but before the decree is realised. In other words, the steps taken

1 2025 INSC 1434.
[2026] 3 S.C.R. 121

R. Savithri Naidu v.
M/s The Cotton Corporation of India Limited and Another

defeat the very fruits of the money decree. The ratio of this Court in
Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram,2 is kept in perspective while appreciating
the claim which falls under Rule 102 of Order XXI of the CPC. The
excerpt is noted here:
“Bare reading of the Rule makes it clear that it is based
on justice, equity and good conscience. A transferee
from a judgment-debtor is presumed to be aware of the
proceedings before a court of law. He should be careful
before he purchases the property which is the subject-
matter of litigation. It recognises the doctrine of lis pendens
recognised by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act,
1882. Rule 102 of Order 21 of the Code thus takes into
account the ground reality and refuses to extend helping
hand to purchasers of property in respect of which litigation
is pending. If unfair, inequitable or undeserved protection
is afforded to a transferee pendente lite, a decree-holder
will never be able to realise the fruits of his decree. Every
time the decree-holder seeks a direction from a court to
execute the decree, the judgment-debtor or his transferee
will transfer the property and the new transferee will offer
resistance or cause obstruction. To avoid such a situation,
the Rule has been enacted.”
11. We have taken note of the rival submissions. At first glance, it appeared
to us that to realise the amount due under an arbitral award, a third
party’s property is attached. We have to arrive at an available finding
examining the record and the foremost circumstances we preface
are from 1999 till 2013, when the arbitration proceedings are pending
against Respondent No. 2. From 2014 till date, the proceedings in
execution are pending against Respondent No. 2. The EP has been
filed before the Court of Principal District Judge, Coimbatore, and was
transferred to Tirupur. The transferee court, within whose jurisdiction
the properties are situated ordered attachment for realisation of the
arbitral award dated 11.06.2001. The Appellant presents the case as
a third-party stranger. We may not hasten to conclude that there is
fraud between the Appellant and Respondent No. 2 in the transfer
of the EP Schedule Properties by sale deed dated 23.04.2015. But

2 (2008) 7 SCC 144 : AIR 2008 SC 1997.
122 [2026] 3 S.C.R.

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the non-production of tripartite agreement, which is the genesis for
discharging the claim of ICICI Bank, as has been rightly held by the
Executing Court, enables this Court to safely conclude that the sale
in favour of Appellant, even if for consideration cannot be without
notice of the existing liability of the Company/Respondent No. 2. The
recovery proceedings under SARFAESI Act are independent and
does not give any shield of protection to other claims against the
Judgment Debtor/Borrower in default. In the circumstances of the
case, we reject the argument that the sale in favour of the Appellant
is without notice.
12. The next question for consideration is whether the sale in favour
of the Appellant can be brought within the purview of pendente
lite, given that the arbitral award is for the recovery of money. The
question need not be treated as res integra; the valid reasoning of
the Madras High Court, affirmed by this court in Danesh (supra), is
a complete answer. The operative portions of the judgment:
“63. To substantiate our reasoning, we may also look into
the decision of the High Court of Madras in Annakkili v.
Murugan & Anr., reported in 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 1673,
wherein the plaintiff had filed a suit for the recovery of
money, and also sought for a direction to be given to the
judgment-debtor to furnish security for the suit claim, failing
which the court must direct that the properties mentioned
in the plaint, be attached. Before any direction could
be passed, the appellant therein purchased one of the
properties mentioned in the plaint. It was then argued that
Section 52 of the 1882 Act cannot be invoked in case of
a simple money suit. The Court held that Section 52 does
not state that it is not applicable to suits for recovery of
money, and the provision would not say so, because the
Explanation to the provision states that the pendency of
any suit continues until the suit or proceeding has been
disposed of by a final decree or order and complete
satisfaction or discharge of such decree or order has been
obtained. It was further held that the parties must not create
new rights in the property till the execution proceedings
are discharged. The Court underscored that if Section
52 was read as always excluding money suits, despite a
specific prayer in the plaint as regards the attachment of
[2026] 3 S.C.R. 123

R. Savithri Naidu v.
M/s The Cotton Corporation of India Limited and Another

the property, a decree passed therein would be rendered
meaningless, since the party would be free to alienate
the property and there would be no property available to
execute the money decree.”
13. It is a well-worn proverb in litigation, echoing the Privy Council’s
century-old observation, that the true difficulties of a litigant begin only
after they have obtained a decree.3 It is generally stated that a suit
may take 5 years to conclude, but its execution takes 10 years. Order
XXI of the CPC was comprehensively amended in 1976 specifically
to cure this mischief, operating as a self-contained code that strictly
bars separate suits (under Section 47, Rule 92(3), and Rule 101) and
imposes rigid limitation periods for raising objections. If the argument
of the appellant is accepted allowing pendente lite purchasers
or third parties to bypass these strict procedural safeguards and
institute separate suits or raise belated objections long after the
execution processes (like attachment and sale) have advanced, it
would completely derail the statutory machinery. Judgment-debtors
would be incentivized to systematically defeat decrees by transferring
properties or planting surrogate objectors to initiate endless collateral
litigation. Consequently, execution proceedings would not merely take
10 years, but would get trapped in an infinite loop and practically
never get completed, reducing the hard-won decrees of competent
courts to mere “paper tigers.”
13.1 This Court emphasized in Jini Dhanrajgir v. Shibu Mathew,4 that
winning a case is meaningless unless the winner actually gets
the relief they sought. We need a shift in mindset: the goal of
the legal system should not just be to dispose of cases, but
to ensure that the litigant enjoys the reliefs. The provisions in
the CPC must be employed to secure actual relief, not just a
formal decree. We must ensure that the legal process results
in justice not just appearing to be done, but justice actually
being done.
14. To sum up, we note that the Appellant is a purchaser post-arbitral
award for recovery of the amount. The execution proceeding was

3 General Manager of the Raj Durbhunga v. Coomar Ramaput Singh, (1871-72) 14 MIA 605; 1872 SCC
OnLine PC 16.
4 (2023) 20 SCC 76.
124 [2026] 3 S.C.R.

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pending when the sale deed was entered into between Respondent
No. 2 and the Appellant. Moreover, the Appellant failed to discharge
the onus on the sale being without notice of the existing claim.
The arbitral award remains unrealised till date. Therefore, in the
circumstances of this case, and by following the ratio in Danesh
(supra) we hold that the claim petition of the Appellant is rightly
dismissed by the courts below.
15. In the circumstances of the case and for the above reasons, we
agree with the order impugned, and the Civil Appeal fails and is
dismissed. The executing court disposes of Execution Proceedings
within two months from today.
16. No order as to costs. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.

†
Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey