Holding

An appellate authority must give a due application of mind to all factors specified in Rule 27(2); failure to do so renders the order void, and there is no absolute duty to state reasons unless the authority departs from the disciplinary findings.

Summary

The appellant, a supervisor in the Border Roads Organisation, was terminated during probation and later faced disciplinary action for desertion, resulting in removal from service under the Central Civil Services Rules. He appealed the removal to the Director-General, who dismissed the appeal without addressing the procedural requirements of Rule 27(2). The Supreme Court held that the word "consider" in Rule 27(2) requires a due application of mind to all three factors: compliance with procedure, adequacy of evidence, and adequacy of the penalty. The Court found the Director-General had only examined the adequacy of the penalty and gave no reasons, thereby violating Rule 27(2). It clarified that Article 311(2) and natural justice do not obligate the appellate authority to state reasons unless it disagrees with the disciplinary findings. Consequently, the appellate order was set aside and the Director-General was directed to rehear the appeal applying the full requirements of Rule 27(2).

Issues considered

Whether the appellate authority complied with the duty under Rule 27(2) to consider procedural compliance, evidential support, and adequacy of penalty.
Whether the appellate authority is required to give reasons in its order under Article 311(2) or principles of natural justice.
Whether the removal from service order is valid in view of alleged procedural lapses.

Legislation cited

Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965s. Rule 11, s. Rule 12, s. Rule 23, s. Rule 27(2)
Constitution of Indias. Article 311(2)

Subjects

Rule 27(2)appellate authoritydue application of minddisciplinary proceedingsArticle 311natural justicereasons in ordercivil serviceBorder Roads Organisationremoval from service

Judgment

947

R.P. BHATT

UNION OF INDIA AND ORS.
B
December 14, 1982

[A.P. SEN AND V. BALAlrRISHNA ERADI, JJ.J

The Central CM/ SerVices Classification, Control •nd Appeal) Rules 1965. C
Rule 27(2)-'Conslder'-lnterpretatlon of.

Duty of appellate authority-To con3ider releFant factorJ Set forth In
clauses (a) to (c).

Constitution of India 1950 : Article 311(2)-Disciplinary proceeding1- D
A.ppellate authority-Whether required to give reasons/or its order.

The Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules
1965 by Rule 27 casts a duty on the Appellate Authority in the case of an
appeal against an order impasing any of the penalties specified in Rule 11 to
consider: (a) whether the procedure laid down in the rules has been complied E
with: and if not, whether such non-compliance has resulted in violation of any
of the provisions of the Constiution or in the failure of justice (b) whether the
findings of the disciplinary authority are warranted by the evidence on record;
and fc) whether the penalty imposed is adequate and thereafter pass orders
confirming, enhancing etc. the penalty, or remit back the case to the authority
which imposed the same.
F
The appellant was appointed as Supervisor in the Border Roads
Organisation on probation for a period of two years. Before the expiry of the
probation period, the Chief Engineer terminated this services. The order of
termination however could not be served as the appellant abser:ted himself
without leave. He was later transferred and the Officer Commanding forwarded G
the order of termination to him. On his representation the Director-General
canceJled the order of termination on a misapprehension that the period of
probation having expired no order of termination could be made. He, however,
directed that the talcing of disciplinary action against him as a deserter since he
had absconded from service to evade service of the termination order. After a
regular departmental enquiry, he was served with a show-cause notice under
Art. 311 (2) of the Constitution and after considerati0n of his representation, the H
Chief Engineer imposed the punishment of removal from service under
Rule 12 read with Rule 11 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control
and Appeal) Rules 196S.
~48 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1985) SUPPL. S.C.R

Tho appeal under Rule 23 of the Rules preferred by the appellant was
A dismissed by the Director.General observing, that 'after thorough examination
of the facts brought out in the appeal, the punishment imposed upon the
appellant was just and in accordance with the rules'.

The writ petition having been dismissed in limine the appellant appealed
by special leave to this court.
B
Allowing the appeal

HELD : The word 'consider' in Rule 27(2) implies 'due application of
mind'. [951AJ

c In the instant case, there is no indication in the order that the Director..
General was satisfied as to whether the procedure laid down in the Rules had
been complied with. No finding has been given on the crucial question as to
whether the findings of the disciplinary authority were warranted by the
evidence on record. [951 CJ

D 2. The Director-General only applied his mind to the requirements of
clause (c) of Rules 27 (2) viz. whether the penalty imposed was adequate or
justified in the facts and circumstances of the case. Rule 27(2) casts a duty
on the appellate authority to consider the relevant factors set forth in clauses
(a), (b) and (c) thereof. [9511!]

E 3. There being non compliance with the requirements ct Rule 27(2) of
the Rules, the order passed by the Director-General is set aside. He is directed '
to dispose of the appeal afresh after applying his mind to the requirements or
Rule 27(2) of the Rules. U951E; 953EJ

4. lt is not the requirement of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution of India
or of the Rules of natural justice that in every case the appeUate authority
1hould in its order state its own reasons except where the appellate authority
disagrees with the findings of the disciplinary authority. [951FJ

State of Madras v. A.P. Srinivasan, AIR 1966 SC 1827; Som Dalt Datta v.
V.0.1. and Ors., [196912 SCR 176 and Tara Chand Khatri v, Municipal Corpora·
G tion of Delhi and OrS, AIR 1977 SC 567, referred to.

C1v1L APPELLATE JuR1so1cTION ; Civil Appeal No. 3165 of
1981.
H
From the Judgment and Order dated 20 . \ 1.198Q Qf tl\~ Delhi
High Co1,1rt iµ Writ P~tition No. 1632 of 1980.
R.P. BHATT v. UNION (Sen, J.) 949

M.K. Ramamurthy, M.A. Krishnamurthy and Miss Kut111
Bansi/al for the Appellant. A

N.C. Talukdar and M.C. Dhingra for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
B
SEN, J. The short point involved in this apeal by special leave
from a judgment and order of the Delhi High Court dated November
20, 1980 dismissing in limine the writ petition filed by the appel-
lant, is whether the appellate Order passed by the Director-General,
Border Roads Organisation dated October 14, 1980, is in conformity
with the requirements of r. 27(2) of the Central Civil Services
(Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1965 ('Rules' for short)
which have been made applicable to the personnel of the Border
Roads Organisation.
D
The facts are that the appellant was appointed as Supervisor
(Barracks & Stores) Grade I attached to 60 Road Construction
Company, General Reserve Engineering Force on probation for a
period of two years by an order dated July 7, 1976. Before the expiry
of the probationary period, the Chief Engineer (project) Dantak by
an order dated June, 24, 1978 terminated the services of appellant.
The order of termination however could not be served on the
appellant as he absented himself without leave. Thereupon, the
Officer commanding by a movement order dated June 27, 1978
transferred the appellant to 19 Border Roads Task Force. On July I, F
1978 the Officer Commanding forwarded the order of termination
issued by the Chief Engineer, but on representation by the appellant,
the Director-General, Border Roads Organisation by order dated
November 17, 1978 cancelled the order of termination presumably on
a misapprehension that the period of prob~tion having expired, no
·, order of termination could be made. He however directed the tak- G
ing of disciplinary action against the appellant as a deserter since be
bad absconded from service to evade the service of the order of
termination. After a regular departmental inquiry, the appellant was
servej with a show cause notice under Article 311 (2) of the
Constitution and after considering the representation made by him, H
the Chief Engineer (Project), Dantak imposed on the appellant
the punishment of removal from service in exercise of the powers
conferred by r. 12 read with r. I l(VIII) of the Rules with effect from
9so SUPllME COURT REPORTS i198SJ suPi>L. s.c.a.

June 10, 1980. Against the order of removal, the appellant preferred
A an appeal under r. 23 of tho Rules before the Director-General,
Border Roads Organisation. The Director-General by the impugned
order dismissed the appeal observing :

"After thorough examination of the facts brought out
B in the appeal, the DGBR is of the opinion that the punish-
ment imposed by the CE (P) DANTAK vide his Order
No. 10527 /762/EIB dated 24 June 78 was just and in
accordance to the Rules applicable. He has accordingly
rejected the appeal."
('
Having heard the parties, we are satisfied that in disposing of
the appeal the Director-General has not applied his mind to the
requirements of r. 27(2) of the Rnles, the relevant provisions of whi
read as follows :

0 "27(2). In the case of an appeal against an order '
imposing any of the panalties specified in Rule 11 or
enhancing any penalty imposed under the said Rules, the
appellate authority shall consider .

(a) whether the procednre laid down in these rules has
E been complied with and if not, whether such non-
compliance has resulted in the violation of any pro-
visions of the Constitution of India or in the failure
of justice;

F (b) whether the findings of the disciplinary authority are
warranted by the evidence on the record; and

(c) whether the penalty or the enhanced penalty imposed
is adequate, inadequate or severe;

and pass orders-

(i} confirming, enhancing, reducing or setting
aside the penalty; or

ff (ii) remitting the case to the authority which impos-
ed or enhanced the penalty or to any other
authority with such direction as it may deem fit
in the circumstances of the case."
R.P. BHATT v. UNION (Sen, J.)

- ~
The word 'consider' in rule 27 (2) implies due application of
mind'. It is clear upon the terms of r. 27(2) that the appellate
authority is required to consider (I) whether the procedure laid down
in the Rules has been complied with; and if not, whether such
non-compliance has resulted in violation of any provisions of tha
A

Constitution or in failure of justice; (2) whether the findings of the
disciplinary authority are warranted by the evidence on record; and B
(3) whether the penalty imposed is adequate; and thereafter pass
orders confirming, enhancing etc. the penalty, or may remit bacl~ the
case to the authority which imposed the same. Rule 2712) casts a
duty on the appellate authority to consider the relevant raetors set
forth in els. (a), (b) and (c) thereof.
c
There is no indication in the impugned order that the Director-
General was satisfied as to whether the procedure laid down in the
Rules bad been complied with; and if not, whether such non-
compliance had resulted in violation of any of the provisions of the
Constitution or in failure of justice. We regret to find that the D
Director-General bas also not given any finding on the crucial
question as to whether the findings of the disciplinary authority were
warranted by the evidence on record, It seems that he only applied
his mind to the requirement of cl. (c) of r. 27(2), viz. whether the
penalty imposed was adequate or justified in the facts and cirum- E
stances of the present case. There being non-compliance with the
requirements of r. 27(2) of the Rules, the impugned order passed by
the Director-General is liable to be set aside.

It is not the requirement of Art. 311(2) of the Constitution of
India or of the Rules of natural justice that in every case the appel· F
]ate authority should in its order state its own reasons except where
the appellate authority disagrees with the findings of the disciplinary
authority. In State of Madras v. A.R. Sriniva•an,(1) a Constitution
Bench repelleed the contention that the State Government's order
compulsorily retiring the delinquent from service was bad as it did
1 not give reasons for accepting the findings of the inquiring tribunal G
and observed as follows :

"Mr. Setalvad for the respondent attempted to argue
that the impugned order gives no reasons why the appel-
lant accepted the findings of the Tribunal. Disciplinary H

(I) AIR 1966 SC 1827
952. SUPREME couRt REPORTS [198SJ SUPPL. s.C.R

proceedings taken against the respondent, says Mr.
A Setalvad, are in the nature of quasi-judicial proceedings
and when the appellant passed the impugned order against -
the respondent, it was acting in a quasi-judicial character.
That being so, the appellant should have indicated some
reasons as to why it accepted the findings of the Tribunal;
B and since no reasons are given, the order should be struck
down on that ground alone.

We are not prepared to accept this argument. Jn
dealing with the question as to whether it is obligatory on
the State Government to give reasons in support of the
c order imposing a penalty on the delinquent officer, 11e
cannot overlook the fact that the disciplinary proceedings
against such a delinquent officer begin with an enquiry
conducted by an officer appointed in that behalf. That
enquiry is followed by a report and the Public Service
Commission is consulted where necessary. Having regard
D to the material which is thus made available to the State
Government and which is made available to the delinqu-
ent officer also, it seems to us somewhat unreasonable to
suggest that the State Gover,1ment must record its reasons
why it accepts the findings of the Tribunal. It is conceivable
E that if the State Government does not accept the findings
of the Tribunal which may be in favour of the delinquent
officer, and propose to imposes a penalty on the delin·
quent officer, it should give reasons why it differs from
the conclusions of the Tribunal, though even in such a
case, it is not necessary that the reasons should be detailed
or elaborate. But where the State Government agrees with
the findings of the Tribunal which are against the delinqu-
ent officer, we do not think as a matter of law, it could be
said that the State Government cannot impose the
penalty against the delinquent officer in accordance with
the findings of the Tribunal unless it gives reasons to
G show why the said findings were accepted by it. The
\

proceedings are, no doubt, quasi-judicial: but having
regard to the manner in which these enquiries are conduc-
ted, we do not think an obligation can be imposed on the
State Government to record reasons in every case.

H In Som Datta Datta v. Union of India & Ors(1), a Constitution
Bench of this court rejected the contention that the order of the Chief
(1) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 176
ii..il. BiiATI v. UNION (Sen, J.) 953
of the Army Staff confirming the proceedings of the Court-Martial
unders. 164 of the Army Act and the order of the Central A
Government dismissing the appeal of the delinquent under sec. 165 of
the Army Act were illegal and ultra vires as the did not give
reasons in support of the orders, and summed up the legal position
as follows :
B
"Apart from any requirement imposed by· the statute
or statutory rule either expressly or by necessary implica·
tion, there is no legal obligation that the statutory tribunal
should give reasons for its decision. There is also no
general principle or any rule of natural justice that a
statutory tribunal should always and in every case give c
reasons in support of its decision."

To the same effect is the decision in Tara Chand Khatri v.
Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Ors.( 1 )
D
Accordingly, the appeal must succed and is allowed. Tbe
impugned order passed by the Director-General, Border Roads
Organization is set aside and he is directed to dispose of the appeal
afresh after applying his mind to the requirements of r. 27\2) of the
Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, E
1965, with advertence to the points raised by the appellant in his
petition of leave.

There shall be no order as to costs.

N.V.K. Appeal allowed. F
(I) A.I.R. 1977 SC. 567.